JUDGMENT S.R. Das, J. - This is an attorney's suit for the recovery of the balance of his taxed costs. 2. The plaintiff acted as the attorney for the present defendant in suit No. 891 of 1931. That suit was filed in this Court on 25-4-1931 by the defendant as the administrator to the estate of his mother Sm. Madhab Mohini Dassi, deceased against the executors of his father Gopal Chandra Sinha, deceased, who was during his lifetime the executor of the deceased lady. That suit was for the recovery of several government promissory notes, jewellery, ornaments and other properties belonging to the deceased lady and alleged to have been retained by the said executors and also for administration, if necessary, of the estate of the said Gopal Chandra Sinha. The defendant retained and employed the plaintiff, who is a practising attorney of this Court, as his attorney to act for him in that suit. The warrant of attorney executed by the defendant on 24-4-1931 is Ex. E in this suit. The said warrant of attorney was duly filed in Court in that suit and the plaintiff acted as the attorney for the defendant throughout that suit under that warrant of attorney. 3. By the preliminary decree made in that suit on 1-6-1933 the defendant was declared entitled to government promissory notes of the face value of Rs. 25,000, Port Trust Debentures of the face value of Rs. 3,000 and to a sum of Rs. 24,135 with interest thereon and the costs of the said suit and a reference was directed to take certain accounts and make certain enquiries for the purpose of ascertaining what further sums, if any, were due from the estate of Gopal Chandra Sinha to the estate of Sm. Madhab Mohini Dassi. 4. The plaintiff duly lodged his bills of costs of that suit upto the said preliminary decree and under some orders made in that suit prior thereto and the same were taxed upon notice to the defendant and allocatures were issued in favour of the plaintiff. The party and party portions of the said taxed costs with interest thereon were realised by the plaintiff from the executor defendants in that suit but the sums of Rs. 149-7-6 and Rs. 1752-2-0 allowed as costs as between attorney and client and Rs. 357-0-6 being the amount double crossed upto the preliminary decree remained unpaid. 5. The party and party portions of the said taxed costs with interest thereon were realised by the plaintiff from the executor defendants in that suit but the sums of Rs. 149-7-6 and Rs. 1752-2-0 allowed as costs as between attorney and client and Rs. 357-0-6 being the amount double crossed upto the preliminary decree remained unpaid. 5. Pursuant to the preliminary decree the Assistant Referee of this Court took up the reference and after a protracted hearing made his report on 7-11-1938. By that report the Assistant Referee found and certified that a sum exceeding Rs. 31,000 was still due from the estate of Gopal Chandra Sinha to the estate of Sm. Madhab Mohini Dassi and he recommended that the costs of the reference certified for counsel should be paid by the executor defendants in that suit to the plaintiff therein i.e., the present defendant. 6. Exceptions were taken to the report by both parties in that suit and after the exceptions had been heard for some days the parties thereto arrived at certain terms of settlement. On 25-8-1941 a final decree was passed in that suit in accordance with those terms of settlement which were ordered to be carried out. The terms of settlement embodied in that final decree (Ex. F) were as follows: (1) Both the exceptions now pending shall be discharged and the Report of the Assistant Referee is hereby confirmed including the costs recommended by him. (2) The Executor defendants shall get the costs of this suit and also of the Reference and exceptions as of a hearing and also of the costs of the suit No. 1084 of 1931 (Sadasiv Mitter v. Purna Chandra Sinha) out of the estate of Gopal Chandra Sinha to be taxed, if necessary, as between attorney and client. (3) Purna Chandra Sinha will be at liberty to pay all his costs of the two exceptions to be taxed as between attorney and client as of a hearing as also the attorney and client portion of the costs (1) of this suit, (2) of the said other suit No. 1084 of 1931 and (3) of the reference before the Assistant Referee out of the estate of Madhab Mohini Dassi. 7. 7. The usual procedure for circulation of the draft decree and the approval thereof by the attorneys of the parties was gone through and eventually on 25-9-1941 the draft decree was finally settled and passed by the Master. The final decree was engrossed and signed by the Master on 10-12-1941 and by the Judge on 12-12-1941. On 2-2-1942 the plaintiff as attorney for the present defendant received service of a copy of the decree from the attorneys of the other side. The final decree (Ex. F) was filed on record on 4-2-1942. 8. On 21-12-1942 the plaintiff paid Ra. 362-4-0 in stamps for taxation of his bill of costs subsequent to the preliminary decree and on 22-12-1942 lodged the said bill for taxation both as between party and party and as between attorney and client. The said bill was duly taxed on notice to all parties including the defendant and eventually on 2-8-1944 an allocatur for Rs. 12,988-15-0 as between party and party with a body allocatur for Rs. 19,640-4-9 as between attorney and client was issued. 9. The plaintiff admits that besides the party and party costs upto the preliminary decree realised from the executor defendants in that suit the plaintiff received from or on behalf of the defendant the total sum of Rs. 8789-7-0 including Rs. 4819-7-0 from the Public Debt Office by two money drafts. The plaintiff's case is that he made over to the defendant Rs. 4819-7-0 being the amount of the said two money drafts which is acknowledged by the defendant by his receipt (Ex. J) and certain petty sums which together with certain petty expenses incurred for him amounted to Rs. 276-3-0 were appropriated by the plaintiff leaving a balance of Rs. 3,693-13-0 in his hands, This balance of Rs. 3,693-13-0 is said to have been appropriated by the plaintiff towards his dues in the manner alleged in para. 8 of the plaint. On this basis and after the aforesaid appropriation the sums of Rs. 12,988-15-0 being the party and party costs subsequent to the preliminary decree and Rs. 18,890-11-3 being the balance of the attorney and client portion of the costs subsequent to the preliminary decree making a total of Rs. 31,879-10-3 remained due to the plaintiff. 10. 8 of the plaint. On this basis and after the aforesaid appropriation the sums of Rs. 12,988-15-0 being the party and party costs subsequent to the preliminary decree and Rs. 18,890-11-3 being the balance of the attorney and client portion of the costs subsequent to the preliminary decree making a total of Rs. 31,879-10-3 remained due to the plaintiff. 10. On 10-8-1944 the plaintiff applied on a tabular statement for execution of the final decree in that suit against the defendant and obtained an interim order for attachment of certain moneys due to the defendant under certain decrees and orders. That application was eventually dismissed. 11. Appreciating that there was considerable doubt as to the success of the application for execution, the plaintiff on 15-8-1944 made another application, namely, an application for an order for payment under the provisions of Ch. 38, R. 48 of the Original Side Rules and obtained an interim injunction restraining the defendant from disposing of premises No. 99/1, Karaya Road or from withdrawing the party and party costs from the executor defendants in that suit. That application came up for hearing before me on 24-1-1945. In view of the conflicting allegations, claims and counterclaims made by the parties I did not think that it was a proper case for a summary order for payment and I relegated the plaintiff to a suit and ordered the costs of that application to abide the result of such suit. To protect the plaintiff I took an undertaking from the defendant not to alienate the said premises or to withdraw the party and party costs until the disposal of the suit that might be filed. I further directed that if such suit was not filed within six weeks the undertaking of the defendant would stand discharged and the plaintiff would have to pay the costs of that application. The present suit was accordingly filed on 31-1-1945. 12. In this suit the plaintiff seeks to recover Rs. 31,879-10-3 as the balance of taxed costs. He also claims interest at 6% per annum on all advances made by him for out of pocket expenses from 22-12-1942 before which date all such advances had been made upto 2-8-1944 when the allocatur was issued and further interest at like rate from the date of allocatur until payment. 13. The defendant filed his written statement on 2-3-1945. He also claims interest at 6% per annum on all advances made by him for out of pocket expenses from 22-12-1942 before which date all such advances had been made upto 2-8-1944 when the allocatur was issued and further interest at like rate from the date of allocatur until payment. 13. The defendant filed his written statement on 2-3-1945. In the written statement the defendant admits having employed the plaintiff in the said suit No. 891 of 1931 upon terms contained in the warrant of attorney executed by him on 24-4-1931 and that the plaintiff rendered professional service in connection with that suit. He denies, however, that the plaintiff rendered any service after the final decree dated 25-8-1941. He alleges that besides the amounts admitted to have been received by the plaintiff the latter received various other sums from the defendant or to his use and that on accounts being taken nothing will be found due to the plaintiff. The defendant denies the factum or validity of the appropriation of Rs. 3693-13-0, and states that it was expressly agreed that all moneys received by the plaintiff from the executor defendants on account of suit No. 891 of 1931 would be appropriated towards the costs of that suit. Finally he pleads limitation and denies all allegations made by the plaintiff to get over the bar of limitation. 14. Three several applications were made by the plaintiff for further and better particulars of the allegations made in several paragraphs of the written statement to the effect that the plaintiff had received diverse other amounts and eventually by an order made on 30-11-1945 the greater parts of paras. 6, 7 and 8 of the written statement were struck out. 14a. Amongst the issues suggested by Mr. S.B. Sinha appearing for the defendant at the hearing before me were the two following issues: A. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree without taking an account of all dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant? B. Has the plaintiff given credit for all sums received by him from or on behalf of the defendant? Mr. S.B. Sinha appearing for the defendant at the hearing before me were the two following issues: A. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree without taking an account of all dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant? B. Has the plaintiff given credit for all sums received by him from or on behalf of the defendant? Mr. Sinha contended that an agent was not entitled to any decree for any sum without rendering a full and complete account; that the agent could not pick and choose a particular item or items in his favour and ask for a decree for the same and that before any decree could be passed in favour of the agent he must render accounts of all dealings. The object of these issues, Mr. Sinha admitted, was to make the plaintiff to render a general account of all dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant including all moneys received by the plaintiff in course of his employment in that suit and in all other proceedings or matters. I disallowed these issues. In the first place the general allegations that the plaintiff had received diverse sums from or on account of the defendant made in paras. 6, 7 and 8 of the written statement had been struck out for want of proper and sufficient particulars and the defendant could not be permitted to raise those allegations on the pleadings as they stood after the amendment. In the next place the principle relied on by Mr. S.B. Sinha did not appear to me to be applicable to a case of several independent contracts of employment. The plaintiff was employed as the defendant's attorney in suit No. 891 of 1931 by the warrant of Attorney to which I have already referred. He was employed in other proceedings or matters separately and independently. S.B. Sinha did not appear to me to be applicable to a case of several independent contracts of employment. The plaintiff was employed as the defendant's attorney in suit No. 891 of 1931 by the warrant of Attorney to which I have already referred. He was employed in other proceedings or matters separately and independently. The defendant as the principal was and is undoubtedly entitled to call upon the plaintiff to render accounts in respect of each of these employments but I took the view that the accounts in respect of the other matters were entirely separate accounts and did not form any part of the account in that Butt and that the defendant's rights against the plaintiff in respect of those other matters being a mere right to account could not be brought into this suit and set off against the plaintiff's claim in this suit unless and until the amount of his claim had been previously ascertained and fixed. I agreed with Mr. Sinha that the plaintiff was bound in this suit to account for all moneys received by him from or on account of the defendant in course of his employment as attorney in suit No. 891 of 1931 but I did not accept his further contention that the defendant was entitled in this suit to ask for accounts in respect of the other matters. All that the defendant was entitled to insist upon in this suit was that the plaintiff must give him credit for all moneys received by the plaintiff in course of his employment in suit No. 891 of 1931. There was no suggestion, particularly after portions of paras. 6, 7 and 8 had been struck out, that in suit No. 891 of 1931 the plaintiff had received any money besides those admitted in the plaint in this suit. The fact of several separate and independent employments having been pointed out to him and in view of the inability of the defendant to allege or prove that the plaintiff had received any other moneys as attorney in suit No. 891 of 1931 Mr. Sinha did not press for raising these two issues. Eventually the following issues were raised and settled: 1. (a) Is the suit barred by limitation? (b) Was the application for order for payment prosecuted between 15-8-1944 and 24-1-1945? Was it so prosecuted in good faith or with due diligence? Sinha did not press for raising these two issues. Eventually the following issues were raised and settled: 1. (a) Is the suit barred by limitation? (b) Was the application for order for payment prosecuted between 15-8-1944 and 24-1-1945? Was it so prosecuted in good faith or with due diligence? (c) Is the plaintiff's claim or any part thereof saved from limitation by reason of the facts alleged in para. 12 of plaint. 2. (a) Was there any appropriation as alleged in para. 12 of the plaint? (b) Is the alleged appropriation valid and binding on the defendant? 3. To what amount, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? I now proceed to deal with the issues seriatim. 15. Re. Issue 1(a): The principal controversy before me centred round the plea of limitation founded on Art. 84, Limitation Act. That article prescribes for a suit by an attorney or vakil for his costs of a suit or a particular business, there being no express agreement as to the time when such costs are to be paid, a period of three years commencing from the date of the termination of the suit or business or (where the attorney or vakil properly discontinues the suit or business) the date of such discontinuance. There was no dispute that Art. 84 was the appropriate article governing this case. It was not contended before me that the consent decree gave any independent-right to the plaintiff so that this suit could be said to be founded on his rights under the decree and governed by Art. 120 as was held in Rustomji and Ginwala Vs. Fazal Rahim, AIR 1932 Bom 378 . Both sides proceeded on the footing that Art. 84 governed this suit. The only controversy was as to what constituted the termination and the date of such termination of Suit No. 891 of 1931. Mr. Sinha for the defendant contended that the suit terminated on 25-8-1941 when terms of settlement were put in and the final decree was made. Mr. S.N. Banerjee for plaintiff maintained that the suit terminated on 2-8-1944 when the allocatur was issued or at any rate on 2-2-1942 when the plaintiff did the last act as attorney for the defendant, namely accepted service of a copy of the final decree made by Messrs. K.K. Dutt & Co. Mr. S.N. Banerjee for plaintiff maintained that the suit terminated on 2-8-1944 when the allocatur was issued or at any rate on 2-2-1942 when the plaintiff did the last act as attorney for the defendant, namely accepted service of a copy of the final decree made by Messrs. K.K. Dutt & Co. the attorneys for the executor defendants in suit No. 891 of 1931 and the charge in respect of which had been allowed by the Taxing Officer. If 25-8-1941 were to be taken as the date of the termination of the suit then, subject to the issue of extension of time under S. 14, Limitation Act, the present suit which was filed on 31-1-1946 would be barred under Art. 84. On the other hand the suit would be within time if either of the two dates insisted upon by Learned Counsel for the plaintiff and mentioned above were to be accepted as the date of the termination of the suit. A large number of authorities, English and Indian, were referred to and relied on by Learned Counsel in support of their respective contentions. I think the authorities show that the starting point is somewhere in between the two dates suggested by Learned Counsel on either side. 16. The earliest authority that was brought; to my notice was the opinion of Lord Coke in 2 Ins. 378 expressed in the following terms: By the judgment against the defendant the warranty of attorney is determined; for thereby placitum terminatur, but only to sue execution (which is the. fruit of the judgment) within the year, and if be sue out execution within the year he may prosecute the same after the year; but if he sue out no execution within the year, then after the year is ended after judgment, his warrant of attorney is determined. 17. In Lawrence v. Harrison, (1654) Style 426 : 82 E.R. 833, the client brought an action upon the case against his attorney for delivering a fieri facias against him in the suit wherein the attorney acted for him as such and for causing it to be executed against him contrary to the trust reposed in him. 17. In Lawrence v. Harrison, (1654) Style 426 : 82 E.R. 833, the client brought an action upon the case against his attorney for delivering a fieri facias against him in the suit wherein the attorney acted for him as such and for causing it to be executed against him contrary to the trust reposed in him. In giving judgment for the plaintiff (client) Rolles C.J. observed: The only question is, whether the warrant of attorney be determined by the judgment given in the suit wherein he was retained; and I conceive it is not for the suit is not determined, for the attorney after the judgment is to be called to say why there should not execution be made out against his client, and is trusted to defend his client, as far as he can from the execution. The two authorities referred to above indicate that the authority of the attorney of the successful party continues for realising the fruits of the judgment for a year after the judgment and still further if execution is taken out within the year and that of the attorney for the unsuccessful party continues for defending his client from execution. These two authorities, by themselves, do not throw any light on the question whether the cause of action of the attorney for his costs accrues immediately after judgment or whether he must wait until his authority comes to an end. 18. At Common Law the employment of an attorney was regarded as one entire contract and the attorney was not entitled to get any remuneration until the entire work was done. In Cresswell v. Byron, (1807) 14 Ves. 271 : 33 E.R. 525, Lord Eldon L.C. referred to the practice of the Common Pleas Court: The client may discharge his solicitor; but I do not know that a solicitor, whatever may be his reasons for declining to proceed, can claim a lien, if be does not carry the business through to a hearing. If that could take place, there might be numerous claims of lien. The Court of Common Pleas, when I was there, held, that an attorney, having quitted his client before trial, could not bring an action for his bill. 19. In Rothery v. Munnings, (1830) 1 B & Ad. If that could take place, there might be numerous claims of lien. The Court of Common Pleas, when I was there, held, that an attorney, having quitted his client before trial, could not bring an action for his bill. 19. In Rothery v. Munnings, (1830) 1 B & Ad. 15 : 109 E.R. 693, plaintiff had been retained by the defendant as his proctor to conduct an appeal on his behalf from the Vice-Admiralty Court at Mauritius to the High Court of Admiralty in England. On 23-7-1822 sentence was given against the appeal and the defendant (client) was condemned in costs. On 31-10-1822 the plaintiff (proctor) received a letter from the adverse proctor threatening to take out process. The plaintiff attended the adverse proctor. No proceeding, however, took place, the defendant (client) having paid the costs. The plaintiff (proctor) commenced his action in September 1828 for the amount of his charges in the cause. No item of his demand was proved to have accrued later than the day of the sentence except two items both dated 31st October, namely 6s. 8d. for perusing the adverse proctor's letter and 13s. 4d. paid for registrar's bill for costs, Sportulage and attendances. Lord Tenterden C.J. directed a verdict for 1 only being the amount of the two items and gave leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for the whole demand. In discharging the rule which was accordingly obtained by the plaintiff Lord Tenterden C.J., observed: When the suit was terminated by a sentence, there is no doubt that the proctor had a right to call for the amount of his bill. His duty was then concluded, unless something should occur to require his further interference. That was quite uncertain. A letter is indeed sent to him in October, on the subject of the costs, and a further charge arises for the perusal and consequent attendance; but this was mere accident. As, therefore, his right of suing on the items now in question accrued at the time of the judgment, and was not enforced within six years, I think he is not entitled to recover beyond the amount given at the trial. Bayley, J. did not see any necessary connection between the last two items and the rest of the bill. As, therefore, his right of suing on the items now in question accrued at the time of the judgment, and was not enforced within six years, I think he is not entitled to recover beyond the amount given at the trial. Bayley, J. did not see any necessary connection between the last two items and the rest of the bill. Parke, J.'s opinion was as follows: If the right of action accrued de die in diem as was contended on behalf of the defendant, the items previous to October are within the statute on that ground. But at all events the right accrued when judgment was given on the appeal. In either view of the case the statute is a bar. 20. Then we come to Vansandau v. Browne, (1832) 9 Bing. 402 : 131 E.R. 667, where Tindal, C.J., sitting in the Court of Common Pleas, followed the principle adopted by Lord Tenterden in Rowson v. Earle, 1 Mo. & Mal. 538 and held that an attorney was not compelled to proceed to the end of a suit in order to be entitled to his costs, but might, upon reasonable cause and giving reasonable notice, abandon the conduct of the suit and in such a case might recover his costs for the period during which he was employed. This case, therefore, engrafts an exception to the general common law rule. 21. In Harris v. Osbourn, (1834) 2 C. & M. 629 : 149 E.R. 912, the Court of Exchequer decided that where a client employed an attorney to conduct a suit it was an entire contract to carry on the suit to its termination, and determinable by the attorney only on reasonable notice and that where no such notice had been given the statute was no bar to that part of the demand which was for business done more than sis years before the commencement of an action by the attorney for business done in the suit which was not brought to a termination till within six years of the commencement of the action. Lord Lyndhurst C.B. said: I consider that when an attorney is retained to prosecute or defend a cause, he entered into a special contract to carry it on to its termination. Lord Lyndhurst C.B. said: I consider that when an attorney is retained to prosecute or defend a cause, he entered into a special contract to carry it on to its termination. I do not mean to say, that under no circumstances, can be put an end to this contract; but it cannot be put an end to without notice. To the like effect are the following observations of Parke B in the same case: The cases which have been cited may be explained either upon the supposition that this is to be treated either as a general contract or upon the supposition that it is a special contract, to carry the suit to its termination, subject to be put an end to on reasonable notice. In ancient times it was considered as an entire contract, of which the attorney could not divest himself by any means; but, in consequence of the increased expenses of suits in modern times, the rule has been varied, and the attorney is at liberty to determine the contract on reasonable notice. The contract of the client is to pay at the completion of the suit; and unless the contract be defeated by reasonable notice the attorney has no cause of action, and the Statute of Limitations is no defence. This case, therefore, recognises the general rule that the employment of an attorney in a suit is an entire contract in respect of which the cause of action for costs accrues on the termination of the suit and also the exception that it may be determinable by reasonable notice in which case the attorneys cause of action arises on such termination of the contract. It throws no light on the question as to when a suit is to be regarded as terminated. 22. In Whitehead v. Lord, (1852) 7 Ex. 691 : 155 E.R. 1126 the facts were as follows: In 1835 Ann Lord who had been made a defendant in a suit in equity by a bill of revivor retained the plaintiff as her solicitor in that suit. In 1840 an order was made that a supplemental bill should be filed to make certain other persons parties to the suit. No supplemental bill was ever filed nor was any further proceeding taken in the suit. In June 1851 Ann Lord died and the defendant took out letters of administration. In 1840 an order was made that a supplemental bill should be filed to make certain other persons parties to the suit. No supplemental bill was ever filed nor was any further proceeding taken in the suit. In June 1851 Ann Lord died and the defendant took out letters of administration. In July 1851 the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant the administrator of the client that unless the sum of 30 was paid to him for his bill of costs be would cease to act any longer as solicitor in the suit. Payment not having been made the plaintiff filed the present action claiming 68 for costs due up to 1840 when the last proceedings in the suit were taken. The defendant took the plea of limitation. At the trial verdict was given for the plaintiff for 68, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to set aside the verdict. A rule obtained by the defendant was, however, discharged. It was held that as a general rule an attorney or solicitor retained to conduct a suit was under the obligation to carry it on to its termination and he could not sue for his bill of costs until that period had arrived. It was further held that the attorney or solicitor might give a reasonable notice to his client to supply him with adequate funds and in case of refusal be might sue him for his costs. The retainer was also held to be determined by the death of the client. This case, therefore, engrafted another exception to the general rule and allowed the attorney or solicitor to sue for his costs on the death of the client, although the suit had not been terminated. In this case the defendant attempted to introduce another exception which was repelled by the Court. The observations of Parke B. may be quoted here: The rule, as applicable to this case, was correctly laid down in Harris v. Osbourn, ((1834) 2 C. & M. 629 : 149 E.R. 912) that an attorney, under a retainer to conduct a suit, undertakes to conduct the suit to its final termination, and be cannot sue for his bill until that time has arrived, subject, however, to the exception there stated and subject also to the additional exception which arises upon the death of the client, in which case he can sue the personal representatives. But Mr. Phipson now seeks to introduce another qualification to the rule for he contends that where a Butt in the Court of Chancery falls into a state of sleep fur a lengthened period, the attorney may sue his client when a reasonable time has elapsed after the suit has fallen into such a state. But I think that there is no authority for that position. 23. The next case cited was that of Harris v. Quine, (1869) 4 Q.B. 653 : (38 L.J.Q.B. 331). There the plaintiffs who were attorneys in the Isle of Man were retained by the defendant in 1858 to defend a suit in the Manx Court. The suit was dismissed in April 1861. In September 1861 the other party in that suit appealed and the plaintiff continued to act as the solicitor for the defendant and conducted the appeal up to 1st October 1862. The plaintiff brought an action in the Manx Court for his costs more than three years after October 1862 and the Manx Court dismissed that suit as barred by limitation because the Manx Statute prescribed for such a suit a period of three years from the date of the cause of action. The plaintiff then brought an action in England in January 1868 for the costs of the suit and the appeal. The defendant pleaded res judicata and limitation. It was held that the Manx Statute of Limitation only barred the remedy but did not extinguish the right and, therefore, the judgment of the Manx Court did not operate as res judicata and further that there being a continuous employment of the plaintiffs none of the items were barred. As regards the plea of limitation Cockburn, C.J. said: On the other branch of the case, the defendant's counsel contended that the suit was terminated when it was dismissed in the Court below, and that the Statute of limitations began to run from that time. It nothing had taken place after that judgment, and the other items in the bill had no reference to the suit, that would be so; but as soon as the defendant instructed the plaintiffs to appear for him in the appeal, and they did so, it is nothing more nor less than a continuation of the original suit, although the plaintiffs might have refused to go on. Blackburn J. expressed the same views in the following terms: On the other question it has been decided as long ago as Harris v. Osbourn: ((1834) 2 C & M 629 : 149 E.R. 912), that the conduct of a suit is an entire contract, and the attorney can ordinarily sue at the end of the litigation. No doubt, prima facie, the termination of a suit is when judgment is given in the Court in which the action is commenced; but when an appeal is brought, and the same attorneys continue to conduct the suit on appeal, that is a continuation of the original suit, and what prima facie was a termination of the contract ceases to be so. 24. Sir John Wickens, V.C. in Baile v. Baile, (1872) 13 Eq. 497 at p. 509, accepts as correct and adopts in a chancery case the principles laid down in Harris v. Quine, ((1869) 4 Q.B. 653 : 38 L.J.Q.B. 331). 25. Sir George Jessel M.R. in In re Hall and Barker ( 1873) 9 Ch. D. 538, strongly criticised the common law doctrine which treats the attorney's retainer in an action as an entire contract and at any rate declined to extend it to the retainer of a solicitor in administration or winding up matters pending in the Chancery Court. The matter arose out of an application by the client for an order for taxation of two bills delivered by his solicitor. The first bill had been sent more than a year before the date of the application for taxation but the second bill was sent within a year before the application. The question was whether the two bills should be treated as one bill brought down to the date of the latest delivery. It was held that they were separate bills and the first one could not be taxed because it had been delivered more than a year prior to the application and that only the second bill could be taxed. The Master of the Rolls recognised that it had been held that the retainer of a solicitor at common law to bring an action was a retainer to do a single thing, namely to bring the action to an end. The Master of the Rolls recognised that it had been held that the retainer of a solicitor at common law to bring an action was a retainer to do a single thing, namely to bring the action to an end. He explained that the reason of that rule was that actions at common law did not occupy a very long time and were comparatively simple matters but that the same reason did not apply to a suit in equity which might relate to a number of different matters and might be continued for a very long time. After referring to the observations of Parke B. in Harris v. Osburn : (1834-2 C. & M. 629 : 149 E.R. 912), which I have quoted above the learned Master of the Rolls said at p. 545: If a man engages to carry a box of cigars from London to Birmingham, it is an entire contract and be cannot throw the cigars out of the carriage half way there, and ask for half the money; or if a shoemaker agrees to make a pair of shoes, he cannot offer you one shoe and ask you to pay one half the price. That is intelligible. In my opinion, in the case of solicitor there is not an implied contract of that kind. It bears no fair relation to the doctrine of entire contract.....In my opinion it would be not only an unwise but an improper extension of the doctrine of entire contract to apply it to such a case as this. But, even if it were right, there must be a break somewhere. In the case of a Chancery suit I have shown what sort of breaks you may have. In the case of winding up there are all sorts of breaks. Is it to be supposed that, because a few matters are un-disposed of, the solicitor is not to be paid until the final termination? The learned judge's opinion was that in Chancery matters the solicitor would be entitled to submit bills periodically at different stages of proceedings when a break might occur although the suit was not finished. 26. The case of Lady De La Pole v. Dick, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 351, was concerned only with the question of duration of the authority of the solicitors for the defendant in that case. 26. The case of Lady De La Pole v. Dick, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 351, was concerned only with the question of duration of the authority of the solicitors for the defendant in that case. The estate of Sir Reginald De La Pole was being administered in an action in the Chanchery Court. With the leave of the Court Lady De La Pole the executrix of Sir Reginald brought this action against Dick an agent of the testator for an account of his receipts and payments. Judgment was given for an account and the accounts were taken by the Official Referee. In June 1883 the action came on for further consideration. An order was made directing the defendant to pay a certain sum of money into Court with a further direction that on such payment the money was to be carried to the credit of the administration suit. The defendant went abroad without complying with the order. It was considered necessary to vary the form of that order and accordingly leave was obtained to appeal from that order. The notice of motion before the appeal Court was served on the London agents of the solicitor at Exeter who had acted for the defendant in the action. They stated that they had ceased to act for him, but they still were his solicitors on the record, no notice of change of solicitors having been given. The question was whether it was a good service. It was held, following the opinions of Lord Coke and Rolles C.J. to which I have already referred, that as the order on further consideration had not been worked out, the solicitors still represented the defendant and that service of the notice on them was good service. This case throws no light on the question as to when the solicitor's cause of action for costs accrues. 27. The case of Callow v. Young, (1886) 55 L.T. (N.S.) 543 stands on the same footing. There Chitty J. made an order for issue of a writ of attachment for breach of an undertaking on the strength of service of the notice of motion on the solicitor on record of the party proceeded against. 27. The case of Callow v. Young, (1886) 55 L.T. (N.S.) 543 stands on the same footing. There Chitty J. made an order for issue of a writ of attachment for breach of an undertaking on the strength of service of the notice of motion on the solicitor on record of the party proceeded against. The learned Judge observed: So long as any order made in the action is not worked out, or so long as anything remains for working out the judgment, the solicitor on the record remains the solicitor, and the trial of the action does not determine that relation. 28. In Re: Romer & Haslam, (1893) 2 Q.B. 286 : (62 L.J.Q.B. 610) was also concerned with the question of taxation. It was held by the Court of appeal that where a solicitor was retained to conduct litigation, other than an ordinary action at common law, which might extend over a considerable period of time, and in which breaks might occur of such a kind as to be equivalent to the conclusion of a definite and distinct part of the proceedings, he might deliver to his client a bill of costs for business done upto the occurrence of any such breaks in the litigation and demand payment. Cave J. took the view that In re Hall and Barker : (1893-2 Q.B. 286 : 62 L.J.Q.B. 610) had modified the common law rule and that the principle of decision in In re Hall and Barker also applied to a retainer of a solicitor in a common law matter which might take considerable time. 29. In The Queen v. The Justices of Oxford-shire, (1893) 2 Q.B. 149 : (62 L.J.M.C. 156) the notice of appeal against an affiliation order was served upon the solicitor who had appeared for the mother on the hearing of the application for the order at petty sessions and such service was accepted by him on her behalf. It was held that the solicitor's retainer had come to an end upon the making of the order and that he had no authority to accept service of the notice of appeal and there was no valid service of such notice. Lord Esher M.R. in whose judgment Bowen & Key L. JJ. It was held that the solicitor's retainer had come to an end upon the making of the order and that he had no authority to accept service of the notice of appeal and there was no valid service of such notice. Lord Esher M.R. in whose judgment Bowen & Key L. JJ. concurred, recognised, with regard to common law actions in which there had been a judgment but such judgment had not been carried into effect by execution, that so long as steps remained to be taken in the litigation for the purpose of obtaining for one party the fruits of it or of defending the other party from any wrong proceeding by way of execution, the action was not finished and therefore the solicitor employed by a party remained his solicitor. The Master of the Rolls also conceded that after the decision in Lady De La Pole v. Dick : (1885 29 Ch. D. 351) it had to be recognised that the same principle applied to a litigation in the Court of chancery. His Lordship, however, did not find it possible to apply the same principle to the case before him, for the result of applying that rule would be that the authority of the solicitor would continue for the whole period during which payments had to be made by the appellant in respect of the child. It is not necessary, for the purposes of the case now before me, to scrutinise the reasons of this decision any more closely and it will suffice to note that this case only lays down that on an affiliation order being made by the petty sessions that litigation is finished and the authority of the solicitor employed by a party thereto comes to an end then and there. 30. In Underwood, Son & Piper v. Lewis, (1894) 2 Q.B. 306 : (64 L.J.Q.B. 60) the Court of appeal after re-affirming the general rule laid down in the earlier cases that a solicitor's retainer in a common law action constituted an entire contract held that a solicitor could not sue for his costs until his contract had been entirely fulfilled, unless the case was brought within some recognised exception to the general rule. One of the exceptions to the general rule was that the solicitor who properly declined to act for the client might sue for his costs although the action was not finished. In order to establish that the solicitor properly put an end to the contract it was not enough for the solicitor to prove that he had given reasonable notice to the client of his intention not to act any further but that he must also prove that he had good cause for not acting any further. There must be both good cause and reasonable notice before a solicitor can refuse to act any further and sue for his costs up to the date of his discontinuance. Both Lord Esher M.R. and Davey L.J. left the question open as to whether a solicitor or his legal representative could demand any payment of his costs if the whole business had not been completed by reason of the illness or death of the solicitor. Referring to the decision of Jessel M.R. in In re Hall and Barker, ((1878) 9 Ch. D. 538) which was said to have exploded the Common Law doctrine Lord Esher observed at p. 312: I cannot think that that decision had the effect so attributed to it, and, if it had, I think it ought to be overruled. I think that what he really meant to decide was merely that it would be unjust to apply the rule undoubtedly applicable to common law actions in the case of chancery suits, where the proceedings might be of a very long and complicated character and be divided into several stages, and if the same implication were made as in the ease of a retainer in common law actions, the solicitor might be unable to recover anything for the work he had been doing for a long period of years; that it would be wrong in such cases to make the same implication as in the case of a common law action, because it could not be said that all reasonable people fairly considering the matter would come to the conclusion that both parties must have understood that the solicitor was employed on the terms that he would carry on the litigation until the end. With that decision, so construed, we have on the present occasion nothing to do. With that decision, so construed, we have on the present occasion nothing to do. A.L. Smith, L.J., after referring to the general rule established in Harris v. Osbourn, (1834-2 C. & M. 629 : 149 E.R. 912) and Whitehead v. Lord, (1852-7 Ex 691 : 155 E.R. 1126) observed as follows: I do not find that this doctrine, so far as it applies to common law actions, is really dissented from by Jessel M.R. in In re Hall and Barker : (1878-9 Ch. D. 538). He there says that he will not adopt it in relation to suits in equity then before him, but he enunciates it as the principle applicable in the case of common law actions. The above observations indicate that the view expressed by Cave J. in In re Romer & Haslam, (1893-2 Q.B. 286 : 62 L.J.Q.B. 610) that In re Hall and Barker, ((1878) 9 Ch. D 538) had modified the common law doctrine was not correct. In the light of the above explanations In re Hall and Barker, (1878-9 Ch. D. 538) does not destroy the general rule applicable to the retainer of a solicitor in all common law actions but only lays down that it does not apply to a retainer of a solicitor in complicated and long drawn bankruptcy, administration and winding up matters in the Chancery Court and establishes with regard to chancery matters another exception to the general rule and enables a solicitor to claim his costs up to well-defined breaks in the proceedings. 31. Coburn v. Colledge, (1897) 1 Q.B. 702 : (66 L.J.Q.B. 462) was an action by a solicitor for the amount of a bill of costs in respect of certain work done by him as solicitor for the defendant which was completed on 30th May 1889. On 7th June 1889 the defendant left England and went beyond the seas. On 12th June 1889 the plaintiff sent by post his signed bill of costs to the defendant at an address in Guernsey given by the defendant. The letter reached the defendant in Australia in 1891. The defendant returned to England in 1896 and on 12th June 1896 the plaintiff commenced this action. On 12th June 1889 the plaintiff sent by post his signed bill of costs to the defendant at an address in Guernsey given by the defendant. The letter reached the defendant in Australia in 1891. The defendant returned to England in 1896 and on 12th June 1896 the plaintiff commenced this action. Under the English Limitation Act, 1623, all actions of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without a speciality must be commenced within six years "next after the cause of such action." By 4 and 5 Anne C. 16, S. 19 it was provided that if the person against whom there was any such cause of action was at the time such cause of action arose beyond the seas then the person entitled to such cause of action might bring his action within six years after the return of that person. Section 37, Solicitors Act, 1843, provided that no attorney should commence or maintain any action for costs for any business done by him until the expiration of one month after the delivery of his bill of costs to the client. In that case if the cause of action arose on the completion of the business, i.e. on 30th May 1889 then the defendant being in England on that date his subsequent going out of England on 7th June 1889 did not stop the time running. This was conceded by Learned Counsel for the plaintiff. The argument that was advanced was that as the solicitor could not commence any action until after a month after delivery of his bill his cause of action did not accrue until after such delivery and as the defendant was beyond the seas when the bill was sent by post and when it reached him the plaintiff had six years after the return of the defendant to England. The Appeal Court upholding the trial Court held that the Solicitors Act did not affect the cause of action but only postponed the remedy and the cause of action arose when the business was completed, and, as the defendant was in England at the time, the Statute began to run and therefore the action was barred. This case only reaffirms the general rule that a solicitor's cause of action for his remuneration arises on the completion of the entire business. This case only reaffirms the general rule that a solicitor's cause of action for his remuneration arises on the completion of the entire business. In this case apparently the solicitor was not employed in a suit and, therefore, the question of the solicitor being entitled, as and by way of exception to the general rule, to his remuneration on the termination of the action by judgment did not arise. 32. In Warmingtons v. McMurray, (1936) 2 All. E.R. 745; S.C. On appeal (1937) 1 All. E.R. 562 : (53 T.L.R. 395), the defendant, a lady had embarked upon a variety of investments and transactions which were likely to result in serious loss. She retained the plaintiffs generally to prosecute all such actions and proceedings as might be necessary to get her out of her difficulties. Having successfully prosecuted several matters the plaintiffs delivered a bill of costs. The defendant, while offering to meet all disbursements in certain arbitration proceedings which were then being prosecuted on her behalf, intimated that she could not pay anything further. The plaintiffs then discharged themselves from their retainer and delivered a second bill and brought an action upon both bills. Goddard J. accepted the reasonings of Jessel M.R. in In re Hall and Barker, (1878) 9 Ch. D. 538 and held that this was not a case of a solicitor retained to prosecute an action and no question of entire contract arose and the solicitor could upon reasonable notice cease to act and sue for his costs. At p. 749 His Lordship observed: To employ a solicitor to conduct an action is one thing; to employ him to get you generally out of your difficulties, which may involve several actions, originating summonses, bankruptcy proceedings and taking all manner of proceedings extending perhaps over years, is another. I think it would be altogether wrong to apply the doctrine of entire contract to such a state of things as the present and to isolate this arbitration, so to speak, from everything else. I think that the reasoning of Sir George Jessel M.R. in In re Hall and Barker : (1878) 9 Ch. D. 538, exactly applies to this case. This decision was upheld on appeal. I think that the reasoning of Sir George Jessel M.R. in In re Hall and Barker : (1878) 9 Ch. D. 538, exactly applies to this case. This decision was upheld on appeal. This case shows that when a solicitor is retained not in any particular action but is retained in a general way so that he may have to do diverse kinds of businesses which may be spread over a very long time, the nature and diversity of the business may justify an inference, in the absence of express agreement, that the parties did not intend the retainer to be an entire contract to finish all the businesses. 33. As regards the nature and scope of an attorney's retainer the observations of the different learned Judges which I have quoted above may, on a cursory reading, appear to be conflicting. Thus Lord Coke said that "by judgment the warrant of attorney is determined" except for the purpose of execution. Rolles, C.J. did not conceive that the warrant of attorney was determined by the judgment given in the suit "for the suit is not determined." Lord Tenterden, C.J. expressed the view that "the suit was terminated by a sentence." Cockburn, C.J. agreed that unless there was an appeal "the suit was determined when it was dismissed in the Court below" and in the same case Blackburn J. said "No doubt, prima facie, the termination of a suit is when judgment is given in the Court in which the action is commenced." Chitty, J's view was that "the trial of the action did not determine that relation" (i.e. as between the attorney and client). Lord Esher M.R. formulated the common law rule by saying that so long as the judgment had not been worked out "the action was not finished." It is, however, possible to reconcile the different observations and deduce certain broad general principles. The net result of the English decisions is summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Edn. 2, Vol. 31, Art. 144 at pp. 95, 96 in the following terms: The general rule is that a solicitor when retained by a client undertakes to finish the business for which he is retained. Thus, a retainer is, generally speaking, an entire contract, that is to say, a contract to do certain business, to finish that business, and to be remunerated at the completion of the business. Thus, a retainer is, generally speaking, an entire contract, that is to say, a contract to do certain business, to finish that business, and to be remunerated at the completion of the business. Applying the broad general principles mentioned above in the employment of an attorney in an action it is clear that when an attorney accepts a retainer in an action he undertakes not only to act upto the judgment but also to continue to act thereafter until the fruits of the judgment are realised (Per Lord Coke) or until the client needs protection against execution (Per Rolles C.J.). In other words he undertakes to act not only in the action proper but also in proceedings which may take place after judgment. When Rolles C.J. said that "the suit was not determined" or Lord Esher said "the action was not finished" they obviously used the expressions "suit" and "action", not in their strict sense but, in the broader sense as including also the proceedings subsequent to the judgment as the contest in which they used those expressions clearly indicates. On the other hand when Lord Tenterden C.J said that "the suit was terminated by sentence" or when Blackburn J. said that "termination of a suit is when judgment is given", their Lordships obviously used the expression "suit" in its strict meaning covering the proceedings from the institution of the suit upto the judgment. If the word "suit" is taken and read in this limited sense then there is no difficulty in holding that judgment does terminate the suit. The termination of the suit, however, does not terminate the retainer, for termination of the suit and termination of the retainer are different things. The scope of the attorney's retainer goes beyond the suit and covers proceedings that may arise subsequent to the termination of the suit as understood in the sense mentioned above. 34. As regards the attorney's right to remuneration the English decisions mentioned above clearly establish that as a general rule the attorney's retainer being an entire contract the attorney is not entitled to any remuneration before the entire contract is fulfilled. His claim for remuneration arises when the whole business is completed and not before. 34. As regards the attorney's right to remuneration the English decisions mentioned above clearly establish that as a general rule the attorney's retainer being an entire contract the attorney is not entitled to any remuneration before the entire contract is fulfilled. His claim for remuneration arises when the whole business is completed and not before. According to the general rule an attorney retained in an action will not be entitled to any remuneration even if the suit terminates by the judgment, for his entire contract will not be fulfilled until the fruits of the judgment are realised or until his client needs his protection against execution. He cannot throw up the retainer and claim remuneration on the basis of quantum meruit. On the same principle it has been stated to be doubtful if, on the death of the attorney before the completion of the business, his legal representatives may claim any remuneration for the work dons upto the attorney's death. The hardship of this general rule has been sought to be mitigated by the English Courts by engrafting certain exceptions to that general rule. As far as I can make out from the English decisions referred to above the attorney has been held entitled to claim remuneration, although the entire business has not been completed, in the following exceptional cases: (i) When the solicitor for good cause and on giving reasonable notice to the client declines to act and puts an end to the retainer; (ii) When the client dies before the completion of the business; (iii) When judgment is given in the action and there is no appeal; (iv) When in bankruptcy, administration and winding up matters in Chancery Courts or in other protracted proceedings there occur in the proceedings breaks of such a kind as to be equivalent to the conclusion of a definite and distinct part of the proceedings; (v) When the nature of the business for which the solicitor is retained justifies an inference, in the absence of express agreement, that the parties did not intend the retainer to be a contract to finish the business. 35. 35. From what I have stated it follows that an attorney's retainer in a suit is an entire contract, that the suit is terminated by judgment, that notwithstanding the termination of the suit the attorney's authority continues and that the attorney is not entitled to any remuneration before the contract is entirely fulfilled unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions. One of the exceptions I have mentioned is that when the suit is terminated by judgment and there is no appeal the attorney becomes entitled to his remuneration up to judgment and to sue for his bill. 35A. In the English Limitation Act 1623 (21 Jac. 1 C. 16) there was no special provision for an attorney's suit for costs. By S. 3 of that Statute all actions of (inter alia) debt, grounded upon any lending or contract without speciality are to be commenced within six years "next after the cause of such action". Under the English Statute the starting point of limitation being the accrual of the cause of action the solicitor's suit for costs must be instituted within six years from the time when his right to remuneration accrued according to the general rule or the exceptions enumerated above whichever may be applicable. The result of the cases on the question of limitation is summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn. Vol. 20 Art. 767 at p. 611 in the following terms: If a solicitor sues for his costs in an action, the statute only begins to run from the date of the termination of the action or of the lawful ending of the employment of the solicitor. If there is an appeal from the judgment in the action, the Statute does not begin to run against the solicitor if he continues to act as such till the appeal is decided. But when judgment has been given and there is no appeal, the Statute runs from the judgment, and subsequent items of costs incidental to the business of the action will not take the earlier items out of the Statute. 36. Having considered the English authorities cited before me and after analysing what I conceive to be the principles underlying them I proceed to examine and consider the position of attorneys in India. 36. Having considered the English authorities cited before me and after analysing what I conceive to be the principles underlying them I proceed to examine and consider the position of attorneys in India. The earliest reference to attorneys at law that I find is in the Charter of George III dated 20th March 1774 which established the Supreme Court in Calcutta. Clause 11 of that Charter empowered the Supreme Court to approve, admit and enrol advocates and attorneys at law who were authorised to appear and plead and act for the suitors. Clauses 7 to 10 of the Letters Patent of 1862 which were subsequently reproduced in Cls. 9 & 10 of our present Letters Patent gave like powers to the High Court. Rules 85 to 142 of our old rules (see Belchambers 2nd Edn. of the Original Side Rules) related to attorneys. Of those rules, Rr. 85 to 135 came into force in 1880 and Rr. 186 to 142 were reproduced from the Supreme Court Rules. Chapter II of our present rules relates to attorneys. The old rules and the present rules are mainly concerned with prescribing the qualifications for admission of attorneys and the procedure connected therewith and the manner of execution of the retainer and filing thereof in Court. The law regulating the rights and duties of the attorney vis a vis the client was and is practically left untouched by the rules except in one important particular, namely that under our rules no suitor is at liberty to change his solicitor without the leave of the Court. Sections 16 and 18, Civil P.C. 1859, which dealt with pleaders did not apply to attorneys for the term "pleader" was not by that Act defined to include them. Then came the CPC of 1882 which by S. 39 after providing that the appointment of a pleader should be in writing and filed in Court proceeded to enact that the appointment when filed in Court would be considered to be in force until the client or the pleader died or all proceedings in the suit were ended so far as regards the client. This section by reason of the definition of "pleader" in S. 2 of that Act applied to attorneys. No specific indication was, however, given as to when the proceedings were to be regarded as at an end. This section by reason of the definition of "pleader" in S. 2 of that Act applied to attorneys. No specific indication was, however, given as to when the proceedings were to be regarded as at an end. The provisions of S. 39 of the Code of 1882 are now reproduced in O. 3, R. 4(1) and (2) of our present Code. These provisions like our rules made a substantial departure from the English law relating to attorneys in. that they made the retainer irrevocable except with the leave of the Court. Sub-rules (3) to (5) in O. 3, R. 4 are new. Sub-rule (3) provides that for the purposes of sub-r. (2) certain proceedings mentioned therein shall be deemed to be proceedings in the suit and consequently the retainer continues throughout those proceedings. Except as mentioned above there was and is no provision in our rules or the Code regulating the rights and duties of attorneys in India. It is, however, well known that the English common law and rules of equity were administered by the Supreme Court as rules of justice and right" and I apprehend that the attorneys who came out to India were governed by the common law of England as if they had carried it with them as their personal law. The attorneys in India are, therefore, governed by the English common law except to the extent as such law has been modified by our code or rules. The English statutes relating to solicitors have no application to attorneys in India and I leave them out of consideration. In Damodar Das Vs. Morgan and Co., AIR 1934 Cal 341 Panckridge J., following Marten C.J. in Tyabji, Dayabhai and Co. Vs. Jetha Devji and Co., AIR 1927 Bom 542 held that the rights of attorneys in India are the same as the rights of a solicitor in England except in so far as the latter has been diminished or increased by statute, and, if I may add, except in so far as the former has been modified by Indian Acts or Rules. It follows, therefore, that an attorney's retainer in India is also an entire contract and the authority of the attorney continues until the proceedings including those mentioned in sub-r. (3) of O. 3, R. 4 are ended; that the attorney is not as a general rule entitled to any remuneration until all proceedings covered by the retainer are ended unless he can bring himself within any of the exceptions enumerated above. 37. As regards limitation it appears that in our Limitation Act of 1859 (Act XIV of 1859) there was no specific provision governing suits by an attorney or pleader or vakil for his remuneration just as there was none in the English statute of 1623. Clauses 9 and 10 of S. 1 of that Indian Act like S. 3 of the English statute governed suits for money lent or interest or the breach of any contract made orally or in writing not registered. The Indian Act prescribed a period of 3 years while the English Act provided for 6 years. 38. The Indian Limitation Act, 1871 (Act IX of 1871) for the first time, as far as I can find, made special provision for a suit by an attorney or vakil for his costs of a suit or a particular business, there being no express agreement as to the time when such costs were to be paid. Article 85 of that Act prescribed for such a suit a period of three years from "termination of the suit or business or (where the attorney or vakil properly discontinues the suit or business) the date of such discontinuance." This article was reproduced in Art. 84, Limitation Act, 1877, with the addition of the words "the date of the" before the word "termination" in column 3. Article 84 of our present Limitation Act of 1908 is precisely the same as Art. 84 of the Act of 1877. 39. The plaintiff before me was retained in a suit and, therefore, it is not necessary, for the purposes of this suit, to discuss the meaning of the word "business". The plaintiff never declined to act and, therefore, I leave out the portion of column 3 dealing with discontinuance. I am only concerned with the words "the date of the termination of the suit" and the question before me is: What is the true meaning of those words as used in the Indian Limitation Act. The plaintiff never declined to act and, therefore, I leave out the portion of column 3 dealing with discontinuance. I am only concerned with the words "the date of the termination of the suit" and the question before me is: What is the true meaning of those words as used in the Indian Limitation Act. I propose first to examine the question on broad general lines and attempt to arrive at my own conclusion and then consider the Indian decisions on the question. 40. I have already quoted various observations of learned English Judges indicating that a suit is terminated by judgment. In what sense did the English Judges use the expression "judgment" in that context? Did they mean by "judgment" "the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order" as that expression has been defined in S. 2(9), of our Civil P.C.? or did they mean by "judgment" "the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit" as a decree has been defined in our Code? Under R.S.C., O. 13, R. 3 where the writ of summons is indorsed for a liquidated demand and the defendant fails to appear the plaintiff is permitted, under certain conditions, to "enter final judgment." Similar provision for entering judgment is made in various other English Rules. By R.S.C., O. 36, R. 39 the Judge is enjoined at or after the trial to direct "judgment" to be entered. R.S.C., O. 41 deals with "Entry of judgment." A perusal of the different English rules of practice will at once make it clear that the word "judgment" has a technical meaning. It does not in such context mean the statements or reasons given by the Judge in support of his decision but means the formal expression of the actual decision which, when entered and filed of record, may be put into execution. There is a background of legal history. The chancery lawyers used to use the term "decree" to denote the formal expression of adjudication of the chancery Court while the common lawyers used' to use the term "judgment" to denote the formal expression of adjudication of the common law Courts. There is a background of legal history. The chancery lawyers used to use the term "decree" to denote the formal expression of adjudication of the chancery Court while the common lawyers used' to use the term "judgment" to denote the formal expression of adjudication of the common law Courts. Lindley L.J. in Onslow v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 465 at P. 467 : (59 L.J.Q.B. 556) called a decree of the chancery Court as "the equivalent term to 'judgment' in the Queen's Bench Division." I have no doubt in my mind that when English Judges talk of a suit being terminated by judgment they obviously do not use the word "judgment" as meaning the statement of the reasons delivered by the Judge in Court but they refer to the formal expression of the actual adjudication which is eventually entered and filed of record. Under S. 225, Judicature Act, 1925, "judgment includes decree." In India the position is still more clear, for, by the very definitions of 'judgment' and of 'decree' to which I have referred, it is the decree and the decree alone which, so far as regards the Court making it, conclusively determines rights of the parties. In view of these definitions there is no escape from the proposition that in India at any rate a suit is terminated not by the "judgment" as it is defined or in its ordinary popular meaning but by the "decree" as defined and as it is understood by lawyers. The provisions of O. 3, R. 4 are also significant. Sub-rule (3) of R. 4 prescribes that certain proceedings therein mentioned are to be deemed to be proceedings in the suit for the purposes of sub-r. (2). The proceedings referred to in sub-r. (3), it will be noticed, are-proceedings which arise normally after the decree. The provision that those proceedings are to be deemed to be proceedings in the suit clearly indicates that they are not really proceedings in the suit but are to be deemed to be so for the specific purpose of continuing the retainer in force, But for sub-r. (3) the retainer would have come to an end before these proceedings could arise. This also indicates to my mind that the proceedings in the suit come to an end by the decree. 41. This also indicates to my mind that the proceedings in the suit come to an end by the decree. 41. If, as I hold, the suit is terminated by the decree, the question still remains: When does it terminate? Section 33, Civil P.C., provides that the Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a decree shall follow. Then I pass on to O. 20, Rr. 1 to 8 which is headed "judgment and decree." These rules also provide that after the judgment the decree follows. Rule 6 prescribes the contents of the decree. Rule 7 provides that the decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced and that when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment he shall sign the decree. It is clear from these rules that a period must intervene between the delivery of the judgment and the drawing up and signing of the decree. What is the position of the suit during this period? So far as the High Court is concernedO. 20 Rr. 1 to 8 do not apply. Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules deals with judgments, decrees and orders passed by this Court. Rules 27 of 34 lay down the procedure for completing the decree. There has to be an application in the form of a requisition in writing by the attorney or the party appearing in person for the drawing up of the decree. The draft is then prepared in the office and issued and circulated amongst the attorneys or parties appearing in person. A date has to be fixed for the settlement of the draft and a notice is to be served on the attorneys and evidence of service is to be filed. The draft has to be approved with or without alteration by the attorneys. The draft is then settled by the Registrar or Master in the presence of the attorneys. If any party is dissatisfied with the form of the draft as settled, he may apply to Court for speaking to the minutes. If on such application any variation is made by the Court such variation has to be embodied in the decree. The draft is then settled by the Registrar or Master in the presence of the attorneys. If any party is dissatisfied with the form of the draft as settled, he may apply to Court for speaking to the minutes. If on such application any variation is made by the Court such variation has to be embodied in the decree. The decree as finally settled and passed has to be signed by the Registrar or Master and the Judge and sealed with the Seal of the Court and thereafter filed in Court. There is, therefore, under our rules also an intervening period between the delivery of judgment and the signing and the filing of the decree. What is the position of the suit during this period? It is true that both under the Code and under our Rules the decree is to be dated as of the date of the judgment and further that the decree takes effect, as regards the rights and liabilities of the parties inter se, as from the date of the judgment. (Holtby v. Hodgson, (1889) 24 Q.B.D. 103 : (59 L.J.Q.B. 46); Guardians &c. of West Ham v. Churchwardens &c. of Bethnal Gree, (1895) 1 Q.B.D. 662). But the question that is material for my purposes is as to the position of the suit between the date of the judgment and the completion of the decree. Is the suit alive during this intervening period or is it at an end? 42. Ever since the observations of Jessel M. R. made in course of argument in In re St. Nazaire Company, (1879) 12 Ch. D. 88 : (41 L.T. 110) at p. 91 it is well established that before an order is drawn up it is within the power of the Judge to reconsider it and if thought proper to alter it. In In re Suffield and Watts, (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 693 : (58 L.T. 911) Lord Esher M.R. at p. 696 and Lopes L.J. at p. 698 stated the principle in a negative form, namely that after the Judge had once made an order and it had been drawn up and perfected he had no jurisdiction to alter it. This by implication amounts to the statement that if the order has not been drawn up and perfected it may be reconsidered. Fry L.J. at p. 697 put the matter in both ways: In re St. This by implication amounts to the statement that if the order has not been drawn up and perfected it may be reconsidered. Fry L.J. at p. 697 put the matter in both ways: In re St. Nazaire Co, : (1879-12 Ch. D. 88 : 41 L.T. 110) shews that, when an order or judgment of the High Court has once been perfected, the Court has no jurisdiction to alter it. So long as the order has not been perfected the Judge has a power of reconsidering the matter, but, when once the order has been completed, the Jurisdiction of the Judge over it has come to an end. This statement of the law was again affirmed by the Court of appeal in Millensted v. Grosvenor House (Park Lane) Ltd. (1937) 1 K.B. 717 : (1937 1 All. E.R. 736). The same principle has been followed by this Court on the original side and on appeal from it. (See Sarupchand Hukumchand Vs. Madhoram Raghumall, AIR 1925 Cal 83 (Buckland J); Ramjiban Kedarnath v. Akhil Chandra Poddar, (1934) 39 C.W.N. 1196 : 62 C.L.J. 377 C.A. (Lort-Williams J. & Jack J.); In the matter of Steel Construction Co. Ltd., (1935) 39 C.W. N. 1259 (McNair J.) and G.D. Ritchson Vs. W.L.D. Ritchson, AIR 1938 Cal 321 (Panckridge. J.) It follows from these decisions that until and unless the decree is perfected i.e. drawn up, signed and filed the Judge has seisin of the matter and can reconsider his decision. How can the Judge continue to have seisin of the suit if the suit had terminated by the delivery of the judgment in the sense in which that expression has been defined in the Code? There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the suit is not terminated until the decree is perfected, i.e., completed and filed. As I have said, as soon as the decree is perfected it takes effect, as regards the rights and liabilities of the parties, from the date of the judgment which is usually the date put in the decree but the operative effect of the decree on the rights of the parties is one thing and termination of the suit is a different thing. The proceedings for drawing up and completing the decree are proceedings in the suit and the suit is terminated only when the decree is perfected in the sense I have mentioned, although once perfected it operates retrospectively, as regards the rights and liabilities of the party, from the date of the judgment, In this connection reference may also be made to the cases of Bai Divali v. Shah Vishnav Manordas, (1909) 34 Bom. 182 : (4 I.C. 829) and Sakharam Vishram v. Sadashiv Balshit, (1913) 37 Bom. 480 : (19 I.C. 894) where it has been held that until the decree is drawn up there is no decree from which there may be an appeal. Reference may also be made to the significant difference in the language of Arts. 84 and 182, Limitation Act. The starting point of limitation under Art. 182 is the date of the decree or order, although the decree or order may have been perfected on a later date but that under Art. 84 is the date of the termination of the suit or business. It is true that the words "the date of the decree or order" would have been inappropriate with respect to "business" but the Legislature might have easily made the time run from "the date of the decree in the suit or the date of the termination of the business." 43. On a consideration of the provisions of the Code and of our Rules and on general principles underlying the cases mentioned above I am bound to conclude that for the purposes of Art. 84 a suit terminates only when the decree finally determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to the suit is perfected, i.e., drawn up, signed, sealed and filed of record in the suit. It is only after the decree is so perfected that certified copies can be obtained for purposes of other or subsequent proceedings, namely execution or appeal or review. 44. Mr. Banerjee argued that if such construction were put upon Art. 84 then the attorney would have to file his suit against the client for costs up to the decree and go on acting for the client in the further proceedings and would have to file further suits for subsequent costs. Article 84 gives 3 years' time and in a normal case all proceedings are likely to be over within that time. Article 84 gives 3 years' time and in a normal case all proceedings are likely to be over within that time. Further in actual practice if the attorney is driven to a suit for costs up to the decree it is more than likely that he will get himself discharged with the leave of the Court and the question of his acting in further proceedings will not ordinarily arise. Finally if there be further proceedings the attorney will be entitled to remuneration on the completion of those proceedings and not before. Therefore, there will not be very many suits. To give effect to Mr. Banerjee's argument will be to inflict a much greater hardship on the attorney for then the client will be able to make the attorney work until the completion of all proceedings without any payment in the meantime unless the attorney gets himself discharged with the leave of the Court. 45. It now remains to be seen whether the conclusion I have arrived at militates against any of the decisions of the Indian Courts which have been brought to my notice. 46. In Dwarkanath Moitra v. T.J. Kenny, (1866) 5 W.R. (S.C.R.) 1 and Kashinath Roy Chowdhury v. Ishun Chandra Mookerjee (1866) 5 W.R. (C.R.) 297 it was held that a pleader's suit for remuneration was governed by cl. 9 of S. 1, Limitation Act of 1859. In the first mentioned case it was held by Peacock C.J. and Jackson J., that if there was no express contract making provision for the time at which payment was to be made the cause of action in respect of conducting or defending a suit accrued when the decision was passed in the suit. This decision proceeds on the lines of the English cases that a suit terminates by judgment. The question whether the suit terminates by the mere delivery of the judgment or upon the completion of the decree which is the question before me did not arise and was not dealt with in that case. 47. The case of Narayana Chetti v. Alfred Champion, (1883) 7 Mad. 1 came before the Madras High Court on an application for revision under S. 622, Civil P.C. of 1882. There the plaintiff had acted as attorney for the defendant in an appeal. 47. The case of Narayana Chetti v. Alfred Champion, (1883) 7 Mad. 1 came before the Madras High Court on an application for revision under S. 622, Civil P.C. of 1882. There the plaintiff had acted as attorney for the defendant in an appeal. The decree in the appeal was dated 5th January 1878, the plaintiff as solicitor was served with a notice from the solicitor for the other party intimating that a date had been fixed for taxation of that party's costs. The plaintiff communicated with the defendant and was instructed not to appear on the taxation. The plaintiff then filed his suit for costs on 22nd February 1881. The suit was decreed by the lower Courts. On the defendant's application for revision it was held by the High Court that the suit was not barred by limitation. It was pointed out that the costs had to be taxed and inserted in the decree and the plaintiff continued as the attorney on record and was bound on receipt of service of the notice of taxation to communicate with the client and take instructions and protect the client's interest at the taxation. The learned Judges concluded by saying that it could not be said that the suit had terminated in the sense of Art. 84 until the costs were inserted in the decree and the decree was issued. Very probably the rules of the Madras High Court then in force required that after the judgment the costs must be taxed and inserted in the decree before it was issued. Be that as it may, the observations of the learned Judges clearly indicate that the decree could not issue until the costs after taxation were inserted therein. The point of this decision appears to be that the decree could not be regarded as completed or perfected until the taxed costs were inserted in the decree and that the decree not being perfected the suit could not be treated as terminated within the meaning of Art. 84. I read this decision as establishing that it is only a perfected decree that can bring a suit to its termination and I respectfully agree with it. 48. In Balkrishna Pandurang v. Govind Shivji, (1883) 7 Bom. 518 the plaintiff acted as the pleader for the defendant in a suit. That suit was decided on 29th November 1879 against the defendant. 48. In Balkrishna Pandurang v. Govind Shivji, (1883) 7 Bom. 518 the plaintiff acted as the pleader for the defendant in a suit. That suit was decided on 29th November 1879 against the defendant. The plaintiff as such pleader applied for and obtained copies of the judgment and the decree but it was only on 27th February 1880 that he gave them to the defendant. Thereafter on 27th January 1883 the plaintiff filed his suit for the balance of his remuneration. The subordinate Judge referred the question of limitation to the High Court under S. 617, Civil P.C. Quoting and adopting the observations of Blackburn J., in Harris v. Quine ((1869) 4 Q.B. 653 : 38 L.J.Q.B. 331) namely that "the termination of a suit is when judgment is given in the Court in which the action is commenced" the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held that as the suit had been instituted more than three years after the termination thus defined of the suit in which the plaintiff had been retained by the defendant, the suit was barred by limitation. I have already explained that the expression "judgment" is used with reference to the decision of the common law Courts in the same sense as the word "decree" is used with reference to the decision of the chancery Courts and that so understood the observations of Blackburn J., only establish that it is the decree which brings the suit to its termination. The Bombay decision simply follows the observations of Blackburn J., and there is no reason to think that the Bombay High Court used the word "judgment" in any different sense. Further in this case, as in Harris v. Quine, ((1869) 4 Q.B. 653 : 88 L.J.Q.B. 331) the question whether the suit is terminated by the mere delivery of the judgment i.e. the statements given by the Judge of the grounds of his decision or by the completion and perfecting of the decree which finally determines the rights and liabilities of the parties to the suit was not raised or considered. Indeed, seeing that the plaintiff had made over the copies of the judgment and the decree to the defendant on 27th February 1880 it is quite clear that the decree had been perfected some time before that date and it may well be that it was so perfected more than three years before the date of the filing of the suit for costs and that that is why there was no reason in that case, to make any distinction between the judgment and the decree as the starting point of limitation. There is no reason to think that the Bombay High Court used the word "judgment" deliberately to make a distinction between judgment and decree. If the Bombay case is understood to mean that a suit is terminated by judgment in the sense of a decree then there is no conflict between it and the previous Madras case. In this view this case, therefore, cannot be regarded as a decision militating against the conclusion I have arrived at. If, on the other hand, this case is to be read as laying down the proposition that a suit is terminated by the "judgment" as opposed to the "decree" I respectfully differ from it. 49. The observations of Trevelyan J. in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Chunder Kant Mookerjee, (1895) 22 Cal. 952 (Note) appear to me to support the view I have expressed herein. 50. In Watkins v. Fox, (1895) 22 Cal. 943 the plaintiffs were retained by the defendants as their solicitors for the purpose of an application under S. 24 of Act (15 [XV] of 1859) for the revocation of a patent. That application was dismissed on 30th January 1888, the order of dismissal was completed and filed on or about 20th February 1888. Thereafter the plaintiffs continued to act as solicitors for the defendant for opposing the taxation of the costs of the other side. The last item of work done by them was on 7th September 1888. The plaintiffs filed their suit for costs on 7th April 1891 i.e. more than three years after the date of dismissal of the application in which they acted as attorneys, "as well as of the filing of the order of dismissal" but within three years after they did the last item of work. The defendants raised a plea of limitation. The plaintiffs filed their suit for costs on 7th April 1891 i.e. more than three years after the date of dismissal of the application in which they acted as attorneys, "as well as of the filing of the order of dismissal" but within three years after they did the last item of work. The defendants raised a plea of limitation. After referring to the Madras and the Bombay cases Hill J., proceeded as follows: ....and the cases seem therefore to show that, although there may be proceedings in the suit subsequent to the judgment or decree and the suit may therefore still, in that sense subsist (for that, I take it, may be inferred from S. 39), the point at which for the purposes of the Limitation Act the suit is to be taken to terminate is the issue of the decree (according to the Madras Court) or the giving of judgment (according to the Bombay Court). By 'judgment' in the decision of the latter Court I presume is meant the judgment of the Court in the sense in which the term is used in the Code of Civil Procedure. But whether the issue of the decree or the giving of judgment be the proper starting point for the running of the period of limitation, would not make any practical difference in the present instance, for neither of these things (taking the order of the Court to be equivalent to a decree) appears to have taken place within three years before the institution of this suit. Referring to the contention that the suit could not be treated as at an end because the taxation was going on, Hill J. said: In support of his contention Mr. Dunne relied upon the Madras case cited above for the purpose of showing that, while the taxation of costs was proceeding, the suit could not be said to have ended. But while I doubt with much deference whether the rule laid down in that case can be supposed on principle, I think at all events that it is inapplicable to the practice prevailing on the Original Side of this Court and that I ought rather to follow the rule laid down in Bombay. But while I doubt with much deference whether the rule laid down in that case can be supposed on principle, I think at all events that it is inapplicable to the practice prevailing on the Original Side of this Court and that I ought rather to follow the rule laid down in Bombay. With great respect to Hill J., I do not see why it should be assumed that the Bombay High Court used the word "judgment" in the sense in which it is used in the Code and not in the sense of a decree. There is no reason to think that the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court used that expression in any sense different from that in which Blackburn J., used it. For reasons already stated the word "judgment" means with reference to the decisions of the common law Courts what the word "decree" means with reference to the decisions of the chancery Courts. If Blackburn J. used the word "judgment" in the sense of a decree, it must be held that the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court also used the word 'judgment' in the same sense. I have said there was no necessity either in Harris v. Quine, ((1869) 4 Q.B. 653 : 38 L.J.Q.B. 331) or in the Bombay case to make any distinction between judgment and decree for fixing the starting point of limitation. If the Bombay decision is read and understood in this way then there is really no conflict between the Madras case and the Bombay case. In my humble opinion Hill J. overlooked this aspect of the matter. Again, with great respect to Hill J. it appears to me that His Lordship missed the real point of the decision in the Madras case. Apparently according to the rules or practice of that Court the costs had to be taxed and the taxed costs had to be inserted in the decree before the decree was issued. In other words in Madras the taxation of costs was anterior in point of time to the completion of the decree and was a part of the process for perfecting it and that until the taxed costs were inserted in the decree the decree could not be issued and consequently until the decree was perfected the suit was not at an end. The ratio decidendi of the Madras case, as I understand it, is that the suit did not terminate because the decree which finally determined the rights and liabilities of the parties had not been perfected and not simply because the taxation had not been completed. The question of completion of taxation was material in that case because without the taxed costs being inserted in the decree, the decree could not be said to have been perfected. According to the practice of our Court on its original side there is no provision for inserting the taxed costs in the decree and indeed there can be no taxation of costs under the decree until the decree is perfected by being filed of record. Therefore here the taxation of costs is not a part of the process for perfecting the decree. It follows, therefore, that in this Court taxation of costs has nothing to do with the completion of the decree. The suit terminates as soon as the decree is perfected and taxation begins later on and, therefore, the proceedings for taxation have no bearing on the question of the termination of the suit and the actual decision of Hill J. can properly be supported on this ground and not on the ground of any assumed distinction between the Madras case and the Bombay case on which he founded his decision. The practice of the Bombay High Court, I understand, is similar, and, therefore, there also the suit terminates when the decree is perfected and subsequent taxation of costs does not affect that position. I am unable to appreciate that the Bombay decision if it is correctly read and understood, militates against the Madras case. The actual decision of Hill J., in Watkins v. Fox, (1895-22 Cal. 943) really supports the conclusion I have arrived at, namely that a suit comes to an end when the decree is perfected and the time begins to run and the subsequent taxation of costs has no bearing on the construction of Art. 84. In that case the solicitors' suit for costs was filed more than three years after the order of dismissal of the application for revocation of the patent had been perfected and it was rightly held, if I may say so with respect, that the claim was barred. In that case the solicitors' suit for costs was filed more than three years after the order of dismissal of the application for revocation of the patent had been perfected and it was rightly held, if I may say so with respect, that the claim was barred. I accept the decision of Hill J., as correct but not the reasonings on which he based it. 51. In Makhan Lal Mukerjee v. Nalin Chandra Gupta, (1908) 35 Cal. 171 the plaintiff acted as the attorney for the defendant in a suit instituted in 1899 and continued to act as such until by an order made on 1st May 1902 there was a change of attorney from him to another attorney. That order did not direct any payment of costs to the plaintiff but only directed that his costs be taxed. The plaintiff filed his suit for costs amounting to Rs. 5955-14-0 on 27th May 1905. On a plea of limitation under Art. 84 having been raised, Sale J. held that the order for taxation operated as a stay of any suit for costs and that in computing the period the plaintiff would, under S. 15, Limitation Act, be entitled to deduct the period between the submission of his bill for taxation and the issue of the allocatur. On appeal by the defendant the Court in appeal reversed the decision of Sale J., and held that an order for taxation did not operate as a stay of suit. This case, therefore, was not at all concerned with the question now before me. The following observations of Harrington J., at p. 175 may, however, be noted: All the authorities show that the taxation of costs is not a condition which must be performed before an action on an attorney's bill may be brought. It that is so, an order for taxation cannot affect the plaintiff's right to bring his action. Where the attorney properly discontinues to act and thereupon an order is made for his discharge, the attorney comes within one of the exceptions to the general Common law rule and his cause of action arises and time begins to run from the date of discontinuance. The taxation of costs is not a condition precedent to his cause of action. Where the attorney properly discontinues to act and thereupon an order is made for his discharge, the attorney comes within one of the exceptions to the general Common law rule and his cause of action arises and time begins to run from the date of discontinuance. The taxation of costs is not a condition precedent to his cause of action. Likewise when the suit is terminated by the decree being perfected the attorney comes within another exception to the general rule and his cause of action arises from the date of such termination of the suit and the taxation of his costs not being a condition precedent has nothing to do with his cause of action which had already arisen by reason of the termination of the suit. This, I apprehend, is the reasonable implication of the above quoted observations of Harrington J. So understood this in no way militates against the views I have expressed above but rather tends to support them. 52. The material facts in Atul Chunder Ghose v. Lakshman Chunder Sen, (1909) 36 Cal. 609 : (2 I.C. 830) were as follows: In 1901 the plaintiff was retained by the defendants as their attorney in Suit No. 882 of 1896 and acted as such in that suit as well as in the appeal therefrom being Appeal No. 29 of 1903. It does not appear from the report when the decree in Suit No. 882 of 1896 was made or perfected or when the decree in the appeal was made or perfected. It appears, however, that certain parties including Gocool Chunder Sen, one of the clients were by the decree in appeal directed personally to pay certain costs of the appeal to the appellant. The appellant's costs were taxed and an allocatur was issued on 6th July 1905. The plaintiff's own bill of costs was taxed as between him and his client on 16th September 1907. The plaintiff filed this suit for the balance of his taxed costs on 4th July 1908. The suit was contested by Gocul. The first ground urged was that he had revoked the authority of the attorney on 13th January 1903 and therefore he was not liable for any costs after that date and that the costs incurred before that date were barred. The suit was contested by Gocul. The first ground urged was that he had revoked the authority of the attorney on 13th January 1903 and therefore he was not liable for any costs after that date and that the costs incurred before that date were barred. The Court held against Gocul on facts as well as on the ground that by reason of S. 39 of the Code (now O. 3 R. 4) he could not without leave of the Court revoke the authority of the attorney. The next contention was that at any rate the costs incurred more than three years prior to the institution of the suit by the attorney were barred. The question was when did the cause of action arise Harrington J, referred to Coburn v. Colledge : (1897-1 Q.B. 702 : 66 L.J.Q.B. 462) as establishing that the plaintiff's cause of action arose when the work for which he had been retained was completed and to Lady de La Pole v. Dick, (1885-29 Ch. D. 351) as an authority for the proposition that the authority of the attorney might continue after judgment. His Lordship then concluded: In the present case, I think in fact the attorney's authority did continue after judgment and covered the taxation of costs, because the decree directs that certain parties, amongst others Gocool, shall personally pay to the appellants 6-12ths of the costs of the appeal to be taxed on scale No. 2. Until taxation, therefore, the amount payable by the client under the decree could not be ascertained. The solicitor's retainer, therefore, covered the taxation of these costs which took place early in July 1905, and was not at an end until the issue of the allocatur on the 6th of that month. Until the allocatur issued, the amount payable by the client was not ascertained and the work was, therefore, not completed. Harrington J., held that inasmuch as the plaintiff did some work after 4th July 1905 and as his suit for costs was filed on 4th July 1908 the suit was not barred and the plaintiff was entitled to recover the balance of his costs. Harrington J., held that inasmuch as the plaintiff did some work after 4th July 1905 and as his suit for costs was filed on 4th July 1908 the suit was not barred and the plaintiff was entitled to recover the balance of his costs. I respectfully agree with the learned Judge that the authority of the plaintiff as attorney continued after the decree in the suit and even after the decree in the appeal and also that the general rule is that the attorney is entitled to payment of his remuneration after the entire work for which he was retained was completed. It appears to me, however, that the learned Judge missed the point that the case of Lady de La Pole v. Dick: (1885-29 Ch. D. 351) was concerned only with the question of the duration of the attorney's authority and had no bearing on the question of the accrual of the attorney's cause of action for costs. The learned Judge also overlooked the fact that Coburn v. Colledge : (1897-1 Q.B. 702 : 66 L.J.Q.B. 462) did not deal with the retainer of an attorney in an action and that that case only followed the general rule that an attorney was entitled to his remuneration on the completion of the entire business for which he had been retained. Harrington J., apparently did not advert to the point that in the case of an attorney retained in an action he is entitled, as and by way of exception to the general rule, to his remuneration in certain exceptional circumstances and that, therefore, the case before him was governed by one of those exceptions rather than by the general rule. An attorney's retainer in an action is an entire contract and the attorney is not ordinarily entitled to any remuneration until the entire contract is performed, nevertheless as an exception to that general rule the attorney has been held entitled to claim his remuneration on the termination of the suit by a perfected decree, In this case on the decree in the suit having been perfected the plaintiff's cause of action for his remuneration up to the date of the decree arose. There was, however, an appeal. There was, however, an appeal. According to the English decisions what is prima facie a termination of the suit ceases to be so on the filing of the appeal, for the appeal is but a continuation of the suit (See Per Blackburn J., in Harris v. Quine : (1869-4 Q.B. 653 : 38 L.J.Q.B. 331.) The question whether in view of S. 2(10) of our Limitation Act providing that "suit" does not include an appeal or application this principle of English law applies in India was not raised in this case and I express no opinion thereon. Assuming that in India an appeal may be treated as a continuation of the suit, surely in the case before Harrington J., the suit had terminated by the decree in the appeal having been perfected and the plaintiff's cause of action accrued then and there. The learned Judge overlooked the distinction between the termination of the attorney's authority and the termination of the suit. The suit terminated by the perfected decree and the attorney's cause of action for costs accrued on such termination of the suit although the attorney's authority continued and he was bound, unless properly discharged, to continue to act for the client. The termination of the suit and the accrual of the attorney's cause of action do not appear to me to be incompatible with the continuation of the attorney's authority. In the second place the reasonings adopted by Harrington J., do not appear to me to support his conclusion. According to his Lordship the attorney's authority continued after judgment i.e., the decree and his cause of action arose when the work for which he had been retained was completed. On this reasoning the authority of the attorney continued even after the taxation of the appellant's costs for the retainer covered even the application for execution of the decree for costs. If the attorney's cause of action would arise only on the completion of the entire business covered by the retainer then the attorney would have no cause of action, if the attorney was retained by the successful party, until the fruits of the decree had been realised or if he was retained by the unsuccessful party, until the client needed his protection against execution. The plaintiff's authority as attorney did not come to an end on the taxation of the appellant's costs and issue of the allocatur in favour of the appellant but continued even after that and therefore it was illogical for the learned Judge to fix the date of the allocatur as the starting point of limitation. In the third place this decision of Harrington J., appears to me to be inconsistent with the logical implication of his own observations in the earlier case of Malkhan Lal Mukerjee v. Nalin Chandra Gupta, (1908-35 Cal. 171) to which I have already referred. For reasons stated above I am unable, in spite of my utmost respect for the learned Judge, to accept his decision as correct. 53. The last case on the subject to which reference has been made is that of Mt. Attormoni Dasi and Another Vs. Ramesh Chunder Bose, AIR 1930 Cal 651 . That case arose out of an application by the attorney for an order for payment of his taxed costs under Chap. 38, R. 59 (now Chap. 38, R. 48). In that case the attorney acted as attorney for the plaintiffs in administration suit filed on 2nd December 1904. The preliminary decree was made on 23rd January 1906 and the final decree was made on 17th December 1912. There were appeals and further enquiries were directed and eventually the final decree was made on 8th May 1916. On 17th September 1921 the attorney's bill of costs was lodged for taxation and on 26th June 1928 the bill was finally passed and an allocatur was issued. The attorney thereafter applied for an order for payment of his taxed costs. The clients opposed and contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Court should, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to make any order for payment and should refer the attorney to a suit. Panckridge J. however, went into the facts and made the order. On appeal the majority of the learned Judges held that in the facts and circumstances of the case no summary order for payment should have been made and reversed the decision of Panckridge J., and relegated the attorney to a regular suit. Panckridge J. however, went into the facts and made the order. On appeal the majority of the learned Judges held that in the facts and circumstances of the case no summary order for payment should have been made and reversed the decision of Panckridge J., and relegated the attorney to a regular suit. It was urged before Panckridge J., that the Court should take into account the fact that if the attorney were to file a suit such suit must be dismissed as being time barred. It is with regard to this argument that Panckridge J., made the following observations: It appears to me, however, that this is not an aspect of the matter with which I need concern myself since in my judgment it is clear that in a suit brought by the attorney Attormoni and Ashutosh would not be in a position successfully to plead the provisions of the Limitation Act. By Art. 84 of that Act the date from which the three years' period of limitation provided by the article begins to run is the date of the termination of the suit or business. I am asked to hold that the final decree of 8th May 1916 is the termination of this suit within the meaning of the article. To do so would, I think, be patently absurd; in many proceedings of which administration suits are an example, the so-called final decree is very far from being the termination of the suit. Moreover, Atul Chunder Ghose v. Lakshman Chunder Sen appears to me an authority for the proposition that the period of limitation in an attorney's suit for taxed costs does not begin to run until at the earliest the issue of the allocatur. With great respect to Panckridge J., I am unable to subscribe to the above quoted observations. In the first place the learned Judge did not analyse and consequently failed to note that the actual decision in Atul Chandra Ghose v. Lakshman Chunder Sen, (1909-36 Cal 609 : 2 I.C. 830) could not be supported on the reasonings on which Harrington J., based it. Panckridge J., apparently accepted the correctness of that decision without Scrutiny and based his own observations thereon. In the second place it was not necessary for him to go into the question of limitation and express a definite opinion thereon. Panckridge J., apparently accepted the correctness of that decision without Scrutiny and based his own observations thereon. In the second place it was not necessary for him to go into the question of limitation and express a definite opinion thereon. In the third place the learned Judge overlooked the distinction between the termination of the suit by the decree and the termination of the attorney's authority by the completion of the entire work for which ha had been retained. The attention of Panckridge J., does not appear to have been drawn to the exceptions to the general rule as to the retainer being an entire contract. The learned Judge did not advert to the principle that the final decree even in an administration suit constitutes a definite break giving rise, by way of exception to the general rule to an enforceable claim of the attorney for his costs. The learned Judge did not note that post decree proceedings, e.g., execution proceedings are not necessarily proceedings in the suit and that such proceedings arise only after the termination of the suit by the decree when it is completed and filed. 54. From what I have stated so far it is clear that the conclusion I have arrived at on a consideration of the judicial authorities, namely that a suit comes to its termination upon the decree finally adjudicating the rights and liabilities of the parties being completed and perfected and that as exception to the general rule, the attorney's cause of action for his remuneration accrues on, and the statute begins to run against him from the date of such termination, does not really militate against any judicial decision of the Indian High Court except the decision of Harrington J. in Atul Chunder Ghosh v. Lakshman Chunder Sen, (1909-36 Cal. 609 : 2 I.C. 830) and the observations of Panckridge J. in Mt. Attormoni Dasi and Another Vs. Ramesh Chunder Bose, AIR 1930 Cal 651 . For reasons stated above I respectfully dissent from those learned Judges. 609 : 2 I.C. 830) and the observations of Panckridge J. in Mt. Attormoni Dasi and Another Vs. Ramesh Chunder Bose, AIR 1930 Cal 651 . For reasons stated above I respectfully dissent from those learned Judges. In my judgment suit No. 891 of 1931 in which the plaintiff before me was retained by the defendant as his solicitor terminated on 4th February 1942 when the final decree therein was perfected by being filed on record in that suit and that the present suit which was instituted on 31st January 1945 is not barred by limitation under Art. 84, Limitation Act, This issue must, therefore, be answered in the negative. 55. Re: Issues 1(b) and 1(c). - The plaintiff has in his plaint also sought to get over the bar of limitation, if any, by claiming that in computing the period of limitation the period between 15th August 1944 and 24th January 1945 when he was prosecuting his application under Chap. 38, R. 48 for an order for payment against the defendant should be deducted. If I am right in my answer to Issue 1(a) then these issues will not arise. As, however, the matter may not rest here it is right that I should record my findings and conclusions on these issues as well. 56. These issues are directed to ascertaining whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act. Sub-s. (1) of S. 14 provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. That the plaintiffs application for an order for payment was a civil proceeding in a Court of first instance cannot for a moment be doubted. That the plaintiffs application for an order for payment was a civil proceeding in a Court of first instance cannot for a moment be doubted. In order to come within the section the only other things which the plaintiff must establish are: (i) that the proceedings were founded upon the same cause of action; (ii) that the plaintiff prosecuted those proceedings (a) with due diligence, and (b) in good faith; and (iii) that the Court from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature was unable to entertain it. 57. Mr. Sinha contended that this suit is not founded on the same cause of action in that in this suit the plaintiff is claiming interest on advances and drew my attention to para. 14 of the plaint. I do not think there is any substance in this contention. The cause of action of the plaintiff in that application and in this suit appears to me to be identical. This cause of action arose out of the retainer and the work done and advances made thereunder and the remuneration due to him. The claim for interest on advances may be an additional relief but this flows from the same cause of action. This additional claim does not alter the cause of action. The difference in the language of sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of S. 14 is significant. Section 14(1) requires the two proceedings to be founded on the same cause of action while S. 14(2) requires that both the proceedings must be for the same reliefs. 58. Mr. Sinha next urged that the plaintiff did not prosecute that application with due diligence. He pointed out that though the summons was taken out on 15th August 1944 it was made returnable on 22nd August 1944 and not two days after the date of the summons as would have been done under the rules. It appears from the summons that it was originally made returnable on 17th August 1944 but the returnable date was changed to 22nd August 1944 by the Master presumably as the defendant resided outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The initials of the Master appear against the alteration. Therefore the plaintiff did not waste 5 days. The affidavit in opposition was filed by the defendant on 26th August 1944 and the affidavit in reply was filed on 29th August 1944. The initials of the Master appear against the alteration. Therefore the plaintiff did not waste 5 days. The affidavit in opposition was filed by the defendant on 26th August 1944 and the affidavit in reply was filed on 29th August 1944. The annual vacation started on 1st September 1944 and the Court re-opened on 13th November 1944. The complaint is that after the re-opening of the Court in November 1944 the plaintiff did not bring on the summons to a hearing until 24th January 1945, From the fiats endorsed on the summons it appears that every time the summons was adjourned it was so adjourned with the consent of both parties. It is true that the plaintiff has to establish his diligence, but the party who has consented to the adjournments can hardly be permitted to rely on them as evidence of want of diligence. In any event the very fact that the defendant consented to the adjournments may well be taken as prima facie evidence that the adjournments were necessary or at any rate were not without good cause. The consent of the defendant ought prima facie to be regarded as negativing any want of diligence. Finally we are all aware that chamber applications are frequently adjourned from time to time to suit the convenience of counsel on both sides and it will be unreasonable and unjust to impute want of diligence to the parties for such adjournments. In my judgment I am not prepared to hold that the plaintiff was guilty of any laches or want of diligence in the matter of prosecuting that application. 59. Mr. Sinha pointed out that the conduct of the plaintiff indicates that he was not acting in good faith. As soon as the allocatur was issued the plaintiff who was not a party to the suit applied for execution of the decree and obtained an interim attachment. Finding that the execution proceedings were misconceived and were bound to be dismissed the plaintiff made the application for payment order and again obtained an interim order. All this shows that the plaintiff was out to harass the defendant. The terms of settlement embodied in the final decree provided that the defendant would be at liberty to pay all his costs out of the estate of Madhab Mohini Dassi. All this shows that the plaintiff was out to harass the defendant. The terms of settlement embodied in the final decree provided that the defendant would be at liberty to pay all his costs out of the estate of Madhab Mohini Dassi. The plaintiff's application for execution was, I apprehend, dismissed because the decree only gave liberty to the defendant to pay all his costs and did not expressly and unconditionally direct him to pay the costs to the plaintiff. It appears to me that the application for execution was made by the plaintiff in the belief that it made provision for the payment of his costs and to ensure prompt recovery of his dues. It was certainly a misconceived application in view of the language of the terms of settlement but I am not prepared to say that the circumstances in which it had been made did not at all warrant the considerable apprehension that the plaintiff had about his being unable to realise his dues. In any case, even if that application was misconceived and was made in bad faith, it does not follow at all that the application for payment order must also have been made in bad faith. Enforcement of a claim for payment against a person inevitably causes a certain amount of inconvenience and harassment to the debtor but it does not prove want of good faith in the creditor. 60. The last branch of the arguments on this issue was directed to the point whether the Court from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature was unable to entertain it. That this Court was the proper Court before which the plaintiff's application under chap. 38, R. 48 could be made was not disputed. The only question that was argued was whether this Court was, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, unable to entertain it. A large number of judicial decisions bearing on the question were cited before me. I do not consider it necessary to deal with the cases individually. The result of the authorities on this point has been thus summarised in Chitaley's Limitation Act, Vol. A large number of judicial decisions bearing on the question were cited before me. I do not consider it necessary to deal with the cases individually. The result of the authorities on this point has been thus summarised in Chitaley's Limitation Act, Vol. 1, p. 538: The principle of the section is the protection against the bar of limitation of a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on the merits, but failing through the Court being unable to give him such a trial; and the principle is applicable not only to eases where the person brings his suit in the wrong Court, but also where he brings his suit in the right Court but is nevertheless prevented from getting a trial on the merits by something, which, though not a defect of jurisdiction, is analogous to that defect. 61. Mr. Sinha's argument was that the plaintiff's application was not dismissed because of any defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. His contention was that chap. 38, R. 48 of our Rules authorised the Court either to make an order for payment or to relegate the attorney to a regular suit. Therefore, whichever order was made, it was made on the application. In other words the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's application and did entertain the application and made an order thereon which it was competent to make and, therefore, it was not a case of the Court being unable to entertain the application and, therefore, S. 14(1), Limitation Act, had no application. This leads me to consider the true meaning, scope and effect of R. 48 which is expressed in the following terms: 48. An attorney, where he has taxed his bill of costs against his client, may apply in Chambers on summons for an order against his client or the legal representatives of such client for payment of the sum allowed on taxation or such sum as may then remain due. The Judge on hearing the summons may make such order or refer the parties to a suit. Such order where made may be executed under O. 21 of the Code as a decree for money. It will be observed that it is left entirely in the discretion of the Court to make an order for payment or to refer the parties to a suit. Such order where made may be executed under O. 21 of the Code as a decree for money. It will be observed that it is left entirely in the discretion of the Court to make an order for payment or to refer the parties to a suit. The attorney is not entitled, as of right, to have his claim adjudicated upon on its merits by the Court. The language is that the Court may make such order or refer the parties to a suit. There may be a contention that on an application under this rule the Court cannot reject the claim for it is authorised only to make "such order" i.e., an order for payment or to refer the parties to a suit. It is, however, not necessary to pursue this extreme contention and I do not express any final opinion on it. I proceed on the basis that the Court has a discretion to make an order for payment or refer the parties to a suit. When the Court does not make an order for payment but refers the parties to a suit, what is implied in such order? It certainly does not imply a finding that the attorney's claim does not exist, for if the Court finds that the, claim does not exist, there can be no point in referring the parties to a suit. On the contrary the order referring the party to a suit implies that the Court will not, in the circumstances of the case, go into the merits of the case or try the case. What is the underlying reason for which the Court is authorised to refer and does refer the parties to a suit? It is that the case is not, having regard to the allegations and counter-allegations and the complicated nature of the issues, a fit case for being dealt with in a summary application on affidavits. The Court may, I imagine, take evidence but is not bound to do so. It is clear, therefore, that the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by this rule is a jurisdiction of a very limited nature. If the case is a fairly clear one and free from any difficulty the Court may exercise this summary jurisdiction. The Court may, I imagine, take evidence but is not bound to do so. It is clear, therefore, that the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by this rule is a jurisdiction of a very limited nature. If the case is a fairly clear one and free from any difficulty the Court may exercise this summary jurisdiction. The provision for referring the parties to a suit only emphasises that the Court has a discretion not to make an order for payment in exercise of this summary jurisdiction and it has been inserted to indicate and ensure that the omission to make an order for payment may not be taken as tantamount to an adverse adjudication on the attorney's claim on its merits. When, therefore, in a complicated case the Court does not make an order for payment on an application under this rule and refers the parties to a suit, the Court in effect tells the parties that its jurisdiction being what it is it is unable to try and adjudicate upon the claim on its merits, or in other words, that its jurisdiction is so limited as not to permit it in the circumstances to make an order for payment. The order referring the parties to a suit is an order made on the application only in the sense in which an order for return of the plaint under the Code may be regarded as an order in the suit. It is nothing more than an indication that the Court is unable to entertain the application. When the plaintiff's application came before me I expressed my opinion in my judgment (Ex. L) as follows: I have been through the affidavits and on reading the affidavits it appears to me that this application raises various disputed questions of fact. I do not consider it right, on a summary application of this nature, to undertake any investigation as to the correctness or otherwise of the disputed facts. It seems to me that this is a proper case where the attorney should be relegated to a suit. In these circumstances I decline to make an order for payment in this application. The attorney will enforce his rights by taking other appropriate proceedings. It is quite clear that the plaintiff's rights were not investigated into on that application, because it could not be done on that summary application. In these circumstances I decline to make an order for payment in this application. The attorney will enforce his rights by taking other appropriate proceedings. It is quite clear that the plaintiff's rights were not investigated into on that application, because it could not be done on that summary application. In other words because of the limited nature of Court's jurisdiction the Court could not make an order for payment on that application. It is, therefore, by reason of an infirmity or defect of jurisdiction that the order for payment could not be made. This defect of jurisdiction was in no way brought about by the plaintiff or any absence of diligence or good faith on his part and the plaintiff therefore comes within the principle of S. 14. The case of Baijnath Ramgopal v. Hem Chunder Bose, 10 C.W.N. 959 proceeds on this basis and appears to be in point. On a consideration of the authorities and taking a broad view of the substance of the matter I cannot but hold that the Court was unable by reason of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature to entertain the plaintiff's application for an order for payment. The order relegating the plaintiff to a suit was nothing more than an acknowledgment of this defective jurisdiction. In this view of the matter I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act. 62. Mr. Sinha urged that even if S. 14 applied the plaintiff was still out of time. The final decree was made on 25th August 1941 and, therefore, according to Mr. Sinha, the plaintiff's suit should ordinarily have been filed on 25th August 1944. The plaintiff, however, took out a summons on 15th August 1944 returnable on 22nd August 1944. Mr. Sinha argued that according to the recent decision of the Court on appeal in Shree Chand Daga Vs. Sohanlal Daga and Others, AIR 1943 Cal 257 the application must be taken as having been made on 22nd August 1944. The full period of limitation had only three days to run from that date. The running of time stopped on 22nd August 1944. That application was disposed of on 25th January 1945. Therefore time began to run again on and from 26th January 1945. The full period of limitation had only three days to run from that date. The running of time stopped on 22nd August 1944. That application was disposed of on 25th January 1945. Therefore time began to run again on and from 26th January 1945. The three days that were in hand expired on 29th January 1945 and the present suit which was filed on 31st January 1945 was consequently two days out of time. In the first place Mr. Sinha assumed that time began to run from the date of the final decree. I have already said that the suit terminated on the final decree being perfected which was on 4th February 1942. Assuming that the date of the decree namely 25th August 1941 was the starting point of time, it appears that on 15th August 1944 the plaintiff took out his summons returnable on 22nd August 1944 but on 15th August 1944 obtained an interim order on his petition. Therefore even according to Shree Chand Daga Vs. Sohanlal Daga and Others, AIR 1943 Cal 257 the application must be treated as having been made on 15th August 1944, for no interim order could be made unless the application had been made. In this view of the matter the running of time stopped on 15th August 1944 when there were yet ten days left in hand. The plaintiff's application was disposed of on 25th January 1945 and, therefore, he had ten days thereafter within which to file his suit. He filed his suit on 3lst August 1945 and the suit was, therefore, within time. I therefore answer issues 1(b) and 1(c) in the affirmative in favour of the plaintiff. 63. Re: Issues 2(a) and 2(b).- In para. 6 of the plaint it has been stated that besides the party and party costs under the preliminary decree the plaintiff received from or on behalf of the defendant the total sum of Rs. 8789-7-0 including Rs. 4819 7-0 from the public debt office by two money drafts. The plaintiff made over to the defendant Rs. 4819-7-0 being the amount of the said two money drafts receipt of which was acknowledged by the defendant by his receipt (Ex. J) After deducting Rs. 276-3-0 on account of some petty expenses and advances there remained a balance of Rs. 3693-13-0 in the bands of the plaintiff. This balance of Rs. The plaintiff made over to the defendant Rs. 4819-7-0 being the amount of the said two money drafts receipt of which was acknowledged by the defendant by his receipt (Ex. J) After deducting Rs. 276-3-0 on account of some petty expenses and advances there remained a balance of Rs. 3693-13-0 in the bands of the plaintiff. This balance of Rs. 3693-13-0 is alleged in para 8 of the plaint to have been appropriated as follows : Rupees 1901-9-6 as the attorney and client portion of the costs up to the preliminary decree in this suit, Rs. 357-0-6 against the amounts double crossed on taxation and Rs. 677-9-6 against the attorney and client portion of the taxed costs of Suit No. 1084 of 1931 referred to in the terms of settlement embodied in the final decree and the balance of Rs. 757-9-6 towards and on account of the attorney and client portion of the taxed costs of this suit subsequent to the preliminary decree. These appropriations are challenged. Mr. Sinha relying on Damodar Das Vs. Morgan and Co., AIR 1934 Cal 341 , a case to which reference has already been made contended that the plaintiff as attorney had no right to appropriate moneys received in one suit towards his claim in respect of other works done by him. Besides there was no evidence that any amount was due to the attorney for costs of Suit No. 1084 of 1931. Mr. Banerjee during his opening speech gave up Rs. 357-0-6 on account of the amounts double crossed and in his final address did not press his claim for appropriating Rs. 677-9-6 towards the costs of the other suit I have mentioned. The other two sums of Rs. 1901-9-6 and Rs. 757-9-6 have been appropriated towards the costs of this very suit These sums represent moneys received by the plaintiff from or on behalf of the plaintiff as costs of this suit and I do not see why they should not be applied towards such costs, even if there has been no previous appropriation. Therefore, Mr. Sinha's argument founded on S. 60 needs no consideration. I, therefore, answer these issues in favour of the plaintiff only in respect of these two sums. 64. Re: Issue 3. - The claim of the plaintiff is Rs. 12,988-15-0 for party and party portion of the costs and Rs. Therefore, Mr. Sinha's argument founded on S. 60 needs no consideration. I, therefore, answer these issues in favour of the plaintiff only in respect of these two sums. 64. Re: Issue 3. - The claim of the plaintiff is Rs. 12,988-15-0 for party and party portion of the costs and Rs. 18,890-11-3 for the balance of attorney and client portion of the costs under the allocatur issued in his favour on taxation under the final decree. These two sums make up the total sum of Rs. 31,879-10-3. There is no evidence before me as to the petty expenses or advances for which the plaintiff has sought to deduct Rs. 276-3-0. The plaintiff has also in his hands Rs. 357-0-6 which he deducted for amounts double crossed and Rs. 677-9 6 which he appropriated towards the costs of another suit, which two last mentioned amounts Mr. Banerjee gave up. These three sums aggregating to Rs. 1310-13-0 must therefore be deducted from the sum of Rs 31,879-10-3. This will reduce the plaintiff's claim to Rs. 30-568-13-3. My attention has not been drawn to any provision of law under which interest may be allowed to the plaintiff prior to the suit and, therefore, I allow none for that period. The claim of the plaintiff is for work done and moneys advanced by him as attorney for the defendant. Even after the issue of the allocatur the defendant did not pay up his dues. In his written statement the defendant made certain vague allegations about the attorney having received diverse other sums but those allegations were struck out for want of particulars. In these circumstances I think it is a fit case in which under S. 34 of the Code the Court will be justified in allowing interest pending suit. There will, therefore, be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 30,563-13-3 and interest thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from date of suit up to the date of this decree. The plaintiff will get the costs of this suit on scale No. 2 and further interest at 6 per cent. on the principal amount from the date of the decree until realisation and on costs from the date of taxation until realisation. Certified for two counsel.