JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is an appeal by the judgment debtors against an order of the learned Civil Judge of Allahabad, refusing to certify the adjustment of a decree. 2. On the basis of a mortgage granted by Bbola Nath and others, Mool Chand obtained a preliminary decree for a sum of Rs. 9,990-150 which was made final on November 6, 1943. After the usual proceedings, December 22, 1944 was fixed for the auction sale. Mool Chand had, meanwhile, transferred his decree in favour of the Respondent, Panna Lal. 3. On December 21, 1944, that is one day before the date of the sale, the judgment-debtors presented an application, supported by an affidavit sworn by Bhola Nath, under Order 21, Rule 2, of the Code of CPC praying for the adjustment of the decree, on the allegation that it bad been settled that Panna Lal would accept Rs. 7,000 in full satisfaction of the decree. This application was resisted by Panna Lal. He did not say that there was no talk of an adjusment. His case Was that it was agreed that the money would be paid to him by 1st of December and, as that was not done, the negotiations failed. 4. The learned Civil Judge found that the Story with which the judgment-debtors went to the Court in support of their application, was not a true story; on the other band, the truth lay with Panna Lal. In the result, he rejected the application. 5. The judgment debtors have come to this Court in appeal against that order. 6. When the case came before us on the 5th instant, we thought it was preeminently a case for compromise and granted a short adjournment. No compromise has been arrived at. 7. Panna Lal had examined in support of his version one Mr. Vishwanath Pande, a lawyer practising in the district Courts. The judgment debtors had, in support of their version, examined another lawyer, Mr. Lakshmi Das Gupta, also practising in the district Courts. The truth lay between these two versions, and we thought an amicable settlement would, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, be conducive to the interest of all concerned. It is, however, to be regretted that a settlement has not been possible. 8. Lakshmi Das Gupta, also practising in the district Courts. The truth lay between these two versions, and we thought an amicable settlement would, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, be conducive to the interest of all concerned. It is, however, to be regretted that a settlement has not been possible. 8. The learned Civil Judge has devoted considerable time and care to the case, but it is obvious that he has based his judgment largely on the statement of Mr. Vishwanath Pande. In so doing, he has discredited the version of the other lawyer, Mr. Lakshmi Das Gupta. It is true that there are circumstances, which, seemingly, tend in favour of the version of the decree-holder, but a careful analysis of the whole of the evidence, principally the probabilities of the case, tip the scale in favour of the judgment debtors. We do not propose to follow the learned Civil Judge in accepting, at its face value, the testimony of Mr. Vishwanath Pande and rejecting altogether the testimony of Mr. Lakshmi Das Gupta. We do not propose to address ourselves in detail to their statements. We prefer to rest cur decision upon the probabilities of the case and upon such evidence as fits in with those probabilities. 9. The broad fact remains that on December 21, 1944, an application was presented by the judgment-debtors for recording the adjustment of the decree. In support of this, among other pieces of evidence, they produced a draft sale-deed. It is the draft of a sale-deed, which the judgment-debtors proposed to execute in favour of a lady Srimati Chandrakali Devi, wife of one Rameshwar Prasad, for a sum of Rs. 7,000, the precise amount at which the adjustment was, according to the jadgment debtors, settled. It is an elaborate document and was prepared on November 24 or soon after, as the stamp bears that date. 10. It runs over three sheets of paper and refers to all the conditions of the transaction. It might be noted that the sons of the judgment-debtors had, with Badri Prasad, their maternal uncle, as their next friend, brought a suit No. 22 of 1944, in the Court of the Civil Judge of Allahabad, for a declaration that the mortgage made by their fathers was tainted with illegality and immorality and the decree passed on its basis was not binding on the family. This was obviously one of the important factors to be taken into consideration by both the parties. It stands to reason that Panna Lal, the purchaser of the decree, could not accept any arrangement, unless the hurdle created by this suit was successfully negotiated and the suit with-dtawn. The draft contains clear stipulation that it would be withdrawn. It is true that it was brought by the sons and not by the fathers, but it is distinctly provided that Badri Prasad would not only withdraw the suit but join the sale. This is a very important circumstance and, in our opinion, goes a long way in support of the theory of the judgment-debtors. It could have been only at the instance of Panna Lal, who must have been anxious to secure a title free from all cloud, that Badri Prasad under-look to join the transaction. The insistence upon Badri Prasad's joining the transaction, could have proceeded only from the purchaser of the decree and not from the judgment-debtors. 11. There is nothing in this draft to indicate that the transaction was to be completed and the money paid by the prospective purchaser by December 1, 1944. to make it available to the decree-holder by that date. Rameshwar Prasad went into the witness-box on behalf of the judgment-debtors and no question was put to him on behalf of Panna Lal on this point. All this clearly proves that there were negotiations for a compromise The negotiations had materialised and the theory that the money was to be paid by December 1 and not thereafter, is an alter-throught. 12. Dr. San, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, has strenuously argued that there is a divergence between the version of Mr. Vishwanath Pande and that of the judgment-debtors. The former says that he was acting on behalf of his client; Bhola Nath has, on the other hand, stated that Mr. Vishwanath Pande had acquired a personal interest in the decree and was acting on his own behalf. This, in our opinion, is of no consequence. To the judgment-debtors what mattered was the factum of the adjustment. It was of no consequence to them whether the person really interested was Panna Lal or Mr. Vishwanath Pande. 13. Dr. Sen has also contended that the Vakalatnama did not confer any power upon Mr. Vishwanath Pande to come to terms on behalf of bis client. To the judgment-debtors what mattered was the factum of the adjustment. It was of no consequence to them whether the person really interested was Panna Lal or Mr. Vishwanath Pande. 13. Dr. Sen has also contended that the Vakalatnama did not confer any power upon Mr. Vishwanath Pande to come to terms on behalf of bis client. In the first place, the statement of Mr. Vishwanath Pande itself militates against this suggestion. He says: Panna Lal when I pressed told me that if he was paid Rs. 7,000 by December 1, 1944, he would accept it in total satisfaction of the decree. 14. Whether the initiative for the compromise came from Mr. Vishwanath Pande himself, or it was taken at the instance of his client, the fact remains that a stage was reached when Mr. Vishwanath Pande purported to act on behalf of his client and under his instructions. 15. It is too late in the day, after the pronouncement of their Lordships in Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Srimati Tatubala Dasi, 1930 ALJ 489 (PC), to contend that a specific authority to compromise is necessary. Say their Lordships at page 432: They are of opinion that Mr. Sircar, as an Advocate of the High Court, had, when briefed on behalf of the Defendant in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Hoogly, the implied authority of hit client to settle the suit. Their Lordships have already said that he must be treated as though briefed on the trial of the suit. Their Lordships regard the power to compromise a suit as inherent in the position of an Advocate in India. 16. We are of opinion that Mr. Vishwanath Pande had, by virtue of his position as an Advocate and also because he had received definite instructions from his client, ample power to settle the dispute. We have also come to the conclusion that the story of the judgment-debtors, that the matter had been comprorsed(sic) at a sum of Rs. 7,000 is borne out by the probabilities of the case. We might repeat that, in arriving at our conclusion, we have been influenced solely by the probabilities. We mean no aspersion upon Mr. Vishwanath Pande. Nor do we share the criticism by the learned Civil Judge of the conduct of Babu Lakshmi Das Gupta. 17. 7,000 is borne out by the probabilities of the case. We might repeat that, in arriving at our conclusion, we have been influenced solely by the probabilities. We mean no aspersion upon Mr. Vishwanath Pande. Nor do we share the criticism by the learned Civil Judge of the conduct of Babu Lakshmi Das Gupta. 17. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court belo and hold that there was an adjustment of the dispute within the, meaning of Order 21, Role 2 of the Code Civil Procedure. 18. We are informed by the learned Counsel for the parties that the auction sale was held on December 22, 1944, and Panna Lal has withdrawn a sum of Rs. 8,059-12-0 out of the sum deposited by the Appellants In view of our decision that there was an adjustment of the decree at Rs. 7,000, Panna Lal is entitled to retain only a sum of Rs. 7,000 and must refund the balance. He shall do it within a fortnight of this date. 19. We have, on a consideration of all the facts, come to the conclusion that this is a fit case in which the parties should bear their own costs throughout.