Judgement Consolidated Appeals (No. 8 of 1946), by special leave, from two orders of the High Court (January 27, 1942), the first setting aside in appeal an order of the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura (July 25, 1938), and the second setting aside in revision an order of the same Subordinate Judge (February 9, 1939)- The substantial question for decision in these appeals was whether the respondent was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1938), hereinafter referred to as the Act," but the appellant took a preliminary point that, assuming the respondent to be an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act, the orders of the High Court which were under appeal were incompetent and that this appeal should succeed on that ground. The following facts relevant to the determination of that issue are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. On September, 15, 1925, a final decree was passed in a mortgage suit, which was original suit No. 5 of 1921 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura, in favour of the appellants or their predecessors in title against the predecessor in title of the respondent. (For convenience, the parties interested from time to time in the mortgage decree will be referred to as the decree-holders and the person interested in the equity of redemption as the judgment-debtor.”) Execution proceeding No. 79 of 1933 was taken out to enforce the final decree and certain of the mortgage properties were advertised for sale, but before a sale had been effected the Act was passed in March, 1938. On July 8, 1938, the judgment-debtor made execution application No. 237 of 1938 to the said Subordinate Judge, which was intituled E.A. No. 237 of 1938 in E.P. No. 79 of 1933 in O.S. No. 5 of 1921, and was expressed to be made under ss. 20, 19 and 8 of the Act, and ss. 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relief prayed was that the execution proceedings in E.P. No. 79 of 1933 and the auction sale then pending be stayed until the disposal of the question of the extent of liability of the petitioner for the debt under s. 19 of the Act, and a declaration that the debt was wholly discharged under s. 8 of the Act. The relief prayed was that the execution proceedings in E.P. No. 79 of 1933 and the auction sale then pending be stayed until the disposal of the question of the extent of liability of the petitioner for the debt under s. 19 of the Act, and a declaration that the debt was wholly discharged under s. 8 of the Act. To appreciate the nature of that relief it was necessary to notice that under s. 8 of the Act the debts of an agriculturist could be scaled down. Under s. 19 it was provided, so far as material for the present purpose, that where a court had passed a decree for the repayment of a debt it should, on the application of any judgment-debtor who was an agriculturist, apply the provisions of the Act to such decree and should, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, amend the decree accordingly, or enter satisfaction as the case might be. Section 20 provided that every court executing a decree passed against a person entitled to the benefits of the Act should, on application, stay the proceedings until the court which passed the decree had passed orders on an application made, or to be made, under s. 19, but a proviso to the section enacted that where within sixty days after an application for stay had been granted the judgment-debtor did not apply to the court which passed the decree for relief under s. 19, the decree should be executed as it stood. On July 25, 1938, execution application No. 237 of 1938 came before the Subordinate Judge, who dismissed it summarily on the ground that the judgment-debtor was not an agriculturist. From that order an appeal was brought to the High Court of Madras, and that court directed the learned Subordinate Judge to submit a finding whether the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist and, if so, to what relief he was entitled under the Act. On the matter coming again before the Subordinate Judge on remand he heard evidence and delivered a detailed judgment on February 9, 1939. He found that the judgment-debtor was not an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act and was not entitled to any scaling down of the debt under the Act. On the matter coming again before the Subordinate Judge on remand he heard evidence and delivered a detailed judgment on February 9, 1939. He found that the judgment-debtor was not an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act and was not entitled to any scaling down of the debt under the Act. Mean- while, namely, on August 3, 1938, the judgment-debtor had made an independent application, I.A. No. 361 of 1938 in O.S. No. 5 of 1921, to the said Subordinate Judge asking that the preliminary and final decrees in the said mortgage suit be amended in accordance with the provisions of the Act and that the debt might be declared to have been wholly discharged. On February 9, 1939, after recording his findings in E.A. No. 237 of 1938 the learned judge passed an order dismissing I.A. No. 361 of 1938, in view of his finding in E.A. No. 237 of 1938. The reasons for making that further application, I.A. No. 361 of 1938, were not disclosed by the record but, presumably, the advisers of the judgment-debtor thought that it might be held that two applications to the court were necessary, one under s. 19 to the court which passed the decree, and another under s. 20 to the court executing the decree, as would be the case if the two courts were different. The danger of limitation running under the proviso to s. 20 had to be considered. But, as in the present case the two courts were the same, and it was clear that both the Subordinate Judge and the High Court in considering whether the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act were treating execution application No. 237 of 1938 as properly raising questions under ss. 8 and 19 of the Act as well as under £. 20, application No. 361 of 1938 appeared to have been redundant. The judgment-debtor presented an appeal from the order of February 9, 1939, made in I.A. 361 of 1938, and that appeal came before the High Court at Madras (Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri JJ.) at the same time as the appeal from the order of July 25, 1938, on its restoration with the findings of the Subordinate Judge on the matters remanded. But when the two appeals came before the High Court that court was faced with a judgment of a Full Bench of the court delivered in Nagappa v. Annapoorani (I. L.R. [ 1941] M. 261.), in which it had been held that no appeal lay from an order passed under s. 19 of the Act. The High Court held that in view of that decision the appeal against the order of February 9, 1939, which had been made under s. 19 of the Act, was incompetent; but they had acceded to an application of the judgment-debtor to be allowed to convert his appeal into a civil revision application and, holding that the Subordinate Judge had been guilty of material irregularity within the meaning of s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, they set aside his order of February 9, 1939, in revision. The court nevertheless dealt with the appeal against the order of July 5, 1938, as an appeal, and directed that the order of the Subordinate Judge of July 25, 1938, made in E.A. No. 237 of 1938, be set aside and the application remanded, and directed the Subordinate Judge to restore the said application to its original number in the register, and to proceed to dispose of it according to law and in the light of the observations and directions contained in the judgment of the High Court. As the High Court, as hereinafter noticed, had expressed the view that the judgment-debtor had proved that he was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act, those directions involved that the Subordinate Judge would deal with the execution proceeding before him under ss. 8 and 19 of the Act. 1947. June 17, 18, 19. Rewcastle K.C. and P. V. Subba Row for the appellant. This appeal arises out of a claim by the respondent that he is an agriculturist within the meaning of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938, and entitled to relief thereunder, but it is contended first, by way of preliminary objection, that there is no appeal from an order made under the Act of 1938 Nagappa v. Annapoorani (I. L .R. [ 1941] M. 261.). No doubt there can be an appeal in execution, but there is no appeal from a decision made under this-particular Act, and the decision of the Subordinate Judge of July 25, 1938, was not in execution. No doubt there can be an appeal in execution, but there is no appeal from a decision made under this-particular Act, and the decision of the Subordinate Judge of July 25, 1938, was not in execution. If, therefore, the Full Bench decision (1) was right, the High Court here had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the order of the Subordinate Judge of July 25, 1938, and this initial mistake in the proceedings vitiates the whole of the subsequent proceedings. There being no right of appeal, what the Subordinate Judge did when the High Court sent the matter back to him, was to revise what, it is submitted, was his final judgment, which he had no fight to do unless directed by a proper revision tribunal. On the matter going back to the Subordinate Judge under the order made by the High Court he found that it had not been shown that the respondent was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act and that accordingly he was not entitled to relief that was on February 9, 1939, and on the same day the Subordinate Judge dismissed the other application—I.A. No. 361 of 1938. If the Full Bench decision (I. L. R. [ 1941] M. 261.) is right in law there was no power in the High Court to entertain the first appeal, and everything thereafter is without jurisdiction and null, and the order of July 25, 1938, stands, as also does the consequential order dismissing I.A. No. 361 of 1938. If it be right that the jurisdiction has broken down, then the present appeal to the Board cannot be valid. This is a special Act, and the right of appeal must be found from the Act itself. It must be construed with great strictness. [Reference was made to Rangoon Botatoung Company v. The Collector, Rangoon (( 1912) L. R. 39 I. A. 197.), Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 192, 198.) and Meenakshi Naidoo v. Sabramaniya Sastri (( 1887) L. R. 14 I. A. 160, 165.).] Assuming that there was a right of appeal throughout, it is clear that the High Court did not decide the matter as an appeal, but as a matter of revision. They could only deal with it in revision if there was a right of appeal. They could only deal with it in revision if there was a right of appeal. On the merits of the case, the Subordinate Judge said that he was not satisfied that the whole of the income of the properties in question was settled on the charity, and unless he was satisfied of that he could-not be satisfied that the applicant had made out his submission that he was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act. There is no evidence as to how this trust originally came into being. So long as the Subordinate Judge has not made a serious error in the exercise of his jurisdiction he cannot be interfered with on revision. On the facts and in the circumstances a positive finding of fact cannot be reached that the whole income of these villages was dedicated to charity. It is impossible to say that when the Subordinate Judge said I am not satisfied,” he was exercising his jurisdiction with a material irregularity, and to enable the High Court properly to revise anything that the Subordinate Judge had done they would have to be satisfied that he had exercised his jurisdiction with material irregularity Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (( 1884) L. R. 11 I. A. 237.); Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyer (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 261, 267.). It is not enough that he came to a wrong conclusion in law; he was exercising his jurisdiction without any material irregularity. Cyril King K.C. and Handoo for the respondent. In this case the Subordinate Judge was the court passing the decree and the executing court as well, and was competent to deal with procedure under ss. 19 and 20 of the Act of 1938 at one and the same time. Cyril King K.C. and Handoo for the respondent. In this case the Subordinate Judge was the court passing the decree and the executing court as well, and was competent to deal with procedure under ss. 19 and 20 of the Act of 1938 at one and the same time. The Full Bench decision in Nagappa v. Annapoorani (I. L. R. [ 1941] M. 261.) was incorrect, and the view was right in Jami Venkatappadu v. Kannepalli Ramamurthi (( 1940) A. I. R. (Mad.) 131, 132), where it was said We have no doubt that all the petitions, i.e., those under s. 19 as well as under s. 20, Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, must be deemed to be petitions which raise questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and therefore come within the matters covered by s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.” The general principle governing appeals is dealt with in Hem Singh v. Das (( 1936) L. R. 63 I. A. 180, 188-90.), where Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao (L. R. 43 I. A. 192.) is affirmed. Orders under s. 19 of the Act of 1938 are appealable. With regard to s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the only way the case for the respondent can be put is that under sub-para, c the Subordinate Judge appears to have acted with material irregularity in that, in the light of the evidence, the exhibits and the account books, he was shutting his eyes to things which should have satisfied him that there was a charity in the shape of dedicated lands and villages of which the respondent was a trustee. If it is established that there was a good charity, established some one hundred or more years ago, in respect of the property, any misapplication of the income by the trustee would be a matter of breach of trust but would not affect the question of what capacity he occupied in respect of the dedicated charitable lands; it would not affect the question of construction of the document or the question of dedication. As to whether a document is unambiguous, see North Eastern Ry. As to whether a document is unambiguous, see North Eastern Ry. v. Hastings (Lord) ([ 1900J A. C. 260, 263.), and, as to the test whether there has been a dedication, Singh Sanatan Dharam High School Trust, Indaura v. Singh Rajput High School, Indaura (( 1937) L. R. 65 1. A. 106, 116.). I swart Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v. Brojo Nath Dey (( 1937) L. R. 64 I. A. 203, 211.) shows that a dedication, when established, is not invalid because members of the settlors family are nominated as the managers and given reasonable remuneration. The respondent is an agriculturist within the meaning of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act and entitled to relief thereunder. Rewcastle K.C. replied. July 29. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SIMONDS, who stated the facts set out above and continued Before considering the propriety and validity of the orders made by the High Court in the two appeals presented to them it is necessary, in the first place, to determine whether the decision of the Full Bench was right. The facts in the case before the Full Bench can be distinguished on the ground that in that case there were no proceedings in execution of the decree such as exist in the present case, but the court expressed the view that the existence of execution proceedings would not make any difference. The view taken by the Full Bench was that s. 19 of the Act conferred a particular right on a judgment-debtor and that, as the Act conferred no right of appeal from an order of the court made under the section, no appeal was competent. The court relied to some extent on the decision of this Board in Rangoon Botatoung Company v. The Collector, Rangoon (( 1912) L. R. 39 I. A. 197.). That case, however, has been explained in later decisions of the Board as depending on the fact that the pro ceedings were from beginning to end ostensibly and actually arbitration proceedings. Their Lordships are not in agreement with the view of the Full Bench of the High Court of Madras. That case, however, has been explained in later decisions of the Board as depending on the fact that the pro ceedings were from beginning to end ostensibly and actually arbitration proceedings. Their Lordships are not in agreement with the view of the Full Bench of the High Court of Madras. The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such dispute the courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal —see Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 192.) and Hem Singh v. Das (( 1936) L. R. 63 I. A. 180.). The question, therefore, to be considered in the present case is whether a right of appeal from the orders in question was conferred by the Civil Procedure Code. The order of February 9, 1939, was not made in execution proceedings but it was made in a suit and, in their Lordships opinion, it amounted to the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determined the rights of the parties with regard to one of the matters in controversy in the suit, namely, whether the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist and entitled therefore to have his debt discharged or reduced under the Act. In their Lordships opinion, the order was a decree within the meaning of s. 2, sub-s. 2, of the Civil Procedure Code and an appeal lay under s. 96 of the Code. That being so, the High Court was wrong in entertaining an application in revision, since under s. 115 of the Code there is no jurisdiction in revision where an appeal lies. The order of the High Court setting aside the order of the Subordinate Judge of February 9, 1939, will have to be set aside, but this is not of any practical consequence since the application on which the order was made was redundant. The appeal against the order of July 25, 1938, was rightly entertained. The order of the High Court setting aside the order of the Subordinate Judge of February 9, 1939, will have to be set aside, but this is not of any practical consequence since the application on which the order was made was redundant. The appeal against the order of July 25, 1938, was rightly entertained. That older related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree within the meaning of s. 47 of the Code and an appeal therefore lay under s. 96. The procedural questions having been thus disposed of on the footing that an appeal lay against the older of July 25, 1938, it remains for their Lordships to consider the case on its merits. The single issue is whether the respondent has established that he is an agriculturist within the meaning of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (IV of 1938) and as such entitled to debt relief. And this question may now further be narrowed down, since other matters of dispute are no longer raised, by saying that the only controversy is whether the respondent was at the relevant time within proviso (D) to s. 3, sub-s.2 (a), of the Act. This in trn will depend on whether the respondent had a beneficial interest in certain villages, to which reference will be made, or whether those villages were wholly dedicated to charity. In the former event the respondent was not an agriculturist within the Act; in the latter event he was. In the consideration of this question their Lordships think it right to have regard not only to the materials which were before the Subordinate Judge but also to the documents which were properly admitted in evidence by the High Court. That court in allowing the appeal from the Subordinate Judge was no doubt influenced by such documents and they are, in fact, of substantial importance in considering the merits of the case. The relevance of this matter is apparent in the consideration of the documents the interpretation of which is all important in the decision of this case. A few words of introduction are necessary to their consideration. The relevance of this matter is apparent in the consideration of the documents the interpretation of which is all important in the decision of this case. A few words of introduction are necessary to their consideration. It appears that in the year 1843 there was litigation in the Madras Adalat Court in regard to the succession to the Ramnad Zamindari after the death of the late Zamindar, between his widow, Parvathavardhani Nachiar, and his mother, Muthu Veerayi Nachiar, who set up rival claims to the estate, the latter being plaintiff in the suit and the former one of the defendants. This suit was eventually compromised on certain terms. The Subordinate Judge had before him a document which is described as a certified copy of the special vakalat given by one of the parties to her pleader to compromise the suit. This document embodied the terms of compromise and, in the absence of better evidence, was no doubt admissible in evidence. The learned judge had also before him an unsigned document described as a draft compromise which, even if admissible, could be of little value. These documents can now be dis-regarded, for their Lordships have (as the High Court had) the advantage of seeing the authentic razinama or deed of compromise which was signed by or on behalf of the parties. This document (which is Exhibit WW in the proceedings), after stating the parties and the nature of the proceedings, sets out in full the terms of compromise. It provides by cl. 1 that the first defendant shall not only enjoy throughout her lifetime the Ramnad Zamin, etc., all plaint-mentioned pro-" parties as have now been jarried to her but shall also adopt a son whom she may like as mentioned in the supplemental rejoinder and that the son to be so adopted shall after her lifetime enjoy the said Zamindari with all properties from son to grandson and so on in succession. Clause 2 provides for certain yearly payments to be made by the first defendant to the plaintiff out of the income of the Zamindari; cl. 3 provides for certain other payments; cl. 4 for the enjoyment by the plaintiff of a certain bungalow, and cl. 5 for certain immaterial matters. Then come the material cls. 6, 7 and 8 which are as follows "6. 3 provides for certain other payments; cl. 4 for the enjoyment by the plaintiff of a certain bungalow, and cl. 5 for certain immaterial matters. Then come the material cls. 6, 7 and 8 which are as follows "6. The plaintiff shall, for the performance of annadhanam (free feeding), etc., in the chatram which she is running at Ramnad, for ever, enjoy the villages of Siruvayal, Manjakulam and Kadambur in the Cusba taluk of the said zamindari and the village of Kilapanaiyur in Chikkan taluk, in all four villages of the total extent of one thousand kalams viraiyadis (seed extent) as also the palace tope situate on the southern bund of the Lakshmipuram tank in the Ramnad Fort area and shall pay full tax for the nanja and punja lands of the said four villages as in the case of dharmasanam (lands). "7. Out of the net amisham (income) of the said zamindar during the administration of the Court of Wards and "previous thereto, the amount invested in company, for interest and since drawn and deposited with the Collector, is Rs.6,74,983. The documents relating to Rs.3,37,491-8-0, out of this, shall be received by the plaintiff and the documents relating to the balance of Rs.3,37,491-8-0 shall be received by the first defendant, through court, by "granting receipt. The plaintiff shall enjoy as she pleases all the properties got by her under this razinama and all other properties remaining in her possession. "8. For the manovarti melchilavu (the monthly private and personal expenses) of the plaintiff, she shall enjoy the six sivuthettu pangus, belonging to the zamindari, in Darmasanam Kannivayal village, Sivaganga zamindari segaram, with powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, sale, etc." There is nothing else in the razinama which appears to be relevant. It is this document which the respondent adduces as conclusive evidence that the four villages in question were freely dedicated to charity, that neither the plaintiff in the 1843 suit nor he, as claiming through her, had any beneficial interest therein, with the consequence, already stated, ^that he established his right to be deemed an agriculturist within the Act. This is the contention which the High Court has upheld. Their Lordships cannot take the same view of the document. It must be observed that the origin of the charity is not to be found in it. This is the contention which the High Court has upheld. Their Lordships cannot take the same view of the document. It must be observed that the origin of the charity is not to be found in it. That is clear from the reference to the chatram which she is running at Ramnad." It cannot be inferred that the four villages had at an earlier date been dedicated to charity. All that can be gleaned from the document is that the plaintiff was at that date carrying on the chatram, and it was natural and proper that on a division of the disputed zamindari such an appropriation should be made to her as would enable her to continue to do so. It appears to their Lordships that, while the language used may not be free from ambiguity, the more natural meaning to ascribe to it is that the four villages were to belong to the plaintiff but charged with the obligation of maintaining the charity which she had theretofore carried on. The words do not appear apt to impose a duty on the plaintiff of devoting to charity the whole of the income of the villages however much it might exceed the requirements of the charity in fact maintained by her. There is, no doubt, force in the observation made by the High Court that, if a donor was making a gift of property burdened with the performance of a charity, one would expect to find that the charity was to be conducted according to a fixed dittam or standard of expenses, after meeting which the surplus income was to be enjoyed by the donee. But it appears to be a sufficient answer to this point that the nature of the charity itself supplied a sufficient standard. The maintenance of a choultry for the feeding of travelling pilgrims would normally require a sum which varied from time to time and could not easily be defined in the terms of so many rupees a year no more and no less. The maintenance of a choultry for the feeding of travelling pilgrims would normally require a sum which varied from time to time and could not easily be defined in the terms of so many rupees a year no more and no less. It appears to their Lordships in accordance both with the probabilities of the case and with the language of the document to conclude that, an estimate being made of the probable expenses of the charity and of the income of the villages, an appropriation was on the division of the zamindari made to the plaintiff which would enable her to carry on the charity but would leave her free to retain for her own use any surplus after that purpose had been satisfied. The alternative view is one that would involve a cy-pres application of the surplus to some other charitable purpose in the event of the income exceeding the needs of the particular charity. In the circumstances of the case there seems to be little justification for ascribing to the parties a general charitable intention which alone would justify such an application. To this conclusion their Lordships come on a consideration of the document which is now more than a hundred years old, but it is desirable to make some observations on other aspects of the case. The dispute being whether or not the respondent had a beneficial interest in the four villages, it is a strange course of events which leads to his repudiation of the view normally favourable to him. For he denies such a benefit with a view to a different advantage. This places an opponent, who would assert just that which the respondent might be expected to assert and would be in the best position to prove, in a position of peculiar difficulty. For he denies such a benefit with a view to a different advantage. This places an opponent, who would assert just that which the respondent might be expected to assert and would be in the best position to prove, in a position of peculiar difficulty. The exact nature of this charity has been discussed, but not decided, in other proceedings, and it was said in Appeal No. 128 of 1922 in the course of a judgment in the High Court at Madras Unless and until it is found in a regular suit instituted by someone interested in the trust that the whole income is devoted to charity, the decree in the present suit must provide that the maintenance should be a charge on the surplus funds, if any, derived from these villages and the lower courts decree must be amended in so far as it directed a charge on the villages themselves.” The suit in which this appeal has been brought raises the precise question indicated in the cited judgment. It cannot but be regarded as unfortunate that the claim of the charity should now be vindicated by one whose conduct has not been consistent with that claim. Their Lordships agree with the High Court that, if the terms of the razinama of 1847 were unambiguous in favour of an entire dedication to charity, the diversion of any part of the income to other purposes by a trustee could be disregarded, but, holding as they do that the better construction of the deed is otherwise, or that at the lowest there is an ambiguity, they cannot altogether ignore that the respondent who now advances the claim has hitherto not been vigilant in asserting it, but on the contrary, as the learned Subordinate Judge has pointed out, has acted as if he had a beneficial interest in the surplus income. It must at least be said that for him it becomes difficult in his own interest to affirm what his previous conduct has denied. It is, however, not only the conduct of the respondent himself which has been discussed in the courts in India. The earlier history of the case between 1847 and the death of the respondents father in or about 1920 has also been investigated, and different views have been taken as to the inferences to be drawn from divers documents and transactions. The earlier history of the case between 1847 and the death of the respondents father in or about 1920 has also been investigated, and different views have been taken as to the inferences to be drawn from divers documents and transactions. Their Lordships have carefully considered these matters and it appears to them that they do not point decisively in favour of one view or the other. There are, no doubt, references which suggest a dedication of the entire income to charity these are exhaustively examined in the careful judgment of the High Court. But in almost every case the language used would be equally appropriate, or at least not inappropriate, if the income was not wholly dedicated to, but only charged in favour of, charity, and it must not be forgotten that if, in fact, the whole income is at any time required for the charity, the two things are, in effect, the same. Nor would it be right to give much weight to expressions of doubtful import where the question now under consideration did not arise. One example out of many must suffice. In 1879 the question had arisen whether the charity was being properly maintained. A report appears to have been made by the Tahsildar of Ramnad Taluk. The head assistant collector wrote a letter in regard to it and on this letter the Vice-President of the District Board Madura wrote an endorse ment which contained these words .... the present “trustee”. Muthuduraiswami Thevar seems to have been doing his best for the choultry in spite of the several inconveniences caused him by Kolanda Nachiar, his aunt. He will, however, it is hoped, repair the second portions of the building, as there seems to be a good balance in favour of the choultry.” This statement, assuming it to be admissible evidence against the respondent, is conclusive that there was a charity, but it is of little significance on the question whether after the needs of the charity have been satisfied the surplus belongs to him. Their Lordships have thought it proper to refer to these matters, because, the High Court having taken a different view of the construction of the razinama, it would not be right to assume that it is free from ambiguity. Their Lordships have thought it proper to refer to these matters, because, the High Court having taken a different view of the construction of the razinama, it would not be right to assume that it is free from ambiguity. But they do not find in the transactions or conduct of the parties, whether more or less contemporaneous with the deed, anything which would lead them to depart from the meaning which they themselves attach to it. They must conclude, therefore, that the respondent has not established that he is an agriculturist within the meaning of the Madras Act and as such entitled to relief. They will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed and the decision of the Subordinate Judge of July 25, 1938, restored. The respondent must pay the appellants costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the High Court.