JUDGMENT Moothan, J. - This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of Civil Judge of Pithoragarh and arises in the following circumstances: In 1922 Khushal Singh, the present respondeat, and his uncle Lal Singh borrowed a sum of Rs. 2,000 from Messrs. Anti Ram Sah and Sons who are the present Appellants. In respect of this sum Khushal Singh and Lal Singh executed a joint promissory note in favour of the Appellant. In 1927, at the request of the Appellants, two promissory notes, each (or Rs .1,000, were substituted for the original promissory note for Rs. 2,000. One of these new promissory notes was executed by Khushal Singh and his brother Prem Singh, and the other was executed by Lal Singh and his brother Chet Ram. The two promissory notes were renewed from time to time. Lal Singh died in 1934, shortly afterwards the Appellants brought a suit against Chet Ram upon the promissory note which had been executed by him and Lal Singh. The suit was ultimately withdrawn as the result of an agreement between Chet Ram, Khushal Singh and the Appellants whereunder Khushal Singh accepted liability for the amount due on the promissory note and as security there-fore executed a mortgage in favour of the Appellants on the 28th February, 1933. The terms of this agreement have cot been stated very clearly in the judgment of the lower Courts, but it would appear from the recitals in the mortgage and in a sale deed which was executed on the same day by Chet Ram in favour or Khushal Singh, that the liability for the discharge of which the latter made himself responsible was that of Chet Ram on the promissory note. 2. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the Appellants against Khushal Singh on the mortgage. Khushal Singh did not deny execution of the mortgage deed, but he contended that he was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of S 9 of the United Provinces Debt Redemption Act, 1940. The trial Court came to the conclusion that Khushal Singh was so entitled and this view was upheld by the learned District Judge of Kumaun on appeal. The trial Court came to the conclusion that Khushal Singh was so entitled and this view was upheld by the learned District Judge of Kumaun on appeal. The viaw taken by the lower Courts, if 1 have understood it correctly, was that the loah of 1922 and the mortgage of 1935(sic) were part of one transaction, and that, therefore, Khushal Singh was, as regards the liability which he accepted in 1935, a borrower and not "another person" within the meaning of the definition of "Loan" in Section 2(9) of the Act. 3. It has been urged on behalf of the Appellants that the finding of the learned District Judge has been vitiated by his failure to appreciate the legal effect of the substitution in 1927 of the two promissory notes each for one thousand rupees for the original one of two thousand rupees, and it is said that as Khushal Singh could not be liable on the promissory note executed in 1927 by Lal Singh and Chet Ram (otherwise than as an heir in the event of the dscease of one of them) the execution of that note and of the renewals thereof severed any links that might otherwise have connected the first transaction in 1922 with the mortgage of 1935. 4. On the other hand it was argued that the mortgage was only a renewal of the original debt, and reliance was placed by the Courts below upon certain correspondence between the parties from which it appeared that the Appellants always regarded the Respondent as the principal debtor. This is not, in my opinion, a correct view of the position. Whatever amount of the original loan in 1922 it is quite clear that from 1927 onwards, the whole extent of the Respondent's liability was limited to the amount recoverable on the promissory note which he then executed. From that date onwards he ceased to be under any liability in respect of the balance of the original loan, the repayment of which became the responsibility of Lal Singh and Chet Ram. In these circumstances it appears to me clear that the Respondent assumed in 1935 a liability for the repayment of part of an advance in respect of which he had, since 1927, been under no legal obligation. In these circumstances it appears to me clear that the Respondent assumed in 1935 a liability for the repayment of part of an advance in respect of which he had, since 1927, been under no legal obligation. From that date I think that the Respondent clased to be a "borrower" within the meaning of the Act, so far as that portion of the original loan for the repayment of which Lal Singh and Chet Ram were responsible. 5. Now an advance in respect of which the liability for repayment has been transferred to a person other than the borrower is an advance of a kind which it was not, in my opinion, the intention of the legislature to enclude Within the dafinition of "loan" in the Debt Redemption Act, but some difficulty is caused by the reference in that definition to a contract by the borrower" as the means whereby the transfer of liability is to be effected. Strictly construed, the second half of the definition in S. 2 (9) would lead to a very difficult position. Suppose, for example, a case where an advance is made to A, an agriculturist, upon condition that repayment is secured by a joint promissory note executed by A a and his friend B. Subsequently A and B, with the consent of the lender, transfer their liability to C. Can C when sued by the lender, claim the benefit of the provisions of the Debt Redemption Act? The contract wheraunder liability for the repayment of the advance was transferred was entered into by C with B who was not the borrower and with A who was. 6. It follows in my view that the word "borrower" is not in this context used in its ordinary sense, for such use would be repugnant to what appears to me to be the clear intention of the Act, but in a wider sense as including the person liable for the repayment of the sums advanced. 7. 6. It follows in my view that the word "borrower" is not in this context used in its ordinary sense, for such use would be repugnant to what appears to me to be the clear intention of the Act, but in a wider sense as including the person liable for the repayment of the sums advanced. 7. If this be the proper way of construing the definition of the word "loan" as I think it is, then in my view the suit giving rise to this appeal is not one to which the United Provinces Debt Redemption Act applies Khushal Singh contracted with Chet Ram for the transfer to himself of a liability which was that of Chat Ram, and Chet Ram was, in my opinion a "borrower" within the meaning of S. 2 (9) of the Act. 8. In my opinion, therefore, this appeal must succeed. I accordingly set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and give the Appellants a decree for the amount claimed by them with costs, in all Courts. 9. Leave to file a Letters Patent appeal is granted.