JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The Appellant Sundari Patoa is the third wife and now the widow of one Karamchand, who, before marrying her, took in adoption the original Respondent, who was the third son of his brother Sukhlal. The second wife of Karamchand and the wife of Sukhlal were sisters. Karamchand died in the year 1939. In 1940, the suit out of which the present appeal arises, was brought by the original Respondent Seuraj Patoa for a declaration that he was the validly adopted son and only heir of Karamchand and for recovery of the whole of Karamchand's estate from the Appellant. The second part of the declaration, namely, that the Plaintiff was the sole heir of Karamchand and recovery of the whole of Karamchand's estate were prayed for on the basis that the Appellant was not the legally married wife of Karamchand. 2. The defence of the Appellant was that she had been legally married to Karamchand, but it was the Plaintiff who had not been adopted as a son at all, at any rate, not validly adopted. 3. The trial Court found that the Plaintiff's adoption and the Defendant's marriage were both valid. On that finding, it declared the Plaintiff to be the validly adopted son of Karamchand and gave him joint possession of half the estate along with the Defendant who was held to have a life-estate in the remaining half. 4. The Plaintiff accepted this decision, but the Defendant appealed against that part of it by which the Plaintiff had been declared to be the validly adopted son of Karamchand. The appeal having been dismissed and the finding as to the validity of the Plaintiff's adoption affirmed, the Defendant has preferred the present Second Appeal. 5. During the pendency of the appeal, the Plaintiff, we are informed, died, leaving a will and his legatees have since been brought on the record in his place and stead, but it will be convenient to refer in this judgment to the Plaintiff himself. 6. In so far as the Defendant contended that Karamchand never intended or purported to take the Plaintiff in adoption at all, that contention stands disposed of by the concurrent findings of the Courts below. 6. In so far as the Defendant contended that Karamchand never intended or purported to take the Plaintiff in adoption at all, that contention stands disposed of by the concurrent findings of the Courts below. It has been found that there was actually a ceremony of adoption and that the Plaintiff was treated as an adopted son, as was shown by certain entries in a school-register as also by his having performed the rite of applying fire to the mouth of Karamchand on the funeral pyre, which is a special prerogative of a son where a son exists. All the witnesses have said that an adoption did take place and it is noteworthy that the natural father of the Plaintiff, who ought to know best, himself stated that he had given up all claims' to his son. 7. The Courts below have regarded the two circumstances, namely, there being certain entries in the school-register as to the guardian or father of the Plaintiff and the performance by him of funeral rites as establishing the validity of the adoption as well. In this regard, in our opinion, the Courts below misdirected themselves. When there is no direct evidence of adoption, subsequent conduct of the adoptive father or of relatives or even of the adopted son himself may be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the person concerned was accorded the status of an adopted son and if it is found that he was, it may reasonably be inferred that he had been validly adopted. But where, as in the present case, there is evidence of the actual ceremony, subsequent conduct of the parties is wholly immaterial and the only matter for enquiry is whether what was done at the ceremony was sufficient to effect an adoption in law. If there was a defect in the ceremony, no amount of subsequent acknowledgment by the adoptive father or by relatives would cure that initial defect. In the present case, witnesses were called to give an account of what took place at the ceremony of adoption and if the rites proved to have been performed fell short of the irreducible minimum, the fact that the Plaintiff was represented by Karamchand to be his adopted son or that he was allowed by relatives to perform funeral rites would not make good the invalidity of the adoption. 8. 8. The Courts below have, however, found as a fact, as already stated, that Karamchand did intend and purport to adopt the Plaintiff as a son. As to the actual ceremony, the findings are that the adoption took place when the Plaintiff was three or four days old, that the nurse handed up the child to its natural father, who made it over to the adoptive father and the adoptive father paid to the natural father five cowrhies and some molasses, which are the customary consideration for an adopted son among the Patoas. The Appellant, however, contends that this was not sufficient and that inasmuch as there was no verbal declaration by the natural father that he was giving the son in adoption and no declaration by the adoptive father that he was accepting him, the adoption was invalid in law. 9. In our opinion, this contention is based upon a misconception of the Hindu law. Whether or not the parties in the present case are Sudras, they were, according to both sides, persons outside the pale of the twice-born classes. Among Hindus of this class, it is well settled, no religious ceremony is necessary and all that is required is physical giving and taking with intent to transfer the boy from one family to another. In other words, all that is needed is a corporal delivery of the boy and acceptance by the adoptive father, accompanied, of course, by the necessary intention that there should be an adoption; but it is not required that the giving and taking should be accompanied by any declarations on either side, nor is it the law that the intention of the parties can be expressed only by word of mouth. As already stated, where the parties do not belong to the twice-born classes, no religious ceremony is necessary. It is true that, nevertheless, there must be some overt act and it is now established that such overt act must take the form of a physical giving and taking of the child; but the intention that by such giving the child is given in adoption and by such taking the child is accepted as an adopted son can well be expressed by means other than language and can even be inferred from circumstances. There is no authority, so far as we have been able to investigate, for the proposition that the recital of any formula is necessary. 10. The Appellant relied strongly on the decision of the Privy Council in Shoshinath Ghose v. Krishnasunderi Dasi (1880) ILR 6 Cal. 381 : L.R. 7 IndAp 250 and a decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, viz., the case of Goviridayyar v. Dorasami (1887) ILR 11 Mad 5. We are unable to see that either case is of much assistance to her. The case before the Privy Council related to Sudras and the only question which fell to be considered was whether an adoption had been effected by certain deeds. Their Lordships held, in agreement with the Courts in India, that the deeds were not even intended to operate as instruments of an immediate and final adoption and on that finding, as they were careful to point out, it became unnecessary even to consider whether among the Sudras there could be an adoption by deed alone. Their Lordships, however, proceeded to observe that they did not wish to lend any countenance to the notion that there could be a giving and taking of an adopted son, even in the case of Sudras, by mere deed without an actual delivery of the child. They then pointed out that no religious ceremony was necessary in the case of Sudras, but the Sudras had fallen into the habit of imitating the higher classes even to the extent of performing religious ceremonies. Their Lordships next observed that the giving and taking which was an essential part of the ceremony of adoption rested on Hindu law and usage and they concluded their observations with the following sentence:-- It would seem, therefore, that, according to Hindu usage, which the Courts should accept as governing the law, the giving and' taking in adoption ought to take place by the father handing over the child to the adoptive mother and the adoptive mother declaring that she accepts the child in adoption (see p. 389 of the report). 11. It is to be noticed that the passage above quoted refers to an adoptive mother. 11. It is to be noticed that the passage above quoted refers to an adoptive mother. That circumstance is explained by the fact that in the case before their Lordships the adoption had been made by a widow and obviously the statement of the law was adjusted to the facts of that particular case. But in so far as their Lordships said that the adoptive mother would have to declare that she accepted the child in adoption, we do not read the statement as containing a decision that such a verbal declaration is such an essential part of the ritual that its absence would invalidate the adoption. What their Lordships were concerned with was simply a general statement of the necessity of giving and taking, which even was not called for in view of their decision on the facts of the case. But it is, to our mind, perfectly clear that the reference to the verbal declaration on the part of the adoptive mother means no more than this that there should be an expression of intention on the part of the adoptive mother to accept the child in adoption. In other words, it would not suffice if the taking of the child was a mere physical taking without anything more to show that the taking was by way of an adoption. 12. Referring to this decision of the Privy Council, the Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed as follows: The decision is an authority for the proposition that any overt act is not sufficient, but that there must be corporeal delivery of the child by a person competent to give, to a person competent to take, accompanied by the declaration on the one side, "I give the child in adoption" and on the other, "I take the child in adoption." (Page 7). 13. It is to be observed that the Madras Court enlarges the statement of the law as contained in the decision of the Privy Council by adding a verbal declaration also on the part of the person giving the child. It has already been seen that the Privy Council said nothing as to the necessity of any declaration by the giver and in so far as they referred to a declaration by the taker, we have already stated what, in our opinion, the true meaning of the passage is. It has already been seen that the Privy Council said nothing as to the necessity of any declaration by the giver and in so far as they referred to a declaration by the taker, we have already stated what, in our opinion, the true meaning of the passage is. In our opinion, if there is a physical giving and taking and it is proved by other evidence that such corporeal delivery and acceptance of the child was intended to effect an adoption, it is not necessary to prove further that any verbal declarations were made and such declarations are not essential to the validity of the adoption. The view we are taking is in accordance with the statement of the law as contained in the works of Mulla and Shastri. The latter, who is an acknowledged authority on Hindu law and more particularly on the subject of adoption, does not say either in his treatise on Hindu law or the special treatise on adoption that any verbal declarations are necessary. 14. In the present case, the physical giving and taking has been proved. It has also been proved that Karamchand and Sukhlal were brothers and their wives were sisters. No child having been born to the former although he had married twice, it was perfectly natural for him and his wife to think of adopting a son and if they desired to adopt a son, it was in the highest degree natural that they should have desired to adopt a son of Karamchand's brother, Sukhlal. Previous talk between the parents as to such an adoption has been proved and it has also been proved that when the child was actually given over, the adoptive father paid the customary consideration for as adopted son. In our opinion, nothing could be more conclusive evidence of an intention to adopt and in our opinion in the facts of the present case verbal declarations were entirely unnecessary. 15. We are, accordingly, of opinion that the Courts below have rightly held that the adoption of the Plaintiff was perfectly valid in law. 16. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs. Roxburgh, J. 17. I agree.