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1947 DIGILAW 207 (CAL)

Syam Sundar De v. Sailabala Dasi

1947-12-04

body1947
JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is an appeal from a judgment and order of Ormond J., made upon an application by a mortgagee for a final decree. 2. It appears that the mortgagee had taken proceedings against the mortgagor upon a mortgage dated July 26, 1931, the mortgage being for Rs. 2,600. The mortgage suit was actually filed on February 28, 1942 and a preliminary decree was passed on April 8, 1943. This preliminary decree was in form No. 5 in App. D of the Code of Civil Procedure. Inter alia it directed the learned Registrar of this Court to take an account to ascertain the precise sum which was due and owing. The learned Registrar took an account and found that a total sum of Rs. 5,034-11 was due and owing up to April 8, 1943, that is, up to the date of the preliminary decree. The preliminary decree contained the usual direction that the Defendant should make payment within six months of the date of the countersignature of the report or before any other date fixed by the Court under Order XXXIV, Rule 4, Sub-rule (2), and in default of payment, the Plaintiff was given a right to apply for a final decree. 3. The payments of the sum mentioned in the preliminary decree was not made within the period of six months allowed and on April 23, 1945, the mortgagee applied to the Court for a final decree. The Defendant mortgagor filed-an affidavit in reply. She pleaded that she was a poor woman and could not possibly pay. She prayed that the preliminary decree should be re-opened and a new decree passed directing payment to the Plaintiff of half the decretal amount in twenty annual instalments. 4. When the matter came before the learned Judge, he was rightly of opinion that this was not a decree which could be reopened. The decree was passed when the Bengal Money-lenders Act was in force and effect had been given to all the provisions of that Act, which were in favour of the Defendant mortgagor. That being so, the decree was not one that could be re-opened. The learned Judge, however, treated this affidavit in reply as an application for payment by instalments. Eventually he directed that the sum found by the Registrar should be paid in ten annual instalments. 5. That being so, the decree was not one that could be re-opened. The learned Judge, however, treated this affidavit in reply as an application for payment by instalments. Eventually he directed that the sum found by the Registrar should be paid in ten annual instalments. 5. From that order the present appeal has been preferred., It was contended, in the first place, on behalf of the mortgagee that no order of this kind could have been made, because there was no substantive application by the mortgagor before the Court. Secondly, it was argued that, even if the counter-affidavit sworn to by the Defendant could be regarded as an application for instalments, no instalments could be granted, because the application was too late and should have been made at the time the preliminary decree was passed. 6. It appears to me that the contentions of the Appellant are well founded. A preliminary decree of this kind is governed by Section 34 of the Bengal Money-lenders Act. The material portion of that section reads as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in any agreement, the Court shall-- (a) in suits in respect of loans to which the provisions of Order XXXIV of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply, on the application of the Defendant and after hearing the Plaintiff, notwithstanding the limit of six months provided therein, direct at the time of the passing of the preliminary decree under Rule 2 or Rule 4 of the said order to the effect mentioned in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (c) of Sub-rule (1) of the said Rule 2,-- (i) that the payment of the amount found or declared due under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2 or Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the said order, as the case may be, is to be made, subject to such conditions as the Court may impose in such number of annual instalments and on such dates as the Court thinks fit having regard to the circumstances of the Plaintiff and the Defendant and the amount of the decree;.... 7. This section contemplates in the first place an application by the Defendant. 7. This section contemplates in the first place an application by the Defendant. As I have said, it was contended that there was no application by the Defendant and in any event, if the counter-affidavit can be regarded as an application, it was not an application for payment of the decretal amount by instalments, but rather an application for re-opening the decree, reducing the sum-due and directing payment of the reduced sum by instalments. Technically the argument of the Appellant is well-founded that it was not in fact an application for instalments u/s 34. However, as instalments were asked for, the learned Judge could possibly treat the counter-affidavit as an application u/s 34 of the Bengal Money-lenders Act and thus avoid a fresh application by the Defendant. I do not suggest that, in every case, similar leniency should be shown, but in the present case the Defendant was obviously in financial difficulties and was a. woman and therefore, the Court could well feel that she should not be driven to file a fresh application. 8. Even if this counter-affidavit be treated as an application u/s 34, it appears to me that it was too late for the Court to make any order. The words of Section 34(2)(a) of the Bengal Money lenders Act are clear. An application by the Defendant must be made and the Plaintiff given an opportunity to put his case. Further the application must be dealt with at the time of the passing of the preliminary decree. 9. If the plain words of the statute are to be followed, then clearly this application was out of time, because it was made long after the preliminary decree had been passed. Ormond J. realised that difficulty, but he seems to have thought that the preliminary decree so called made by this Court on April 8, 1943, was not in the true sense a preliminary decree, because the amount due from the Defendant to the Plaintiff had not been found. He seemed to think that until the actual amount due was found no application by the Defendant u/s 34 for installment could be made or disposed of. The learned Judge stated that no order for instalments could be made by the Court unless the Court knew the precise amount due. He seemed to think that until the actual amount due was found no application by the Defendant u/s 34 for installment could be made or disposed of. The learned Judge stated that no order for instalments could be made by the Court unless the Court knew the precise amount due. That being so, the learned Judge was of opinion that the words in Section 34, directing the application to be heard at the time of the passing of the decree, should not be construed too strictly. He seems to have thought that the application made by the Defendant was an application in pursuance of the preliminary decree and he stated that it was not his intention either to re-open that decree or to pass a fresh preliminary decree. The effect of his judgment is to substitute in Section 34 of the Bengal Money-lenders Act for the words "at the time "of the passing of the preliminary decree" the words, "at any time before the final decree is passed;" because it must be remembered the learned Judge heard the Defendant upon this question of instalments when there was before him an application by the mortgagee for a final decree. 10. It has been urged that, as the Court is directed by Section 34(1)(a)(i) to have regard to the amount of the decree when fixing instalments, the instalments cannot be fixed until the enquiry has been held and the report made by the learned Registrar as to what was the exact amount due. 11. Section 34 of the Bengal Money-lenders Act refers in terms to Order XXXIV, Rules 2 and 4 and sub-rules of those Rules. It is, therefore, clear that the legislature had in mind that the preliminary decree in the majority of cases directs an enquiry. Having that in mind, the legislature nevertheless directed that the application for installment should be heard and disposed of at the time of passing the preliminary decree. It is argued that if that is the true construction the legislature directed the impossible. But it must be remembered that, when a Court passes a preliminary decree, the approximate amount due is known. The enquiry is in most cases merely a matter of mathematical calculation to ascertain the exact amount due. It is argued that if that is the true construction the legislature directed the impossible. But it must be remembered that, when a Court passes a preliminary decree, the approximate amount due is known. The enquiry is in most cases merely a matter of mathematical calculation to ascertain the exact amount due. Having regard to the plain words of the statute, I think it must be held that the application must be heard at the time of the passing of the preliminary decree. It is no answer to suggest that it would be better if the application were disposed of after the learned Registrar or an officer of the Court had made his report as to the exact amount due. For reasons best known to the legislature they directed this application to be disposed of at a particular time. It appears to me that it must be disposed of at that time and any application at a subsequent date cannot be entertained. 12. In the result, therefore, this appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Judge granting payment by instalments is set aside. As I have said, the substantive application before the Court was the application to make the decree final. The time allowed to pay the decretal amount, namely, six months has long since elapsed; but this Court has jurisdiction to extend the time under Order XXXIV, Rule 4(2). We, therefore, give the Defendant mortgagor a further period of six months from to-day to pay the decretal amount. If the amount be not paid on or before that date the preliminary decree will be made final. IN the circumstances, I would make no order as to costs in this Court or before the learned single Judge. 13. I understand that one or two instalments payable under the order of Ormond J. have been paid. Credit of course must be given for whatever has been paid.