JUDGMENT Majumdar, J. - This is an application by the Plaintiff firm for leave to execute the decree under Or. 21, r. 50, sub-r. (2) of the CPC against the Respondents, Pulin Behari Pal, Jnanendra K. Pal, Pulin Krishna Pal, Anil Krishna Pal and Gopendra suit No. 2204 of 1930 Krishna Pal as partners of the Defendant firm Issur Kamkrishna Pal and Issur Kali Krishna Pal. The suit in which the application has been made was instituted by the Plaintiff firm for recovery of the sum of Rs. 18,456-11-3 being due on a promissory note executed by the said Defendant firm. The writ of summons in the said suit was served on the said Pulin Behari Pal as a partner of the Defendant firm and as also the person having the control and management of the business. On the 6th March, 1931, a decree for Rs. 18,456-11-3 with interest at 6 per cent, per annum was passed against the Defendant firm. An application for execution of the decree having been made, notice under Or. 21, r. 22 of the CPC was ordered to issue on 31st July, 1933. The said notice was served only on Pulin Behari Pal. On the 4th August, 1933, the execution of the decree was ordered against the Defendant firm by attachment of certain Government securities deposited by the said firm with Messrs. Burma Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India, Limited but nothing was realised by such attachment. The application for execution was transmitted in November, 1942, to the District Judge's Court at Dacca when on an application for execution of the decree against the Respondents as partners of the said Defendant firm an order was made on the 3rd July, 1943. This Court in its appellate jurisdiction set aside the said order on the 9th January, 1945, leaving it open to the decree-holder to make an application to the proper Court as is contemplated by Or. 21, r. 50 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter the present application was made on the 12th July, 1945. The only question argued before me is one of limitation. It is common ground that Art. 183 of the Limitation Act would govern this case. Therefore the application would not be barred if the order of attachment made as aforesaid on the 4th August, 1933, had revived the decree as against all the Respondents. Air. The only question argued before me is one of limitation. It is common ground that Art. 183 of the Limitation Act would govern this case. Therefore the application would not be barred if the order of attachment made as aforesaid on the 4th August, 1933, had revived the decree as against all the Respondents. Air. Das Gupta contends that as against the Respondents other than Pulin Behari Pal, the decree had not revived, because no notice of execution under Or. 21, r. 22 of the CPC resulting in the order of the 4th of August, 1933, was served on them. Elaborate arguments have been addressed to me by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties as to the meaning and effect of " revivor of a decree under Art. 183 of the Limitation Act and as to whether the revivor of the decree against one partner operates as a revivor against other partners who have not been served with any notice under Or. 21, r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There have been various decisions of this Court as well as other High Courts as to the meaning of the word "revivor." 1 am not inclined to get attracted to enter into any disquisition on the subject except saying this that the word " revived" as used in Art. 183 of the Limitation Act refers to the common law practice which prevailed in the Supreme Courts in India prior to 1859 under which if a writ of execution was not sued out within a year and a day, the decree had to be revived by a writ of Fieri Facias whereby the judgment-debtor was called upon to show cause why the decree should not be revived and the decree-holder should not have execution against him. This doctrine had its origin in the presumption of satisfaction which was held to arise in cases where the decree had been more than a year and a day old and had not been executed. This is why the word " revived " is found in the Limitation Act of 1859 and in later Limitation Acts. This procedure by writ of Fieri Facias had been displaced by a provision in the CPC (sec. 248 of the Code of 1882 and Or. This is why the word " revived " is found in the Limitation Act of 1859 and in later Limitation Acts. This procedure by writ of Fieri Facias had been displaced by a provision in the CPC (sec. 248 of the Code of 1882 and Or. 21, r. 22 of the present Code) requiring a creditor to issue a notice to a person against whom execution is applied for, to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him [see Ashootosh Dutt v. Doorya Churn Chatterjee I. L. R. (1880) Cal. 501 and James Russel McLaren v. Veeriah Naidu I. L. R. (1915) Mad. 1102]. The underlying idea of giving notice is, in my opinion, the same old presumption of satisfaction when any application for execution of a decree had not been made for more than one year. That being so, I think when there are more than one judgment-debtors with joint liability, a decree more than a year old cannot be revived against all unless each of the judgment-debtors is given an opportunity to show cause why the decree should not be executed as against him. I find support of this view in the case James Russel McLaran v. Vccriah Naidu I. L. R. (1915) 38 Mad. 1102 and also in the case of Krishnaiyah v. Gajendra Naidu I. L. R. (1917) Mad. 1127. I consider the position of partner in the case of execution of a decree obtained against a firm, to be better than that of the joint judgment-debtors. Though the decree against a firm is in effect a decree against all the partners as joint debtors it is not capable of execution straight away against all of them. Or. 21, r. 50 provides for execution of a decree against a firm. Under it execution may issue against the personal property of (1) any person who has appeared in his own name under r. 6 or r. 7 of Or. 30 or who has admitted in the pleadings that he is or who has been adjudged to be, a partner (2) against any person who has been individually served with summons and has failed to appear. But when the decree-holder claims to be entitled to execute the decree against any other person as being partner he has got to adopt the procedure contemplated by sub-r. (2) thereof. But when the decree-holder claims to be entitled to execute the decree against any other person as being partner he has got to adopt the procedure contemplated by sub-r. (2) thereof. So the principle that entitles a joint judgment-debtor to a notice under Or. 21, r. 50 applies with equal if not greater force to the case of partners and more so in case of those who come under sub-r. (2). Therefore the Respondents other than Pulin Behari Pal who come under such category of persons as in sub-r. (2) were entitled to notice under Or. 21, r. 22 and in the absence thereof the decree could not be said to have revived against them for the purposes of execution under Or. 21, r. 50, sub-r. (2). My attention has been drawn to the case of Harnarain v. Dayabhai Hira Chand I. L. R. (1940) Pat. 909. I find that the same principle has been relied upon by the High Court, Patna where dealing with the execution of a decree (passed by the Original Side of the Bombay High Court) against a firm it was held, that an order for arrest of one of the partners in execution of a decree did not operate as a revivor against another partner. 2. Another contention raised by Mr. Das Gupta but argued rather feebly was that there can be no determination of liability under Or. 21, r. 50 (2) unless the persons sought to be made liable as partners had been served with the summons in the suit. This contention is founded upon the use of the words " summons to appear and answer " in sub-r. (4) of Or. 21, r. 50. 3. I do not consider there is any substance in this point. It is covered by authority as reported in Jagat Chandra v. Gunny Hajee Ahmed (1925) 8 C. W. N. 11. and Jayannath v. Chimanlal (1944) 48 C. W. N. 545. 4. The result, therefore, is that this application as against Respondents other than Pulin Behari Pal is dismissed. The decree-holder may proceed in execution against Pulin Behary Pal's firm. Each party to bear his costs of this application. Certified for Counsel.