Judgment.- The petitioner brought a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Madras, on a promisory note. An earlier suit had been filed which had been settled out of Court by the execution of the suit promissory note. The Court noted that the matter had been settled (and presumably dismissed the suit). During the hearing of the present suit, the provisions of section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act were invoked and the Court was asked to re-open the transaction, take an account between the parties, and relieve the debtors of all liability on account of the excessive interest already paid. The Court did so. On a point of law, an application for a new trial was made; and the only question considered by the Full Bench was whether the transaction was one which attracted the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act. The Full Bench agreed with the trial judge and dismissed the application. The result was that the suit was dismissed. It is argued here that since the earlier transaction between the parties had been the subject of a suit, it was not open to the trial Judge to reconsider in the present suit matters which had already been the subject of a suit. In support of this argument, the learned advocate for the petitioner has referred to a decision of Finlay, J., in Cohen v. Jonesco1. In that case, the prior transactions had come up before a Judge and a decree on those prior transactions had been passed. The decision was of course based on the corresponding English Act, which is similar in its terms to the Indian Act, but does not contain a proviso such as that to which I shall presently refer. The learned Judge, regretting the absence of any authority on this point, said: “I think that if it had been intended to give the Court power to re-open a former transaction between the parties, notwithstanding that it had been the subject of a judgment, the section must have specifically mentioned a judgment.” In other words, the learned Judge read into the Act an implied proviso that it would not apply to transactions that had been the subject of a judgment. In the first place, it is pretty clear that the learned Judge refused to consider those transactions, because they had been incorporated in a decree in favour of the creditor. In the first place, it is pretty clear that the learned Judge refused to consider those transactions, because they had been incorporated in a decree in favour of the creditor. In the present case, the claim of the creditor had not been adjudicated upon in the previous suit and had not been embodied in a decree. If there was a decree or a judgment, it must have been one dismissing the suit. So it cannot be argued that the transactions were the subject of an adjudication in the former suit and had been embodied in a decree. There is another reason, however, why this English decision should not be applied to the present case; and that is that it is not open to Courts in India to read into a provision of a statute an implied proviso when there is a proviso dealing expressly with the point in question. The Indian Act, proviso (ii) to section 3 (1), says that: “in the exercise of these powers, the Court shall not do anything which affects any decree of a Court.” It is clear that in re-opening this transaction the Court did not in any way affect the previous decree of the Court, which was merely one dismissing the petitioner’s claim. The petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.