JUDGMENT Mukherjea, J. - This appeal is directed against an order of Gentle J., dated June 17, 1946, made in an application presented by the Governor-General in Council, who is the Respondent before us, u/s 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. 2. The facts material for our present purposes lie within a short compass and may be stated as follows: There was a contract between the Respondent company and the Industries and Supplies Department of the Government of India for the supply, by the former to the latter, of 50,000 felling axes complete with handles, at a price of Rs. 4-8 for the first 10,000 and cost plus 10 per cent, profit, with a ceiling price of Rs. 4-8 for the remaining 40,000. The tender of the company was accepted by the Government on December 9, 1942 and it was agreed by and between the parties that the terms and conditions of the contract would be the same as are contained in Directorate Form No. "Con. 19". Paragraph 13 of this contract provides for inspection and rejection of the stores supplied by the contractor Sub-paragraph (iii), Clause (b) of this paragraph empowers the Inspector to reject any stores submitted as not being in accordance with the particulars. Under sub-para, (iv), Clause (d) the Inspector's decision as regards rejection is to be treated as final and binding on the parties. Paragraph 20 of the agreement contains the arbitration clause which runs as follows: In the event of any question or dispute arising under these conditions or any special conditions of contract or in connection with this contract (except as to any matters the decision of which is specially provided for by these conditions) the same shall be referred to the award of an arbitrator to be nominated by the Director and an arbitrator to be nominated by the contractor.... 3. The company, it is admitted, supplied to the Department a total of 16,441 axes by March 31, 1945. A further consignment of 20,542 axes was tendered for delivery in October, 1945. It was, however, not accepted by the Department as the Inspector rejected these axes on the ground that they had not been properly heat treated. On December 8, 1945, the company wrote a letter to the Chief Controller of Purchase claiming Rs. A further consignment of 20,542 axes was tendered for delivery in October, 1945. It was, however, not accepted by the Department as the Inspector rejected these axes on the ground that they had not been properly heat treated. On December 8, 1945, the company wrote a letter to the Chief Controller of Purchase claiming Rs. 1,67,505 as compensation for the 20,000 and odd axes which were rejected by the Supplies Department and demanded that their claim be referred to arbitration, nominating Rai Bahadur Surajnarain as their arbitrator. On January 11, 1946, the Chief Controller of Purchase wrote to the company stating inter alia that the stores were not of a merchantable quality and were not properly heated in accordance with the requirements of the Inspectorate, and as the Inspector's decision in these matters was final, the question could not be referred to arbitration at all. It is stated by the Government that the company ignored this letter altogether and purported to proceed with the arbitration before Rai Bahadur Surajnarain, acting as the sole arbitrator and raised their demand to Rs. 1,84,817. On March 14, 1946, the Supplies Department sent a cable message to Rai Bahadur Surajnarain requesting him not to proceed with the arbitration and on March 30, 1946, the present application was filed u/s 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act. 4. The prayers in the petition inter alia are that the true scope and effect of the arbitration clause contained in the contract between the parties might be determined and that, on a proper construction of the said agreement; it might be declared that, the rejection of the supplies by the Inspectorate being final, the arbitrator or arbitrators have no jurisdiction to decide the scope and validity of such rejection or to adjudicate upon any claim or demand in respect thereof. 5. Gentle J., by his order, dated June 17, 1946, has substantially accepted the contention of the Petitioner and has decided that, in the events which happened, the arbitration-clause does not come into operation at all and that the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed thereunder have no jurisdiction to decide the propriety or otherwise of the decision of the Inspector, or to adjudicate upon any claim or demand in reference thereto. It is against this order that the present appeal has been taken. 6. Mr. It is against this order that the present appeal has been taken. 6. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the Respondent, has raised a preliminary objection challenging the competency of this appeal. His contentions are of a two-fold character. It has been argued, in the first place, that the appeal is barred u/s 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act, and even if the order appealed against is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Letters Patent must be taken subject to the Arbitration Act, which is a piece of legislation passed by the Central Government. 7. In the second place, it has been argued that, even if Section 39 of the Arbitration Act does not prevent the appeal, there is no appeal even under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, inasmuch as the order which has been challenged was not made pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915. 8. Now, so far as the first point is concerned, the language of Section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act seems to us to be perfectly clear. It allows appeals from certain orders which are specified in the section and expressly provides that no other order made in the Act would be appealable. 9. It is conceded by Mr. Sinha, who appeared for the Appellants, that the order in the present case, being one u/s 33 of the Arbitration Act, is not appealable u/s 39 of the Act. Mr. Sinha contends, however, that the right of appeal against the judgment of a single Judge in this Court exercising original civil jurisdiction, as is given by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, has not been taken away by Section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act. It is true he says that the provisions of the Letters Patent are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Assembly, but it is argued that to take away the right of appeal given by the Letters Patent some more express words than those actually used in Section 39 of the Arbitration Act are necessary. The right, created by the Letters Patent, cannot be taken away by mere implication. As an authority for the proposition, Mr. Sinha placed considerable reliance upon the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry v. Kalisunderi Debi (1882) ILR 9 Cal. The right, created by the Letters Patent, cannot be taken away by mere implication. As an authority for the proposition, Mr. Sinha placed considerable reliance upon the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry v. Kalisunderi Debi (1882) ILR 9 Cal. 482 : L.R. 10 IndAp 4 where it was held that the provision of 8. 588 of the CPC of 1882, which was worded almost in the same manner as Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, did not prevent an appeal to the High Court from an order of a Judge of that Court, sitting singly tinder Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 10. Now in the CPC of 1882, Section 588 was worded as follows: 11. An appeal shall lie from the following orders under this Code and from no other such orders. 12. The clauses that follow set out the different orders against which an appeal would lie. In Harrish Chunder Chowdhry v. Kalisunderi Debi (supra) the dispute arose out of a proceeding to enforce an order of the Privy Council u/s 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. What happened in that case are that two ladies named Kalisunderi and Chundermani filed a suit against one Hurrish Chunder in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Mymensingh for recovery of possession of a certain taluk on declaration of their title under a will executed by one Kassiswari. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal to this Court the judgment was reversed and the suit was dismissed. There was an appeal then taken to the Judicial Committee and the Judicial Committee set aside the judgment of this Court and restored that of the Subordinate Judge. After the decision of the Judicial Committee, it appears, that Hurrish Chunder, the Defendant, purchased the interest of one of the Plaintiffs, namely, Chundermani, from her heirs and Kalisunderi alone made an application to a single Judge of this Court in charge of the Privy Council department for an order u/s 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The prayer was that the order in council might be transmitted to the Mymensingh Court for execution. Pontifex J., who heard the application, rejected the prayer on the ground that the decree could not be executed by one of the decree-holders, when the other decree-holder did not join in the application. The prayer was that the order in council might be transmitted to the Mymensingh Court for execution. Pontifex J., who heard the application, rejected the prayer on the ground that the decree could not be executed by one of the decree-holders, when the other decree-holder did not join in the application. An appeal was taken against this order to the appellate Bench of this Court and the appeal was heard by Garth C.J., along with White and Mitter JJ. Garth C.J. was of opinion that the duties of a Judge in charge of the Privy Council department were really of a ministerial character and there was no appeal against the order of Pontifex J. The other two learned Judges held otherwise and it was held that the order was a judicial order, which could be challenged by way of appeal and that on the merits the decision of Pontifex J. was wrong. Against this decision an appeal was taken to the Judicial Committee and the. Judicial Committee affirmed the majority judgment of this Court. One of the questions raised before the Judicial Committee was the competency of the appeal against the order of the single Judge, in view of the provision of Section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This point was disposed of by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in favour of the decree-holder in the following words: It only remains to observe that their Lordships do not think that Section 588 of Act X of 1877, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, applies to such a case as this, where the appeal is from one of the Judges of the Court to the full Court. 13. On the strength of this decision, it has been held by the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay that. Section 588 of the old CPC did not take away the right of appeal given by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Vide Toolsee Money Dassee v. Sudevi Dassee (1899) ILR 26 Cal. 361; Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayansami Chetti (1901) ILR 25 Mad. 555; Secretary of State for India in Council v. Jehangir Maneckji Cursetji (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 342. Section 588 of the old CPC did not take away the right of appeal given by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Vide Toolsee Money Dassee v. Sudevi Dassee (1899) ILR 26 Cal. 361; Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayansami Chetti (1901) ILR 25 Mad. 555; Secretary of State for India in Council v. Jehangir Maneckji Cursetji (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 342. The Allahabad High Court held, on the other hand, that no such general proposition could be spelt out of the judgment of the Judicial Committee and the pronouncement could be taken as an authority only for what it actually decided, vide Banno Bibi v. Mehdi Husain (1889) ILR 11 All. 375; Muhammed Naim-ul-lah Khan v. Ishan-Ullah Khan (1892) ILR 14 All. 226. The legislature has removed this conflict by enacting in Section 104 of the present CPC (which corresponds to Section 588 of the old Code) that the right of appeal provided by any other law for the time being in force would not in any way be affected by this section. We are bound to hold that the Privy Council decision referred to above is an authority for the proposition that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was not in any way controlled by Section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood in 1882. This decision, however, is not a direct authority on the present question and we must be satisfied that the reasons for which it was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that Section 588 was not restricted in any way by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would apply to Section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act also. The difficulty is created by the fact that the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee on this particular point is of a summary character and no reasons in the proper sense of the word have at all been given. We are certainly not permitted to say, as was said by some of the Judges of the Allahabad and Madras High Courts, that in Hurrish Chunder's case (supra) the order of Pontifex J., being one which could come u/s 244 of the then Code of Civil Procedure, could be challenged by way of appeal as if it were decree, vide per Edge C.J. in Banno Bibi's case (supra); per Benson J. in Vasudeva Upadyaya v. Visvaraja Thirthasami (1897) ILR 20 Mad. 407. 407. This is not what was said by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee or by the learned Judges who decided the appeal in this Court. It is not permissible for us to say also that Section 610 of the CPC of 1882 did not contemplate an order at all, but a mere direction which would not come within the purview of Section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure. From the language used by the Judicial Committee, it seems clear to us that the reason why Section 588 of the CPC was held by their Lordships not to be applicable to an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is that, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the appeal is from one of the Judges of the Court to a Full Court. This obviously means, if it means anything, that there is a vital difference between an appeal under the CPC and one under the Letters Patent. A Judge exercising Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court is not subordinate to the High Court. He is the High Court himself, whereas the CPC deals with appeals from an inferior Court to a superior Court and not with appeals from one Judge of the Court to other Judges of the same Court. If that be the ratio decidendi, upon which the decision in Hurrish Chunder's case rested, the same principle cannot, in our opinion, be made applicable in the present case. The Arbitration Act is a consolidating and amending Act, which is self-contained in its character and save what is reserved in Section 47 of the Act, the entire law and procedure relating to arbitration in British India are contained in it. Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, it is pointed out to us, could only refer to the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act of 1937 which is more or less an international statute and has no connection whatsoever with arbitration proceedings between private citizens. The Act applies equally to mofussil districts and presidency-towns and the appeals contemplated by Section 39 cannot be limited to appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure, where the appeal is from one inferior Court to another, but must extend to all appeals under whatever law they might have been entertained, provided the order appealed against is one made under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. The language, in our opinion, is perfectly explicit and it forbids appeals from all orders except those enumerated in the section. 14. The whole question, it seems, hinges upon the construction of the language used by the legislature and if, as we think, the language of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act is wide enough to include a Letters Patent Appeal, we are bound to hold that Clause 44 of the Letters Patent is attracted to the present case and the right of appeal given under Clause 15 has been taken away. 15. Another ground seems to have been put forward in some of the later decisions of some of the High Courts in India wherein the principle enunciated in Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry v. Kalisunderi Debt (supra) was attempted to be supported: vide Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti (supra). The reason is that special provisions will control general provisions generalia specialibus non derogant. It is certainty a well-accepted canon of interpretation that-- when the legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. 16. Vide Craies on Statute Law, 3rd Ed., p 317. 16. It is perfectly true that the CPC is a general law vis-a-vis the Letters Patent and the special provisions contained in the Letters Patent could not be deemed to have been overridden by the Code of Civil Procedure, unless there were clear words to that effect in the Code. But vis-a-vis the Letters Patent, the Arbitration Act is certainly a special Act. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent gives a general right of appeal against all judgments of a single Judge on the Original Side exercising civil jurisdiction. 17. The Arbitration Act deals with one particular subject, namely, arbitration and the general right of appeal given in el. 15 is curtailed by the special provisions of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, which restricts the right of appeal only to the cases specified in the section itself. We do not think, therefore, that this principle, upon which reliance has been placed, would be of any assistance to the Appellants in this case. 18. Mr. 15 is curtailed by the special provisions of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, which restricts the right of appeal only to the cases specified in the section itself. We do not think, therefore, that this principle, upon which reliance has been placed, would be of any assistance to the Appellants in this case. 18. Mr. Sinha has placed considerable reliance upon a decision of this Court which is to be found reported in Mathura Sundari Dasi v. Haran Chandra Saha (1915) ILR 43 Cal. 857. There the question arose as to whether an appeal would lie to the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction from an order made by a Judge sitting singly on the Original Side, dismissing an application for rehearing of a suit which had been dismissed for default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question was answered in the affirmative by a Bench of three Judges, who heard the appeal. Sanderson C.J. was doubtful as to whether the order appealed against was a judgment at all, but in his opinion an appeal would lie under Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even though the order was one made by a single Judge sitting on the Original Side. Woodroffe J. was of opinion that the order appealed against was a judgment and in his opinion, the fact that the CPC has provided for an appeal in a case like this would prima facie be an indication that the order would rank as a judgment under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Mookerjee J. held that the order was a judgment and an appeal would lie both under the Letters Patent as well as under Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion upon this decision. The utmost that can be said about this case is that it decided that an appeal would lie from a single Judge of the High Court exercising Original Civil Jurisdiction not only under the provisions of the Letters Patent, but under the provisions of the CPC as well. The question may have to be considered by some larger Bench at a future time as to how far the provisions of the CPC are applicable to appeals from judgments of Judges sitting singly on the Original Side. The question may have to be considered by some larger Bench at a future time as to how far the provisions of the CPC are applicable to appeals from judgments of Judges sitting singly on the Original Side. For our present purposes, it is not necessary to express any opinion upon that point at all. 19. Our conclusion, therefore, is that Section 39 of the Arbitration Act is sufficiently explicit to include an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as well, and as the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent have to be taken subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council, we must hold that, to this extent, the right of appeal has been curtailed and modified. It may be mentioned here that the view we are taking receives entire support from the pronouncements of the Madras and Bombay High Courts, vide Penugonda Radhakrishnamurthy v. V.A.Y. Ethirajulu Chetty and Company ILR (1945) Mad. 564; Ranchhoddas Purshottam and Company v. Ratanji Virpal and Company (1943) AIR (Bom.) 196. The concluding portion of the judgment of Leach C.J. in the Madras High Court case runs as follows: It is true that Clause 15 Letters Patent, if it stood alone, would allow the appeal, but Clause 44, Letters Patent says that the provisions are subject inter alia to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council. The Indian Arbitration Act is an Act of the Central Legislature and the provisions of Section 39 must prevail. 20. It is needless to say that we are in entire agreement with the view taken by the learned Chief Justice. 21. Having regard to the view we have taken, it is not necessary to consider the second point raised by Mr. Chatterjee in support of his preliminary objection. 22. The result is that the preliminary point succeeds and the appeal is dismissed with costs. 23. Certified for two counsel. Harries, C.J. 24. I agree.