JUDGMENT B.K. Mukherjea, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the plaintiffs, and it is directed against a judgment of Ormond J. dated 27th November 1945, by which he set aside a consent decree for ejectment made in favour of the appellants under the provision of para. 9B, sub-cl. (3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943. The facts so far as they are material for our present purposes lie within a short compass and may be stated as follows: The plaintiffs-appellants are the shebaits of an idol known as Sree Sree Radhakrishna Jiu which owns, amongst other properties, premises No. 26 W.C. Bonnerji Street in the town of Calcutta. Sometime in August 1940, the defendant came to occupy a portion of the said premises as a monthly tenant under the deity at a rental of Rs. 110 per month. On 29th September 1942, the plaintiffs served upon the defendant a notice to quit asking him to deliver possession of the portion of the premises in his occupation on the expiry of the last day of Kartik 1349 B.S. corresponding to 16th November 1942. As the defendant did not vacate the premises in spite of the notice the plaintiffs instituted a suit in the Original Bide of this Court on 5th December 1942, for recovery of possession of the disputed premises and for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 220. There was a claim for mesne profits also at the rate of Rs. 5 per diem from 17th November 1942. The defendant put in his written statement on 6th March 1943, and a variety of pleas were taken in answer to the plaintiffs' claim. His main contention was that there was an oral agreement between him and the plaintiffs under which the latter agreed to grant a five years' lease to him with an option for renewal for a further period. The execution of the document, it was said, was put off for some reason or other, but as the defendant was in possession of the premises on the basis of the said agreement he could not be treated as a monthly tenant. 2. The execution of the document, it was said, was put off for some reason or other, but as the defendant was in possession of the premises on the basis of the said agreement he could not be treated as a monthly tenant. 2. As regards the plaintiffs' claim for arrears of rent the defendant denied that he failed or neglected to pay the rent as alleged by the plaintiffs, and his case was that in view of the war conditions then prevailing the landlords did agree to a remission of rent to the extent of one-third of the amount agreed upon so long as the emergency lasted. The other defences put forward by the defendant are not material for our present purposes. 3. On 25th June 1943 the Calcutta House Rent Control Order came into operation and para. 9(1) of the Order stands as follows: No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable by this Order and performs the conditions of the tenancy. A proviso is attached to this sub-paragraph laying down that nothing in it shall apply (a) where the tenant has done any act contrary to the provisions of cl. (m), cl. (o) or cl. (p) of S. 108, T.P. Act, 1882 or (b) where the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, or (c) where the house is bona fide required by the landlord either for the purposes of building or re-building or for his own occupation....or where the landlord can show any cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court. Sub-paragraph (4) of para. 9 further provides: No tenant shall be entitled to the benefit of this paragraph in respect of any house unless he pays the rent due by him in respect of such house to the full extent allowable by this Order within the time fixed in the contract, with his landlord or in the absence of any such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable.... 4. On 27th March 1944, the suit came up for hearing before Gentle J. The issues were settled sometime before that. 4. On 27th March 1944, the suit came up for hearing before Gentle J. The issues were settled sometime before that. One of the issues which is issue No. 12 raised the question as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to eject the defendant by reason of para. 9, Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943. The parties, however, did not proceed with the case. The suit was compromised and the terms of settlement were put in, on the basis of which a decree was passed. Under the compromise the plaintiffs were given a decree for ejectment with mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 110 per month and arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 220 as claimed in the plaint. The plaintiffs undertook not to execute the decree for a period of six months after it was passed provided certain conditions relating to payment of rents and mesne profits were complied with by the defendant. The period of six months expired on 27th September 1914 and as the defendant did not vacate the premises even then, the plaintiffs were obliged to take out execution of the decree. The application for execution was resisted by the defendant inter alia on the allegation that the decree was adjusted by a subsequent oral agreement. This contention was negatived and the execution case was directed to proceed. The defendant thereupon filed a suit for specific performance of the alleged oral agreement which he had set up in the execution proceedings, and pending the hearing of the suit applied for a temporary injunction restraining the plaintiffs from proceeding with the execution of the decree. This application was rejected on 30th July 1945 and an appeal against the order of rejection was also dismissed by the appellate Court. 5. On 29th August 1945, the Calcutta House Rent Control Order of 1943 was amended and several new paragraphs were introduced; one of which is para. 9B. Sub-paragraph (3) of para 9B is material for our purpose and runs as follows: Where any decree or order for the recovery of possession of any house bas been made on or before the 29th day of August 1945 on the ground that the tenant in possession of such house is not entitled to the benefit of para. 9B. Sub-paragraph (3) of para 9B is material for our purpose and runs as follows: Where any decree or order for the recovery of possession of any house bas been made on or before the 29th day of August 1945 on the ground that the tenant in possession of such house is not entitled to the benefit of para. 9 by reason of his non-compliance with the provisions of this Order as to the payment or deposit of rent due by him in respect of such house but the possession of such house has not been recovered from the tenant; (a)...............; (b) the Court by which the decree or order was made shall set aside the decree or order if- (i) any application is made in that behalf by the judgment-debtor not later than the said 29th day of September 1945, and (ii) the judgment-debtor pays to the decree-holder or deposits in Court within such time as the Court may order the rent in arrear together with such portion of the cost of the suit or proceeding as may be determined by the Court. 6. Soon after this amended Order was promulgated, the defendant on 3rd September 1945, filed an application to set aside the consent decree passed against him on the ground that it was a decree for possession within the meaning of para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order, it being made prior to 29th August 1945 and on the ground that the defendant was in default regarding payment of rent. Ormond J., who heard the application allowed the prayer of the defendant and set aside the consent decree. It is against this judgment that the present appeal has been preferred. 7. Mr. Meyer who appears in support of the appeal has assailed the propriety of the decision of Ormond J., substantially on the ground that the decree for ejectment made in the present case is not one to which the provision of para. 9B(3) of the amended Calcutta House Rent Control Order could be attracted. He has argued first of all that para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order, contemplates a decree passed after adjudication by the Court upon grounds specified in the Order and cannot have any application to a decree passed on consent. He has contended in the alternative that even if the provision of para. He has argued first of all that para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order, contemplates a decree passed after adjudication by the Court upon grounds specified in the Order and cannot have any application to a decree passed on consent. He has contended in the alternative that even if the provision of para. 9B(3) can be extended to a decree made on consent, the decree for possession passed in the present case cannot be said to be one made on the ground that the tenant was not entitled to the protection of para. 9, Calcutta House Rent Control Order because of his default in his payment or deposit of rent. 8. Mr. Dutt who appears for the respondent has contended inter alia that there is no reason why the expression "decree" as used in para. 9, Calcutta House Rent Control Order should not include a consent decree and in the present case from the pleadings of the parties as well as the terms of the compromise decree itself, the conclusion is irresistible that the decree was one which is hit by para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order. It may be stated hear that subsequent to the judgment of Ormond J., against which this appeal has been taken, this question whether a consent decree comes or not within the purview of para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order did come up for consideration in two cases; one of which was heard and decided by Gentle J., and the other by Clough J. Both the learned Judges differed from the view taken by Ormond J., and held that a decree for possession passed on consent of the parties is excluded by the language of para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order. Mr. Meyer not unnaturally, lays considerable stress upon the pronouncements of these two learned Judges which are to be found reported in Sm. Parbati Debt v. Dr. S.N. Sen, 50 C.W.N 242 and Sm. Kironsashi Dassee v. Hirendra Nath Das, 50 C.W.N. 245. 9. I may say at the outset that it cannot be disputed as a general proposition of law that the legal effects of a decree passed on compromise do not materially differ from those of a decree made in a contested suit. S.N. Sen, 50 C.W.N 242 and Sm. Kironsashi Dassee v. Hirendra Nath Das, 50 C.W.N. 245. 9. I may say at the outset that it cannot be disputed as a general proposition of law that the legal effects of a decree passed on compromise do not materially differ from those of a decree made in a contested suit. A consent decree is as much binding on the parties thereto as a decree after a contentious trial and the mode of enforcement is identically the same. I agree with what was said by Mookerjee J., in Bharat Ramanuja Das v. Sarat Kamini Dasi, 34 C.L.J. 96 : (A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 358), that when a Court makes a decree by consent, it performs not a ministerial but a judicial act. The duties of the Court are laid down in O. 23, R. 3, Civil P.C., and it must be satisfied that the agreement is a lawful one before it can be recorded and a decree passed under it. At the same time the proposition is well settled that a consent order is a mere creature of agreement between the parties to the suit. A contract, as has been held by English and Indian Courts, is none-the-less a contract because there is superadded to it the command of a Judge. Vide Huddersfield Banking Co. v. Lister, (1895) 2 Ch. 273 : (64 L.J. Ch. 523), Kushodhaj Bhakta v. Brojo Mohan Bhakta, 19 C.W.N. 1228 : (A.I.R 1916 Cal. 816) and Budhu Ahir Vs. Emperor, AIR 1921 Cal 356 . It may be as has been argued by Mr. Dutt, that a decree given in accordance with the terms of a compromise does not prevent it from being the formal expression by the Court of an adjudication on a right claimed or a defence set up. But what the Court really does is to give formal expression to the agreement between the parties and nothing else. In the language of Kay L.J., in the case of Huddersfield Banking Co. v. Lister, ( (1895) 2 Ch. 273 : 64 L.J. Ch. 523), quoted above, the consent order is only the order of the Court carrying out the agreement between the parties. 10. Now the wording of para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order does not in terms exclude a consent decree. v. Lister, ( (1895) 2 Ch. 273 : 64 L.J. Ch. 523), quoted above, the consent order is only the order of the Court carrying out the agreement between the parties. 10. Now the wording of para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order does not in terms exclude a consent decree. In order to satisfy the requirements of the sub-paragraph it is necessary however that the decree for possession should be passed on the ground that the tenant is not entitled to the benefit of para. 9 of the Order by reason of his default in the payment or deposit of rent. The first and the general question is can this condition be fulfilled when the decree is one made on consent. I agree with Clough J. that the ground upon which a consent decree is passed is the factum of agreement between the parties. The reasons for which the parties did arrive at an agreement and the motives which actuated them in doing so are altogether immaterial and in no sense constitute the basis of the consent decree. The motives which impelled the parties to come to an agreement may not be the same. The tenant may have reasons of his own for vacating the premises and shifting elsewhere whereas the landlord might agree to get rid of the tenant for a different reason altogether. But so long as the parties agree that the defendant should vacate the premises a decree can be passed by the Court on the basis of the agreement itself without anything further to go upon. I do not think that it was the intention of the authority which promulgated these control orders that it would be the subject-matter of investigation in a subsequent proceeding as to whether the parties did agree to ejectment because of this reason or that. 11. That would be to reopen for decision the very question which the parties chose to leave undecided in the suit itself. Again it happens, not infrequently that the tenant agrees to pay some money as rent to the landlord only for the purpose of purchasing peace or for the purpose of getting some other incidental advantage in the nature of further time to vacate the premises, although nothing might be due actually as rent. Again it happens, not infrequently that the tenant agrees to pay some money as rent to the landlord only for the purpose of purchasing peace or for the purpose of getting some other incidental advantage in the nature of further time to vacate the premises, although nothing might be due actually as rent. It would not be correct to say in such cases that the amount which the tenant thus agrees to pay is the rent in arrears within the meaning of para. 9B(3) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. It may be argued that while this is true in regard to cases where by consent of the parties a simple decree for possession is made and the tenant agrees to vacate the premises immediately or within a certain time, yet there may be cases where the compromise itself would indicate that the decree for possession was consented to because of a certain legal position which both the parties assumed to be correct and which constituted the foundation of the agreement. Thus the compromise decree itself might show that there was default on the part of the tenant in regard to payment or deposit of rent which disentitled him to any protection under para. 9 of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, and it was on account of this fact that he consented to a decree for eviction. In such cases it can certainly be argued that the decree even though passed on consent does attract the operation of para. 9B(3) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. It is not, however, necessary for purposes of the present case to decide as to whether or not para. 9B(3) excludes consent decrees altogether. We will assume for our present purposes that a consent decree does come within the purview of this paragraph. We think, however, that even though we decide the general question in favour of the defendant, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the consent decree that has been passed in the present case does not attract the operation of para. 9B(3) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. The terms of compromise which are before us merely state that a decree for possession had been made in favour of the plaintiffs and no ground whatsoever has been stated as to why the decree is made. 9B(3) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. The terms of compromise which are before us merely state that a decree for possession had been made in favour of the plaintiffs and no ground whatsoever has been stated as to why the decree is made. If we look to the plaint it was simply a case of an ejectment on service of notice to quit and nothing else. There was certainly an allegation that rent was in arrears but ejectment could not be claimed and in fact was not claimed at that date on the ground of any default in the payment of rent. It is true that there was a decree for arrears of rent made on consent; but as we have said already simply because there was a decree for rent we cannot necessarily come to the conclusion that the decree for possession was passed on account of the default, if any. If the case was fought out in Court, the plaintiffs might have satisfied the Judge that the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of para. 9 of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order by reason of any of the circumstances specified in the proviso attached to para. 9(1) and need not have relied upon the fact of non-payment of rent at all. Mr. Dutt argues that having regard to the pleadings of the parties it was not open to the plaintiffs to make any other case in support of their claim for eviction except that the defendant was a defaulter with regard to payment of rent. We are not impressed by this argument. The plaint was filed long before the Calcutta House Rent Control Order came into operation and it was a simple suit for ejectment based upon the ground that the tenancy had come to an end by reason of the service of notice to quit. When the suit came up for hearing the case indeed had to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order that was then in force, and that is why it seems to us that issue No. 12 was framed and it was wide enough to enable the parties to adduce evidence on all matters which might be relevant under para. 9. 9. It is true that the pleadings were not amended but that could have been done at any time before the suit was heard and dismissed. But as the parties were going to compromise the matter no amendment of pleadings was considered necessary. 12. Mr. Dutt argued last of all that it was not open to the Court to sanction a compromise under which the plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession of the demised premises, if none of the grounds were present which would justify a decree for ejectment under the provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order then in force. Such a compromise according to him would be unlawful and without jurisdiction. I am not prepared to accept this contention as sound. Strictly speaking, the question whether a compromise was lawful or not and could be recorded by the Court is one outside the scope of the present proceeding. But quite apart from that I do not think that the compromise itself violates the provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. Under cl. (c) of para. 9(1) a decree for possession could be passed if the landlord shows any cause which the Court considers satisfactory. I agree with Clough J. that the intention of the legislative authority was to give protection to the tenant against the landlord and not from himself and it is difficult to conceive of a more satisfactory reason than that all the parties concerned agreed that the tenant should vacate the premises within a certain date. 13. The result is that in my view the decision of Ormond J. is not right. The appeal consequently will be allowed and the order of Ormond J. set aside. The application of the defendant to set aside the decree under para. 9B(3) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order stands dismissed. The appellant will have his costs here and below. Harries, C.J. 14. I entirely agree.