Research › Browse › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

1947 DIGILAW 172 (CAL)

D. A. Langley v. L. J. Langley

1947-08-08

body1947
JUDGMENT Ormond, J. - This is a Chamber application on the part of the Petitioner , the wife, for directions that her own evidence in the suit may be taken on affidavit instead of orally as a witness before the Court. The suit has been filed under the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts of 1926 and 1940. In the petition it is stated that the parties were married at Cawnpore in India on December 14, 1927, that the Respondent is domiciled in England and I am informed by Mr. Leslie appearing for the Petitioner , that, at the time of the marriage, the Respondent was a Civilian; that thereafter, being of English domicile, though resident in India, he was called up for military service and served in the ranks in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, and as I understand, he is still a Captain in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. 2. The grounds on which the petition for divorce proceeds are confined to the single one of desertion for a period of more than three years which, under the existing statute, is in itself sufficient to entitle the wife to a decree for dissolution of marriage. The Petitioner has stated in her present petition filed on her behalf by her attorney that she is at present residing at Naini Tal in the United Provinces together with two children of the marriage, a daughter now aged approximately 17 years and a son aged approximately 15 years. 3. It is stated that she is not in a position to make the journey from Naini Tal to Calcutta in order to give evidence in this case. Among the reasons given for such inability are the following that her daughter has been admitted to hospital in Naini Tal for a serious operation and the Petitioner has to remain with her daughter there; that the Petitioner is receiving no financial support from her husband. As has been stated to me by her attorney, she is not in any employment; and her husband now being in Singapore she has no means to meet the costs of the combined motor and rail journey to Calcutta and the necessary stay in Calcutta for two days or more. As has been stated to me by her attorney, she is not in any employment; and her husband now being in Singapore she has no means to meet the costs of the combined motor and rail journey to Calcutta and the necessary stay in Calcutta for two days or more. Furthermore, that she is apprehensive of her safety in making this journey by herself; and it is not possible for her to arrange for any one to come with her. 4. There is no other evidence on which she seeks to rely for her suit except her own evidence. In ordinary circumstances and on general principles, the Court would be averse to giving any directions for a Petitioner , who has filed a petition in this Court, to avoid coming and giving evidence in the ordinary way as a witness before the learned Judge dealing with the matter in her own case, she having chosen her own forum. 5. In the case, however, on the facts, there appears to me reasonable ground why she should be permitted to furnish her evidence on affidavit only. It will be seen from her petition that the sole matter and the only circumstances necessary for her to establish are that her husband had deserted her for a period of more than three years prior to the institution of the suit. The suit was instituted on February 21, 1947. It will be seen from her petition that the sole matter and the only circumstances necessary for her to establish are that her husband had deserted her for a period of more than three years prior to the institution of the suit. The suit was instituted on February 21, 1947. Therefore, the desertion to be established is a period of three years from and after February 24, 194C Her case as pleaded in her petition for dissolution of marriage is that the circumstances and conduct of the Respondent show that this is not merely a case where the parties have been separated through reasons of the war or military service of the Respondent, such as is of course in many instances inevitable and such as cannot be said to constitute desertion in the matrimonial sense of any kind; but that the Respondent at a time when he was in non-combatant service and in an ordinary town in ordinary peaceful conditions within India, that is to say, Agra, not only took no steps to arrange, as he could easily have done, for his wife and family to live at his own station or at a station sufficiently near to which he could proceed during his leave, but that he has by his conduct in consorting with another woman and refusing to maintain his wife and refusing to have anything to do with her, made it clear that he has on the facts deserted her, so as to constitute desertion in the matrimonial sense. For the proof of these facts, the Petitioner relies on letters, which are referred to in her petition, from the Respondent to herself. I am informed by Mr. Leslie that it is expected that the letters themselves will afford conclusive proof of the desertion without other evidence. Since the first letter is one dated in August, 1943, well before the statutory period of three years over which desertion has to be shown and the other principal letter is one of February 26, 1945, during the currency of that period, this may well be so. 6. Since the first letter is one dated in August, 1943, well before the statutory period of three years over which desertion has to be shown and the other principal letter is one of February 26, 1945, during the currency of that period, this may well be so. 6. If this should be found to be the position, it follows that there may be little or no necessity for the learned Judge dealing with the case to see the Petitioner in the witness box in order to form his own opinion as to the genuineness of her case or as to her reliability as a witness. In these circumstances, on the merits of the matter, I find myself disposed to grant the application to allow her evidence to be given on affidavit. It only remains for me to refer to the provisions of the relevant statutes and rules in order to arrive at a final conclusion whether or not it is open to me sitting here as a Matrimonial Court to take this course. 7. As is well known, broadly speaking, for suits under the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act provision is made for the principles current under the English law in England to govern the case so far as it concerns substantive questions of law affecting the right to relief between the parties. On the other hand, for matters solely of procedure, there are statutory provisions in the main, making the current regulations of Indian-procedure, such as are followed in Courts in India, applicable to the proceedings. There are also certain provisions which have the effect that, when there is no provision contained in the body of law primarily governing the case, then recourse may be, had to the secondary body of law of the other country. Section 1 of the Indian and Colonial Divorce. Jurisdiction Acts is to the above mentioned effect, giving jurisdiction to Indian, Courts to make decrees of dissolution of marriage between the parties domiciled in England and providing that the grounds on which such a decree may be granted shall be those according to the law for the time being in force in England and that the Courts in India should act and give relief on principles and rules as nearly as may be conformable to those on which Courts in England act and give relief. 8. 8. Under the Indian (Non-domiciled Parties) Divorce Rules, 1927, operating in this High Court, to be found at p. 784 of the fourth edition of the Rules of this Court on the Original Side under the heading "Procedure Generally", it is provided as follows: 24. Subject to the provisions of these Rules all proceedings under the Act between party and party shall be regulated by the Indian Divorce Act and the rules made thereunder. 9. There is, as I understand, nothing in the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts themselves or in the Indian (Non-domiciled Parties) Divorce Rules, 1927, themselves which is inconsistent with or a bar to evidence being furnished to the Court in such a case as this on affidavit only. u/s 51 of the Indian Divorce Act there is an express and definite provision making it open for a Court to allow the parties "to verify "their respective cases in whole or in part by affidavit." There are provisions in that section concerning the right of the opposite party to cross-examine the deponent in respect of the affidavit; but where, as in the present case, the suit is undefended, those further considerations hardly arise. In addition to the rules made for this Court, to which I have already referred, under the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts, further rules have also been framed under the Indian Divorce Act. Of these is Rule 17 at p. 571 of the fourth edition of the Rules of this Court under the heading "Evidence taken by affidavit" certain provisions are made in regard to the time within which affidavits should ordinarily be filed and in regard to arrangement for cross-examination of the deponent. As already mentioned, the question of cross-examination in this case, which is undefended, does not appear to arise. 10. Mr. Leslie has referred me to a certified copy of an unreported judgment in an undefended divorce case Mott v. Mott decided in the Lahore High Court, being Matrimonial Case No. 13 of 1947, in which the Petitioner 's evidence, though the Petitioner was himself in India, was allowed to be taken on affidavit. In that instance the case had, been instituted in the Lahore High Court and the Petitioner was in Assam. He was allowed, principally for reasons of expense to give his evidence on affidavit without making the journey to Lahore. 11. In that instance the case had, been instituted in the Lahore High Court and the Petitioner was in Assam. He was allowed, principally for reasons of expense to give his evidence on affidavit without making the journey to Lahore. 11. In my view, therefore, the provisions to which I have referred for the taking of evidence on affidavit contained in the Indian Divorce Act and the rules thereunder, being matters affecting the procedure, may be relied on by the Petitioner in this case, even though it is a suit filed under the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts, in view of the attraction in the Indian provisions to which I have referred to the English Act. Had it been correct, on the other hand, to take the view that this is a matter which should be governed by the current provisions of law obtaining in England, then there is, in my view, dearly sufficient scope for the taking of evidence on affidavit in such a case, as the present this is provided by Rule 25 of the Statutory Rules and Orders known as the Matrimonial Cases Rules, 1947, which have been passed in England to govern proceedings in English Courts. 12. Having regard to the above considerations, I propose to make the following order: that the Petitioner be at liberty to furnish her evidence on affidavit without the necessity of coming to Calcutta and giving evidence in this Court in the first instance but that it will be reserved for the exercise of the discretion of the learned Judge, who comes to hear the case, whether when such affidavit is before him, he considers it necessary that oral evidence of the Petitioner should nevertheless be furnished. On the materials at present before me, it would appear that there may be no necessity for the Court dealing with the matter to go into any consideration for which a view of the demeanor of the witness in the witness box in person might be necessary. I am not, however, to-day in a position fully to foresee what facts may be stated in the affidavit. I am not, however, to-day in a position fully to foresee what facts may be stated in the affidavit. I think it only right, therefore that I should not make any final order dispensing finally with the necessity of the Petitioner coming to give evidence, but that I should leave this for the exercise of the discretion of the learned Judge dealing with the matter after the affidavit has been furnished. The application is allowed as indicated above. I make the usual order that the Respondent should pay the Petitioner 's costs of the application. The suit itself is adjourned till the next matrimonial date, provided it is not earlier than the 32nd of August.