JUDGMENT Mitter, A.C.J. 1. One Nandram Chamaria had two sons, Gorakram and Hurdutrai. Gorakram had two sons, Ramprotap and Amlokchand. Ratanlal is the grandson of Ramprotap. Ramprotap's son, namely, the father of Ratanlal, died a long time ago and the date of his death is not material. Amlokchand died in 1911 leaving a widow, Surji Sethani. Keshardeo has been adopted by her. Hurdutrai had three sons, one adopted and two born of his wife Anardeyi. His adopted son is Durga Prosad and his sons by Anardeyi are Radha Kissen and Motilal, Durga Prosad has three sons, Benarasilal, Keshardeo and Gobind Prosad. Keshardeo, as we have already stated, has been adopted by Surji Sethani. Hurdutrai carried on business in partnership with his nephews, Ramprotap and Amlokchand. He died in December, 1916, after two deeds,--a deed of family arrangement and a deed of partnership had been executed by him. In 1924, Motilal instituted a suit for partition of the estate of Hurdutral Chamaria. The Official Receiver was appointed Receiver in that suit and as Receiver he instituted another Suit No. 1840 of 1930 with the permission of the Court for dissolution of and accounts of the business. Later on, Anardeyi was substituted as the sole Plaintiff in that suit and there was addition of parties to that suit. The suit, as finally constituted after the amendment, was a suit by Anardeyi as Plaintiff against Durga Prosad, Radha Kissen, Motilal, Ramprotap, Ratanlal, Surji Sethani and Keshardeo as Defendants. The subject-matter of the Suit No. 1840 of 1930 was referred to the arbitration of three persons. There was a clause in the reference that if the said three persons did not give a unanimous award, Sir Manmathanath Mukherjee would be the sole arbitrator. The three persons named in the reference did not take up the burden of the reference with the result that Sir Manmathanath entered upon the reference. He was authorised to make separate awards. On the 9th of January, 1941, he made an interim award declaring the rights of the parties and their shares in the different paragraphs of the said award and directed accounts of the business to be taken in order that he may give further directions in the matter. Anardeyi made an application to this Court for a decree in accordance with this award. That application was opposed by Durga Prosad. Anardeyi made an application to this Court for a decree in accordance with this award. That application was opposed by Durga Prosad. The matter came up before Edgley, J., who overruled the objections to the award and passed a decree in accordance therewith by a judgment dated the 7th of March, 1941. An appeal against that judgment was taken by Durga Prosad. That appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the 29th of May, 1946. In the meantime, Sir Manmathanath had died and the reference to arbitration was superseded and the suit was set down for hearing on the other issues not covered by the award which Sir Manmathanath made on the 9th of January, 1941. Durga Prosad and Keshardeo made an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the judgment of the Appeal Court dated the 29th May, 1946, and a certificate under sec. 110 of the CPC has been granted, but that appeal has not been finally admitted yet. To carry out the directions given in the award a special Referee was appointed to take accounts. At the 29th sitting he framed the issues which are 10 in number. The first issue runs thus: "What are the businesses in which Amlokchand was a partner with two annas share?" Thereafter there were 94 sittings before the Special Referee. One witness has been examined and two other witnesses have been examined-in-chief but their cross-examination has not been finished yet. A sum of about Rs. 86,000, we are told, has been paid up to now to the Special Referee on account of his fees and office charges which included the salary of his clerks, etc. It appears from paragraph 8 of the affidavit of Khemchand Serowgi filed on behalf of Surji Sethani that the enquiry is now proceeding on Issue No. 1 only. All the materials on that issue are not before the Special Referee yet and there are besides 9 issues awaiting investigation by him. Before the certificate under sec. 110 of the CPC was granted, Sew Kissendas Bhattar who is the executor of the Plaintiff Anardeyi and who has been substituted in her place, made an application in the trial Court in Suit No. 1840 of 1930 for stay of further proceedings before the Special Referee. After we had granted the certificate under sec. Before the certificate under sec. 110 of the CPC was granted, Sew Kissendas Bhattar who is the executor of the Plaintiff Anardeyi and who has been substituted in her place, made an application in the trial Court in Suit No. 1840 of 1930 for stay of further proceedings before the Special Referee. After we had granted the certificate under sec. 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, by consent of parties this application has been brought before us. Radha Kissen and Motilal support this application. Durga Prosad has not appeared before us, but Keshardeo, Ratanial and Surji Sethani have opposed this application, before is Learned Counsel appearing for them have raised two points before us, namely, (1) that we have no jurisdiction to stay further proceedings in the suit and (2) that in any event on the facts of this case we should not stay the proceedings which are going on before the Special Referee. On the first point the contention before us is that our powers of stay after the certificate has been granted are limited to the provisions of Or. 45, r. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to them, that rule empowers this Court to stay execution of a decree but not to stay further proceedings in a suit. In support of this contention they rely upon the cases of Lalitessur Singh v. Bhabessur Singh 13 C.W.N. 690 (1909) and Ram Narain v. Harman Das 1. L.R. 42 All. 170 (1919). No doubt in those two cases it has been held that cl. (d) of Or. 45, r. 13 of the CPC does not cover the case of stay of proceedings in a suit. On the other hand; a view has been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kumar Sarat Kumar Roy v. The Official Assignee of Calcutta 34 C.W.N. 631 (1930) that that clause is wide enough to include stay of further proceedings in a suit. There is thus a conflict of opinion on this point in this Court, but it has been held in Kumur Sarat Kumar's case 34 C.W.N. 631 (1930) as also in the case of Sailendra Nath Das v. Saroj Kumar Das 38 C.W.N. 795 (1934) that this Court, apart from the provisions of Or. There is thus a conflict of opinion on this point in this Court, but it has been held in Kumur Sarat Kumar's case 34 C.W.N. 631 (1930) as also in the case of Sailendra Nath Das v. Saroj Kumar Das 38 C.W.N. 795 (1934) that this Court, apart from the provisions of Or. 45, r. 13, C.P.C., has inherent power to stay proceedings in a suit in respect of which leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council has been given. In the last-mentioned case the decision in the case of Lalitessur Singh v. Bhabessur Singh 13 C.W.N. 690 (1909) was noticed, but it was pointed out that the question as to whether this Court had inherent power or not was neither argued nor dealt with in that judgment. In this state of the authorities without expressing any opinion on the conflict as to whether stay of proceedings in the suit would come within cl. (d) of r. 13 of Or. 45 of the Code or not, we hold that we have the inherent power to stay further Proceedings in the suit. 2. We may also point out that this application with which we are dealing is not an application made in the Privy Council Appeal, but it is an application in the suit itself made to the trial Judge and transferred, by consent of parties, to us. In the case of Ram Narain v. Harnam Das 1. L.R. 42 All. 170 (1919) the Chief Justice was inclined to the view that even when a certificate has been granted under sec. 110 of the CPC an application before the trial Court for stay of proceedings could he entertained and suitable orders could be made. We accordingly decide the first point raised before us against the parties was are opposing this application. 3. On the merits there cannot be any question. It is quite apparent that a large sum of money will have to be spent, much larger than what has already been spent, to complete the reference. If the appeal to His Majesty in Council succeeds, all those costs would be thrown away. One of the persons who is opposing the application, namely, Keshardeo, is one of the Appellants before His Majesty in Council. He would have the carriage of the proceedings before the Privy Council. If the appeal to His Majesty in Council succeeds, all those costs would be thrown away. One of the persons who is opposing the application, namely, Keshardeo, is one of the Appellants before His Majesty in Council. He would have the carriage of the proceedings before the Privy Council. A large amount of costs would be thrown away if the appeal to His Majesty in Council succeeds and if we do not grant the stay asked for. If we grant the stay, the proceedings before the Referee would not be stayed for any length of time. At least it would be in the power of one of the opposing parties, namely, Keshardeo to reduce the time during which the stay order would be operative by expediting the hearing of the appeal before His Majesty in Council. In these circumstances, we think that this is a fit case in which we should exercise our powers and stay the proceedings till the disposal of the appeal to His Majesty in Council. 4. We may observe that the position taken by Keshardeo is inconsistent. He wants the award to be set aside in his appeal to His Majesty in Council; at the same time, he wants the proceedings which have their foundation and their validity on the same award to go on. We accordingly grant this application and stay the proceedings before the Special Referee till the disposal of the appeal to His Majesty in Council. We have no doubt having regard to what has been stated by the Counsel appearing before us, that they would join in expediting the hearing of the appeal before His Majesty in Council. The applicant before us would have the costs of this application from the opposing parties, namely, Surji Sethani, Keshardeo and Ratanlal. The other parties, namely, Radhakissen and Motilal, would bear their respective costs. Certified for two Counsel. Akram, J. I argee.