Sudhir Kumar Chatterji v. Mahadeb Chakrabarti — 1947 DIGILAW 171 (CAL)

JUDGMENT G.N. Das, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the Plaintiff. The facts are that, on September 2, 1924, one Manmatha took a loan on a mortgage from Defendant No. 1. The sum advanced was Rs. 99 and carried interest at the rate of Re. 1-9 as per cent, per annum. In course of time Manmatha's heirs sold a portion of the mortgaged properties to Respondent No. 4. It is alleged that a sum of Rs. 98 was paid towards the mortgage. A mortgage suit was instituted by Respondent No. 1 against Respondents Nos. 4 to 6 and one Priyabala. On November 23, a final decree was passed on the mortgage and the mortgaged properties were subsequently sold and were purchased by Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Respondent No. 5 and Priyabala were added as parties to the mortgage suit on the allegation that they were subsequent mortgagees. On November 24, 1939, Priyabala executed a deed of release in favour of the Plaintiff Appellant. The Plaintiff Appellant instituted the present suit praying for relief that the decree in the mortgage-suit be re-opened and a new decree be passed and the amount of the new decree be made payable in certain instalments. It was further prayed that an injunction may be issued restraining Defendants Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 from proceeding with the execution case No. 208 of 1940. There was also a prayer for confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession in case Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 took possession of the mortgaged properties. There was also a prayer for declaration that Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, the purchasers at the mortgage sale, were the benamdars of Respondent No. 1, the mortgagee decree-holder On the plaint a court-fee of Re. 1 only was paid in terms of Rule 8, App. B of the Bengal Tenancy Act. An objection was raised on behalf of the mortgagee, Respondent No. 1, that the court-fee paid on the plaint was insufficient and that ad valorem Court fees should be paid. This question was heard by the learned Munsif and by his order No. 10, dated July 3, 1942 the learned Munsif held that the suit did not properly come within the purview of Section 36 of the Bengal Money-lenders Act and that, as the Plaintiff had prayed for recovery of possession on declaration that Respondents Nos. This question was heard by the learned Munsif and by his order No. 10, dated July 3, 1942 the learned Munsif held that the suit did not properly come within the purview of Section 36 of the Bengal Money-lenders Act and that, as the Plaintiff had prayed for recovery of possession on declaration that Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were benamdars of Respondent No. 1, ad valorem court-fee on the value of the property was payable. The learned Munsif, accordingly, raised the valuation of the suit to Rs. 250 and directed the Plaintiff Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees on the plaint by July 10, 1942. The deficit court-fees on the plaint, not having been put in, the learned Munsif, by his order No. 11, dated July 10, 1942, directed that the plaint be rejected. Against the said order No. 11, dated July 10, 1942, the Plaintiff preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court. The appeal was presented on August 17, 1942 and was classed by the Plaintiff Appellant as Miscellaneous Appeal. Court-fee of Re. 1 was paid on the memorandum of appeal. The certified copy of order No. 11, dated July 10, 1942, only was annexed to the memorandum of appeal. The sheristddar submitted a report that ad valorem court-fees was payable. On August 25, 1942, the learned District Judge directed the appeal to be registered as Title Appeal No. 126 of 1942 and a perusal of the office report directed the Appellant to file the deficit court-fees of Rs. 27-2 also the process fees Rs. 3 and written up processes and certified copy of the Munsif's order, dated July 3, 1942, within a week. The Appellant was directed to take necessary steps for correction of the memorandum of appeal in the meantime. The appeal was directed to be put up on the 1st of September for orders. 2. On September 1, 1942, the Plaintiff Appellant took no steps; his pleader could not be found. The learned District Judge thereupon directed by order No. 2, dated September 1, 1942, that the memorandum of appeal be rejected. Against that order the Plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 3. This appeal was heard in part on July 4, 1947. As the appeal involved questions concerning the amount of court-fees payable, a notice was issued on the learned Senior Government Pleader to appear in this case. Mr. Against that order the Plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 3. This appeal was heard in part on July 4, 1947. As the appeal involved questions concerning the amount of court-fees payable, a notice was issued on the learned Senior Government Pleader to appear in this case. Mr. Imam Hossain Chowdhury, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appeared at the time of the hearing of this appeal. 4. Mr. Purushottam Chatterji, appearing for Respondent No. 1, raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was incompetent, inasmuch as it was directed against an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal. In the alternative he argued that, as the order complained of was passed in the absence of the Appellant, it was an order of dismissal for default and no appeal lay against the order. Mr. Chatterjee relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandra Mala (1981) ILR 59 Cal. 388. In that case it was held that the rejection of a memorandum of appeal on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped does not amount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was pointed out by Suhrawardy J. that Section 107(2) of the CPC no doubt invests the appellate Court with the same powers as are conferred on a Court of original jurisdiction, but it does not purport to give the order passed by the appellate Court the same effect as an order passed by an original Court of a like nature. The facts of that case are, however, entirely different. In that case a decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 6 of the CPC was passed on December 23, 1930. An application for amendment of the decree was rejected by the trial Court; against the order rejecting the application a petition u/s 115 of the CPC was moved in this Court, but was rejected on December 5, 1930. On December 23, 1930, an appeal was filed before the District Judge against the personal decree with a court-fee stamp of Re. 1 only. The lower appellate Court thought that ad valorem court-fee was payable and directed the Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees within a certain time. The court-fees called for, not having been paid within the time fixed, the lower appellate Court rejected the memorandum of appeal by an order dated January 7, 1931. 1 only. The lower appellate Court thought that ad valorem court-fee was payable and directed the Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees within a certain time. The court-fees called for, not having been paid within the time fixed, the lower appellate Court rejected the memorandum of appeal by an order dated January 7, 1931. this Court held that the appeal against the order of the lower appellate Court rejecting the memorandum of appeal was incompetent. 5. In this case, however, the trial Court has rejected the plaint; the order of rejection of the plaint by the trial Court is a decree u/s 2, Clause (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure; as such the order of the trial Court is open to a Second Appeal. This view is fully supported by the decision of this Court in the case of Annapurna Dassi v. Sarat Chandra Bhattacharji (1934) 38 C.W.N. 1063. 6. Mr. Chatterji next relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Charu Sheela Dasee v. Abhi Lash Bauri ILR (1937) 1 Cal. 103. In that case the landlord Appellant, Sm. Charu Sheela Dasee, had filed three applications u/s 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act Issues were raised u/s 105A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Court-tee of as. 12 was paid on each application and additional court-fee of RS. 20 was put in ,for issues raised u/s 105A. The Revenue Officer dismissed the applications filed by the landlord. Against the order of dismissal appeals were taken to the Special Judge. The Special Judge was of opinion that ad valorem court-fee was payable on the ground that the case really came within Section 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Time was granted to put in the deficit court-fees. This was not done within the time granted, with the result that the appeals were dismissed by the Special Judge. Against the order of Special Judge, a Second Appeal was preferred to this Court. It was objected on behalf of the Respondent that the appeals were incompetent. Nasim Ali J. delivering the judgment of the Court held that, though the orders of the Special Judge were orders of dismissal of the appeals, strictly speaking, those orders were made for nonpayment of the deficit court-fees and must be regarded as orders rejecting the memorandum of appeals. Nasim Ali J. delivering the judgment of the Court held that, though the orders of the Special Judge were orders of dismissal of the appeals, strictly speaking, those orders were made for nonpayment of the deficit court-fees and must be regarded as orders rejecting the memorandum of appeals. Relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Janandasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandra Mala (supra), it was held that the appeals to this Court were incompetent. 7. The next case to which the reference has been made is the case of Abdul Majid Mridha v. Amina Khatun ILR (1042) 2 Cal. 253. In this case an ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage was passed by the trial Court. Against the ex parte decree an appeal was filed before the District Judge by the Defendant on payment of a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15. The learned District Judge held that ad valorem court-fee was payable u/s 7, Clause iv(c) of the Court-fees Act and as the suit had been valued at Rs. 1,100, the learned District Judge directed the Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees. Such court-fees, not having been paid, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. Against the order of the appellate Court, a Second Appeal was taken to this Court. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Respondent that the appeal was incompetent, first, on the ground that it was an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal and was not appealable on the authority of the cases of Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandra Mala (supra) and of Charu Sheela Dasee v. Abhi Lash Bauri (supra) and secondly, on the ground that the order of the appellate Court being one of dismissal for non-prosecution was really one of dismissal of the appeal for default and had not the force of a decree under Order II, Rule 2, CPC and was not appealable. In dealing with the first part of the preliminary objection Biswas J. observed that it was doubtful how far the cases cited might be regarded as covering the point which was then before the Court. In dealing with the first part of the preliminary objection Biswas J. observed that it was doubtful how far the cases cited might be regarded as covering the point which was then before the Court. His Lordship observed that the dismissal of the appeal, for non-prosecution could not be regarded as an order of dismissal for default u/s 2(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, because there was no provision either in the CPC or in the Court-fees Act for dismissal of an appeal for default for non-payment of court-fees. After referring to Order VII, Rule 11 and Section 107(2) of the CPC and Section 8B(3) and Section 12(ii)(b) of the Court-fees Act his Lordship observed at p. 258 as follows: I see no reason, therefore, why such a decision involving the dismissal of a suit or an appeal under the Court-fees Act should not be held to be appealable as a decree. In my opinion, it should be wholly immaterial that the appeal is directed, not against the adjudication itself, but against the consequent order of dismissal. 8. These observations support the Appellant, but on the facts of this case, it is not necessary for me to consider the contention of Mr. Chatterji that the observations made by his Lordship are opposed to the decisions in Csaru Sheela Dasee's case and the terms of Section 6 of the Court-fees Act, as now amended. In the present case, the order of the trial Court had the force of a decree and therefore, a Second Appeal lies u/s 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the authority of the decision in Annapurna Dassi v. Sarat Chandra Bhattacharji, already referred to. 9. Reference was also made to the case of Jariman Khatun v. Secretary of State for India in Council ILR (1940) 2 Cal. 166. In that case the trial Court, after enquiry u/s 8C of the Court-fees Act directed the Plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fees and on the Plaintiff's failure to do so, rejected the plaint. R.C. Mitter J. observed that the proper order to pass was not to reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but to dismiss the suit u/s 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act; it was held that the appeal to this Court was competent. R.C. Mitter J. observed that the proper order to pass was not to reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but to dismiss the suit u/s 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act; it was held that the appeal to this Court was competent. This case, in my opinion, has no bearing on the question now in controversy, because in that case whether the order of the trial Court amounted to a rejection of the plaint or a dismissal of the suit, in either event an appeal lay to this Court. 10. The preliminary objection raised must, therefore, be overruled. 11. I shall now consider the merits of the appeal. The lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal for non-compliance with the directions given by it on August 25, 1942. In so far as the direction required the Appellant to file a certified copy of the order of the Munsif dated July 3, 1942, in my opinion the direction is not proper. The appeal was filed against the final order rejecting the plaint, which was passed on July 10, 1942. A certified copy of that order had been appended to the memorandum of appeal filed in the lower appellate Court. The other ground on which the lower appellate Court rejected the memorandum of appeal was non-payment of the deficit court-fees which was directed to be paid by the Appellant. 12. This brings me to a discussion of the question whether the proper order to pass was one for rejection of the memorandum of appeal or for dismissal of the memorandum of appeal for default. The Court-fees Act was amended in Bengal by the Court-fees (Bengal Third Amendment) Act, 1935 (Ben. I of 1936). Section 6(2) of the Act reads as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) or in any other Act, a Court may receive a plaint or memorandum of appeal in respect of which an insufficient fee has been paid, subject to the condition that the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be rejected unless the Plaintiff or Appellant, as the case may be, pays to the Court within a time to be fixed by the Court such reasonable sum on account of court-fees as the Court may direct. 13. 13. This sub-section, therefore, empowers the appellate Court, after the memorandum of appeal has been filed, to direct the Appellant to pay such court-fees as seem reasonable to the appellate Court and in default to reject the memorandum of appeal. What sum would be regarded as reasonable fees must at that stage, be determined by the appellate Court ex parte, on the materials available to that Court. In the present case, the sheristadar had called for the records of the trial Court and on perusal of the same had reported that the deficit court-fee of Rs. 27-2 was payable. The learned District Judge accepted the office report and made an order for payment of such deficit court fees and in default of payment of such court-fees, rejected the memorandum of appeal. Such a procedure is amply supported by Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Court-fees Act. Section 8B of the Court-fees Act contemplates a later stage. Section 8B as amended in 1936 is as follows: (1) In every suit in which a court-fee is payable under this Act on the plaint or memorandum of appeal the Court shall, on the date fixed for the appearance of the opposite party or as soon as may be thereafter and in every case before proceeding to deliver judgment, record a finding whether a sufficient court-fee has been paid. (2) If the Court records a finding that an insufficient court-fee has been paid on the plaint or memorandum of appeal the Court shall-- (a) stay all further proceedings in the suit until it has determined the proper amount of such court-fee payable and the Plaintiff or the Appellant, as the case may be, has paid such amount or until the date referred to in Clause (6), as the case may be. Provided that if the Plaintiff or Appellant gives, within such time as the Court may allow, security, to the satisfaction of the Court, for the payment of any additional amount for which he may be found liable the Court may proceed with the suit, (b) fix a date before which the Plaintiff or Appellant shall pay the amount of court-fee due from him, as determined by the Court under Clause (a). (3) If the Plaintiff or Appellant fails to give the security referred to in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) or to pay the amount referred to in Clause (6) of that sub-section within the tune allowed, or before the date fixed, by the Court, as the case may be, the suit shall be dismissed. 14. Section 2(4) defines a suit as including an appeal from a decree except in Section 8A. 15. The effect of the amendment is that the appellate Court will first determine ex parte a reasonable sum to be paid as court-fees. If this sum is paid, the appeal is registered and further proceedings in appeal follow. A notice to the Respondent would then issue after such notice has been served, either on the date of appearance of the Respondent or on any subsequent date, but, before delivering the judgment, the lower appellate Court will hear the parties and record its finding as to the amount of court-fees properly payable on the memorandum of appeal. The Court will then give the Appellant time to furnish security for such court-fees if the Appellant is not in a position to pay the due court-fees all at once. If such security is furnished, the appeal will proceed, but, before the appeal is taken up for hearing, the Court will direct the Appellant to put in the deficit court-fees. In default of furnishing security or of payment of the court-fees, the Court will dismiss the appeal u/s 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act. The Court-fees Act clearly contemplates two stages so far as payment of court-fees is concerned. In the first stage, failure to pay the reasonable court-fees entails a rejection of the memorandum of appeal and at the later stage failure as aforesaid entails a dismissal of the appeal. In my opinion, the lower appellate Court was right in rejecting the memorandum of appeal for non-payment of court-fees. It was urged that the lower appellate Court should have dismissed the appeal for default as the Appellants or his pleader did not appear before the Court. This contention has no force and is opposed to the decision in the case of Abdul Majid Mridha v. Amina Khatun to which I have already referred. The same view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mirza Mohammad Anwarul Ashan v. Naznin Begam A.I.R (1947) (All) 34. This contention has no force and is opposed to the decision in the case of Abdul Majid Mridha v. Amina Khatun to which I have already referred. The same view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mirza Mohammad Anwarul Ashan v. Naznin Begam A.I.R (1947) (All) 34. In that case, the Inspector of Stamps, on inspection of the records, made a report to the Court that the court-fee paid was insufficient. On that report, the Court recorded a finding that a sum of Rs. 785 was to be paid as additional court-fees on the plaint. The Plaintiff furnished security for this sum and the suit proceeded in due course. Before the hearing had commenced an application was made for amendment of the plaint. The Court granted the amendment and came to a finding as to the amount of court-fee to be paid and directed the Plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fees before the final hearing. The court-fee called for was not paid within the time allowed by the Court; the Court then passed an order u/s 6(3) of the Court-fees Act as amended by the. United Provinces Legislature and directed the suit to be dismissed. Thereafter, the Plaintiff made an application under Order IX, Rule 9 Code of Civil Procedure, on the footing that the order dismissing the suit u/s 6(3) of the Court-fees Act was really a dismissal of the suit for default and the application which was filed under Order IX, Rule 9 was competent. The application was dismissed by the trial Court. An appeal was taken to the lower appellate Court. The Respondent raised a preliminary objection that the dismissal could not be regarded as one under Order IX, Rule 8 and therefore, Order IX, Rule 9 did not apply and the appeal was incompetent. Verma and Bind Basni Prasad JJ. concurred in holding that the order of the trial Court, which was passed u/s 6(3) of the Court-fees Act, was justified by the terms of the Court-fees Act and could not be regarded as dismissal of the suit for default. Verma and Bind Basni Prasad JJ. concurred in holding that the order of the trial Court, which was passed u/s 6(3) of the Court-fees Act, was justified by the terms of the Court-fees Act and could not be regarded as dismissal of the suit for default. It was pointed out that the dismissal was occasioned not by the failure on the part of the Plaintiff to appear when the case was called on for hearing, but was brought about by a failure on the part of the Plaintiff to make good the deficit court-fees for which the Court had granted time. Bind Basni Prasad J. further observed that Section 6(3) of the Court-fees Act and Order IX, Rule 8 of the CPC contemplate different stages of the suit. Section 6(3) of the Court-fees Act refers to the earlier stage of the suit when the plaint is presented. Order IX, Rule 8 of the CPC contemplates a later stage after the suit had been registered and a date for hearing of the suit had been fixed and then default was made by the Plaintiff in appearance. 16. Having regard to the principles discussed above, it cannot be said that the lower appellate Court should have dismissed the memorandum of appeal for default and was not right in rejecting the memorandum of appeal. 17. This brings me to a consideration of the question as to tie amount of court-fees payable on the memorandum of appeal and on the plaint. To decide this question it is necessary to consider whether the suit can be regarded as a suit u/s 36(1) of the Bengal Money-lenders Act. Mr. Chatterji appearing for the Respondent argues that the Plaintiff had prayed for a declaration that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, the auction-purchasers, are benamdars for the decree-holder Defendant No. 1; such a prayer was outside the scope of a suit u/s 36(2) of the Bengal Moneylenders Act. He also argues that the prayer for confirmation of possession and in the alternative, for recovery of possession is outside the scope of a suit u/s 36(2) of the Bengal Moneylenders Act. It is true that the plaint is not happily drawn. The substance of the matter is that the Plaintiff was seeking to re-open the mortgage decree and for the passing of a new decree to be paid in certain instalments. It is true that the plaint is not happily drawn. The substance of the matter is that the Plaintiff was seeking to re-open the mortgage decree and for the passing of a new decree to be paid in certain instalments. The prayer which was couched for one for recovery of possession was really intended to be a prayer for restoration of possession u/s 36(2)(c) of the Bengal Moneylenders Act. The prayer for declaration that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are benamdars of Defendant No. 1 was redundant in this case. The plaint alleged that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were benamdars of Defendant No. 1 and the purchase at the mortgage sale was really made by the mortgagee decree-holder, Defendant No. 1. The allegation was made with a view to get an order for restoration of possession on the ground that the possession of the mortgaged properties was really with Defendant No. 1, the decree-holder and not with stranger auction-purchaser (Defendants Nos. 2 and 3) they being his benamdars. In my opinion, the joinder of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 is permissible to decide this question. See Mohendro Chandra Ganguli v. Ashutosh Ganguli (1893) ILR 20 Cal. 762 (765). Substantially the plaint was one u/s 36(1) of the Bengal Money-lenders Act under Article 8 of App. B of the Bengal Moneylenders Act. The court-fee of Re. 1 was properly paid on the plaint; ad valorem, court-fee was not required to be paid. The Munsif was not right in rejecting the plaint on this ground. This, however, does not clear the way for the Plaintiff's success in this suit. The Plaintiff had filed an appeal against the order of rejection of the plaint, which had the form of a decree. It has been held by this Court that on a memorandum of appeal filed against an order passed under the Bengal Money-lenders Act court-fees are payable not in terms of Article 8 or 9, App. B, Bengal Money-lenders Act, but under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court-fees Act: see the case of Kshitish Chandra Maitra v. Satish Chandra Ghosh ILR (1942) 2 Cal. 131. In that case the decree had been re-opened by the trial Court, but not to the extent desired by the borrower. The borrower preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court was of opinion that ad valorem court-fee was payable. 131. In that case the decree had been re-opened by the trial Court, but not to the extent desired by the borrower. The borrower preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court was of opinion that ad valorem court-fee was payable. Against the order of the lower appellate Court an application in revision was taken to this Court. It was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that Articles 8 and 9 of App. B would apply,' the word "suit" having been defined in the Act as including an appeal. This contention was negatived by Mukherjea J., who held that the proper Article to govern the case was Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court-fees Act and ad valorem court-fee was payable, the sum payable being dependent on the subject matter of the appeal. This view was affirmed in the case of Pran Hari Baidya v. Jogesh Chandra Chowdhury 1942 46 C.W.N. 681. The question was again considered on a reference, under the Stamp Act by Akram J. in the case of Hrishi Kesh Mukherji v. Jagadish Chandra Ray Chaudhuri ILR (1945) 2 Cal. 509. In that case the decree-holder auction-purchaser had assigned his rights to a stranger. An appeal was filed by the assignee against the order of the Court below directing the restoration of possession of the auction-purchased properties. The amount payable under the decree was not, however, challenged. It was held that the Court-fees on the memorandum of appeal would be payable on the value of the property under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court-fees Act and in any event, such a value cannot be less than the price paid by the auction-purchaser for the property purchased by him. 18. The position, therefore, is that the memorandum of appeal before the lower appellate Court should have been stamped with court-fees payable on the value of the subject-matter of the appeal. The Plaintiff had prayed for re-opening the decree and for restoration of possession of the mortgaged properties. In case the suit succeeded he would get back possession of the mortgaged properties, in case he was out of possession; but he would have to pay the amount of the new decree in certain installments. The prayer for restoration of possession is ancillary and is dependent on the prayer for re-opening the decree. In case the suit succeeded he would get back possession of the mortgaged properties, in case he was out of possession; but he would have to pay the amount of the new decree in certain installments. The prayer for restoration of possession is ancillary and is dependent on the prayer for re-opening the decree. The learned Munsif had found that the value of the mortgaged properties is Rs. 250. Assuming that this is a correct value of the property, this does not correctly represent the value of the subject-matter of the appeal. A further enquiry u/s 8C of the Court-fees Act would be necessary. 19. The question then arises as to the form of the order to be passed in this appeal. In the case of Tara Prasanna Chongdar v. Nrishingha Moorari Pal (1923) ILR Cal. 216 this Court made an order requiring the Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees on the memorandum of appeal and the plaint respectively in this Court and in the trial Court and directed the payment to be made within a certain time. In a later case of Nalini Nath Mallick Thakur v. Radha Shyam Marwari ILR (1940) 1 Cal. 409, which was a Second Appeal pending in this Court, Edgley J. held that the Plaintiff had paid deficit court-fees in the trial Court, the Defendant who was the Appellant in the lower appellate Court and in this Court had paid deficit court-fees in the lower appellate Court and in this Court. In order to adjust the rights of the parties in the matter of payment of court-fees, his Lordship directed the trial Court to make an enquiry u/s 8C of the Court-fees Act as regards the amount of court-fees payable. His Lordship directed the case to be retained on the file of this Court and the appeal to be put up for further orders on receipt of the report of the trial Court u/s 8C of the Court-fees Act. Such a procedure if adopted, would mean that the case will remain on file for the enquiry to be directed under 80 of the Court-fees Act. The subject-matter in dispute is not of much value. The learned advocates appearing on behalf of the parties have agreed that the subject-matter of appeal may be valued at Rs. 100 and the court-fees payable would be Rs. 11-4. The Appellant has paid Re. The subject-matter in dispute is not of much value. The learned advocates appearing on behalf of the parties have agreed that the subject-matter of appeal may be valued at Rs. 100 and the court-fees payable would be Rs. 11-4. The Appellant has paid Re. 1 as court-fee in this Court and in the lower appellate Court. An additional court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate Court and in this Court in the aggregate would be Rs. 20-8. This sum must be paid within four weeks from this date. If this sum is paid within the time so limited, this appeal will be allowed, the order of rejection of the memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate Court and the order of rejection of the plaint by the trial Court would be set aside and this case remitted to the trial Court for disposal of the suit on the footing that the proper court-fees had been paid on the plaint. If the above sum is not deposited within the time aforesaid, this appeal will stand dismissed. 20. There will be no order for costs either in this Court or in the lower appellate Court. 21. No further order is necessary on the office report.