JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - These are two analogous Rules arising out of two Rent Suits, and the only question is whether the suits were maintainable. It appears that a certain tough of the Noakhali Collectorate fell into arrears of cess, and the Collector of Noakhali found it necessary to issue a notification under sec. 99 of the Bengal Cess Act. The notification was in the usual form prescribed in Schedule F of the Act, and in effect it restrained the tenants from paying rents in respect of the lands comprised in the estate to any person other than the Collector. The Collector thereafter instituted suits for rent against some of the tenants including the Petitioners in the present Rules. In one case the amount claimed was Rs. 4, and in the other Rs. 17, and under orders of this Court the Petitioners deposited these sums in the Court. On behalf of the tenants objection was taken that the suits were not maintainable, and two grounds were urged in support of the objection. In the first place, it was contended that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not subsist between the Collector and the Petitioners. Secondly, it was urged that in any case the Collector could not maintain the suits after the arrears which were due in respect of cess had been satisfied out of the collections in his hands. On both these points the learned Munsif who tried the suits held against the Petitioners, and the same view was affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge in revision under the proviso to sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Hence the present Rules. The objections were renewed in this Court on behalf of the Petitioners. As regards the first point, Mr. Sen argued that an attachment of rents under sec. 99 of the Cess Act was not like an attachment of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, which entitled the attaching creditor to execute the decree under Or. 21, r. 53 in the right and as representative of the holder of the attached decree. The Collector could not be regarded as a representative of the landlord whose estate Had been attached, and could not accordingly claim to be the landlord for the purpose of maintaining a suit for rent against the tenant. 21, r. 53 in the right and as representative of the holder of the attached decree. The Collector could not be regarded as a representative of the landlord whose estate Had been attached, and could not accordingly claim to be the landlord for the purpose of maintaining a suit for rent against the tenant. A right to sue for rent could be conferred on the Collector only by an express provision in the Statute. There was no such provision in the Cess Act. All that the Cess Act provided was in the 4th Paragraph of sec. 99, which laid down that the Collector might recover rent from the tenants " by any process of law for the time being in force by which he might recover rent due to the Government from a tenant in an estate which is managed directly by the Collector." In other words, it was said, the only mode by which the Collector could recover rent from the tenants, if the rent was not paid amicably, was by resort to the process by which Government might realise rent from khas mahal tenants; that is to say, by resort to the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act. It was pointed out that in the case of a Receiver the power of bringing suits for rent is expressly conferred by Or. 40, r." 1 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure; but for such provision the Receiver could not claim the right to sue as landlord. In the absence of a similar provision in the case of the Collector under the Cess Act, it was accordingly contended, the Collector could not claim the status of a landlord vis-a-vi. the tenants from whom rents were due. The Court below did not consider the matter from this aspect. The learned Additional District Judge, on the other hand, addressed himself solely to the question whether the word " may " in paragraph 4 of sec. 99 of the Cess Act was or was not equivalent to "must" or "shall," and as he was of the opinion that the word " may" does not mean "must " or " shall," he held that Civil Courts were not deprived of jurisdiction to entertain suits for recovery of rent from the tenants of lands lying within the attached estate. It was assumed that if sec. It was assumed that if sec. 99 could not be said to lay down in express terms the procedure under the Public Demands Recovery Act as the only mode of recovery open to the Collector, the Collector would be at liberty to proceed in the ordinary way, as an admitted landlord would be entitled to do. I am not at all sure that such an assumption can be made. In any case, if the attachment under sec. 99 could be said to create a right in the Collector to realise the rent, a right of suit to enforce such light would merely amount to a right to sue for recovery of money due. It could not authorise the Collector to maintain a suit for rent which could be regarded as a suit for rent within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In other words, it would be a suit for money and not strictly a suit for rent, which the Collector would be entitled to maintain. If then the suits in the present cases could not be treated as rent suits, it did not follow that they were liable to be dismissed on that ground. It only meant that the suits would have to be tried as suits for money. 2. Mr. Sen accordingly chose to lay more stress on his second point, which, as stated above, was to the effect that the Collector's demand for arrears of cess having been satisfied out of the collections, the attachment had ceased to be in force and the Collector thereupon also ceased to have a right to sue for rent. There is no evidence on record to show that the claim in respect of arrears of cess had been fully satisfied before the suits were brought. An inference is, however, sought to be drawn from a statement made by the learned Munsif. Referring to the Defendants objection under this head, the learned Munsif stated:- " It appears that at first the revenue is deducted and then cess is deducted out of the amount in hands. The revenue having priority over all other dues can be deducted by the creditor. Referring to the Defendants objection under this head, the learned Munsif stated:- " It appears that at first the revenue is deducted and then cess is deducted out of the amount in hands. The revenue having priority over all other dues can be deducted by the creditor. The estate has not as yet been released from attachment." The inference was sought to be drawn that if the revenue had not been deducted, but only the cess had been deducted out of the amount in hand, there could not have been anything due on account of the cess. I cannot say that this inference may not be drawn, but it is not quite conclusive. Very likely the amount due to the Collector on account of cess had been satisfied, but in the absence of a clear finding to that effect, it would be difficult to act on mere speculation. 3. Assuming, however, that that was the case, the question would then arise whether the Collector was justified in deducting revenue first before appropriating the collections in his hands towards the arrears of cess due. Paragraph 4 of sec. 99 clearly lays down that the Collector may recover rent in the manner indicated therein " until the amount due to the Collector together with all costs shall be satisfied," and it then goes on to say that the said notification shall thereupon be revoked. Now the words " the amount due to the Collector " must necessarily refer to the amount mentioned in the opening paragraph of the section as " any sum due under this Act." Any sum due under the Cess Act cannot possibly include a demand for arrears of revenue. It is quite clear", therefore, that by virtue of an attachment under sec. 99, the Collector can have no right to recover by any process of law any arrears of revenue. If the Collector is not required to or cannot then institute any proceedings for recovery of revenue, it must follow that he cannot appropriate the collections to any purpose other than that for which the attachment was made. 4. Reliance is. however, placed on behalf of the Collector on the last paragraph of sec. If the Collector is not required to or cannot then institute any proceedings for recovery of revenue, it must follow that he cannot appropriate the collections to any purpose other than that for which the attachment was made. 4. Reliance is. however, placed on behalf of the Collector on the last paragraph of sec. 99 which runs as follows: In case the Collector shall see fit so to proceed, the claim for arrears of road cess and public works cess due from any estate or tenure in respect of which a notification has been issued as above provided shall have priority over any other demand or claim or lien existing thereupon other than the demand of Government revenue." This provision is of little assistance to the Collector. Assuming that the opening words "shall see fit so to proceed" refer to the issue of a notification under paragraph 1, and not to the institution of a proceeding for recovery of rent under paragraph 4, the question still remains whether priority of a demand for Government revenue over the claim for cess can confer on the Collector the right to appropriate any part of the collections to satisfy the demand for revenue. Mr. Imam Hossein Choudhury has invited my attention to a note in the Cess Manual in which such appropriation seems to be authorised. A departmental note cannot, however, take the place of law, and I should not feel pressed by the existence of such a note, if upon a construction of the Statute the note did not appear to be justified. In my opinion, the priority which is given in the last paragraph of sec. 99 to a revenue demand is merely intended to ensure that if there is a sale for arrears of revenue, the purchaser will take free from all claims of the Collector by virtue of the notification under sec. 99 of the Cess Act. 1 do not think that such priority would entitle the Collector to apply the rent collections in his hands first to the payment of the revenue, and then to the payment of the arrears of cess for which the attachment was effected. So to hold would be to enable the Collector to keep the estate in his hands for a very much longer period than was necessary for satisfaction of his claim in respect of cess. So to hold would be to enable the Collector to keep the estate in his hands for a very much longer period than was necessary for satisfaction of his claim in respect of cess. In the absence of a clear direction in the Statute, I do not think that there is sufficient warrant for a view which would lead to such a result. 5. Reference may be made in this connection to sec. 17 of the Revenue Sale Law which provides inter alia that no estate held under attachment by the revenue authorities otherwise than by order of a judicial authority shall be liable to sale for arrears accruing whilst it was so held under attachment. It was held by this Court in the case of Gobind Lal Roy v. Bipradas Roy I. L. R. (1889) Cal. 398., that a prohibitory order under sec. 99 of the Cess Act is, in effect, a mode of attachment within the meaning of sec. 17 of Act XI of 1859, and a sale for arrears of revenue, while the estate was under attachment, under sec. 99, was, therefore, an invalid sale. The case went up to the Privy Council, and this view was approved by their Lordships in the case of Gobind Lal Roy v. Ramjanam Misser I. L. R. (1898) Cal. 70. It will be seen, therefore that the chances of a competition between the claims of a purchaser at a revenue sale and a purchaser at a sale in a proceeding for recovery of rent under paragraph 4 of the Cess Act are remote. All the same, the Legislature thought it necessary to provide that in the unlikely chance of such a conflict, the claim of the revenue purchaser would prevail. That seems to be the only effect of the exception enacted in the last paragraph of sec. 99 of the Cess Act in the words "other than the demand of the Government revenue." In this view of the matter the suits would not be maintainable, if on the date they were instituted the arrears of cess had been fully satisfied out of the collections in the hands of the Collector without any prior appropriation towards Government revenue. 99 of the Cess Act in the words "other than the demand of the Government revenue." In this view of the matter the suits would not be maintainable, if on the date they were instituted the arrears of cess had been fully satisfied out of the collections in the hands of the Collector without any prior appropriation towards Government revenue. Having regard to the fact that so far as the present cases are concerned, it should make little difference to the Petitioners whether the rents due from them were recovered by way of ordinary suits for rent or by resort to the Public Demands Recovery Act, I do not think that it will serve the interest of any party to direct a remand for a finding on that point. An expression of opinion on the question of law should be sufficient protection to the Petitioners against similar proceedings in other cases. The only order that I need make in these Rules is that the Collector should be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit in this Court and apply them in satisfaction of the rents due to him and the suits will be disposed of accordingly. There will be a formal order that the Rules are made absolute; no order as to costs.