JUDGMENT Lodge, J. - The facts giving rise to this Rule are as follows: Opposite Party No. 1 instituted a suit on a promissory note against the present Petitioner in the Court of the Munsif at Alipore on the 20th September, 1943. The promissory note was executed on the 23rd September, 1940. by the present Petitioner in favour of one Provat Chandra Giri. Opposite Party No. 1 made Provat Giri pro forma Defendant in that suit. On the application of Provat Giri. he was removed from the category of Defendants and added as Plaintiff No. 2 to the suit on the 25th July. 1944, and the suit proceeded in the Court of the Munsif. Thereafter on the 22nd January, 1945, the learned Munsif held that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit and returned the plaint to the Plaintiff to be re-filed in the proper Court. On that same day, the 22nd January, 1945, Opposite Party No. 1 filed the plaint in the present suit again making Provat Giri a pro forma Defendant. Provat Giri actually applied for time to file written statement. But subsequently on the 22nd August, 1945, Provat Giri was again taken from the category of Defendants and added as Plaintiff No. 2 in the suit. Thereafter, the suit was heard on contest and Opposite Party No. 1's suit was dismissed, but the suit was decreed in favour of Provat Giri, Opposite Party No. 2, against the present Petitioner. The present Petitioner has obtained this Rule. It has been argued before me that the suit as instituted by Provat Giri was clearly barred by limitation. Now it is clear that when the suit was first instituted by Opposite Party No. 1, the suit was within time. But the period of limitation has expired by the time Provat Giri was removed from the category of Defendants in the original suit and added as a Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs relied on sec. 22, cl. (2) of the Limitation Act. It has been argued before me on the strength of a case [A. P.K.C. Periakaruppan Chetti v. Mottayya Mudali (1934) 69 M.L.J. 30], that the suit was barred so far as Opposite Party No. 2 was concerned at the time when he was added as a Plaintiff and it was contended that sec. 22, cl. (2) of the Limitation Act. It has been argued before me on the strength of a case [A. P.K.C. Periakaruppan Chetti v. Mottayya Mudali (1934) 69 M.L.J. 30], that the suit was barred so far as Opposite Party No. 2 was concerned at the time when he was added as a Plaintiff and it was contended that sec. 22 (2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable- unless the transposed Plaintiff has a joint cause of action with the original Plaintiff. I am not satisfied that that authority lays down the correct law and I am prepared to hold for the purpose of the present suit at all events, that sec. 22 (2) is applicable and that when Opposite Party No. 2 was transposed from the category of Defendants and made Plaintiff No. 2 in the original suit, his claim was then within the period of limitation. But the plaint was returned and the present suit was instituted on the 22nd January, 1945. Assuming that sec. 22 (2) of the Limitation Act applies even to the second suit (the suit with which we are concerned), Provat Giri was added as a Plaintiff on the 22nd August, 1945. The effect of sec. 22 (2) will merely be the same as though Provat Giri had instituted the second suit on the date on which the plaint was filed, namely, on the 22nd January, 1945. On that date the suit was apparently barred by limitation; and limitation could only be saved if the provision of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act could be invoked by Provat Giri. Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act can only be invoked on behalf of a Plaintiff who has prosecuted the previous suit in good faith. The question would be whether there was any reason to suppose that Provat Giri prosecuted the suit in the Court of the Munsif at Alipore in good faith. There is nothing whatever on the record to show that he applied his mind to the suit at all that he really did anything but execute a vakalatnama to enable his name to be transposed to the category of Defendants and added as Plaintiff. There is no material on record from which it can be inferred that he prosecuted the previous suit in good faith in the Court of the Munsif. Therefore, there is no material on which sec. There is no material on record from which it can be inferred that he prosecuted the previous suit in good faith in the Court of the Munsif. Therefore, there is no material on which sec. 14 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for the benefit of Provat Giri. Such being the case, Provat Giri cannot rely on sec. -14 of the Limitation Act, and the suit, if it be taken to be instituted on the date the plaint was filed, namely, the 22nd January, 1945, was clearly barred by limitation. 2. In this view, the Rule must be made absolute; the judgment and decree of the learned Small Cause Court Judge must be set aside and the suit must be dismissed in its entirety against the present Petitioner. The Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs, hearing-fee being assessed at one gold mohur.