JUDGMENT Das, J. - The material facts leading up to the present proceedings for judgment upon award may shortly be stated as follows: A business is carried on in this city under the name and style of "Modi Brothers." There is no dispute that this business belongs to a Mitakshara joint Hindu family and that Bhuramull Modi as the karta of that family manages this business. In the usual course of business Modi Brothers entered into a contract with Munshi Lal & Sons for the sale of certain quantity of paper. Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties to that contract the same were referred to the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The arbitration agreement, so far as Modi Brothers was concerned, was subscribed as follows:-"Modi Brothers by the pen of Bhuramull Modi, the Manager and karta of the joint family Business Modi Brothers." 2. On 20th December, 1944, the Tribunal of Arbitration made an award declaring that the contract was valid and binding upon the parties and directing Modi Brothers to pay to Munshi Lal & Sons the sum of Rs. 3,360. This award was forwarded by the Tribunal of Arbitration to the Registrar of this Court with a request that the award be filed. The award was filed on or about 27th June, 1945. Under sec. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act a notice addressed to Messrs. Munshi Lal & Sons and Messrs. Modi Brothers was issued by the Registrar at the instance of Munshi Lal & Sons and served by registered post at the place of business of Modi Brothers. 3. On 4th November, 1945, Bhuramull Modi as such karta as aforesaid made an application to this Court for setting aside the award on a variety of grounds. One of the grounds was that the award was bad because it purported to be one against a joint Hindu family business. This objection, I am told, was not regarded as quite appropriate on that application and consequently was not pressed at that stage. I gather that the Court gave liberty to the applicant to raise the objection at the time when the Court would proceed to pronounce judgment upon the award. The application for setting aside the award was, therefore, fought out on other grounds and was eventually dismissed on the 4th June, 1946. 4. I gather that the Court gave liberty to the applicant to raise the objection at the time when the Court would proceed to pronounce judgment upon the award. The application for setting aside the award was, therefore, fought out on other grounds and was eventually dismissed on the 4th June, 1946. 4. On the same day after the dismissal of that application the Court took up the matter of judgment upon the award. Learned Counsel appearing for Munshi Lal & Sons apprehending that the notice directed to Messrs. Modi Brothers and served at its place of business might be held to be misconceived and invalid, applied for an adjournment to enable his client to get fresh notice to be issued and served on proper parties. The prayer for adjournment was granted and a direction for issue of a fresh notice was given upon certain terms as to payment of costs. 5. On 11th June, 1946, a fresh notice addressed to Messrs Munshi Lal & Sons and to Bhuramull Modi of Modi Brothers was issued and has since been duly served on him. Bhuramull Modi has filed an affidavit admitting that he is the karta but contending that as Modi Brothers is a joint family business the award against it is a nullity and is illegal and the award or the decree which is sought to be obtained thereon will not be capable of execution at all. An affidavit in opposition has been filed controverting the several contentions mentioned above Bhuramull Modi has filed a reply re-iterating his contentions. The matter has now come before me for hearing. It is not disputed that Modi Brothers is a joint Hindu family business. 6. Three several points have been raised in the argument, namely, (i) whether an award for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name is at all valid; (ii) whether judgment can be passed under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name upon an award in favour of or against it; (iii) whether judgment can be passed upon such an award for or against the members of the joint Hindu family individually or their karta as such. 7. Re. 7. Re. (i): The objection that an award cannot be validly made for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name was raised on the application for setting aside the award. If the reasons urged in support of this objection to which I shall refer in greater detail hereafter, are well founded, then this objection clearly constitutes a valid ground for setting aside the award under sec. 30 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. As this objection comes under that section it should have been pressed on that application. That application could not be dismissed without rejecting this objection. The dismissal of that application should ordinarily amount to an implied adjudication that this objection is not well founded. It is, however, pointed out that the Court gave liberty to the applicant for setting aside the award to raise this objection at the time of the passing of judgment on the award. It may well be doubted whether the Court had power, while dismissing that application, to give liberty to the unsuccessful party to re-agitate an objection which might have been and should have been raised against such dismissal. [C. F. Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Bakhsh Singh L. R. 52 I. A. 100: s. c. 29 C. C. N. 749 (1924) ]. In any event the dismissal of that application for setting aside the award with a reservation of liberty to raise this objection may well give rise to an anomalous position. That dismissal, as I have said, means or implies that the award is a good award. If I now accede to the objection, it will necessarily mean that I hold that the award is a bad award. That certainly will be an awkward position. In my opinion this objection should have been pressed and should have been heard and determined on the application for setting aside the award. As, however, the matter has been argued on its merits, it is right that I should express my views on it, instead of summarily refusing to entertain the point on principles analogous to res judicata. I am happy that the conclusion I have reached on this point will be consonant with the dismissal of the application for setting aside the award and will not give rise to any anomalous or awkward position. 8. The arguments in support of this objection may now be summarised. I am happy that the conclusion I have reached on this point will be consonant with the dismissal of the application for setting aside the award and will not give rise to any anomalous or awkward position. 8. The arguments in support of this objection may now be summarised. It is pointed out, on the analogy of a partnership firm, that a joint Hindu family business is not a juridical entity and is not recognised as such in a Court of law. In England after the introduction of Or. 48A of the Rules of the Supreme Court in 1891 and in India after the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, came into force a firm was permitted to sue or be sued in the firm name and was recognised as an entity for the limited purpose of suing or being sued. The provisions of Or. 30, however, do not apply to a joint Hindu family business and the position of such a business remains unchanged and is similar to that of a firm before the introduction of those provisions. Such a business cannot sue or be sued in a Court of law in its trading name and, therefore, no decree can be passed in favour of or against a joint Hindu family business as such. Arbitration proceedings are quasi-judicial proceedings and a joint Hindu family business as such cannot figure as a claimant or an objector before the arbitrator just as it cannot figure as a Plaintiff or a Defendant in a Court of law and consequently no award can be properly or validly made in favour of or against a joint Hindu family business as such just as a decree cannot be made against it. The contention is that the trading name of a joint Hindu family business has no meaning or content either in a Court of law or before the arbitrator and an award for or against such a name is not an award for or against any juridical person, and no claim founded on it can be recognised or enforced by a Court of law for or against any body. An award for or against a joint Hindu family business as such is therefore a nullity and of no effect. 9. It will be noticed that the argument is founded on the analogy of the legal conception of a firm. An award for or against a joint Hindu family business as such is therefore a nullity and of no effect. 9. It will be noticed that the argument is founded on the analogy of the legal conception of a firm. I propose, therefore, to consider the real position of a firm in the eye of the law and then consider the true position in law of a joint Hindu family business. 10. It is said that a firm is not a legal entity. What is the implication of this proposition? It is well known that there is a difference in the notions of commercial men and lawyers respecting the nature of a firm. Commercial men look upon a firm in the light in which lawyers look upon a Corporation, that is to say, as a body distinct from the members composing it and having rights and obligations distinct from those of its members. That, however, is not the legal notion of a firm. The firm is not recognised by English lawyers as distinct from its members. (See Lindley on Partnership, 10th Edn., Ch. VII, p. 146-147). It is to bring out and emphasise this legal notion of a firm that it is said that a firm is not a legal entity. This does not mean that the law does not recognise a firm for any purpose. It does not mean that a firm name has, in the eye of law, no meaning or content. The firm name is. a compendious mode of describing the partners. To the business man as well as to the lawyer it means and signifies the partners. When a contract is entered into by a firm in its firm name, it is understood in the trade as well as in law as being in reality a contract entered into by the partners. A contract entered into in the firm name was always and is a good and valid contract and could always be and can now be enforced in a Court of law. The only drawback in England, before the introduction of the rules now incorporated and collected in Or 48A of the Rules of the Supreme Court was that the proceedings to enforce such a contract in a Court of law had to be taken by or against the partners in their individual names. The only drawback in England, before the introduction of the rules now incorporated and collected in Or 48A of the Rules of the Supreme Court was that the proceedings to enforce such a contract in a Court of law had to be taken by or against the partners in their individual names. The old English law of procedure did not recognise the firm as an entity for the purpose of suing or being sued. The old law of procedure required that a juridical person, e.g., an individual or a Corporation should figure on the record as a Plaintiff or a Defendant. This prevented partners from suing or being sued in their firm name, for a firm name was neither a person nor a legal entity apart from its partners. The inconvenience of this technical rule of procedure was mitigated by the provisions now to be found in Or 48A. Under these rules a firm is permitted to sue or to be sued in the firm name. No body is, however, obliged to take advantage of these rules of procedure and the old method of suing or being sued in the individual names of partners remains. These new rules of procedure have not introduced any change in the substantive law in the sense that they for the first time have made the firm name a compendious form of designating the partners or enabled a firm to enter into contracts in the firm name or enabled such contracts to be enforced. The firm name was always regarded as a compendious mode of describing the partners constituting the firm, and independently of these rules contracts used to be freely entered into by firms in firm names and such contracts always could be enforced. These rules have simply introduced a more convenient rule of procedure for filing of suits by or against firms. They have not in any way enlarged the capacity of a firm to enter into a contract in the firm name. That capacity existed and was recognised long before these rules were introduced in England, It is too extravagant to say that before the introduction of these rules a contract in a firm name was a nullity. 11. The position of a firm in India was the same as in England. That capacity existed and was recognised long before these rules were introduced in England, It is too extravagant to say that before the introduction of these rules a contract in a firm name was a nullity. 11. The position of a firm in India was the same as in England. The notions of English lawyers as to a firm were reflected in the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, dealing with partnership. There is no reason whatever to doubt that firms in India freely used to enter into contracts in the firm name and that contracts so entered into used to be recognised and enforced in Courts of law. Prior to 1908 such contracts had to be enforced by suits filed in the individual names of the partners. The CPC of 1908 reproduced the provisions of Or. 48A of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Like its English counterpart Or. 30 introduced a simpler and more convenient rule of procedure enabling a firm to sue or to be sued. The old method of suit in individual names of partners still remains. These new rules have not for the first time authorised a firm to enter into a contract in the firm name. That capacity always existed and was recognised from before the introduction of the new Code. 12. If a firm could always, both in England and in India, enter into a valid contract in the firm name there could be no reason why it should not enter into a valid submission in the firm name. A submission is nothing more than a contract. The convenience and exigencies of trade and commerce did always, as they do now, require this capacity. An arbitration clause was and is a common feature in commercial contracts which are habitually and frequently entered into by firms in the firm name. It is impossible to overlook this practice of business men both in England and in India. It is common knowledge that these arbitration agreements were and are acted upon and arbitrators did and do enter upon references made pursuant to such agreements and make their awards for or against firms. There was and is nothing in the Arbitration Act in England or in India which imposed the technical rules of procedure relating to parties in a suit on arbitration proceedings. There was and is nothing in the Arbitration Act in England or in India which imposed the technical rules of procedure relating to parties in a suit on arbitration proceedings. Arbitrators felt or found no difficulty in entering upon references made in the firm names or in making awards for or against firms. I have been referred to no English case where it has been held that an arbitration agreement in the firm name, or a reference to arbitration in the firm name or an award for or against a firm in the firm name is a nullity or is unenforceable. In the case of Hardwary Mull v. Ahmed Musaji Selaji (1913) 18 C. W. N. 63 which came before the Court after the present CPC of 1908 came into force, Fletcher, J., expressed the view that an award made against a firm without determining who the partners were was bad on the face of it. This view was, however, dissented from by Rankin, J., as he then was, in Louis Dreyfus & Co. v. Purusottam Das Narain Das I. L. R. (1920) Cal. 29. After rejecting the objection that an award against a firm was bad the learned Judge concluded as follows: It is perfectly well known in India, just as it has been known for many years in England, that a large proportion of awards in commercial cases are made in favour of or against the firm. Business cannot be carried on unless commercial men who have constituted themselves into firms can be allowed to deal with firms, and I shall be doing something that I shall be extremely sorry to do, causing much inconvenience and trouble, giving much opportunity for fraud and collusion, if I give my assent to the argument which has been put before me. 13. I respectfully endorse every word of the above passage. This decision has been approved and adopted by the Bombay High Court in Babu Kirparam Vs. Jawaharsingh Harnamdas, AIR 1932 Bom 375 and in Manilal Lallubhai v. Bharat Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd. (1933) I. L. R. 58 Bom. 162. 13. I respectfully endorse every word of the above passage. This decision has been approved and adopted by the Bombay High Court in Babu Kirparam Vs. Jawaharsingh Harnamdas, AIR 1932 Bom 375 and in Manilal Lallubhai v. Bharat Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd. (1933) I. L. R. 58 Bom. 162. In the last-mentioned case Kania, J., observed as follows at p. 164: It cannot be disputed that one or more partners can enter into a contract in the name of their firm and the transaction so entered into in the name of the firm would be binding on all the partners. It cannot also be disputed that in the event of a dispute in respect of a transaction so entered into there can be a settlement of the dispute between the contracting parties in the name of the firm and such settlement would be binding on all the partners of the firm. If instead of settling the disputes directly between the contracting parties the question of settlement is left to a third party by a partner, who is authorised by other partners to so refer the question to a third party, or because of an express term in the contract itself, as is the case here, the settlement of the dispute is left to a third party, I do not see how it can be contended that when the third party has decided the dispute the settlement is not binding on the firm. The settlement so brought about is technically known as arbitration and award. The decision, which is the award, is by reason of sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act enforceable as if it was a decree of the Court and that is what the Petitioners are trying to do in the present case. If these proceedings are looked at from this point of view the presence or absence of the provisions of Or. 30 in the Code had nothing to do with the question whether an award for or against a firm can be made or not. It cannot be argued that before Or. 30 was enacted a transaction could not be entered into or settled in the name of the firm. 14. On appeal the decision of Kania, J., was upheld. 30 in the Code had nothing to do with the question whether an award for or against a firm can be made or not. It cannot be argued that before Or. 30 was enacted a transaction could not be entered into or settled in the name of the firm. 14. On appeal the decision of Kania, J., was upheld. On this point Beaumont, C. J., stated his opinion as follows: It is said, first, that there cannot be an award against a firm in the firm name. There is, in my opinion, no substance in that point. If a firm in the firm name enters into a contract containing a clause for submission of disputes to arbitration, I see no reason why the resulting arbitration should not be in the firm name. 15. To the like effect are the observations of Rangnekar, J., at p. 179. It is thus firmly established that an award in favour of or against a firm is a perfectly valid award. 16. In England there never was any difficulty in enforcing awards of arbitrators. There was no difficulty in filing a suit on an award in favour of or against a firm just as there was no difficulty in suing upon a contract entered into by a firm in its firm name. Under the old rules of procedure the suit upon the award had to be filed in the individual names of the partners. Proceeding by way of a suit upon an award was a well recognised mode of enforcing an award. It is not necessary for me to trace the history of English legislation dealing with arbitration. Suffice it to say that eventually the Arbitration Act of 1889 provided a more convenient and speedy method of enforcing an award. By sec. 12 of that Act, an award on a submission could, by leave of the Court or a Judge, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect. Thus since 1889 it became possible in England for an award to be enforced in execution proceedings without a suit being brought upon it. Or. 48A of the Rules of the Supreme Court enabled firms to sue or to be sued in the firm name and permitted judgments to be passed for or against a firm in the firm name. Rule 8 of Or. Or. 48A of the Rules of the Supreme Court enabled firms to sue or to be sued in the firm name and permitted judgments to be passed for or against a firm in the firm name. Rule 8 of Or. 48A prescribed the procedure for the execution of a judgment against a firm. On the introduction of Or. 48A it became at once possible to enforce an award for or against a firm in the same manner as a judgment or order for or against a firm. The combined effect of sec. 12 of the English Arbitration Act, 1889 and Or. 48A was to provide a convenient and speedy mode of enforcement of awards for or against a firm. This new mode of execution was, however, optional and the old mode of proceeding by way of suit remained and is even now available in England. If, therefore, enforceability be a test of validity then an award for or against a firm was always and is valid, for it was always and is even now enforceable by a suit. Such an award did not, and does not, for its validity, depend on the provisions of sec. 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1889 and Or. 48A. The last-mentioned provisions have only provided an additional and more expeditious mode of enforcing an award for or against a firm in the firm name. They have not conferred any new capacity on a firm to enter into contracts in the firm name or on the arbitrators to make awards for or against a firm. Such capacity always existed. The wider considerations of public convenience and the exigencies of trade and commerce referred to by Rankin, J., held good as well before as after the introduction of these new provisions. 17. In India the matter developed in the same way. Contracts made by firms could be enforced by a suit properly constituted, namely, by a suit in the individual names of the partners as Plaintiffs or Defendants. The fact cannot be overlooked that in India as in England commercial people freely entered into contracts in their firm names and constantly referred disputes arising out of such contracts to arbitration out of Court and that arbitrators freely entered upon references made by firms and made awards for or against firms. The fact cannot be overlooked that in India as in England commercial people freely entered into contracts in their firm names and constantly referred disputes arising out of such contracts to arbitration out of Court and that arbitrators freely entered upon references made by firms and made awards for or against firms. Such awards could be easily enforced by suits properly constituted, that is, by suits filed in the individual names of the partners. The Indian Arbitration Act of 1899, like its English counterpart, provided a simpler and speedier machinery, for the enforcement of awards made out of Court in Presidency Towns, for under sec. 15 of that Act an award, on being filed in Court, became executable as if it were a decree of the Court. Therefore execution could be taken out in respect of an award against an individual or a Corporation and a suit was not necessary any longer. But under that section the award was executable as if it were a decree of the Court. Under the old CPC there could not be a decree in favour of or against a firm as such and therefore it was not perhaps possible to take advantage of sec. 15 in enforcement of an award for or against a firm in the firm name. Nevertheless such an award was not a nullity for it could be enforced by a suit. Then came our new CPC of 1908. It incorporated the provisions of Or. 48A of the Rules of the Supreme Court with slight verbal alterations. Rules 1 to 7 and Rules 10 to 11 of Or. 48A have been included in our Or. 30 and rule 8 of Or. 48A has been reproduced in our Or. 21, r. 50. On the introduction of these rules in India it became possible for awards against firms to be enforced in execution proceedings. The combined effect of sec. 15 of our old Arbitration Act and Or. 21, r. 50 was to provide a simpler mode of execution of such awards. Like their English counterparts they also did not confer any new capacity on firms to enter into contracts in the firm name or on arbitrators to make awards in the firm name. The same considerations of public convenience and exigencies of trade referred to by Rankin, J., required and postulated such capacity which always existed independently of those provisions. Like their English counterparts they also did not confer any new capacity on firms to enter into contracts in the firm name or on arbitrators to make awards in the firm name. The same considerations of public convenience and exigencies of trade referred to by Rankin, J., required and postulated such capacity which always existed independently of those provisions. It is true that Rankin, J., in his judgment in Louis Dreyfus & Co.'s case I. L. R. (1920) Cal. 29, referred to these provisions but his decision in favour of the validity of such an award was not founded on those provisions only but was broad-based on general principles and grounds of convenience and commercial practice. He referred to the speedier mode of execution as only an argument in support of the validity of such an award. The validity of such an award could as well be supported by reason of its being enforceable by a suit. If enforceability were a test of validity of such awards under the Indian Law they were valid for they were always enforceable by a suit before 1908. Since 1908 they became also enforceable by the new and additional mode prescribed by sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act and Or. 21, r. 50. These new provisions did not therefore give any new validity to such awards but only provided an additional mode of enforcement thereof. 18. At this stage it is convenient to refer to the case of Vallabhdas Narandas and Co. Vs. Keshavlal Himatlal, AIR 1927 Bom 428 . That was an application for leave to execute an award against a person as a partner in the firm against which the award was alleged to have been made. On a construction of the award Mirza, J., held that the award in question was not really against a firm at all but was one against an individual. The learned Judge also held that even if the award could be construed as one against a firm, the firm on the face of the record was a foreign firm and therefore did not come within the purview of Or. 30. Each of these findings was sufficient to throw out that application. The learned Judge also held that even if the award could be construed as one against a firm, the firm on the face of the record was a foreign firm and therefore did not come within the purview of Or. 30. Each of these findings was sufficient to throw out that application. The learned Judge, however, went further and propounded two propositions, namely, (i) that a firm even though carrying on business in British India could not be lawfully made a party to a reference to arbitration, for Or. 30 only permitted a suit to be filed in the firm name and did not authorise arbitration proceedings in a firm name, and (ii) that an award against a firm in the firm name was not valid for it could not be executed with the help of Or. 21, r. 50 for although under sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act an award, on being filed in Court, became executable as a decree it was not a decree against a firm which alone could be executed under Or. 21, r. 50. With great respect to the learned Judge I am unable to accept this extreme view. As to his first proposition the learned Judge assumed that the technical rules of procedure relating to parties in a suit applied to arbitration proceedings. I find no justification for this assumption which ignores the well-known habit of businessmen to enter into contracts in firm names and to refer disputes arising out of such contracts to arbitration in firm names and the well-known practice of arbitrators to make awards for or against firms. To assent to this proposition of the learned Judge well amount to countenancing the view that all awards for or against firms in India in the firm names before or after 1908 were and are nullities. It will upset settled transactions and go against the notions of commercial men and paralyse the trade and commerce of the country. As I have already indicated, the validity or enforceability of an award against a firm did not depend on the provisions of Or. 30 or Or. 21, r. 50. Such an award could always be enforced by a suit filed in the names of the parties before those provisions were introduced. The additional speedy method of execution provided by sec. I5 of the old Arbitration Act read with Or. 30 and.Or. 30 or Or. 21, r. 50. Such an award could always be enforced by a suit filed in the names of the parties before those provisions were introduced. The additional speedy method of execution provided by sec. I5 of the old Arbitration Act read with Or. 30 and.Or. 21, r. 50 did not add to or take away from the validity of such an award. Such an award was valid independently of these provisions. As to his second proposition, the decision of Rankin, J., in Louis Dreyfus & Co.'s case I. L. R. (1920) Cal. 29 based on wider considerations of general public convenience was not brought to the notice of Mirza, J. In a later Bombay case, Babu Kirparam Vs. Jawaharsingh Harnamdas, AIR 1932 Bom 375 , Wadia, J., accepted the ruling of Rankin, J., in Louis Dreyfus & Co.'s case I. L. R. (1920) Cal. 29. The Bombay High Court again in Mani Lal Lallubhai v. Bharat Spinning & Weaving Co., Ltd. (1933) I. L. R. 58 Bom. 162 followed Rankin, J.'s ruling. So far as our Courts are concerned it is well established that Or. 21, r. 50 was applicable and could be called in aid of execution of an award against a firm which had been filed in Court. With very great respect to Mirza, J., I am unable to subscribe to either of the two propositions mentioned above. 19. It is said that our present Arbitration Act of 1940 has made a difference in that it has taken away the right of suit on an award. I shall hereafter consider whether such a far-reaching change has been effected by the present Arbitration Act. Assuming for the moment that it has, the validity of an award in favour of or against a firm has in no way been impaired for they can be enforced by following the procedure laid down in that Act and obtaining a judgment upon the award under sec. 17 of that Act. For reasons stated above I have no doubt in my mind that an award in favour of or against a firm as such is not a nullity and can be enforced in a Court of law by appropriate proceedings. 20. 17 of that Act. For reasons stated above I have no doubt in my mind that an award in favour of or against a firm as such is not a nullity and can be enforced in a Court of law by appropriate proceedings. 20. The question then arises whether what I have said about the validity of an award for or against a partnership firm in its firm name applies to an award for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name. Joint Hindu family businesses are very common institutions in this country. They have existed and they exist side by side with partnership firms and they are as well known to the commercial community as to the lawyers. That there are fundamental differences between a firm and a joint Hindu family business is well known. An ordinary partnership is a creature of agreement. A co-parcenary is created by operation of Hindu Law. Membership of a firm arises out of a contract but membership of a joint Hindu family business arises out of status. This basic distinction is now expressly recognised by sec. 5 of the Indian Partnership Act. The other important points of distinction are summarised in paragraph 234 of Mulla's Hindu Law, 10th Edn., p. 264. Some of these important differences are discussed by Page, C. J., in V. R. C. T. V. R. Chettyar v. C. A. P. C. Chettyar I. L. R. (1936) Rang. 122. It is not necessary for me to discuss these differences in detail. There are certain points of similarity also between a firm and a joint Hindu family business. Like firms it adopts a name for purposes of trading and dealing with the outside world. This name is usually a combination of two or more names of the members of the family dead or alive. This trading name is well understood alike by business men and lawyers as a compendious mode of designating or describing the members of the family which owns the business just as a firm name is understood to designate the partners constituting the firm. Some learned Judges have gone further and expressed the view that a joint Hindu family, unlike a firm, is a legal person [see for example Sirikant Lal and Another Vs. Sidheswari Prasad Narain Singh and Another, AIR 1937 Patna 455 ]. Some learned Judges have gone further and expressed the view that a joint Hindu family, unlike a firm, is a legal person [see for example Sirikant Lal and Another Vs. Sidheswari Prasad Narain Singh and Another, AIR 1937 Patna 455 ]. It is not necessary for me, for the purposes of the first point I am now considering, to express any opinion on that point. I am content to assume for the purposes of this point that a joint Hindu family business, like a partnership firm, is not a legal entity. But what does this proposition imply? The, real implication is that such a business is not a juridical person apart from its. owners, as a firm is not a legal entity apart from the partners. This does not mean that the law does not recognise it for any purpose at all. Contracts are entered into every day by joint Hindu family businesses in their respective trading names. Extensive properties are held by them in their trading names. A contract entered into by a joint Hindu family business in its trading name is always regarded as a contract entered into by the members of the family who own the business. The trading name designates these members. The Court recognises such a contract and gives effect to it. It is only the law of procedure that requires that a suit to enforce such a contract should be instituted in the names of the members of the family. The members constituting the family can sue or be sued on such contracts because they are under the cloak of the trading name the real contracting parties just as partners can sue or be sued in their individual names on a contract entered into in their firm name. The joint Hindu family business name in this respect stands on the same footing as a firm name and therefore the members of the family can sue or be sued in their individual names on contracts entered into in their trading name. During the proceedings, there may he deaths and births in the family necessitating amendment of the record. This inconvenience is obviated by the Hindu Law by conferring on the karta a wide representative capacity and thereby enabling him to sue or to be sued for himself and the other members of the family. Whether the previsions of Or. During the proceedings, there may he deaths and births in the family necessitating amendment of the record. This inconvenience is obviated by the Hindu Law by conferring on the karta a wide representative capacity and thereby enabling him to sue or to be sued for himself and the other members of the family. Whether the previsions of Or. 30 have further simplified the law of procedure by allowing a joint Hindu family business to sue in to be sued in the trading name will be discussed when I deal with the other points raised in this case. The point that I am stressing now is that a contract entered into by a joint Hindu family business in its trading name is a good and valid contract recognised by law and independently of the provisions of Or. 30 there was and is no difficulty in enforcing it in a properly constituted suit in a Court of law. If enforceability is a test of validity of such a contract then there is no reason to hold that it is not a valid contract. It is enforceable and is enforced every day in the Courts. 21. If an ordinary contract, commercial or otherwise, entered into by a joint Hindu family business in its trading name, is valid in law I see no reason why an arbitration agreement, which is an usual feature in a commercial contract, should not be valid and why an award for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name should not be perfectly valid. It is argued, on the authority of the decision of Sen, J., in Muti Lal v. Girdharilal I. L. R. [1942] Cal. 161 that an award against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name although made enforceable as a decree on being filed in Court by sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act, was not capable of being executed by reason of Or. 21, r. 50 not being available in the case of an award against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name. Even if this is correct, it by no means follows that such an award was a nullity or a piece of waste paper. It could yet be enforced by means of a regular suit properly constituted. 21, r. 50 not being available in the case of an award against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name. Even if this is correct, it by no means follows that such an award was a nullity or a piece of waste paper. It could yet be enforced by means of a regular suit properly constituted. If enforceability were a test of the validity of such an award, I say that such an award, inasmuch as it was enforceable by suit, was a perfectly valid award. Each and every word of wisdom uttered by Rankin, J., in the passage I have quoted from his judgment in Louis Dreyfus & Co.'s case I. L. R. (1920) 47 Cal. 29 in favour of the validity of an award for or against a firm was and is applicable to an award for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name. To hold otherwise will paralyse the commerce and trade of this country. In my opinion such an award was a good and valid award enforceable in a Court of law by a regular suit, even if it was not summarily enforceable under sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act read with Or. 21, r. 50. 22. It has been urged that cur present Arbitration Act of 1940 has completely altered the position in that there is now no machinery for enforcing an award for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name and being thus unenforceable such an award even if it was previously a good award must now be held to be a nullity. The arguments are: (i) that the present Arbitration Act has taken away the right of suit on an award and (ii) that no judgment can be passed under this Act on an award for or against a joint Hindu family business. 23. In support of the first proposition reference is made to secs. 32 and 33 of the Act. The marginal notes and the language used in these sections clearly indicate that they bar suits contesting an arbitration agreement or an award. It is well known that dishonest litigants against whom awards had been made used frequently to resort to suits to delay the enforcement of such awards by falsely setting up a plea of fraud, illegality or absence of jurisdiction. It is well known that dishonest litigants against whom awards had been made used frequently to resort to suits to delay the enforcement of such awards by falsely setting up a plea of fraud, illegality or absence of jurisdiction. This scandalous practice was noticed and roundly condemned by the Civil Justice Committee in paragraph 18 of Chapter XIII of their Report. These sections were accordingly enacted to give effect to the recommendations of that Report. The purpose of these sections, as I apprehend it, is to prevent the filing of suits to contest the validity of an arbitration agreement or an award and delay the enforcement thereof. But a suit upon an award in the sense of a suit to enforce the award does not come within the mischief which is sought to be removed and remedied by these sections. Ordinarily a person in whose favour an award is made will prefer to adopt the more expeditious procedure laid down in the Act for enforcing the award if the same be applicable, but I can see no reason why such a person should not be allowed to proceed by way of a regular suit to enforce the award, a procedure which was well known and recognised and which led to no hardship. On the contrary if the contention that an award for or against a joint Hindu family business is not enforceable under the present Arbitration Act in that no judgment can be pronounced thereon be correct, then it is an additional reason to lean in favour of the maintainability of a suit on such an award unless one is forced to do otherwise by reason of the language used in secs. 32 and 33 of the Act. A suit to enforce an award can hardly be said to be a suit for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award. Such a suit proceeds on the assumption of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and the award. These sections certainly bar suits contesting or challenging the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, but I am not of opinion that they bar suits which are filed on the footing of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and the award and only seek to enforce the award. These sections certainly bar suits contesting or challenging the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, but I am not of opinion that they bar suits which are filed on the footing of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and the award and only seek to enforce the award. If I am right in this view the arguments against the validity of an award for or against a joint Hindu family business based on its complete unenforceability must fall to the ground, for such an award may even now be enforced by a suit. If I am wrong in my view then the second head of the arguments will have to be considered. This brings me to the second main point raised in the argument before me. Re. (ii). The argument in support of the contention that the Court has no power to pronounce judgment upon an award for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name is founded on the analogy of firms in the matter of suing or being sued. Before the introduction of the rules now collected in Or. 48A in England and of Or. 30 in India a firm could not sue or be sued in the firm name. The joint Hindu family business was in the same position. These provisions enabled a firm to sue or be sued in the firm name but they do not apply to a joint Hindu family business. The argument is that as no such suit can be filed by or against a joint Hindu family business as such there can be no question of the Court passing a judgment for or against a joint Hindu family business in a suit. It is concluded that just as the Court has no authority to pass a judgment for or against a joint Hindu family business in a suit, it cannot pass a judgment upon an award for or against such a business under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. On the other side it is conceded that a joint Hindu family business cannot sue and therefore there cannot be judgment in favour of a joint Hindu family business as it is not a firm within the meaning of Or. 30, rr. On the other side it is conceded that a joint Hindu family business cannot sue and therefore there cannot be judgment in favour of a joint Hindu family business as it is not a firm within the meaning of Or. 30, rr. 1-9, but it is argued that a judgment can easily be passed against such a business as it may be sued under r. 10 of Or. 30. There has been a long discussion on the interpretation of the provisions of Or. 30 and Or. 21, r. 50 and a number of cases has been cited before me. I do not consider that these arguments and the authorities, cited are decisive on the question now before me for it has yet to be considered whether even if no judgment can be passed tor or against a joint Hindu family business in a suit, a judgment can be passed for or against it under the Arbitration Act upon an award for or against it. As however the matter has been argued at some length it is right that I should note the arguments and examine the cases cited in support thereof and state my opinion on the point whether a joint Hindu family business may be sued in its trading name under Or. 30, r. 10. 24. In St. Gobain, Channy and Cirey Company v. Hoyermann's Agency L. R. [1893] 2 Q. B. 97 the Plaintiffs were a French firm of chemical manufacturers carrying on business at Paris, with a depot in London. One Gerhard Hoyermann, a foreigner resident in Hanover and who had never resided within the jurisdiction, carried on business as manufacturer of chemicals in Hanover under the name of " Phosphatfabrick, Hanover " and had a office at Mark Lane in London where orders for goods were taken and sales effected by a manager employed by him. The Plaintiffs filed that suit against " Hoyermann's Agency" for that was the name which appeared on the outer door of the London office. The writ was served on the manager at the London office. The Defendant moved for setting aside the service. The Master set aside the service. Grantham, J., affirmed this order. On appeal a Division Bench upheld Grantham, J. A further appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The writ was served on the manager at the London office. The Defendant moved for setting aside the service. The Master set aside the service. Grantham, J., affirmed this order. On appeal a Division Bench upheld Grantham, J. A further appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. It is quite true that this case was concerned with the question of service on a foreigner resident abroad who carried on business in an assumed name within jurisdiction by and through a manager. There are, however, observations in the judgments of both Lord Esher, M. R., and A. L. Smith, L. J., to the effect that Or. 48A, r. 11 applied to the case of a single individual "carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name." 25. The case of Melver v. G. & J. Burns L. R. [1895] 2 Ch. 630 was also concerned with the question of service of the writ. The three Plaintiffs and one Sir John Burns were in 1895 partners in a business carried on under the name of Clyde Steam Navigation Company. The Plaintiffs were residents in Liverpool and Sir John Burns was a domiciled Scotsman resident in Scotland. He carried on business as a ship-owner in Glasgow under the name of G. & J. Burns but had branch offices in different towns in England including Liverpool. Sir John Burns gave notice to the Plaintiffs dissolving the partnership. The Plaintiffs then filed that suit against G. & J. Burns and served the writ on the manager of the Liverpool branch. Sir J. Bums moved to set aside the service. The Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine refused the motion. Sir John Burns appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Lindley, L. J., in course of his judgment observed at p. 634: Order 48A refers to actions by and against partnerships. The first ten rules of it relate to actions by and against partnerships only. Partnerships can now be sued in the name of the firm, whereas formerly they could only be sued in the names of the persons who composed the firm. It was necessary to frame some rules to carry out the new procedure and rules 1 to 10 of Or. 48A are addressed solely to suits against partnerships. Partnerships can now be sued in the name of the firm, whereas formerly they could only be sued in the names of the persons who composed the firm. It was necessary to frame some rules to carry out the new procedure and rules 1 to 10 of Or. 48A are addressed solely to suits against partnerships. Then comes r. 11, which has really nothing to do with partnership rules, but which is tacked on to apply to the case of a single individual who carries on business, either in the name of a firm or, as it is expressed in the rule, under some name other than his own. 26. In Ramprasad Shivlal Vs. Shrinivas Balmukund, AIR 1925 Bom 527 the suit was originally instituted against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name. Later on the plaint was amended by substituting the names of the members of the family for the name of the business. It was then contended that the provisions of sec. 22 (i) of the Indian Limitation Act applied and that the suit was barred, as the suit must be deemed to have been instituted against the Defendants when the plaint was amended. Maclcod, C. J., and Coyajee, J., agreed with the trial Judge that there was not an addition of parties but only a substitution in order to correct a misdescription. It was assumed in that case that a joint Hindu family business could not be sued under Or. 30 and, therefore, that case is not of any help on the interpretation of Or. 30, r. 10. This case, however, clearly shows that the joint Hindu family business name is not without meaning or content and that that name being in reality the names of the members the subsequent amendment by substitution of the names of the members of the family in the place of the trading name does not amount to an addition of new parties, for those members are already on the record under their compendious business name. 27. The case of Amulakchand Mewaram Vs. Babulal Kanalal Taliwala, AIR 1933 Bom 304 also established that a joint Hindu family business is not a firm in the name of which proceedings may be commenced under Or. 30, r. 1. It throws no light on the question whether such a business may be sued under Or. 30, r. 10. 27. The case of Amulakchand Mewaram Vs. Babulal Kanalal Taliwala, AIR 1933 Bom 304 also established that a joint Hindu family business is not a firm in the name of which proceedings may be commenced under Or. 30, r. 1. It throws no light on the question whether such a business may be sued under Or. 30, r. 10. This case also shows that the trading name of such a business is a compendious way of describing the members of the family and that a suit filed in such a trading name is really a suit filed by the members and therefore it is a case of misdescription of existing persons. 28. In Lalchand Amonmal v. M. C. Boid & Co. I. L. R. 61 Cal. 975: (1934) 38 C. W. N. 914, Buckland. J., following his own unreported decision in the earlier case of Shiva Prosad & Sons v. Ormerodes (India), Ltd. Unreported Suit No. 1207 of 1925 held that a Hindu undivided family carrying on business is not entitled to file a suit as a firm under the provisions of Or. 30. There can be no question that in England the notion of a firm is co-extensive with and limited to a contractual partnership firm and Or. 48A, rr. 1 to 10 were clearly intended to apply to such a firm and enabled such a firm to sue or to be sued. The framers of those rules surely were not concerned with joint Hindu family business. Rules 1 to 7 and rules 10 and 11 were incorporated with slight alterations in Or. 30 and r. 8 in Or. 21, r. 50 of our Code of 1908. The framers of our Code knew that there were in India side by side two kinds of businesses, namely, contractual firms and joint Hindu family businesses. They did not, however, make any suitable alteration in the language of rr. 1 to 9 so as to make them applicable to both kinds of businesses. The inference is, therefore, irresistible that the framers of our Code of 1908 intended to adopt these procedural rules so far as contractual firms only were concerned and joint Hindu family businesses were deliberately left out of rr. 1 to 9 of Or. 30. As regards r. 10 the learned Judge in his earlier judgment observed as follows: The words in the heading 'Persons carrying on business.... 1 to 9 of Or. 30. As regards r. 10 the learned Judge in his earlier judgment observed as follows: The words in the heading 'Persons carrying on business.... other than their own' only have reference to r. 10 under which a single individual may be sued, though he cannot sue if he carries on business under a name other than his own. 29. These observations were certainly obiter but being observations of a Judge of great experience of the commercial Court are entitled to my respectful consideration. 30. The next case to be noticed is that of Re: Gobindlal Mohata (1934) 39 C. W. N. 275. There a joint Hindu family business as such obtained certain orders in an insolvency profiling. The insolvent implied for vacating those orders on the ground that a joint Hindu family business could not initiate proceedings under sec. 99 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. McNair, J., gave effect to this contention. Sec. 99 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act is in the following terms: 99 (1) Any two or more persons, being partners, or any person carrying on business under a partnership name, may take proceedings or be proceeded against under this Act in the name of the firm: 32. Provided that in that case the Court may, on application by any person interested, order the names, of the persons who are partners in the firm or the name of the person carrying on business under a partnership name, to be disclosed in such manner and verified on oath or otherwise, as the Court may direct. (2) In the case of a firm in which one partner is an infant, an adjudication order may be made against the firm other than the infant partner. 31. This section corresponds to sec. 115 of the English Bankruptcy Act, 1883 and sec. 119 of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1914. It will be noticed that sub-sec. (1) of our sec. 99 by its opening words refers to partners and then by the following words brings in " any person carrying on business under a partnership name." The expression "a partnership name " in the context does not signify actual partnership and means nothing more than a name resembling that of a partnership. It is clear, therefore, that sec. 99 (1) is a combination of Or. It is clear, therefore, that sec. 99 (1) is a combination of Or. 30, r. 1 and r. 10 with this important difference that while " any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name " may, under Or. 30, r. 10, only be sued, " any person carrying on business under a partnership name " may, under sec. 99 (1) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, take proceedings or be proceeded against under the Act. It is clear, therefore, that sec. 99 (1) has gone further than Or. 30, r. 10. The point, however, that is important for my present purpose is that the language used in the section and the proviso clearly indicates that " any person carrying on business under a partnership name " refers to a single individual. The proviso dealing with disclosure of names employs the plural in the case of the names of the partners but uses the singular in the case of the name of the person carrying on business under a partnership name. If a joint Hindu family business can be included in Or. 30, r. 10 and, therefore, permitted to be sued, as a " person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own," it should also come under sec. 99 (1) as a " person carrying on business under a partnership name " and be permitted to take proceedings or to be proceeded against under the Act. McNair, J., held it could not initiate the proceeding. It is not possible to brush aside the decision of McNair, J., on the ground that it was only concerned with the question whether a joint Hindu family business could initiate proceedings and not whether it could be proceeded against for, as I have said, sec. 99 (1) unlike Or. 30, r. 10, makes no distinction between proceedings taken by or against a person carrying on business under a partnership name and allows both. I do, however, recognise that the question does not appear to have been argued before McNair, J., so fully as it has been done before me. 32. In V. R. C. T. V. R. Chettyar v. C. A. P. C. Chettyar I L. R. (1936) Rang. 122, Page, C. J., held that a joint Hindu family business was not a " firm" within sec. 32. In V. R. C. T. V. R. Chettyar v. C. A. P. C. Chettyar I L. R. (1936) Rang. 122, Page, C. J., held that a joint Hindu family business was not a " firm" within sec. 99 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and the members of the family are not "partners" of such a " firm " who can be adjudicated insolvent upon a petition for insolvency presented against, and in the name of, the said "firm." It is true that the question whether a joint Hindu family business could be brought within the purview of sec. 99 as a " person carrying on business under a partnership name " was not discussed in that case, but it is somewhat significant that such a point, if it really had any substance, should have escaped the attention of Page, C. J. 33. The case M. A. R. P. M. Chidambaram Chettiar v. The National City Bank of New York I. L. R. [1937] Mad. 28: A. I. R. [1936] Mad. 707 has also been relied on by learnned Counsel for Bhuramuli Modi. In that case a Nathukotai Chetty, who carried on a money-lending business under the name of "R. M. P. M. Chettiar Firm," died leaving his undivided sons who were all minors. Their mother continued the business on their behalf with the aid of an agent. In the course of that business money was borrowed from the National City Bank of New York. The Bank filed a suit for recovery of the debt and obtained a decree, inter alia, against the first Defendant described in the plaint as " R. M. P. M. Chettiar Firm." The question was whether the decree was executable against the minor sons or their property. The learned Judges took time to consider their decision. They held that a firm, in order to come within Or. 30, was to be a contractual partnership. Minors could not be partners, although they could, under sec. 30 of the Partnership Act. be admitted into the benefits of a partnership. That, however, presupposed the existence of a firm into the benefits of which the minors might be admitted. In that case there were no adult partners and consequently there could be no question of the minors being admitted into the benefits of a partnership. 30 of the Partnership Act. be admitted into the benefits of a partnership. That, however, presupposed the existence of a firm into the benefits of which the minors might be admitted. In that case there were no adult partners and consequently there could be no question of the minors being admitted into the benefits of a partnership. Sec. 30 being thus out of the way, and the sons who were minors being incapable of entering into any contract, there could be no partnership and consequently they could not be sued as a "firm" under Or. 30, r. 1. Indeed it was not seriously contended that that suit could be supported as a suit against a "firm" under Or. 30, r. 1. The contention, however, was that the suit should be deemed to have been filed under Or. 30, r. 10. After referring to the Annual Practice and the cases of St. Gobain Channy and Cirey Company v. Hoyermann's Agency L. R. [1893] 2 Q. B. 97 and MacIver v. G. & I. Burns L. R. [1895 ] 2 Ch. 630 the learned Judges held that r. 10 was applicable only in the case of a single individual. This case is certainly an authority for the proposition that a joint Hindu family business owned by several members of the family does not fall within Or. 30, r. 10 because that rule applies only to a single individual carrying on business under a name or style other than his own name. 34. That Or. 30 does not authorise a joint Hindu family business to institute a suit in its trading name is also accepted in Lakhan Sao v. Firm Kani Ram Bhagwan Das A. I. R. [1938] Pat. 270 and in AIR 1938 563 (Lahore) which is explained in the later case of the joint Hindu family, Chaudhri Atma Ram v. Umar Ali I. L. R. (1940) Lah. 39. 35. In Nathuni Prasad and Others Vs. Firm Radha Kishun Dutt Rai, AIR 1940 Patna 149 the Respondent obtained a decree against Ajodhyaram Nandji, the members of which consisted of Nandji and his sons and nephew. The summons was served only on Nandji. After decree Nandji was adjudged insolvent and the execution proceedings were struck off. In the insolvency proceedings the interest of Nandji in the family properties was sold. Nandji then obtained his discharge. The summons was served only on Nandji. After decree Nandji was adjudged insolvent and the execution proceedings were struck off. In the insolvency proceedings the interest of Nandji in the family properties was sold. Nandji then obtained his discharge. The decree-holder then applied for execution against Nandji, his sons and several widows of the family. The learned Munsif dismissed the application. The learned District Judge reversed that decision and ordered execution to proceed. There was an appeal to the High Court by the sons and the widows. One of the points urged on appeal was that having regard to Or. 21, r. 50 (1) execution could not be granted against the sons and the widows because they had not been served with the summons in the suit nor did they individually appear. The Advocate for the decree-holder contended that Or. 21, r. 50 did not apply to a decree against a joint Hindu family business. Chatterjee, J., pointed out that there had been no finding that Ajodhyaram Nandji was a joint Hindu family business and further that even if it were, Or. 21, r. 50 applied to a decree against such a business. The learned Judge referred to the earlier case of Satchidanand Vs. Prayag Sah-Saheb Ram, AIR 1930 Patna 205 . In the last-mentioned case the judgment proceeded on the footing that the Defendant against which the decree had been obtained was a firm within the meaning of Or. 30, r. 1. The person against whom execution was sought had not been served with the summons in the suit nor had he appeared individually. Therefore execution could not go against him unless leave of the Court which passed the decree had been obtained. That not having been done the application was dismissed. That case is no authority for the proposition that a decree against a joint Hindu family business was executable under Or. 21, r. 50 and I am bound to say. with respect, that Chatterjee, J., did not correctly appreciate that ruling. The decision of Chatterjee, J., can only be supported on the footing that he treated Ajodhyaram Nandji as a firm and his observations as to the applicability of Or. 21, r. 50 to a decree against a joint family business must be regarded as obiter. with respect, that Chatterjee, J., did not correctly appreciate that ruling. The decision of Chatterjee, J., can only be supported on the footing that he treated Ajodhyaram Nandji as a firm and his observations as to the applicability of Or. 21, r. 50 to a decree against a joint family business must be regarded as obiter. Further there was no discussion in either of these two cases as to whether a joint Hindu family business could be sued under Or. 30, r. 10. 36. In Alekh Chandra and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra Gajapat Narayan Deo, AIR 1941 Patna 596 it has been laid down that Or. 21, r. 50 relates to execution and must be read with those rules of Or. 30 which relate to Suits by or against firms or partnerships. The learned Judges, however, went further and laid down two prepositions, namely, (1) that Or. 30, r. 10 applied to a joint Hindu family business and (2) that Or. 21, r. 50 applied to the execution of a decree against such a business;. The learned Judges expressed the view that a joint Hindu family was a legal entity under the Hindu law and was therefore included in the term " a person " and therefore Or, 30. r. 10 applied to such a business and they concluded that as Or. 30, r. 10 applied. Or. 21, r. 50 must also be applicable. This case is certainly an authority for the proposition that a joint Hindu family business can be sued as such and the decree in such a suit is executable with the aid of Or. 21, r. 50. 37. The next case cited before me is that of Moti Lal Chhaju Lal v. Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal I. L. R. [1924] 1 Cal. 161. There the Respondents purchased certain goods from the Petitioner. There were disputes between the parties and the same were referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The arbitrators made an award against the Respondents. The award was filed in Court and under sec. 15 of the Arbitration Act of 1899 which was then in force it became executable as if it were a decree of the Court. The Petitioner then applied for leave to execute the award against certain persons as members of Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal under Or. 21. r. 50 (2) of the Code. 15 of the Arbitration Act of 1899 which was then in force it became executable as if it were a decree of the Court. The Petitioner then applied for leave to execute the award against certain persons as members of Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal under Or. 21. r. 50 (2) of the Code. Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal was held to be the name of a joint Hindu family business. The question was whether in those circumstances Or. 21, r. 50 applied at all. Sen, J., answered the question in the negative. The point that, though a joint Hindu family business cannot sue or be sued under Or. 30, r. 1, it can be sued under Or. 30, r. 10 as a " person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name," was not raised in argument presumably because it was felt that the dictum of Buckland, J., in Shivaprosad's case Unreported Suit No. 1207 of 1925 that Or. 30, r. 10 applied to a single individual still held good and the decision of the Patna High Court in Alekh Chandra and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra Gajapat Narayan Deo, AIR 1941 Patna 596 had not been reported in the books or noticed. 38. This decision of Sen, J., therefore, throws no light on the point I am now considering. This decision, if correct, only establishes that Or. 21, r. 50 cannot be called in aid of execution of an award against a joint Hindu family business. If, however, it be held that a joint Hindu family business can be sued under Or. 30, r. 10 the decision of Sen, J., will have to be reconsidered. 39. The case of Jamuna Ram Bhakat v. Heeralal Agarwalla (1940) 44 C. W. N. 1056 accepted the decision of Buckland, J., in Lalchand Amonmal v. M. C. Boid & Co. I. L. R. 61 Cal. 975: (1934) 38 C. W. N. 914 that a joint Hindu family business was not entitled to sue as a firm under Or. 30. It proceeded on the footing that the decree in question in that suit had been passed against partnership firms. The question whether a joint Hindu family business could be sued under Or. 30, r. 10 was not raised or considered in that case. 40. 30. It proceeded on the footing that the decree in question in that suit had been passed against partnership firms. The question whether a joint Hindu family business could be sued under Or. 30, r. 10 was not raised or considered in that case. 40. The last-mentioned question, nowever, was expressly raised and considered by Mitter, J., in the case of Jamunadhar Poddar v. Jamnaram Bhakat 48 C. W. N. 203: I. L. R. (1944) 2 Cal. 131 (1943). It has been quite explicitly held in this case that Or. 30, r. 10 is not limited to the case of a single individual but applies as well to the case where a number of persons trade together in a firm name or an assumed name without forming a partnership in law, e.g., a joint Hindu family trading concern and that accordingly a decree obtained against a joint Hindu family business in its trade name is not a nullity and binds all persons interested in the business carried on in that name and style. This is a decision by a learned Judge for whose learning and experience I have the highest respect and the reasons of this decision require most careful and respectful consideration. This decision was accepted as correct by learned Counsel for the Respondents in Arratoon & Co. v. Nimraj Puramall 48 C. W. N. 706: I. L. R. [1944] Cal. 588. 41. To summarise: It is quite clear on the authorities that a joint Hindu family business is not a firm and the members of the family who own the business are not partners and consequently a joint Hindu family business cannot sue or be sued in its trading name under Or. 30, r. 1. The question is whether such a business can be sued under Or. 30, r. 10. It can be sued under that rule only if that rule is not limited to a single individual carrying on business in a name or style other than his own but comprises within its ambit the case of several persons carrying on business under a firm name or an assumed name without constituting a contractual partnership firm. 42. That the rule is limited to a single individual is supported by the opinion of Lord Esher. M. R., and A. L. Smith, L. J., in St. 42. That the rule is limited to a single individual is supported by the opinion of Lord Esher. M. R., and A. L. Smith, L. J., in St. Gobain case L. R. [1893] 2 Q. B. 97, of Lindley, L. J., in Melver case L. B. [1895] 2 Ch. 630. of Buckland, J., in Shiva Prosad's case Unreported Suit No. 1297 of 1925 and the decision of the Madras Court in The National City Bank of New York's case I. L. R. (1937) Mad. 28: A. I. R. (1936) Mad. 707. The observations of the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal in England and of Buck-land, J. were no doubt obiter but they are nevertheless observations of very eminent and experienced Judges which demand respectful consideration. 43. It may also be useful to remember the genesis of our r. 10. It has reproduced, with certain changes, r. 11 of Or. 48A of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Or. 48A, r. 11 was brought in the place of old English Or. 9, r. 7. That rule was in the following terms: Where one person carrying on business in the name of a firm apparently consisting of more than one person shall be sued in the firm name, the writ may be served at the principal place within the jurisdiction of the business so carried on upon any person having at the time of service the control or management of the business there. 44. It will be noticed that this old rule applied to " one person." There can be no question of two or more persons coming within this rule. A difficulty was felt in bringing within the rule the case of one single individual who carried on business in a name which apparently did not consist of more than one person. Or. 48A, r. 11 which replaced old Or. 9, r. 7 remedied this defect. The reason for the alteration in the language of the rule is explained by A. L. Smith, L. J., in St. Gobain case L. R. [1893] 2 Q. B. 97 at p. 105 as follows: The new rule (Or. Or. 48A, r. 11 which replaced old Or. 9, r. 7 remedied this defect. The reason for the alteration in the language of the rule is explained by A. L. Smith, L. J., in St. Gobain case L. R. [1893] 2 Q. B. 97 at p. 105 as follows: The new rule (Or. 48A, r. 11) is with respect to ' any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name.' The alteration was made to meet cases such as that of a man carrying on business under a name or style which did not indicate a firm apparently consisting of more than one person-such as the name ' Wankanphast.' 45. The object of the change in the language being as stated above there is no reason to think that the expression " any person " in Or. 48A, r. 11 means anything more than the expression " one person " in old English Or. 9, r. 7. 46. Having regard to the framing of the sentence in r. 11, the words "one person" occurring in the old Or. 9, r. 7 had to be changed into " any person." There was apparently no other substantial reason for the change and English lawyers and Judges knowing that r. 11 had taken the place of old Or. 9, r. 7 always understood it to apply to the case of a single individual which alone was governed by old Or. 9, r. 7. It seems to me that this is the explanation for the spontaneously and readily made observations of the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal in England that Or. 48A, r. 11 applies to the case of a single individual only. 47. On the other hand, we have two Indian cases, namely, Alekh Chandra and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra Gajapat Narayan Deo, AIR 1941 Patna 596 and Jamunadhar Poddar v. Jamuna Ram Bhakat 48 C. W. N. 203: I. L. R. (1944) 2 Cal. 131 (1943), where it has been held that Or. 30, r. 10 allows a joint Hindu family business to be sued in its trading name. It will be presently noticed that the two decisions were based on different principles. 48. In the first of these two cases Fazl Ali, J., as he then was, referred to his earlier judgment in Sirikant Lal and Another Vs. 30, r. 10 allows a joint Hindu family business to be sued in its trading name. It will be presently noticed that the two decisions were based on different principles. 48. In the first of these two cases Fazl Ali, J., as he then was, referred to his earlier judgment in Sirikant Lal and Another Vs. Sidheswari Prasad Narain Singh and Another, AIR 1937 Patna 455 and held that a joint Hindu family, which, according to Hindu Law, was a legal person lawfully represented by and acting through the managing member or head thereof, was included ordinarily in the term " a person" and that therefore, Or. 30. r. 10 applied to it. In Sirikant Lal and Another Vs. Sidheswari Prasad Narain Singh and Another, AIR 1937 Patna 455 which was relied on in Alekh Chandra and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra Gajapat Narayan Deo, AIR 1941 Patna 596 the three Defendants were members of a joint Hindu family of which the first Defendant was the karta. The first Defendant as such karta borrowed certain monies for the necessities of the family on promissory notes. The Plaintiffs filed the suit against all the three members of the family for the recovery of the moneys. The trial Court decreed the suit. The two junior members of the family preferred an appeal against this decision. One of the points urged in the appeal was that the Plaintiffs' action being based upon the promissory notes, no decree should have been passed against Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 who had not signed them. The question was whether a suit upon the notes was maintainable against the Appellants. In agreement with the trial Court, Fazl Ali, J., held on a reading of the plaint that the suit was really one; for the debt and not one upon the notes. This was sufficient to uphold the maintainability of the suit. Fazl Ali. The question was whether a suit upon the notes was maintainable against the Appellants. In agreement with the trial Court, Fazl Ali, J., held on a reading of the plaint that the suit was really one; for the debt and not one upon the notes. This was sufficient to uphold the maintainability of the suit. Fazl Ali. J., however, went further and expressed the view that under the Hindu Law a karta was much more than a mere agent for an undisclosed principal and that when a karta acts as such he acts in a capacity which is so well known that there can be no misapprehension as to the identity of the person or persons whom he purports to bind by his act and that, therefore, the rule laid down in Janki Das v. Maharaja Sir Kishen Pershad, I. L. R. (1918) 46 Cal. 663 (P. C.) is not applicable to a joint Hindu family. All that this reasoning amounts to is that when a karta executes a promissory note as karta his name stands for all the members of the family and that therefore all of them are parties to the note and are as such liable on the note. This case throws no light on the question as to how this liability is to be enforced, that is to say, whether the suit should be in the individual names of members or in the name of the karta as such or in the name of the joint family. A joint Hindu family may for some purposes be regarded as a unit. It may also be that a karta so completely represents this unit that he may bind all the members by a contract and that he may sue or be sued on behalf of that unit and that a decree passed in a suit brought by or against a karta as such may be binding on all the members of the family. But the question whether a joint Hindu family is a unit for. the purpose of suing or being sued in its trading name raises quite different considerations and does not appear to me to be supported or even touched by the decision in Sirikant Lal and Another Vs. Sidheswari Prasad Narain Singh and Another, AIR 1937 Patna 455 or the cases cited therein. the purpose of suing or being sued in its trading name raises quite different considerations and does not appear to me to be supported or even touched by the decision in Sirikant Lal and Another Vs. Sidheswari Prasad Narain Singh and Another, AIR 1937 Patna 455 or the cases cited therein. It a joint Hindu family can be sued as " a person" under Or. 30, r. 10 there should be no reason why it should not be able to sue as " a person " under Or. 1. r. 1. No case has gone to the extent of saying that it can. Further the question will arise as to how a decree against a joint Hindu family business as such can be executed against the members of the family who had not been served with the writ of summons in the suit. I need not pursue the matter further for the capacity of a joint Hindu family business to be sued as a person under Or. 30, r. 10 has not been sought to be supported before me on the ground on which Fazl Ali, J., put his decision, namely, on the ground of its being a legal person under the Hindu Law. In these circumstances without fuller arguments and further consideration J am not prepared, as at present advised, to assent to the ground of decision in Alekh Chandra and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra Gajapat Narayan Deo, AIR 1941 Patna 596 , or to adopt it for the purpose of the present case. I find that the correctness of the reasons of the decision in Alekh Chandra and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra Gajapat Narayan Deo, AIR 1941 Patna 596 was questioned in Jamunadhar Poddar's case 48 C. W. N. 203: I. L. R. (1944) 2 Cal. 131 (1943), but Mitter, J., while recognising the force of the arguments left the question open and based his decision in Jamunadhar Poddar's case 48 C. W. N. 203: I. L. R. (1944) 2 Cal. 131 (1943) on different grounds which I proceed now to consider. 49. In the first place, Mitter, J., brushed aside the observations of the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal, in England as obiter. That the observations were obiter there can be no doubt. But the observations appear to me to be supported by the history of r. 11 of Or. 48A. 49. In the first place, Mitter, J., brushed aside the observations of the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal, in England as obiter. That the observations were obiter there can be no doubt. But the observations appear to me to be supported by the history of r. 11 of Or. 48A. This rule is based on old English Or. 9, r. 7 which in terms related to " one person." It is permissible, therefore, to read " any person " in Or. 48A, r. 11 as equivalent to "one person" in Or. 9, r. 7 which is now replaced by Or. 48A, r. 11. There is no reason to suppose that the expression " any person " was introduced in Or. 48A, r. 11 with any particular purpose of widening the rule. The only material alteration effected was to bring within the rule a person carrying on business in a name which did not indicate a firm apparently consisting of more than one person which was necessary under old English Or. 9, r. 7. His Lordship's attention does not appear to have been pointedly drawn to the observations of Buckland, J., that r. 10 applies to the case of a single individual or to the decision of McNair, J., in Re. Gobindlal Mohata (1934) 39 C. W. N. 275. 50. In the second place Mitter, J., assumed that in England whenever any two or more persons carry on business they must necessarily do so as partners. The learned Judge overlooked the fact that in England two or more persons may carry on a business without being partners in law. Thus I when two or more executors carry on their testator's business in the old trading name under the directions of the Will, they certainly are not partners in the strict legal sense. If the interpretation put upon r. 10 of our Or. 30 by Mitter, J., were correct such executors would be liable to be sued in England under Or. 48A, r. 11 and on a parity of reasoning they would also be liable to be proceeded against under the provisions of sec. 115 of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1883 which was reproduced in sec. 99 (1) of our Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. In Re. Fisher & Sons L. R. [1912] 2 K. B. 491 is an instructive case on this point. 115 of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1883 which was reproduced in sec. 99 (1) of our Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. In Re. Fisher & Sons L. R. [1912] 2 K. B. 491 is an instructive case on this point. One E. W. Fisher by his Will dated September 0, 1899, after appointing his wife and George Fisher and Francis George Grim-wade to be the executors and trustees of his Will, empowered them to carry on his business for the benefit of his wife for her life. At the time of his death in 1903 the testator was carrying on business alone in the firm name of " E. W. Fisher & Sons" and after his death the executors continued to carry on the business in that firm name. Early in December, 1911, a creditor, who had supplied the executors with goods for the purpose of the business issued two writs against them in the firm name on two dishonoured bills of exchange accepted in the firm name. An appearance was entered to each writ by " Caroline Fisher, George Fisher and Francis George Grimwade sued and trading as E. W. Fisher & Sons." On December 11, the creditor obtained summary judgment on both writs under Or. 45. The point whether they could be sued under Or. 48A, r. 11 was apparently not taken at that time. On January 3, 1912, the judgment creditor presented a bankruptcy petition against the firm, the act of bankruptcy being their noncompliance with a bankruptcy notice based on the judgment debt and stated to have been served on George Fisher one of the executors at the principal place of business of the firm. On January 26, 1912, a receiving order was made on the petition against the firm. The Official Receiver under sec. 20 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 and r. 264 of the Bankruptcy Rules applied that " Caroline Fisher, George Fisher and Francis George Grimwade constituting the said firm of " E. W. Fisher & Sons " might be adjudged bankrupt. The executors opposed the application on the ground that they were not partners. The contention raised being a difficult and novel one the Registrar referred the matter to the Judge. The two points were (i) whether the executors were partners within the meaning of sec. The executors opposed the application on the ground that they were not partners. The contention raised being a difficult and novel one the Registrar referred the matter to the Judge. The two points were (i) whether the executors were partners within the meaning of sec. 115 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 and (ii) if not, whether they could be proceeded against under that section as being within the words " any person carrying on business under a partnership name " as distinguished from " any two or more persons being partners." Phillimore, J., dismissed the application holding that these executors were not partners within the meaning of cither the Partnership Act or the Bankruptcy Act. The dismissal of the application clearly negatives both the points mentioned above, for without rejecting both the points the application could not be dismissed. This decision must, therefore, be regarded as a decision that the executors could not be proceeded against under sec. 115 either as partners or as "any person carrying on business under a partnership name " as distinguished from " any two or more persons being partners." If they could not be proceeded against as " any person carrying on business under a partnership name,'' it must be on the ground that the words "any person carrying on business under a partnership name" only refer to a single individual. It follows that if such persons cannot be proceeded against under sec. 115 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, they cannot, on the same line of reasoning, be sued under Or. 48A, r. 11, for the words " any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name " in that rule must also refer to a single individual. It is unfortunate that this case was not brought to the notice of Mitter, J. 51. In the third place, Mitter, j., was greatly influenced by the considerations of what he called the interest of commerce and proceeded to interpret r. 10 in the light of those considerations. It is unfortunate that this case was not brought to the notice of Mitter, J. 51. In the third place, Mitter, j., was greatly influenced by the considerations of what he called the interest of commerce and proceeded to interpret r. 10 in the light of those considerations. I have no doubt that the considerations of commercial convenience are of great importance but if in the interests of commerce it is necessary to construe r. 10 as including the case of several persons so as to bring in the joint Hindu family business within that rule, then on a parity of reasoning a foreign business, whether owned by a single individual or. by several partners, should also fall within r. 10. The weighty reasons set forth in Mitter, J.'s judgment in aid of commerce are more applicable to foreign businesses than to joint family businesses carried on in British India, for it may be more difficult for4 the Plaintiff to find out the owners of a foreign business than to find out the members of a joint Hindu family business carried on in British India. Further the fact that the words " within the jurisdiction " occurring in Or. 48A, r. 11 after the words " carrying on business " have been omitted from r. 10 of our Or. 30 should also encourage the inclusion of the case of persons carrying on business outside British India within r. 10. But it has been held in Joharmal Ramkaran Vs. Laxmandas Shivlal, AIR 1934 Bom 467 that as a result of the concluding words of r. 10, namely, that "all rules under this Order shall apply," that rule is controlled by r. 1 and a foreign firm which is excluded from r. 1 cannot be sued under r. 10. In that case the foreign business was owned by a single individual and was in terms within r. 10, yet Mirza, J., held that the suit was incompetent. His reasons were as follows: Under r. 10 the case of the single proprietor trading in a firm name is to be treated as if the single proprietor so trading constituted a firm for the purpose of Or. 30, although under the definition of a firm under the Contract Act there can be no firm unless there are at least two partners. 30, although under the definition of a firm under the Contract Act there can be no firm unless there are at least two partners. If the case of a single proprietor is to be treated as a firm for the purpose of Or. 30, then the case in my judgment is clearly covered by r. 1 which requires that the firm suing or being sued should be carrying on business in British India if it is to sue or to be sued under an abbreviated title ' as a firm. 52. Or. 30, r. 1 lays down two conditions, namely, (i) that there must be a firm and (ii) that the firm must be carrying on business in British India. In the case before Mirza, J., the Defendant did not carry on business in British India and therefore did not satisfy the second condition and as r. 1 controlled r. 10 the suit was held to be not maintainable. If two or more persons carrying on business in a name or style other than their own names are to come within r. 10 at all then I do not sec how they can do so without being partners for r. 1, ex-hypothesi, (controls r. 10. Logically no distinction ought to be made between the two requirements implied in r. 1. In order to come within r. 1 there must be two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in British India. If the requirement of r. 1 that the business must be carried on in British India inferentially excludes from r. 10 a business not carried on in British India, then I do not see why the other requirement of r. 1 that the two or more persons must be partners will not inferentially exclude two or more persons carrying on business otherwise than as partners. Indeed in Amulakchand Mewaram Vs. Babulal Kanalal Taliwala, AIR 1933 Bom 304 to which I have already referred. Beaumont, C. J., said as follows: Or. 30 authorises the bringing of a suit in a firm name in a certain class of case and it may be that inferentially it forbids the bringing of a suit in a firm name in any other class of case. 53. Beaumont, C. J., said as follows: Or. 30 authorises the bringing of a suit in a firm name in a certain class of case and it may be that inferentially it forbids the bringing of a suit in a firm name in any other class of case. 53. In the fourth place Mitter, J., brought in a joint Hindu family business within r. 10 by applying the definition of a "person" occurring in the General Clauses Act. Under sec. 3 (39) of that Act "person" includes any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. Under sec. 13 of that Act words in the singular shall include the plural. Both secs. 3 and 13, however, are applicable only if there be nothing repugnant in the subject or context. Suit by or against an individual person is provided for in Or. 1. Suits by or against a corporation are regulated by Or. 29. Suits by or against a firm carrying on business in British India are dealt with by Or. 30, r. 1. Thus about three-fourths part of the definition of " person" given in sec. 3 (39) cannot be applied to the word "person " in Or. 30, r. 10 as being clearly repugnant to the context or subject. Further if r. 1 controls r. 10 in the way suggested by Mirza, J., then it will be wholly repugnant to the subject or context to include several persons who are not partners or who do not carry on business in British India in the expression "person" or to read the singular as plural. Again, if a joint Hindu family business is included within r. 10, I do not see how we shall exclude from it a members' club which according to all notions of lawyers has never been regarded as a juridical entity. Moreover if we remember that Or. 48A, r. 11 has taken the place of old English Or. 9, r. 7 which dealt with "one person" then I think it is clearly repugnant to the subject, from the historical point of view, to hold that r. 11 of Or. 48A, which is reproduced in our Or. 30, r 10 contemplates the case of more than one person. Mitter, J., referred to a latter part of the judgment of Lindley, J., in Melver's case L. R. [1895] 2 Ch. 48A, which is reproduced in our Or. 30, r 10 contemplates the case of more than one person. Mitter, J., referred to a latter part of the judgment of Lindley, J., in Melver's case L. R. [1895] 2 Ch. 630 and emphasised the words " persons " " they " and " those " presumably to deduce that the learned Judge really meant that r. 11 covered the case of several persons, but I do not think that any inference can be drawn from the use of those, words in the plural, for Lindley, J., was referring to " actions " in plural also. 54. For all the reasons stated above I am unable, inspite of the very high respect I always have for the opinion of Mitter, J., to assent to the proposition that a joint Hindu family business may be sued under Or. 30, r. 10 as a "person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name." I respectfully agree that convenience of trade and commerce in this country requires that joint family businesses should be able to sue or to be sued in their trading names but that does not appear to me to be any qualification for the undue stretching of the language of r. 10 and extending it to a case which was apparently not intended to be covered thereby. I accept the position that a joint Hindu family business by oversight or otherwise has been left out of Or. 30. As this omission causes considerable inconvenience I suggest that a proviso should be added to Or. 30, r. 1 as well as to Or. 21, r. 50 on the same lines as the proviso added by the Lahore High Court to Or. 30, r. 1 so that, appoint Hindu family business may come within those provisions. 55. What I have stated so far does not, however, conclude the matter in hand, for it does not necessarily follow that, because a suit cannot be filed by or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name and consequently a decree cannot be passed for or against such a business, a judgment cannot also be passed for or against it upon an award under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. 56. The necessity for the Court pronouncing judgment upon an award was formerly confined to certain cases only. 56. The necessity for the Court pronouncing judgment upon an award was formerly confined to certain cases only. Thus under the provisions of Chapter VI of the CPC of I850- which were reproduced in Part V, Chapter XXXVIII of the Code of 1882 and then in the Second Schedule to the Code of 1908, the Court had to pronounce judgment upon award when the award was made on a reference made in a suit or on a reference made pursuant to an arbitration agreement filed in Court or when the award had been filed in Court under those enactments. As regards arbitration in a suit, the proceedings had to conform to the rules of procedure relating to suits. Thus before Or. 30 there could be no suit against a firm and consequently there could be no order of reference or an award or a judgment upon an award in a firm name. There could be an award in a firm name made in a suit after Or. 30 came into force. But the joint J Hindu family business remained in the same position as before. There could be no suit by or against such a business and consequently there could be no order of reference and no award for or against it or judgment upon such an award. As regards arbitration out of Court which were sought to be made a rule of Court or as regards awards filed in Court under those enactments I apprehend proceedings had to be taken in conformity with the rules of the Code regulating suits and in case of joint Hindu family business proceedings had to be taken by or against the members of the family in their individual names or against their karta and the judgment upon the award had to be in such individual names or against their karta. In case of arbitration agreement and award made out of 'Court and which were governed by the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 there was no necessity for the Court to pronounce judgment upon the award, for the award on being filed in Court became, by virtue of sec. 15 of the Act, executable as if it were a decree of the Court. The present Arbitration Act has repealed the second schedule and has provided for a uniform procedure. Under this Act the Court has to pronounce judgment on every award filed in Court. 15 of the Act, executable as if it were a decree of the Court. The present Arbitration Act has repealed the second schedule and has provided for a uniform procedure. Under this Act the Court has to pronounce judgment on every award filed in Court. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the present Act so as to ascertain and appreciate the scheme of the Act. 57. Under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 of the Act upon the making and signing of the award the arbitrators have to give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award. Under sub-sec. (2) of that section the arbitrators, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of fees and charges therein specified, have to cause the award together with depositions and other papers to be filed in Court and upon the filing of the award the Court has to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. Sec. 15 of the Act empowers the Court to modify or correct the award in certain specified circumstances. Sec. 16 authorises the Court to remit the award to the arbitrator or umpire for reconsideration in certain circumstances therein mentioned. Sec. 30 enumerates the grounds on which the award may be set aside. Sec. 31 prescribes the jurisdiction of the Court in which the award is to be filed and provides that all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement shall be decided by the Court in which the award has been or may be filed and by no other Court. Sec. 32 provides a bar to suits contesting an arbitration agreement or an award and sec. 33 prescribes that an arbitration agreement or an award is to be contested by an application to the Court. 58. The application to set aside an award or to get an award remitted for re-consideration has to be made under the amended Article 158 of the Limitation Act, within 30 days from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. 58. The application to set aside an award or to get an award remitted for re-consideration has to be made under the amended Article 158 of the Limitation Act, within 30 days from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. Sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act provides that where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or to set aside the award the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow. The scheme appears to be that if no objection is raised against the award or if such objection is rejected a judgment and decree must follow as matters of course. There is no injustice or inconvenience in this, for the Arbitration Act provides for service of notices on the parties by the arbitrators of the making and signing of the award and by the Court of the filing of the award. The party aggrieved has thus ample Opportunity to contest the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement or the award. If he does not take this opportunity or if his objection is rejected he cannot be heard to complain if judgment is pronounced upon the award and a decree follows. If judgment is to be pronounced in such circumstances as a matter of course is there anything to prevent the Court from pronouncing judgment upon an award for or against a joint Hindu family made out of Court? Such an award, I have already held, is a perfectly valid award which is enforceable by a suit. Why cannot the Court proceed to pronounce judgment on such an award which is a good award and which the Court sees no reason to correct or modify or to remit or to set aside? There is nothing in sec. 33 of the Code or in Or. 20 which in terms prohibits passing of a judgment against a joint Hindu family business. The reason why the Court cannot in a suit pass judgment for or against a joint Hindu family business is that no such suit can be filed by or against such a business in its trading name. 33 of the Code or in Or. 20 which in terms prohibits passing of a judgment against a joint Hindu family business. The reason why the Court cannot in a suit pass judgment for or against a joint Hindu family business is that no such suit can be filed by or against such a business in its trading name. Why should the technical rules of procedure as to parties in a suit be made applicable to proceedings under sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act 1940? It is said that sec. 141 attracts the provisions of the Code which impose a disability on a joint Hindu family business in the matter of suing or being sued. The rules of procedure, however, are to be followed as far as they can be made applicable. The rules relating to parties come into play at the inception or institution of suits and they can have no concern with the proceedings for judgment upon award. The matter comes before the Court for judgment after the award is filed in Court. At that stage no question arises as to the institution of a suit or a proceeding by or against a party and therefore the rules relating to parties cannot have any application. Further sec. 41 of the Arbitration Act makes the provisions of the Code applicable to all proceedings before the Court subject to the provisions of that Act. That Act by sec. 17 peremptorily enjoins upon the Court the duty to poceed to pronounce judgment in accordance with the award. Why can it not be said that this section excludes the application of the procedural rules relating to parties in a suit from proceedings for judgment upon award under this section? Why can it not be maintained that whatever may be the limitations on the power of the Court in the matter of passing a judgment in a suit, the Arbitration Act gives it express power to pronounce judgment upon an award irrespective of the question as to whether a suit would be maintainable by or against a party for or against whom the award has been made? In short, why is not sec. 17 an express authorisation enabling the Court to pronounce judgment upon an award for or against a joint Hindu family business? In short, why is not sec. 17 an express authorisation enabling the Court to pronounce judgment upon an award for or against a joint Hindu family business? The exigencies, interests and necessities of trade and commerce so forcefully upheld by Rankin, J., and Mitter, J., in their respective judgments to which I have already referred demand such authority on the part of the Court and unless there be any express provision to the contrary, why should not the Court assume and exercise the authority which this mandatory provision of the Arbitration Act confers on it? 59. It is said that if sec. 17 is construed so literally then if an award is made for or against a dead person and no steps are taken to get it set aside the Court will be obliged to pronounce judgment upon such an award. Award against a dead person is a nullity, for it is against nobody and the fact that it is a nullity, will become at once apparent when notice of the filing of the award under sec. 14 is attempted to be served. If a dishonest award-holder files a false affidavit of service on a dead man as if he were living then a fraud is practised on the Court and the judgment so procured will be liable to be set aside in appropriate proceedings. An award for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name is in reality an award for or against all members of the family owning the business. Such an award is for or against existing persons who are designated by the compendious trading name and is not a nullity in any sense. 60. It is next argued that on such a construction of sec. 17 the Court will be obliged to pronounce judgment upon an award for or against an unincorporated body like a members' club, if no steps are taken by anybody to get it set aside within the prescribed time. I do not think that the notion of a firm name or a joint family business name ought to be extended to a club name. A club name is not regarded as a compendious name in the sense that a firm name or the trading name of a joint Hindu family business is regarded by lawyers and business people. I do not think that the notion of a firm name or a joint family business name ought to be extended to a club name. A club name is not regarded as a compendious name in the sense that a firm name or the trading name of a joint Hindu family business is regarded by lawyers and business people. Businessmen will hardly, if ever, enter into any contract with an unincorporated members' club in the club name. Therefore the question of an arbitration agreement or an award in a club name or the passing of judgment upon such an award will seldom, if ever, arise. If, however, a club name be regarded in the same light as a firm name and all the members enter into an arbitration agreement in the club name and an award is made in such circumstances and notices are served on all the members of the club, logically there should be no difficulty in passing a judgment under sec. 17 of the Act on such an award in the club name. 61. It is urged that great difficulty will arise in enforcing a judgment upon an award against a joint Hindu family business. Let us consider' this question in the light of the method of execution of an award against a firm. How was an award against a firm executed before the passing of the present Arbitration Act? Under the old Arbitration Act there was no necessity for passing any judgment upon an award. The award on being filed became executable as a decree of the Court under sec. 15. The only Way to execute such an award against a partner was by taking proceedings under Or. 21, r. 50 of the Code which corresponds to Or. 48A, r. 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. In Manilal Lallubhai v. The Bharat Spinning and Weaving, Ltd. I. L. R. (1933) 58 Bom. 162 an application was made for execution of an award against a firm against certain individual partners of the firm. The contention was put forward that Or. 21, r. 50 could not be called in aid of execution of such an award. The argument was that although an award was executable as if it were a decree, it was not a decree and that as Or. The contention was put forward that Or. 21, r. 50 could not be called in aid of execution of such an award. The argument was that although an award was executable as if it were a decree, it was not a decree and that as Or. 21, r. 50 was in terms concerned with the execution of a decree passed against a firm, it could not be utilized in execution of an award against a firm. It will be noticed that the opening words of sub-r. (i) of Or. 21, r. 50 begins with the words " Where a decree has been passed against a firm." Cls. (b) and (c) of that sub-rule by referring to rr. 6 and 7 of Or. 30 and service of summons clearly contemplate a suit and a decree passed against the firm in such a suit. Sub-r. (2) uses the expressions "decree-holder" and "the Court which passed the decree." All these expressions have no relevancy or meaning in relation to an award against a firm. In the case of an award against a firm, strictly speaking there is no decree-holder, and no Court which passed the decree. The learned Judges recognised that the arguments were not without considerable force and while agreeing that sub-r. (1), (b) and (c) by reason of the express language used therein could have no application in the case of an award against a firm, sub-r. (2) should be construed liberally by treating the award-holder as the decree-holder and the Court in which the decree had been filed as the Court which passed the decree. To do otherwise would have been to render sec. 15 of the Arbitration Act nugatory. It was pointed out by the learned Judges that as the legislature knew that proceedings under special statutes might have to be enforced by execution, r. 8 of English Or. 48A was not reproduced in Or. 30 but was placed in Or. 21 which deals with execution, so that the rule might not be confined only to the enforcement of decrees made in suits under Or. 30. Sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act made the award on its being filed in Court enforceable as if it were a decree. In order to give effect to this provision of law, one had to look to Or. 21 for the machinery. Or. 30. Sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act made the award on its being filed in Court enforceable as if it were a decree. In order to give effect to this provision of law, one had to look to Or. 21 for the machinery. Or. 21, r. 50 (2) was the only provision which could possibly be of any help. Therefore Or. 21, r. 50 (2) had to be given a meaning which was certainly wider than its terms strictly implied. Sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act created a fiction and to give effect to this statutory fiction the language of Or. 21, r. 50 (2) had to be somewhat stretched. Thus observed Kania, J., at pp. 168-169: Sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act provided that an award on being filed shall be enforceable as if it were a decree. I understand that to mean that it becomes enforceable in the same way as a decree. To put it in other words the legislature by sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act clearly meant to give the award all the qualifications of a decree in connection with enforcing the same. That appears to be the plain and unambiguous meaning of the section. If I accept the Respondents' contention that the award cannot be called a decree which is passed by any Court and the award, although it may be enforceable as a decree under sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act, is not a decree, the result would be that, apart from the fact whether it is made against an individual or a firm an award would not be enforceable at all by execution. When an award under the Indian Arbitration Act is made against an individual and the same is duly filed the method by which it can be enforced is the one provided in Or. 21. If the Respondents' arguments are correct no application under Or. 21, rr. 10, 16, etc., could be made to any Court for the enforcement of the award firstly because there is no decree and secondly there is no Court which has passed a decree and therefore no Court could entertain the application. The logical result of accepting the contention would, therefore, be to render the words of sec. 21, rr. 10, 16, etc., could be made to any Court for the enforcement of the award firstly because there is no decree and secondly there is no Court which has passed a decree and therefore no Court could entertain the application. The logical result of accepting the contention would, therefore, be to render the words of sec. of the Indian Arbitration Act meaningless because the holder of the award would not be a decree-holder and no decree of any Court having been passed in his favour he could not apply for execution to any Court. I should hesitate considerably before accepting any such argument. In my opinion the argument is quite unsound. I consider that the plain meaning of sec. 15 is that for the purpose of enforcing the award the same is to be treated as a decree. 62. Again at p. 170-171, Kania, J., stated as follows: Having regard to the view I have taken of sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act and Or. 21 of the Code I consider that Or. 21, r. 50. being a provision included in Or. 21 should prima facie be applicable in respect of the enforcement of an award against a firm. In my opinion an award against a firm should be considered, for the purpose of enforcement, as if it were a decree passed against a firm and therefore Or. 21, r. 50, would be clearly applicable to the enforcement of such an award. To construe it otherwise would mean that an award against a firm cannot he enforced against it except by a suit and that would be violating the clear words of sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act where it is provided that an award is enforceable as if it were a decree. If such an award is enforceable as a decree against a firm it must be enforceable under Or. 21, r. 50. of which the marginal note is ' Execution of decree against a firm.' No other rule would be applicable to such an award or decree under the present Code. 63. On appeal this decision was upheld. Beaumont, C. J., at p. 176-177, expressed his views in the following terms: A more substantial point is that the provisions of Or. 21, r. 50 (2), do not apply to proceedings to enforce an award. 63. On appeal this decision was upheld. Beaumont, C. J., at p. 176-177, expressed his views in the following terms: A more substantial point is that the provisions of Or. 21, r. 50 (2), do not apply to proceedings to enforce an award. On the actual language of that sub-rule there would certainly seem to be force in the objection. The sub-rule provides, so far as material, that where a decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause a decree to be executed against any person as being a partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the decree, for leave to execute the decree, and the Court may either grant leave or order the question of liability to be tried or determined in any manner in which an issue in a suit may be tried or determined. It is said that that rule cannot apply to enforcing an award, because there is no decree-holder and there is no Court which passed the decree. The question, however, cannot be disposed of merely by reference to the language of the sub-rule. Under the Indian Arbitration Act, sec. -15, it is provided that an award, on a submission on being filed in the Court according to the foregoing provisions, Shall be enforceable as if it were a decree of the Court; and the 'Court' is defined in sec. 4 of the Act in such a way that for the purpose of these particular proceedings the Court is the High Court. So that what sec. 15 provides is not that the award is to become a decree, but that it shall be enforceable as if it were a decree of the High Court. The difficulty is that in Or. 21, which is the order dealing with execution proceedings, the language is throughout inapplicable to enforcing an award, and it seems to me that we have really to choose between two things, either we must say that sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act is of no effect because there are no provisions by which an award can be enforced as if it were a decree, or we must read the relevant provisions of Or. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act is of no effect because there are no provisions by which an award can be enforced as if it were a decree, or we must read the relevant provisions of Or. 21 as covering an award, by treating ' decree' as including an award which has become enforceable as a decree, and by treating ' the Court which passed the decree' as referring to the Court whose decree the award is to be treated as being for the purpose of execution, that is, in this particular case the High Court. I say that because under r. 10 of Or. 21, which is the rule under which execution is ordinarily started, it is provided that if the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the Court which passed it; and unless we read that rule in the case of an award, in the sense I have suggested, there are no provisions for enforcing an award which has become enforceable as a decree. I am not prepared to hold that sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act is really a dead letter. 64. To the like effect are the following observations of Rangnekar, J., at pp. 179-180: The argument is that an award is not a decree and therefore there is ' no decree-holder ' and ' no Court which passed the decree.' Undoubtedly the language of Or. 21, r. 5O, seems to lend support to the argument, but I think we must read the provisions of the Code with the Indian Arbitration Act. Sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act provides that an award on a submission on being filed in the Court under the Act shall be enforceable as if it were a decree. Sec. 11 (2) provides that the arbitrators at the request of a party to a submission or any person claiming under him and on payment of fees and charges and costs of filing, etc., shall cause the award to be filed in Court. Sec. 4 of the Act defines ' the Court' in the Presidency Towns to be the High Court. Sec. 4 of the Act defines ' the Court' in the Presidency Towns to be the High Court. The Indian Arbitration Act does not lay down any separate or special procedure for enforcing an award made under the provisions of the Act; and unless one can turn to the Civil Procedure Code, it is difficult to see how an award can be enforced otherwise than perhaps by a suit. The plain meaning of the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act to which I have referred seems to me to be that an award under the Indian Arbitration Act on being filed in the High Court can be enforced, that is executed, as if it were a decree of the High Court. The procedure for enforcing a decree of the High Court is contained in Or. 21 of the Code, and the principal rule of that order is r. 10. It provides that if the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the Court which passed it. It is not disputed that in the case of an award under the Indian Arbitration Act against an individual the award can be enforced in accordance with the provisions of Or. 21 of the Code. That being the case, and reading the relevant provisions of the Act and the provisions of Or. 21, I think it must be held that in such a case the party applying to enforce an award is ' the holder of a decree,' and the High Court in this particular case is the ' Court which passed the decree.' The result of holding otherwise would be to make sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act for all practical purposes a dead letter, prevent the parties from enforcing their rights summarily, and thus defeat the very object for which the law of arbitration is enacted. I think, therefore, this contention must also be overruled. 65. The question of enforceability of an award against a joint Hindu family business arose in Moti Lal Chhagu Lal v. Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal I. L. R. (1942) 1 Cal. 161. It was urged before Sen, J., that an award against a joint Hindu family business was a perfectly good award, although there could not be a valid decree against such a business in a suit, for by reason of procedural rules no suit could be filed against it. 161. It was urged before Sen, J., that an award against a joint Hindu family business was a perfectly good award, although there could not be a valid decree against such a business in a suit, for by reason of procedural rules no suit could be filed against it. Sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act made this award enforceable as if it were a decree. This fiction had to be given effect to and the only way to do so was to so interpret Or. 21, r. 50 (2) as would bring an award against such a business within its ambit. The same considerations that led the learned Judges in Manilal Lallubhai's case (1933) I. L. R. 58 Bom. 162 to stretch the language of Or. 21, r. 50 (2) applied in the case of an award against a joint Hindu family business and to do otherwise would be to render sec. 15 nugatory so far as such an award was concerned. Sen, J., did not accept this argument. His decision rendered sec. 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act wholly nugatory so far as awards against a joint Hindu family business were concerned. The reasoning adopted by Sen, J., was as follows:-Or. 30 enabled a firm to sue or to be sued in the firm name. Such privilege had not been given to a joint Hindu family business. If Moti Lal Chhagu Lal wanted to file a suit to enforce its rights it could not hate filed a suit against Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal which was the name of a joint Hindu family business but would have had to do so against the members of the joint family owning the business carried on under that name. A suit against the name of Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal not being permissible as it was not a firm but was a joint Hindu family business, there could not be a decree against that name and such a decree if passed would be a nullity and incapable of execution, for Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal was neither a person in fact nor recognised as such by law even for the limited purpose of Or. 30. 30. The learned Judge then concluded that if a decree against Giridhari Lal Rameswar Lal being a decree against a joint Hindu family business, would be incapable of execution, an award against it, which was only to be deemed to be a decree, would be equally unenforceable, for a fictional decree cannot have a higher efficiency than a real decree. With great respect to the learned Judge, I do not see why the validity of an award in favour of or against a joint Hindu family business should be made dependent on Or. 30 at all. I have already shown that the provisions of Or. 30 have nothing to do with arbitration proceedings and an award in favour of or against a joint Hindu family business like an award in favour of or against a firm was valid independently of Or. 30 and was enforceable by way of a suit. Sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act provided for a simpler method of enforcement of such awards. The Bombay High Court in Manilal Lallubhai's case (1933) I. L. R. 58 Bom. 162 followed the case of Louis Dreyfus & Co. I. L. R. (1920) 47 Cal. 29 and gave effect to this provision by applying the provisions of Or. 21, r. 50 (2) to an award against a firm. I do not see why the reasonings adopted in that case should not be equally applicable to an award against a joint Hindu family business. The Bombay High Court made Or. 21, r. 5O (2) applicable to an award against a firm by reading the words " decree," " decree-holder " and " the Court which passed the decree" as " award," "award-holder" and "the Court in which the award had been filed." Likewise an award against a joint Hindu family business could he brought within that rule by treating the words " firm " and " partner " in a wide sense so as to include " a joint Hindu family business " and " members of a joint Hindu family business " respectively so as to give effect to sec. 15. I repeat with great respect that Sen, J., made sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act nugatory so far as an award against a joint Hindu family business was concerned. 15. I repeat with great respect that Sen, J., made sec. 15 of the old Arbitration Act nugatory so far as an award against a joint Hindu family business was concerned. I need not, however, pursue the matter any further, because the present Arbitration Act provides for pronouncing judgment upon an award. The award merges in the judgment and there can be no question of an award being executable as if it were a decree. The old Arbitration Act is repealed. 66. How will such a decree be executable against the members of the family, it is asked. If the decision of Mitter, J., in Jamunadhar Poddar's case 48 C. W. N. 203: I. L. R. [1944] 2 Cal. 131 .(1943) and that of Fazl Ali, J., in Alekh Chandra and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra Gajapat Narayan Deo, AIR 1941 Patna 596 were correct, namely, that a suit can be filed against a joint Hindu family business under Or. 30, r. 10 and a decree can be passed against such a business, how is such decree to be enforced against the members of the family except under Or. 21, r. 50? If Sen, J.'s construction of Or. 21, r. 50 were strictly followed, then such a decree not being one against a firm cannot come under Or. 21, r. 5O and that will be an additional ground for not accepting the decision of Mitter, J., in Jamunadhar Poddar's case 48 C. W. N. 203: I. L. R. [1944] 2 Cal. 131 (1943). On the other hand, if it be held that a decree in a suit against a joint Hindu family business is not a nullity and is executable under Or. 21, r. 50, then that will be an additional reason for not accepting the decision of Sen, J., It is to be noted that Or. 30, r. 10 only makes all the provisions of that order applicable to a suit under r. 10. "It does not in terms attract Or. 21, r. 50. The position is quite different in England. Or. 48A, r. 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court attracts r. 8 which is in that very order. Therefore in India a decree passed in a suit under Or. 30 like all other decrees or orders has to depend for its execution on Or. 21 which contains the general rules of execution of decrees and orders. Or. 48A, r. 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court attracts r. 8 which is in that very order. Therefore in India a decree passed in a suit under Or. 30 like all other decrees or orders has to depend for its execution on Or. 21 which contains the general rules of execution of decrees and orders. In the Code there is no express provision for execution of a decree passed in a suit under Or. 30, r. 10 against a joint Hindu family business. The nearest provision is that in Or. 21, r. 50. Therefore that rule will necessarily have to be construed by reading a firm as including a joint family business: and partners as including a member of the family. This will be a less violent interpretation of Or. 21, r. 50 (2) than the interpretation that was put upon it to enable an award against a firm to be executed as a decree. Likewise Or. 21, r. 50 (2) will have to be made available for executing a judgment.pronounced under the Indian Arbitration Act 1940, upon an award for or against a joint Hindu family business. 67. I may also point out that a judgment passed upon such an award may not require the aid of Or. 21, r. 50 (2) in execution, for before such a judgment can be passed notice has to be given to the parties under sec. 14 of the Arbitration Act of the filing of the award. This notice will be served on the members individually or on their Karta who, under the Hindu Law, represents them. I am assuming that there is no fraud or collusion on the part of the person seeking to have judgment on the award in the matter of service of this notice. Any party wishing to contest the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement or the award may move the Court to set aside the award. An award against a joint Hindu family business as such is, as I have said, nothing more nor less than an award against each and every one of the members of the family. When notice is given to and received by a member he may apply to have the award set aside on the grounds set forth in sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The language of that section is extremely wide. When notice is given to and received by a member he may apply to have the award set aside on the grounds set forth in sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The language of that section is extremely wide. I do not see why it will not be open to a member of the family to contest the arbitration agreement entered into by the Karta and the award on the ground that the family had separated or that he was not a member or that the debt in respect of which the Karta had agreed to go to arbitration and on which the arbitrator had made the award was a personal debt of the Karta or had been incurred for no legal necessity or was incurred in respect of a new business and not an ancestral business or was an immoral debt or that the applicant member was not otherwise liable therefor and therefore the arbitration agreement or the award was not binding on the joint family. In each of these cases the award may be said to have been improperly procured or to be otherwise invalid. If on receipt of notice of the filing of such an award no member of the family takes steps to get the award set aside or if the application made by him be dismissed, then nobody can have a grievance if judgment is pronounced upon the award. The trading name of the joint family business being a compendious mode of describing the members of the family, a judgment against such a name is in reality a judgment against each and every one of the members. Each and every one of them having had actually or constructively through the karta received notice and such judgment having been passed after service of such notice, each and every one of the members is a judgment-debtor. In these circumstances I do not see why such a judgment should not be executable against each of them individually under Or. 21, r. 11 without the aid of Or. 21., r. 50 (2). All questions of the nature which may be raised under Or. 21, r. 50 (2) in the case of a decree against a linn may be raised on an application for setting aside the award under sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act. 21, r. 11 without the aid of Or. 21., r. 50 (2). All questions of the nature which may be raised under Or. 21, r. 50 (2) in the case of a decree against a linn may be raised on an application for setting aside the award under sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act. An opportunity for raising those questions having been given before the passing of judgment it is no longer necessary to take recourse to Or. 21, r. 50 (2) and the decree-holder may proceed to execution against the individual members who have had notice under sec. 14 of the Arbitration Act and name such member as the person against whom execution is sought as provided in Or. 21, r. 11. 68. To summarise: In my judgment there is no want of machinery for executing a decree following a judgment passed under the Arbitration Act, upon an award against a joint Hindu family business. As I hold that an award for or against a joint Hindu family business is a perfectly good award and as the provisions of the Code relating to parties in a suit has no application at the stage when the award made out. of Court comes before the Court for judgment being passed upon it and as I find nothing in the Code applicable to judgments which expressly forbids a judgment being passed on an award for or against a joint Hindu family business and as sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act peremptorily enjoins the Court to proceed to pronounce judgment upon an award in certain specified circumstances and after the lapse of the specified time and as the decree following such judgment may easily be executed either under Or. 21, r. 11 or r. 50, I should not shirk from answering the second question in the. affirmative and from holding that under the Arbitration Act judgment may be passed for or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name upon an award for or against a joint Hindu family business. Re. (iii) : I now proceed to discuss the third main question argued before me, namely, whether judgment can be passed upon such an award for or against the members of the joint Hindu family individually or their karta as such. Re. (iii) : I now proceed to discuss the third main question argued before me, namely, whether judgment can be passed upon such an award for or against the members of the joint Hindu family individually or their karta as such. As I have said, the rules of the Code relating to parties are applicable only at the time of the inception or institution of a suit. If we are to treat the proceedings for judgment upon an award as akin to a suit, the question is what is the point of time which should be regarded as the inception or institution of those proceedings. We have seen that sec. 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, provides that the arbitrators at the request of any of the parties and upon payment of fees and charges, shall cause the award to be filed in Court and the Court shall then give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. Rules have been framed by this Court under sec. 44 of the Act. These Arbitration Rules prescribe how applications are to be instituted and how different proceedings under different sections of the Act are to be initiated. As regards the filing of the award r. 13 provides that the arbitrators shall forward the award together with depositions and documents and the necessary Court fees to the Registrar with a letter requesting that the award be filed. Under r. 14, when the provisions of the Act and of r. 13 have been complied with, the Registrar shall file the award and issue notice thereof to the parties under sec. 14 (2) of the Act intimating to them that the Court will proceed to pronounce judgment thereon on a date to be fixed in the notice and such notice shall be served by and at the expense of such party or parties as the Registrar may direct. R. 15 prescribes the Court before which the notice is to be made returnable and the period of the notice. It is clear from sec. 14 and the Arbitration Rules that the request of the parties to the arbitrator is an act out of Court and upto that point of time there is no proceeding in Court. It is further clear that the arbitrator merely forwards the award and the fees to the Registrar with a letter requesting that the award be filed. 14 and the Arbitration Rules that the request of the parties to the arbitrator is an act out of Court and upto that point of time there is no proceeding in Court. It is further clear that the arbitrator merely forwards the award and the fees to the Registrar with a letter requesting that the award be filed. The Registrar then files the award. The forwarding of the award by the arbitrators to the Registrar and the filing of the award by the Registrar are clearly ministerial acts. The Act and the rules suggest that the Registrar is to issue the notice under sec. 14 (2) suo moto but on enquiry from the Registrar I gather that in practice the party seeking judgment or his attorney has to go to the Court office and take out the notice signed by the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar for service, and unless the Registrar is so moved by the party or his attorney the notice is not actually issued. The name of the party or his attorney who moves the Registrar and gets the notice out is shown at the foot of the notice. The reason for this practice is that while in the case of individuals or corporations it may be possible for the Registrar to issue the notice in the name of the individual or the corporation concerned,, in the case of firms, for example, it is not possible for the Registrar to issue the notice in the names of the partners until somebody tells him the names. Be that as it may in practice, the party or his attorney first comes on the scene, so far as the Court is concerned, when the Registrar is moved to issue the notice. This taking out of the notice, appears to me to be the initiation of proceedings towards obtaining judgment on the award and is like issuing a writ under the English practice. I have already said that a contract by a joint Hindu family business in its trading name is a perfectly valid contract and can be enforced in a Court of law in a properly constituted suit, namely, a suit filed in the names of all the members of the family or the karta as such. I have already said that a contract by a joint Hindu family business in its trading name is a perfectly valid contract and can be enforced in a Court of law in a properly constituted suit, namely, a suit filed in the names of all the members of the family or the karta as such. I have also held that an award for or against a joint Hindu family business is a perfectly good award and may be enforced in a suit by presentation of a plaint by or against all the members of the family or the karta as such. If the award can be so enforced by a suit I do not see why it cannot be enforced under the Arbitration Act by getting notice issued on all the members of the family or the karta. As I have said, this taking out of the notice and service thereof amount to the initiation of the proceedings. Whether in the case of an award against a firm it is enough to get a notice issued and served on one partner or the manager as is done in a suit under Or. 30, r. 3 or notice will have to be issued and served on all partners as parties as required by sec. 14, may be a question of some nicety and I need not discuss it in this case. But in the case of an award against a joint Hindu family business the provisions of Or. 30 have no application and notice under sec. 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act must be served on all the members because the members are the parties designated by the trading name. If, therefore, notice is issued and served on all members the requirements of sec. 14 (2) and the Rules are complied with. Then comes the rule of Hindu Law which allows a karta to take proceedings or to be proceeded against on behalf of the joint family. Therefore if notice under sec. 14 (2) is issued and served on the karta as such, notice is in effect given to all the members. Thus if all the real parties are served with the notice under sec. 14 (2) either actually by service on all individual members or constructively by service on the karta by his right of representation under the Hindu Law, proceedings are effectively initiated against the whole family. Thus if all the real parties are served with the notice under sec. 14 (2) either actually by service on all individual members or constructively by service on the karta by his right of representation under the Hindu Law, proceedings are effectively initiated against the whole family. If proceedings so initiated be valid, as I hold it to be, I do not see why the Court should not have the power to pronounce judgment against all the members or the karta as the case may be. If the notice is issued and served on the members of the family individually each can apply to Court contesting the existence or validity of the award on any of the grounds stated above and praying that the same be set aside and there will be no difficulty. But if the notice is issued and served on the karta alone and a judgment is passed against the karta, how, it is asked, will the junior members be able to contest the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement or the award. The Hindu Law assumes that the karta acts honestly and in the interest of the family and therefore that the karta will inform the junior members of the arbitration agreement and the award and the notice of filing thereof. It is on this assumption of honest and fair dealing that such a wide representative character is conferred on the karta by the Hindu Law. But if the karta is fraudulent and incurs liability for no necessity of the family he may, it is said, suppress all information and notice from the junior members and the latter may not know of the award until after judgment has been pronounced in accordance with it. In the first place, it is the duty of the junior members to be vigilant and to keep themselves informed of the affairs of the family. In the next place, if the person who procures judgment upon the award is guilty of any fraud or collusion with the karta then such fraud or collusion will vitiate the proceedings and the judgment and the same may be set aside in appropriate proceedings. What if the karta alone is fraudulent? In the next place, if the person who procures judgment upon the award is guilty of any fraud or collusion with the karta then such fraud or collusion will vitiate the proceedings and the judgment and the same may be set aside in appropriate proceedings. What if the karta alone is fraudulent? Suppose the karta indulges in speculative transactions or gambling transactions or incurs debts for immoral purposes or for no necessity of the family, how will the junior members protect themselves against such unauthorised or illegal transactions or against awards on the basis thereof or judgments in terms of such awards? As I pointed out in my judgment in C. M. Shahani v. Havero Trading Co. Suit No. 1533 of 1936 which was upheld on appeal in Appeal No. 64 of 1943 in connection with the position of partners from whom the managing partner had suppressed all facts, the real remedy of the junior members is against their own fraudulent karta. Besides, what do they do when a suit is filed against the karta as such and a decree is obtained in such a suit? We are familiar with suits for setting aside of such transactions and for declaration that such transactions or judgments are not binding on the family. If it is open to the junior members to contest a judgment in a suit against the karta on the ground that there had been a separation before the transactions or the suit resulting in the judgment complained of, or that the karta acted illegally or in excess of his powers, I do not see why they will not be permitted to contest a judgment passed in accordance with an award. If the grounds of complaint fall within secs. 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, it may be that a regular suit will not lie but the aggrieved party may proceed under those sections by way of an application, and in cases not coming within the sections the right of suit is still there. The Court has ample power, pending such proceedings, to stay the execution of the impugned decree or injunct the decree-holder from proceeding to execution. The Court has ample power, pending such proceedings, to stay the execution of the impugned decree or injunct the decree-holder from proceeding to execution. Finally, it is said that if the award stands in the name of the joint Hindu family business then a judgment for or against the members individually or the karta as such will not be a judgment in accordance with the award. This argument overlooks the basic principle that the trading name of a joint Hindu family business is the compendious mode of describing the members and that an award in the trading name is in reality an award in the name of all the members. Therefore a judgment in the names of all the members is quite in accordance with the award. The karta under the Hindu Law represents and stands for all the members and therefore a judgment for or against the karta is in reality a judgment for or against the whole family and as such is in accordance with the award. For reasons stated above, I am prepared to hold that if, upon an award in favour of or against a joint Hindu family business in its trading name being filed in Court, notice is issued and served on the individual members or on the karta as such the Court can under sec. 17 of the Indian Arbitration Act proceed to pronounce judgment for or against the members or the karta as the case may be. Accordingly I answer the third question also in the affirmative. In the case now before me the original notice was issued in the name of the joint Hindu family business. That notice was not acted upon and a fresh notice was, with the leave of the Court, issued and served on Bhuramull Modi as karta of the joint family carrying on business under the name of Modi Brothers. The present proceedings were initiated before me by that notice, I, therefore, pronounce judgment in accordance with the award against Bhuramull Modi as the karta of the joint family carrying on business in the name of Modi Brothers referred to in the award. Bhuramull Modi as such karta will also pay the costs of these proceedings before me.