JUDGMENT G.N. Das, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. There was a tenancy bearing a rental of Rs. 16-8-3 pies. That tenancy was subsequently split up and a jama of Rs. 2-4 was carved out in favour of Prasanna Mallik. The remaining jama of Rs. 14-4-3 pies continued in the name of the Plaintiff and certain Malliks. The landlord Defendant No. 1 instituted a suit for recovery of arrears of rent of the jama of Rs. 14-4-3 and recovered a decree and in execution thereof this tenancy was purchased by Defendant No. 1 and subsequently settled with Defendant No. 2. The Plaintiff, who was a party to the rent-suit and the execution proceeding, brought the present suit on the allegation that, as he was an aboriginal, the sale held was a nullity in view of the provisions of Section 49K of the Bengal Tenancy Act and his title to 8 annas share was unaffected by the sale. The Courts below have concurred in decreeing the Plaintiff's suit in the view that the decree obtained by Defendant No. 1, though it was for recovery of arrears of rent, had the force of a money-decree and as such the sale held in execution of the decree was a nullity in terms of Section 49K of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The lower appellate Court construes the proviso to Section 49K to mean that it contemplates only decrees for arrears of rent which have the force of a rent-decree under Ch. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 2. Mr. Mukerji appearing for the Appellants has contended that the view taken by the lower appellate Court is wrong. He has referred to the provs. (a) and (c) to Section 49K of the Bengal Tenancy Act and has argued that where the claim, in respect of which the decree was obtained and execution sought for, is one for arrears of rent or for dues recoverable as public demands, the tenant though an aboriginal is not protected under the statute. In my opinion, this contention is correct. The object of Section 49K was to protect aboriginals from claims other than claims for arrears of rent or for claims recoverable as public demands. In my opinion, this contention is correct. The object of Section 49K was to protect aboriginals from claims other than claims for arrears of rent or for claims recoverable as public demands. The section is an invasion on the ordinary rights of decree-holders and unless the words are sufficiently clear I am not prepared to say that the section forbids execution altogether. Proviso (a) is as follows: Any tenure or holding belonging to an aboriginal may be sold, in execution of a decree of a competent Court to recover an arrear of rent which has accrued in respect of the tenure or holding. 3. The words "to recover an arrear of rent" refer to the nature of the claim which was put in litigation. It does not mean that the decree which may be passed in a suit to recover an arrear of rent should also partake of the character of a rent-decree. A contrary view would lead to various complications. The first contention raised by Mr. Mukerji, therefore, succeeds. 4. Mr. Mukerji has also contended that it is no longer open to the Plaintiffs who are judgment-debtors to say that the execution proceedings were not taken under Ch. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act and in support of his submission he referred me to a decision in the case of Ambika Charan Roy Barman and Another Vs. Har Kishore Chakravarti and Others, AIR 1927 Cal 825 . In my opinion, this does not touch the question with which we are now concerned. The whole controversy now is whether the words "the decree to recover an arrear "of rent" mean a decree having the force of a rent-decree or not. 5. There is another difficulty in the Plaintiff's way. According to the Plaintiff the order for sale was a nullity because of contravention of Section 49K. If this be correct, this was an objection which was available to him in the course of the execution proceedings. In my opinion, a remedy by way of a suit filed about seven years later is no longer available to them. 6. The result, therefore, is that this appeal succeeds. Judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the Plaintiffs' suit dismissed. 7. In the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their own costs.