JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs whose suit for possession has been dismissed by the Courts below. 2. On June 23, 1937, the Defendant purchased the property, in execution of his simple money decree, for Rd. 50. The Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act (Act No. X of 1937) came into force on January 1, 1938, and the proceedings were accordingly held up. The judgment-debtors applied for amendment of the decree under the Agriculturists' Relief Act (Act No. 27 of 1934) and the prayer was granted by an order of March 5, 1938. The amount fixed was reduced and certain instalments were allowed. On April 19, 1941, there was, in compliance with the request of the judgment debtors, a further amendment under the U. P. Debt Redemption Act (Act No 13 of 1941), with the result that the sum found payable to the decree-holder was Rs. 85. In 1943, the decree-hclder applied for confirmation of the sale and had it confirmed. The judgment-debtors, therefore, moved an application for setting aside the sale before the Revenue Officer, but failed in their attempt. The present suit was instituted on January 8, 1944, in the Court of the Munsif of Khurja. The case with which they came to Court, briefly this: 3. The original decree had been amended and no confirmation of it was legally possible. The order granting confirmation was passed without notice. The land was protected land within the meaning of Section 17 of the U. P. Debt Redemption Act and the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to hold a sale of that property. It was also pleaded that the decree-holder was aware of the amendments and that, in with holding this information from the Revenue Officer, be committed fraud. 4. The suit was resisted principally on the ground that the conduct of the decree-holder did not amount to fraud. It was also pleaded that the Defendant did not know that the land was protected and, at all events, it was the duty of the judgment-debtors to have furnished the necessary information to the Court and the sale, as made, was not without jurisdiction. The bar of Order 21, Rule 92 of the Code of CPC was also pleaded. There was a further plea that the suit was barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. The bar of Order 21, Rule 92 of the Code of CPC was also pleaded. There was a further plea that the suit was barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Both the Courts below have dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit on the finding that there was no fraud perpetrated by the decree-holder and that Order 21, Rule 92, of the Code of CPC operated as a bar to the suit. They have, however, repelled the objection that the suit fell within the mischief of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiffs have come to this Court in second appeal. 6. The case came up before me on January 21, 1947. On the statement of the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the land was protected land, I granted him a short adjournment in order to secure definite instructions. He has filed an affidavit sworn by one Hari Raj Singh, who professes to be a pairokar of the Appellants to the effect that the land in dispute is protected land. I adopted this course as the language of Section 17 of the U. P. Debt Redemption Act is unmistakable and emphatic in its prohibition of the alienation of a land of this character except in the manner provided by the Act itself. I proceeded on the analogy of the class of cases like Katwart v. Sita Ram Tewari, (1921)19 A L J 47 3, Hanuman Prasad Narain Singh v. Harakb Narain, (1920) 18 A L J 59, and Satdhav v, Ram Chandra, (1923 A L J 917,which are authority for the proposition that where the land is inalienable, a plea that it cannot be touched in execution, is available to the judgment-debtor even in proceedings in execution, even though no plea to this effect was raised in the suit itself. This is only an amplification of the principle of law that there can be no estoppel against a statute. I have, however, decided to send down an issue to the Court below as to whether the land in dispute is protected land within the meaning of Section 17 of the U. P. Debt Redemption Act (Act No. 13 of 1941), inasmuch as it might be possible for the decree-holder to rebut this position. 7. I have, however, decided to send down an issue to the Court below as to whether the land in dispute is protected land within the meaning of Section 17 of the U. P. Debt Redemption Act (Act No. 13 of 1941), inasmuch as it might be possible for the decree-holder to rebut this position. 7. But before I do so, I deem it necessary to address myself to some of the arguments which have been raised by the learned Counsel for the parties; by the learned Counsel for the appeallants in support of the contention that the suit was not barred by Order 21, Rule 92, and that such a suit is permissible, and by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that the suit is so barred and that, on the findings recorded by the Court below, the second appeal is not entertainable. 8. Coming now to the first question whether Order 21, Rule 92 constitutes a bar to the suit, it has been conceded by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that, if there is an allegation of fraud and if that fraud is established, the bar will cease to exist, Indeed, there have been so many cases of this Court on the point that the learned Counsel has acted very properly in taking this stand. To mention just one, there is the case of Bhagwan Das Marwari v. Suraj Prasad singh, 1924 A L J 1060 What, therefore, fall to consider whether the allegation of fraud has been substantiated. 9. The learned Counsel for the Appellants however, contends that, even apart from the plea of fraud, the suit does not fall within the mischief of Order 21, Rule 92, as the nature of the property and the facts of the case do not attract the application of that provision of the law. 10. I must, however, before dealing with Order 21, Rule 92, clear the ground by saying that this Court, has in the unreported case of Alauddin Khan v. Narain Das (Execution First Appeal No. 88 of 1942, decided on May 3, 1944) a case to which I was a party, held that an express order of confirmation of sale is necessary in all cases. 11. The language of the order of June 23, 1937, leaves no room for argument on this question. 11. The language of the order of June 23, 1937, leaves no room for argument on this question. It says that the confirmation of the sale shall be postponed till an order of the Court. Mr. Shyam Behari Lal Gaur, the learned Counsel for the Appellants, states that no notice of the order confirming the sale was received by his clients. This position Mr. Chandra Bhan Agarwala, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, is not in a position to controvert. That the provisions of Order 21, Rule 92 must be strictly followed was held by this Court in Panna Lal v. Bhola Nath, (1931) 53 All 152. Indeed, it seems absolutely necessary that it should be so, because it is a very drastic provision of law and has, in certain cases, led to the extinction of rights. To the precise effect of want of notice to the judgment-debtors when the Court passed the order of confirmation it is not necessary to address myself. 12. Order 21, Rule 92 sums up the result of the preceding rules starting from Rule 89. Rule 89 deals with an application to set aside the sale on deposit. The present is not a case of that character. Rule 90 deals with an application to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud. but the irregularity or fraud must be in the publication or the conduct of the sale. But where the sale is not attacked on the above grounds, but on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the sale officer to hold the sale at all. Rule 92 shall, to my mind, have no application. This view of mine receives support from the observations of Mr. Justice Boys in Bulaqi Das v. Kesri, 1928 A L J 716 at 720. Says the learned Judge but it is not all questions in which an auction-purchaser is involved that come within that bar but only those which come within the scope of one or other of the Rules 89, 90 and 91. 13. Almost to the same effect is the decision in Ram Kishun v. Lalta Singh, 1928 A L J 1160 at 1164. 13. Almost to the same effect is the decision in Ram Kishun v. Lalta Singh, 1928 A L J 1160 at 1164. If Order 21, Rule 92, Sub-clause (3) were taken laterally, no suit would ever lie to set aside an order confirming a sale where any application under Rules 89, 90 or 91 has been disallowed or not made at all. I am inclined to think that this rule cannot be understood in that wide and comprehensive sense. When the decree itself is being attacked on account of want of jurisdiction or even on account of fraud, undue influence or coercion, as distinct fr.om any irregularity of fraud in the sale, I think a separate suit undoubtedly lies. Also see Mangal Sen v. Mathura Prasad, 1935 A W R. 162. 14. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has taken his stand principally on the case of Agha Husain v. Qasim Ali, (1925) 23 A L J 946. The ratio of the case was that different considerations arise when the rights of third parties have come into existence. 15. This case affords no parallel to the case before me. 16. It is also contended that the case of Bulaqi Das cannot, in view of the decision of this Court in Rahim Bukhsh v. Kishan Lai, 1939 A W R (H C). 126, be treated as good law. The facts of this case were entirely different. There some property not mortgaged was sold. There was no doubt an impropriety in the sale, but there was no lack of jurisdiction. 17. The position before me is different from what it was before the learned Judges in the case of Rahim Bukhsh. Here by reason of the amendment, which was allowed to the judgment-debtors, Under the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act and the U. P. Debt Redemption Act, a new decree, entirely different from the original, had come into existence. It was held in Zamin Ali v. Parshotam Chandra,1938 A W R (HC). 407, that after the conversion of the decree into an instalment decree, the sale held in pursuance of the original decree must be set aside. 18. The confirmation of the original sale was, therefore, invalid and without jurisdiction. 19. It was held in Zamin Ali v. Parshotam Chandra,1938 A W R (HC). 407, that after the conversion of the decree into an instalment decree, the sale held in pursuance of the original decree must be set aside. 18. The confirmation of the original sale was, therefore, invalid and without jurisdiction. 19. In the view which I have taken that the facts of this case do not attract the application of Order 21, Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the objection, did not relate to Rules 89, 90 or 91, there is obviously no bar to the suit. In this view of the case it is not necessary to deal with the question of fraud. 20. I, therefore, send down the following issues: Is the property in dispute "protected land" within the meaning of Section 17 of the U. P. Debt Redemption Act, Act No. 13 of 1941? (2) Did the Appellants have notice of the proceedings relating to the confirmation of the sale? 21. The parties shall be allowed additional evidence. The learned Additional Civil Judge is requested to return his findings within two months from this date. On receipt of the findings the usual ten days shall be allowed for objections.