JUDGMENT Das, J. - It is intended by this judgment to dispose of 13 several applications which have been made under sec. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for stay of 13 several suits and which have been heard one after another and are appearing on the list to-day for judgment. Each of the Plaintiffs in the said 13 suits entered into forward contracts with the respective Defendants for sale of diverse quantities of jute upon terms and conditions contained in the respective contracts which are in jute contract forms approved by the Indian Jute Mills Association. The time for delivery under most of the contracts was August-September, 1946, and in some it was for a period beyond September, 1946. Each of the contracts, other than those which form the subject-matter of Suits Nos. 42 and 43 of 1947 contains an arbitration clause in the words following : All matters,.questions, disputes, differences and/or claims arising out of and/or concerning and/or in connection with and/or in consequence of or relating to this contract whether or not the obligations of either or both parties under this contract be subsisting at the -time of such dispute and whether or not this contract has been terminated or purported to the terminated or completed shall the referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce under the rules of its Tribunal of Arbitration for the time being in force and according to such rules the arbitration shall be conducted. 2. Each of the contracts which are the subject-matter of Suits Nos. 42 and 43 of 1947 also contains an arbitration clause slightly differently worded. The material part of the arbitration clause in those contracts is as follows: Any dispute whatsoever arising out of or in any way relating to this contract or to its cons. traction or fulfillment or payment between the pates hereto and whether arising before or after the date of the expiration of this contract Will be referred to the arbitration of two persons, one to be appointed by each party The buyers, however, have the option of referring any dispute arising under or out of this contract for arbitration to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce in a manner prescribed by the rules (then in force), of the said Chamber a Tribunal of Arbitration and according to such the arbitration shall be conducted throughout,..... 3. 3. On different dates in the month of August and/or September, 1946. each of the Plaintiffs (sellers) in each of the said suits other than Suits Nos. 42 and 43 of 1947 wrote to the respective Defendants (buyers) intimating that in view of the situation brought about by communal riots it would not be possible for the Plaintiffs to give delivery of the jute and requesting the Defendants to cancel the contracts and to bill for the difference between the contract rate and the market-rate of jute prevailing at the time. None of those Defendants accepted this suggestion but insisted on delivery being given in terms of the contract. No delivery having been so given, each of those Defendants in exercise of the option under the contract claimed to cancel the contracts and charge the difference between the contract rate and the market rate prevailing on the 5th working day after the due date and submitted difference bills accordingly. None of those Plaintiffs paid up the differences and each of them contended that the differences should be calculated on the basis of the rates prevailing on the date of repudiation in September, 1946. Each of those Defendants thereupon referred the matter to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. These sellers replied by filing suits in this Court. 4. All these suits proceed more or less on the same lines. The contracts in question in those suits were entered into when the Jute Price Control Order of 1945 was in force. The allegation is that it was expected, as it was well known and assumed by the parties that after the Defense of India Act and the Rules made there under would cease to be in force on the 30th September, 1946, the Jute Price Control Order would be continued and kept in force. Reference is made to certain correspondence between certain trade associations and the Government of India and in particular to a letter dated the 4th April,1946, from the Under-Secretary to the Government of India. Department of Commerce, in support of such expectation and assumption. Reference is made to certain correspondence between certain trade associations and the Government of India and in particular to a letter dated the 4th April,1946, from the Under-Secretary to the Government of India. Department of Commerce, in support of such expectation and assumption. It is alleged that the parties entered into the contracts on the basis and subject to the condition that the Jute Price Control Order would be continued after September, 1946, and the rights and obligations of the parties would be governed and regulated by and be subject to the said order and that the continued existence of the said order and the selling price of jute were the foundation of the contracts. The Jute Price Control Order, however, was not extended. It expired on the 30th September, 1946. It is contended that in the premises the contracts, automatically came to an end on the principle of frustration and the par lies were discharged from further performance of the contracts, without any liability. It is formulated, in the alternative, that both parties to the contracts were under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the contracts, namely, that the said order would be extended and therefore the contracts were void. The prayers in all those plaints are to the effect that it be declared that the contracts are or have become void and of no effect and that the same be delivered up and cancelled. There is an alternative prayer in some of the plaints for a declaration that the Defendant is entitled, if at all, to damages as on one or other of certain specified dates in September, 1946, when the Plaintiff repudiated the contracts. In one of these plaints there is also a prayer for the construction of the contracts and the ascertainment and declaration of the rights of the parties under the contracts. 5. The Plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 42 and 43 of 1947 also expressed their inability to deliver the goods, one of these by letters asked for extension of time but eventually failed to deliver any goods. The other Plaintiff entered into a settlement contract whereby he bought back the goods. This settlement contract also contained arbitration clauses similar to those contained in the original contracts. Even after this settlement contracts he failed to pay the settled differences. The buyers having called for arbitration the sellers filed suits Nos. The other Plaintiff entered into a settlement contract whereby he bought back the goods. This settlement contract also contained arbitration clauses similar to those contained in the original contracts. Even after this settlement contracts he failed to pay the settled differences. The buyers having called for arbitration the sellers filed suits Nos. 42 and 43 of 1947 claiming similar relies as in the other suits I have mentioned. In these 2 suits also the contention is that both parties entered into the contracts on the basis that the Jute Price Control Order would be continued and that there has been a frustration of the adventure by reason of the non-contiuance of that Order, it is further alleged that the agreement for extension or the settlement contract as the case may be, was entered into though mutual mistake as to and in ignorance of their respective rights arising out of the frustration of the original contracts and that consequently the settlement contracts were and are void. 6. The Defendants who are buyers have now applied for stay of their respective suits. Each of them denies that the continuation of the Jute Price Control Order was the basis or foundation of the contracts or that there was any mutual mistake as alleged or at all. 7. On an application for stay the Court has first to ascertain the nature and scope of the disputes between the parties. This has to be done primarily by a reference to the plaint and possibly also to the affidavits used in the application for stay. The Court has to take the Plaintiff's case at its face value. On such an application the Court is not called upon to, and indeed it must not. prejudge the issues between the parties. The Court must, however, ascertain what case is made by the Plaintiff. 8. Turning to the plaint and the affidavits I find that the first contention of the Plaintiffs is that the contracts were entered into on the basis that the Jute Price Control Order would be extended and that that not having been done the contracts automatically came to an end. The Defendants deny these allegations and contentions. That is the main dispute between the parties. The Defendants deny these allegations and contentions. That is the main dispute between the parties. Rightly or wrongly the Plaintiffs have raised these questions and they will have to be heard, considered and decided by the tribunal which may ultimately be called upon to adjudicate thereon. Having thus ascertained the disputes the Court must next enquire whether the disputes come within the arbitration clauses in the contract. If they do then the suits must be regarded as being in respect of matters agreed to be referred. 9. The Plaintiffs' contentions are two-fold. In the first place they contend that in the facts and circumstances of these cases there is no arbitration agreement subsisting between the parties. This is explained by stating that the contracts having come to an end, the arbitration clauses which are part thereof also came to an end. Reliance is placed on the part of the Plaintiffs on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Hirjje Mulji's case L. R. [1926] A. C 497., which, it is argued, establishes that the effect of frustration is that the arbitration clause which is part of the contract must fall with the contract. It is further contended on the same authority that the question as to whether a contract is subsisting or not is not one for the arbitrator to decide, for he cannot invest himself with arbitral jurisdiction by deciding that question in his own favour. The Defendants on the other hand take their stand on the decision of the House of Lords in Heyman v. Darwins, Ld. (2) and refer me to the following observations of Viscount Simon, L. C, at p. 366: If the dispute is whether the contract which contains the clause has ever been entered into at all, that issue cannot go to arbitration under the clause, for the party who denies that he has ever entered into the contract thereby denies that he has ever joined in the submission. Similarly, if one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void bonito (because, for example, the making of such a contract is illegal) the arbitration clause cannot operate, for on this view the clause itself is also void. Similarly, if one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void bonito (because, for example, the making of such a contract is illegal) the arbitration clause cannot operate, for on this view the clause itself is also void. But, in a situation where the parties are at one in asserting that they entered into a binding contract, but a difference has arisen between them whether there has been a breach by one side or the other, or whether circumstances have arisen which have discharged one or both parties from further performance, such differences should be regarded as. differences which have arisen " in respect of " or " with regard to " or " under " the contract and an arbitration clause which uses these or similar expression should be construed accordingly. 10. The argument is that the doctrine of frustration being founded on the principle of an implied term read into the contract frustration amounts to a breach of that implied term and stands on the same footing as breach of an express term and does not destroy the arbitration clause. A large number of cases have been cited before me on both sides. In the view I have taken of the arbitration clauses before me I do not find it necessary to consider whether there is any conflict between the decision in Hirji Mulji's case L. R. [1926] A. O. 407. and that in Heyman's case L. R. [1942] A. C. 356.. Hirji Mulji's case L. R. [1926] A. O. 407. clearly recognizes (at p. 505) that the arbitration clause may be couched in such terms as will except it' out of the results of frustration on the substantive contract. In Heyman's case L. R. [1942] A. C. 356., Viscount Simon, L. C. (at p. 366) also expressed the following views: Ordinarily speaking, there seems no reason at all why a widely drawn arbitration clause should not embrace a dispute whether a party is discharged from future performance (by frustration, whether the time for performance has already arrived or not. 11. The important question, therefore, is whether the arbitration clauses before me are couched in such terms as will except them out of the effect of frustration on the contracts themselves. I have already quoted the two arbitration clauses in extensor. A wider arbitration clause it is difficult to imagine. 11. The important question, therefore, is whether the arbitration clauses before me are couched in such terms as will except them out of the effect of frustration on the contracts themselves. I have already quoted the two arbitration clauses in extensor. A wider arbitration clause it is difficult to imagine. The first quoted arbitration clause comprises and covers all manner of disputes " arising out of " or " concerning " or " in connection with " or " in consequence of " or " relating to" the contracts. It embraces disputes that may arise before or after the termination of the contracts. It appears whether or not the obligations of parties are subsisting when disputes arise. The second arbitration clause is equally widely worded. It appears to me that these arbitration clauses are very much wider in scope and import than the ordinary arbitration clause which is usually attached to commercial contracts and which was used in the contract which was the subject-matter of Hirjce Mulji's case L. R. [1926] A. 0. 497.. They are so expressed that they, in my opinion, constitute an arbitration agreement which is collateral to or even independent of the substantive stipulations of the contracts themselves. The substantive contracts and the arbitration agreements are, as it were, separate contracts rolled into one and set forth in one document for the sake of convenience. In my judgment these arbitration clauses have been worded in such away that even if the substantive contracts came to an end, by frustration the arbitration clauses still survive. I respectfully agree with the judgment of Gentle, J., in In the matter of Arbitration between Brojoraj Saha v. Bengal Jute Mills Co., Ltl. Unreported: delivered on August 28, 1945- 12. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs next contended that even if the arbitration clauses are still subsisting they do not cover the disputes that have arisen between the parties. The argument is that the arbitration clauses comprise disputes that arise upon the termination of the contracts by act of parties, e.g., by breach or by repudiation and acceptance thereof. Frustration, it is pointed out, puts an end to the contracts automatically and without any actor volition of the parties and disputes that arise out of or relating to such automatic termination by operation of law are not within the purview of the arbitration clauses. Frustration, it is pointed out, puts an end to the contracts automatically and without any actor volition of the parties and disputes that arise out of or relating to such automatic termination by operation of law are not within the purview of the arbitration clauses. I see no justification for so limiting the arbitration clauses which are expressed in so very general and wide terms. As I read them the arbitration clauses cover disputes arising before or after the expiration or termination of the contracts in howsoever way such expiration or termination may be brought about. It appears to me that these clauses were framed expressly to avoid the application of the decision in Hirjee Mulji's case L. R. [1926] A. C. 497. In my opinion they are couched in such terms as save them from the results of frustration. 13. In most of the plaints an alternative case is pleaded as follows: Alternatively the Plaintiffs state both the parties to the agreement were under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement rarely that. the Jute Control Order would be extended as aforesaid. In the premises the said contract is void. 14. It is urged, on the authority of the passage from the speech of Viscount Simon in Heyman's case L. R. [1942] A. C. 356 which I have quoted above, that the arbitration clause cannot operate, for the contracts being void abilities because the parties were under a mutual mistake as to a matter of fact essential to them, the arbitration clauses were also void. The disputes, it is argued, are as to the very formation of the contracts and the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to decide whether these contracts ever came into being at all. It is contended that as the case of there being no contract has been raised, the Plaintiffs are entitled to have that issue tried by the Court in the suit. The question, therefore, is whether the paragraph I have quoted from the plaint can be at all construed as a plea raising the issue as to whether any contract came into being at all. A mutual mistake which will make a contract void under sec. 20 of the Indian Contract Act must be one as to an existing matter of fact essential to the agreement. The decision in Babshetti v. Venkataramana (1879) I. L. R. 3 Bom. 154. A mutual mistake which will make a contract void under sec. 20 of the Indian Contract Act must be one as to an existing matter of fact essential to the agreement. The decision in Babshetti v. Venkataramana (1879) I. L. R. 3 Bom. 154. following the observations of the Judicial Committee in Periaiasami v. Representatives of Salvgai (1878) L. R. 5 I. A. 73. clearly indicates that a mistake as to existing facts may make a contract void but an erroneous expectation which events entirely falsify has no effect. If two parties enter into a contract through a mutual mistake as to an existing fact there is, as pointed out by Lord Wright in his "Legal Essays and Addresses" at p. 261, only the appearance and not the fact of consent. In such it case there is no contract ab-initio. if two parties enter into a. contract expressly or impliedly on the basis of the happening of a future event there is a concluded contract and on the not happening of the future event, the contract ceases to operate. The proposition formulated by Sir John Simon as Counsel and recorded by Lord Atkin in Hell v. Brothers, Ltd. L. B. [1932] A. C. 161. clearly brings out the difference between a mutual mistake as to an existing fact and an erroneous assumption of a future fact. The proposition is as follows: Whenever it is to be inferred from the terms of a con tract or its surrounding circumstances that the consensus has been reached upon the basis of a particular contractual assumption and that assumption is not true, the contract is avoided: i.e., it is void ab initio if the assumption is of a present fact and it ceases to bind if the assumption is of a future fact. 15. It is quite clear, therefore, that while the effect of a mutual mistake as to an existing fact is that the contract is void ab initio, or in other words, no contract comes into being at all, if the mutual mistake consists of a wrong assumption of a future fact, the contract comes into being but ceases to be operative when the events falsify the assumption. The allegation in the plaint is that the parties were under a mutual mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the contracts, namely, that the Jute Price Control Order would be extended. The allegation in the plaint is that the parties were under a mutual mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the contracts, namely, that the Jute Price Control Order would be extended. It is nothing more than an allegation of an erroneous assumption of a future fact. So regarded and understood the alternative case formulated in the plaints is not really an alternative case of a mutual mistake such as would render the contract void ab initio under sec. 20 of the Indian Contract -Act but is only a different way of expressing the same case of the contracts coming to an end by reason of frustration which is pleaded earlier. Learned Counsel strenuously argued that rightly or wrongly the Plaintiffs case was that there was no contract ab initio by reason of mutual mistake and that I should not prejudge that case on these interlocutory applications but should let the Plaintiffs have a chance of making good their contention before the trial Judge. I disclaim any intention of prejudging any case but I must ascertain what case has really been made and that is my main concern. After ascertaining the real issue I have to see whether that issue is covered by the arbitration clause. When the real issue is ascertained and it is found to be outside the arbitration clause the Court cannot refuse to stay the suit on the ground that the issue is of no substance or is bound to be decided in a particular way. If on a construction of the plaint I were satisfied that a case of mutual mistake making the contracts void ab initio had been really pleaded I would not disregard it only because I might think that it was not a sound or bona fide defence. If I did that 1 would prejudge the issue. I am not doing anything of that kind. I am only trying to ascertain what is the meaning of the paragraph I have quoted from the plaint. 1 do not read the plaint in the way learned Counsel will like me to do. I do not accept their construction of that paragraph. I am not doing anything of that kind. I am only trying to ascertain what is the meaning of the paragraph I have quoted from the plaint. 1 do not read the plaint in the way learned Counsel will like me to do. I do not accept their construction of that paragraph. In my opinion the alternative case as pleaded does not raise the issue of there being no contract ab initio but raises the issue of the contracts subsequently coming to an end by reason of the non-fulfilment of the alleged mutual expectation or assumption as to the continuation of the Jute Price Control Order. By saying so I do not prejudge any issue but only state what the issue is as pleaded. Having thus ascertained the real issue I am bound to say that it is covered by the arbitration clauses for I have already held that the issue of frustration is within the arbitration clauses. 16. In Suits Nos. 42 and 43 of 1947, however, the position is somewhat different. What is alleged in those two suits is that the original contracts had been entered into on the basis that the Jute Price Control Order would be continued and that as it was not continued the contracts came to an end and the arbitration clauses became inoperative. I have held that this contention cannot be sustained, having regard to the language used in the arbitration clauses. The second case of the Plaintiffs in these suits is that the parties entered into the agreement for extension or the settlement contract in ignorance of their respective rights arising out of the frustration of the original contracts. Here is a plea of mutual mistake of an existing fact, namely, the existing rights. The contention is that the parties entered into the agreement for extension of the settlement contract in the belief that the original contracts were binding when in truth they had, by reason of frustration, ceased to be binding and it follows that the settlement contract was void ab initio and, therefore, the arbitration clause therein never came into operation. That may be correct. But the matter does not rest there. The arbitration clause in the settlement contract may be inoperative. That may be correct. But the matter does not rest there. The arbitration clause in the settlement contract may be inoperative. But the disputes as to whether or not there was a valid agreement for extension or a valid contract in settlement of the original contracts, are disputes arising out of or relating to the original contracts or the fulfilment thereof and are within the arbitration clauses contained in the original contracts which, I have held, are subsisting. 17. The next ground urged by the Plaintiffs in opposition to these applications is that very serious and complicated questions of law are involved in these cases and the Court should not, in the exercise of its discretion, stay the suits. There can be no doubt that under sec. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act the Court has a discretion. But the discretion of the Court must be exercised in accordance with sound principles laid down in judicial decisions. The major conditions prescribed by the section being fulfilled the Court will generally lean in favour of a stay and thus indirectly compel the contumacious party, who seeks to back out of his arbitration agreement, to go to arbitration. It is said that if the matters in dispute involve only questions if law that circumstance alone ought to be regarded as constituting a sufficient reason why the matters should not be referred to arbitration. Before the Arbitration Act, 1889, came into force in England it was laid down in a number of cases that the fact that the matter in issue between the parties was merely a question of law was not a sufficient reason for refusing a stay, because, if the parties, instead of resorting to the ordinary Courts, agree to submit their disputes to a domestic tribunal of their own choosing, it is the prima facie duty of the Court to give effect to their agreement. Under the English Arbitration Act of 1889, however, the arbitrator may be compelled to state in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court any Question of law arising in the course of the reference. This circumstance made the English Courts, after the Arbitration Act, 1889, came into force, less disposed in those cases to grant a stay for the matter was likely to come back to Court in the form of a special case (Halsbury, VoI. This circumstance made the English Courts, after the Arbitration Act, 1889, came into force, less disposed in those cases to grant a stay for the matter was likely to come back to Court in the form of a special case (Halsbury, VoI. I, Art. 1090, p. 641). It is argued on behalf of the Defendants that in India the position is different, for under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, as under our old Arbitration Act, 1899, there is no provision whereby the arbitrator can be compelled to state a special case and, therefore, the consideration, namely, the probability of the matter coming back to Court on a special case stated by the arbitrator, which induced the English Court to refuse a stay, ought not to weigh with the Indian Court and the Indian Court ought not to follow the English decisions under the English Arbitration Act of 1889. Reference is made on the part of the Defendants to the decision of the Bombay High Court in The Raneegunge Coal Association, Ltd. v. The Tara Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (1938) I. L. R. 53 Bom. 271. and it is contended that whether the disputes involve questions of fact or of law, the Court should give effect to the agreement of parties by granting a stay. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that if the disputes are on matters of law only the circumstance that the arbitrator in India cannot be committed to state a special case should induce the Court to refuse a stay, for a trial of the question of law by the Court will be much more satisfactory than a trial of such questions by laymen for whom the questions may be too deep and abstruse. The Plaintiffs rely on the observations of Panckridge, J., in Tolaram Champalal v. Jewanram Gangaram I. L. R. [1940] Cal. 26.. In that case the learned Judge held in favour of the applicant on all other points but refused the stay on the ground that the question involved in that case, namely, whether the state of things then existing in the Far East was War, was a difficult question of law which appeared to the learned Judge quite unsuited for decision by laymen. Further the embarrassment likely to be caused by having two Japanese merchants to act as arbitrators was regarded by Panckridge, J., as a special circumstance which he thought he was entitled to take into consideration. It will be noticed that the learned Judge was greatly influenced by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Edward Grey & Co. v. Tolme & Runge 31 T. L. R. 137 (1914).. In that case the question of law was whether the contracts were suspended during the War or had been dissolved. The Master declined to order a stay. Scrutton J. dismissed an appeal from the decision of the Master. On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the matter was entirely one for the decision of the Judge. If he had exercised that discretion on proper grounds the Appeal Court would not interfere with it. This case to my mind indicates how the Court of Appeal will regard the exercise of discretion by the Judge hearing the application for stay. I do not think that any general rule has been laid down that when the only question is one of law, stay must be refused. I think the truth lies somewhere between the two extreme views I have mentioned above. The ultimate factor is the discretion of the Court to be exercised on a consideration of all facts and surrounding circumstances. The other conditions prescribed by sec. 34 being fulfilled the mutual bias will be in favour of a stay irrespective of whether the disputes are of fact or of law, for a stay will give effect to the agreement between the parties. Further if the question of law is dependent on facts, the Court will be further and more readily inclined to stay the action and compel the parties to take the decision of the tribunal of their own choice. [See Metropolitan Tunnel and Public Works, Ltd. v. London Electric Railway Co. L. R. [1926] 1 Ch. 371.]. The case of Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd. L. R. [19421 A. C. 356 itself arose out of an application for stay. Cassel, J. in Chambers held that the issue involved only a question of law and in the exercise of his discretion refused to grant a stay. L. R. [1926] 1 Ch. 371.]. The case of Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd. L. R. [19421 A. C. 356 itself arose out of an application for stay. Cassel, J. in Chambers held that the issue involved only a question of law and in the exercise of his discretion refused to grant a stay. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the Respondents, holding that the arbitration clause applied and that Cassel, J., had wrongly exercised his discretion. The House of Lords upheld this decision. Viscount Simon, L. C, concluded his speech with the words following: I think the Court of Appeal was right in reversing Cassel J.'s decision on this head. Even if the learned Judge were right in regarding the issue as one in which nothing but a question of law is involved, that circumstance would not necessarily and in all cases make it right to refuse a stay: Lord Parker's observaton in Bristol Corporation v. John Aird & Co. L. R. [1913] A. C. 241. refers to a question of construction. Moreover, in the present case questions of fact may well have to be determined and the disput as a whole is of a class which is constantly dealt with by an arbitrator. There is no sufficient reason why the matter should not 'be referred, and therefore, by the express language of sec. 4, there must be a stay. Lord Wright said: I need not quote authorities for what has been said so often, that under a general submission the artbitrator is appointed to decide issues both of fact and of law. In the background, indee6d, is the Court's jurisdiction to set aside an award if it is bad in law on its face, and the opinion of the Court on issues of law may be invoked by means of cases stated under the Acts of 1889 and 1934, but, if the submission is general, it will require some substantial reason to induce the. Court to deny its due effect to the agreement of the parties to submit the whole dispute, whether it includes both feet and law or is limited to either fact or law. In the present case I can find no sufficient reason. The dispute is of the most ordinary character. The correspondence pursues a course similar to that in hosts of other commercial disputes. 18. In the present case I can find no sufficient reason. The dispute is of the most ordinary character. The correspondence pursues a course similar to that in hosts of other commercial disputes. 18. After stating that the broad question was not one of law but one of law and fact combined and of law dependent on the view of facts taken by the tribunal which was to determine the issue, Lord Porter observed : The parties have chosen to refer their differences to arbitration and to arbitration they should go in the ordinary way unless there is some good reason to the contrary, as, e.g., where there is nothing but law to bo decided, as was the case in Rowe Bros. 4 Co., Ltd. v. Crossley & Bros. Ltd. L. R. [1915] 3 K. B. 167. 19. In the light of the above observations I proceed to consider whether the question involved in this case is one of law or of fact or both. Whether the contracts had been entered into by the parties expressly on the basis that the Jute Price Control Order would be extended or in circumstances from which the Court will infer such a term, is essentially one of fact. Whether the circumstances then prevailing were calculated to give rise to expectations that the Jute Price Control Order would be extended, whether persons engaged in jute trade had any and if so what belief in that behalf and what operated on the minds of the particular contracting parties are questions which obviously are of facts which will be much more satisfactorily determined by people engaged in jute trade than by a Court of law. Unless and until this question of fact is decided in favour of the Plaintiffs, the question of law will not arise at all. Again, the question whether the extension of that Order beyond the 30th September, 1946, could at all be the basis of contracts which had to be performed on or before the 30th September, 1946, is a question which the commercial arbitrator will be more competent to answer than a lawyer. Whether the provision of the contracts that damages are to be calculated on the market-rate prevailing on the 5th working day after the due date has the effect of extending the currency of the contracts by 5 working days beyond the 30th September, 1946. Whether the provision of the contracts that damages are to be calculated on the market-rate prevailing on the 5th working day after the due date has the effect of extending the currency of the contracts by 5 working days beyond the 30th September, 1946. so as to make the extension of the Jute Price Control Order a matter of importance even with regard to such contracts, is peculiarly well suited for decision by commercial men who habitually enter into contracts with, such a clause. A commercial arbitrator will be quite astute in noticing that in the correspondence that passed between the parties there was no reference to any such contention of frustration as is now raised by the sellers. If and when the relevant facts are ascertained, commercial men will find it easy to decide whether the contracts have been " frustrated.' The doctrine of frus-tration is not half as difficult in its application to a given set of facts as it is in the explanation of the legal theory on which it is to be based. Judges and jurists have adopted different theories on which this doctrine is founded. Thus we have the theory of implied term which found favour with some of the Law Lords, e.g., Earl of Loreburn, Lord Sumner and Viscount Simon. Viscount Haldane put it on the theory of the disappearance of the foundation of the contract. Lord Wright explained the doctrine on the theory of a supplementing power of the Court to determine what is just. Then there is the theory of common mistake and finally the theory of supervening impossibility. While the conflict of theories will go on worrying Judges and jurists alike, the commercial arbitrator will not find it difficult to decide whether in a given case the further performance of the contract should or should not be insisted upon. In any case the parties chose that all their disputes, whether of fact or of law, should be decided by commercial men and I find no cogent reason, particularly when the questions of law are dependent on questions of fact, why the matters should not be referred. The question of frustration of commercial contracts appears to me specially well suited for decision by commercial men. The question of frustration of commercial contracts appears to me specially well suited for decision by commercial men. In the facts and circumstances of these cases I am unable to accept the contentions of the Plaintiffs that the disputes involve only questions of law or that the law on such questions of law are too difficult for lay arbitrators to appreciate or apply or that the stay should be refused on these grounds. 20. In all the suits other than Suits Nos. 42 and 43 of 1947 a further ground has been taken why these applications should be refused. It is alleged that persons interested in or connected with various Jute Mill Companies are members of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and are on the panel from which arbitrators are chosen. Reference is made to a circular-No. 4 G. A. dated the 31st October, 1946, which, it is alleged, shows that the arbitrators or the firms or companies they represent are all buyers and as such interested in seeing that the points in issue in these cases are decided against the Plaintiffs who are sellers. It is not out of bounds of possibility that situation may sometime arise, in a trade which will divide persons engaged therein into two opposite groups and if such situation does arise the Court will certainly take that into consideration. I shall, therefore, have to scrutinise these allegations somewhat closely. In the first place the affidavits in opposition are not verified in the way required by a recent decision of the Appeal Court. It is not clear whether the allegations are statements of facts true to the knowledge of the deponents or based on information received from any particular source or are mere expressions of apprehensions, real or pretended. It is stated that it appears from the circular that the arbitrators or their firms are all buyers. The circular sets out in the first column the names of 66 firms and companies. Against each of these firms and companies are set out in the second column the names and descriptions of one or more persons presumably representing those firms and companies. The persons whose names are set out in the second coiumn are eligible to act as arbitrators. There are about I 152 such names set out in the second column. Against each of these firms and companies are set out in the second column the names and descriptions of one or more persons presumably representing those firms and companies. The persons whose names are set out in the second coiumn are eligible to act as arbitrators. There are about I 152 such names set out in the second column. The descriptions set forth against each of these persons include, Mill Salesman, Shipper, Kutcha balers. Pucca balers, brokers and supervisors of Kutcha and Pucca baling. In the third column are set out certain figures which read with the foot-notes indicate the classes of matters in which a particular arbitrator will act. It is difficult to see how it appears from this circular that all these companies or firms or their representatives are all buyers. I take it that buyers bought jute for the purpose of selling either locally or abroad and presumably they in their turn entered into contracts for sale of the goods bought by them either as jute or manufactured products of jute at or about that time. I do not see why I should assume that they will break their contracts with their buyers with a view to sell them again at higher prices. The Registrar of the Tribunal appoints the arbitrator for particular cases. The rules of the Tribunal make it clear that the Registrar shall not appoint any person who for any reason within his knowledge would not be a proper person to act as arbitrator. I have no reason to assume that the Registrar will violate this salutory rule. I have before me affidavits in reply denying that any person is appointed to act as arbitrator in a matter in which his firm is concerned. In these cases the Defendants had all referred their disputes to arbitration before these suits had been filed and presumably arbitrators had been selected. Under Rule V (4) the names of persons constituting the Court are not ordinarily disclosed to parties nor are parties entitled to such information as of right. But the rule provides that any of the parties may apply on special grounds (to be specified in writing to the Registrar) for the disclosure of the said names, although whether such disclosure should be made or not rests in the absolute discretion of the Registrar. But the rule provides that any of the parties may apply on special grounds (to be specified in writing to the Registrar) for the disclosure of the said names, although whether such disclosure should be made or not rests in the absolute discretion of the Registrar. It is not stated in the affidavits that any of the Plaintiffs made any attempt for the purposes of this application to get the names of arbitrators so as to make good their position that the arbitrators are interested. Nor is it stated that the Registrar refused to disclose the names. It is not disclosed in the affidavits when the Plaintiffs discovered that their buyers were people who wielded great influence in the Chamber. The fact that the affidavits are not properly verified and that the allegations are vague and devoid of particulars take away the force of the allegations. The fact that these allegations of apprehension of failure of justice are made by the Plaintiffs who appear through the same firm of solicitors and not by Plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 42 and 43 of 1947 who have different solicitors, is perhaps not without significance. The fact that no such case was made in the correspondence also weakens the Plaintiffs' case. For all I know the tremendous rise in prices which, it is said, will prompt the arbitrators who are buyers to decide against the Plaintiffs who are sellers so as to make huge profit for themselves, may well have induced the Plaintiffs to make these allegations against the arbitrators or their firms so as to get out of their submission and to take their chance of winning the suit in Court and getting the benefit of that rise in prices. In my opinion the allegations in the affidavits are not such as I may act upon them. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce has gained a reputation for the excellence of their arbitration proceedings and I shall require much more specific averments of facts properly verified showing that in any particular case justice will be denied by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce to any party. 21. The question whether, in view of secs. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce has gained a reputation for the excellence of their arbitration proceedings and I shall require much more specific averments of facts properly verified showing that in any particular case justice will be denied by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce to any party. 21. The question whether, in view of secs. 32 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, the suits are maintainable at all has not been argued and indeed it does not call for a decision on an application for stay [see Monro v. Bognor Urban District Council L. R. [1915] 3 K. B. 167]. There is no allegation that any of the other conditions specified in sec. 34 has not been fulfilled. In these circumstances I am bound to give effect to the agreement of the parties and stay these suits and I order accordingly in each of these applications. The Plaintiffs will pay the costs of the respective applications in their suits.