Judgments.- This second appeal has been referred to a Full Bench by Sir Alfred Lionel Leach, C.J. and Lakshmana Rao, J. The order of reference, dated 9th January, 1947, is as follows: “The question which arises in this appeal is one of considerable importance. There is a Bench decision of this Court which is directly in point-Veerappa Chetti v. Ramaswami Chetti1. The learned Advocate-General has, however, submitted that the judgment requires reconsideration in view of the observations of the Full Bench in Ramier v. Muthukrishna Aiyar2. He has contended that inasmuch as a trial Court retains jurisdiction in spite of a notification transferring the jurisdiction to another Court, the same principle should apply to a Court to which a decree is sent for execution when the alteration in jurisdiction takes place after the Court is seised with the case. The question is one which may often arise and the properties here are of a very considerable value. In these circumstances we direct that the appeal be placed before a Full Bench.” Shortly, the circumstances giving rise to the appeal are: When the Court which passes a money decree transmits the decree to another Court for execution and when an execution petition is pending for attachment and sale of immoveable property belonging to the judgment-debtor situate within the territory of the transferee Court and after an order for attachment has been made by that Court, the property is removed from the territory of the transferee Court to another Court, whether: (1) the transferee Court can make an order for sale of the property by Court auction so as to give a good title to the purchaser; (2) if the transferee Court has no jurisdiction but the judgment-debtor does not take objection to jurisdiction at the time of the order for sale and during the execution proceedings, a judgment-creditor in execution of a decree in another suit, seeking to attach and sell the property can question the jurisdiction of the Court, by which the property was sold, and the validity of the sale. The relevant facts can now be stated. On 7th July, 1931, a money decree was passed against one Venkata Subbiah, by the Court of the District Munsiff of Guntur. The decree was transferred to the Court of the District Munsiff of Bapatla for execution. The relevant facts can now be stated. On 7th July, 1931, a money decree was passed against one Venkata Subbiah, by the Court of the District Munsiff of Guntur. The decree was transferred to the Court of the District Munsiff of Bapatla for execution. On 6th February, 1933, an execution petition was filed in the Bapatla Court for attachment and sale of immoveable property belonging to the judgment-debtor situate within the territory of that Court. On 7th February, 1933, an order for attachment was made. On 22nd June, 1933, the Court ordered sale of the property to take place on 10th August on which date it was sold at a Court auction to the appellants. The sale was confirmed on 16th September and a sale certificate was issued on 16th November, 1933, by the Bapatla Court in favour of the appellants. Meanwhile on 9th May, 1933, after the Bapatla Court had made the order for attachment but before it ordered the property to be sold, a Government notification was issued transferring to the District Munsiff’s Court of Tenali, as from 29th May, the territory in which the property was situated. The judgment-debtor did not take objection against the jurisdiction of the Bapatla Court at any stage of the execution proceedings. On 18th March, 1938, the respondents obtained, in appeal to the High Court from the Subordinate Judge’s Court of Guntur, a decree for specific performance of an agreement for the sale of some property (not the property the subject of the present appeal), mesne profits and costs against Venkata Subbiah and others; in respect of the money portion of this decree, it was transferred to the Bapatla Subordinate Court for execution, as the property in suit subsequently was re-included in the territory of that Court. The property was attached, the appellants preferred a claim against the attachment by virtue of their purchase in 1933. This claim was allowed. On 4th September 1941, the suit out of which this appeal arises, was instituted in the District Munsiff’s Court of Tenali by the respondents against the appellants to set aside the order in the claim petition. The suit was decreed in the respondents’ favour and an appeal by the appellants to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tenali was dismissed on 14th July, 1945. This is the appellants’ (defendants’ in the suit) second appeal against the decision of the lower Courts. The suit was decreed in the respondents’ favour and an appeal by the appellants to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tenali was dismissed on 14th July, 1945. This is the appellants’ (defendants’ in the suit) second appeal against the decision of the lower Courts. The notification dated 9th May, 1933, provides, so far as relevant for the present consideration, as follows: “In supersession of all previous notifications, regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Courts of the District Munsiff’s in the Guntur District the High Court hereby directs and notifies that from and after 29th May, 1933, the Courts of the District Munsiff’s in the said District shall have and exercise local jurisdiction as stated below: (2) District Munsiff’s Court, Tenali. (v) Ponnur Firka. (6) Chebrole.” The property in question is situate in Chebrole. The notification is expressed to be in supersession of all previous notifications by which, inter alia, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Bellary Court in respect of immoveable property in Chebrole. It follows that, on and from 29th May, 1933, the property in question was removed from the territorial jurisdiction of the Bapatla Court, it became part of the territory of the Tenali Court, which thenceforth had jurisdiction with respect to it. Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure enacts that: “(1) The Court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree-holder, send it for execution to another Court; (b) if such person (the judgment-debtor) has not property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree sufficient to satisfy such decree and has property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court; (2) The Court which passed a decree may of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction.” Since sub-section (1) of the section requires a decretal Court to send its decree to another Court for execution when a judgment-debtor’s property is within the jurisdiction of that Court, it must follow that a decretal Court cannot itself execute against property outside its own territory; if it could do so transmission would be unnecessary. Further manifestation of this proposition is found in sub-section (2) which enables a decretal Court suo motu to transmit its decree for execution to a subordinate Court, but only to one of competent jurisdiction; this must mean a Court which has jurisdiction, that is to say, a Court within whose limits the property against which execution will lie is situate. Section 42 of the Code enacts that, “The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself.” Since a decretal Court can execute only in respect of property lying within its territory, it follows that that is the extent of a transferee Court’s jurisdiction. The Code provides two exceptions to the above restriction upon the power of a Court to execute: (a) Where a suit is to obtain relief respecting, compensation for, or wrong to, immoveable property situate within the jurisdiction of different Courts, section 17 allows a suit to be instituted in any Court within whose territory any portion of the property is situate; since such Court has jurisdiction to entertain such suit it has also jurisdiction to execute against the outlying properties, in respect of which it can pass a decree: (b) Under Order 21, rule 3 of the Code, where immoveable property forming one estate is situate within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Courts, any one of such Courts may attach and sell the entire estate. The above provisions of the Code would be unnecessary if a Court could execute a decree against outlying property and the presence in the Code of those enactments manifests the ordinary restriction upon a Court’s powers of execution. Now returning to the facts of the present case when the decree of 1931 was sent by the Guntur Court to the Bapatla Court for execution, the property in question was within the territory of the latter Court and the transmission complied with the provisions of section 39. The state of affairs regarding location of the property was the same when the execution petition was presented and the order for attachment of the property was made by the Bapatla Court in February, 1933. The state of affairs regarding location of the property was the same when the execution petition was presented and the order for attachment of the property was made by the Bapatla Court in February, 1933. When, however, that Court made the order for sale in June, 1933, sold the property in August and issued the sale certificate in November, 1933, the property had ceased to be within its territorial jurisdiction, having been transferred to the Tenali Court. Subject to what hereinafter appears, since a Court, save for the two exceptions above mentioned which are not in point in the present instance, has not jurisdiction to execute in respect of property which is situate outside its territory, the Bapatla Court had no jurisdiction to make the order for sale of the property in question and the sale of it was effected without lawful authority. The learned Advocate-General, on behalf of the appellants contended that, upon presentation of a petition in execution of a decree in respect of property situate within the territory of the Court to which it is presented, thereby, that Court takes cognizance of its subject-matter and has seisin of the property against which execution is sought; the removal of the property from the territorial jurisdiction of that Court, before an order for sale is made, does not deprive it of jurisdiction to execute the decree, but it retains jurisdiction as if the property had remained within its territory. Reliance for this proposition was placed upon Chockalingam Pillai v. Velayudha Mudaliar1 and Rainier v. Muthukrishna Aiyar2. In Chockalinga’s case1 a mortgage suit was instituted in a Court; thereafter the hypotheca was removed from its territorial jurisdiction; later, a final decree for sale was passed by the Court. In a suit brought to set aside the decree on the ground that it was void for want of jurisdiction, the finding was that the mortgage decree was valid. After referring to some authorities which held that the withdrawal of jurisdiction from a Court does not affect suits which have been instituted in it, Phillips, J., observed, at page 451 of the report, that: “The jurisdiction of a Court consists in its power to entertain suits and when once a suit has been properly entertained, it is difficult to understand how that jurisdiction is removed unless it is specifically so done by the order of a competent authority. Once the suit has been entertained, the remaining proceedings taken therein are not taken by reason of any particular territorial jurisdiction but in exercise of the powers vested in the Court to try suits generally and consequently the only time at which the territorial jurisdiction comes into operation is at the time of filing the suit. Once the Court has seisin of the case, it has jurisdiction to try it to its conclusion, unless there is any reason for holding that that jurisdiction has been removed.” The learned Judge then referred to section 21 of the Code, which provides that, unless objection is taken to the place of suing at the earliest possible opportunity, no objection in that behalf, shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court, and, at page 452, he observed that the section has been extended in Zamindar of Ettavapuram v. Chidambaram Chetti3, to execution proceedings. The decision in Zamindar of Ettayapuram’s case3 was that if a party does not raise objection to jurisdiction when a preliminary mortgage decree is made absolute, i.e., when an order for sale of property is made, he is not entitled to plead in execution that the order was passed without jurisdiction. At page 686 of the report Sir John Wallis, C.J., observed that the effect of section 21 is that objections which the appellate or revisional Court is thereby precluded from allowing must be considered cured for all purposes unless they were taken before the passing of the decree in the original Court. It was not held that section 21 applied simpliciter to execution proceedings but the decision was that it applied to a suit in which objection could have been taken to jurisdiction before a decree had been passed and that the failure to take objection in the suit precluded it being done at any later stage, including proceedings in execution. Section 21 refers to objection as to a place of “suing”. An execution petition is not a suit and its presentation is not “suing”. In Chockalinga’s case1a suit was instituted in a Court which, at the date of institution, had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and thereby the Court obtained seisin of the suit and its subject-matter. Section 21 refers to objection as to a place of “suing”. An execution petition is not a suit and its presentation is not “suing”. In Chockalinga’s case1a suit was instituted in a Court which, at the date of institution, had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and thereby the Court obtained seisin of the suit and its subject-matter. The subsequent proceedings in the suit were in exercise of the powers vested in the Court to try the suit; those powers were not taken away by the subsequent removal of from its territory of the property. A Court does not obtain seisin of the property which is the subject of an execution petition upon its presentation; the presentation of an execution petition is not “suing”. An order for attachment of property confers no right upon the execution petitioner, all it does is to make a subsequent private transfer or delivery of the property void against all claims enforceable under the attachment (vide section 64 of the Code). The decree, in the present case, was sent for execution to the Bapatla Court because, at that time, the property was within its territory and, by reason of that instance, it had jurisdiction to order execution against the property. It had not lost its jurisdiction when the execution petition was presented to it and when it made the order for attachment. But, the presentation of the petition did not give the Court seisin over the property nor did it confer any right upon the execution creditor when it made the order for attachment. When the Bapatla Court made the order for sale, it had no longer jurisdiction over the property so as to be able to execute the decree. Section 39 is clear and unambiguous in its meaning and effect; a Court passing a decree must have territorial jurisdiction in respect of property against which it can order execution; if it has not got that jurisdiction it cannot order execution and must send the decree for that purpose to the Court competent to do so. Section 42 confers like powers in execution upon a transferee Court and, it will follow, such Court is subject to the same limitation as the Court which passed the decree. Section 42 confers like powers in execution upon a transferee Court and, it will follow, such Court is subject to the same limitation as the Court which passed the decree. Whilst I agree with the observation of Phillips, J., in Chockalinga’s case1 which I have quoted, with respect, I am unable to subscribe to his opinion, that the principles relating to a suit were extended in Zamindar of Ettayapuram case to execution proceedings. The other authority upon which the learned Advocate-General relies is Ramier’s case2 a decision of a Full Bench. There, a final decree was passed in a mortgage suit, subsequently the Court ceased to have territorial jurisdiction over the mortgaged property which was removed to another Court’s territory. The actual decision in that case is that the latter Court could not execute the decree without it being transmitted for that purpose by the Court passing the decree. In the judgment of the Court, delivered by Ramesam, J., the effect is discussed of the notification by which the transfer of the territory had been made and whether, within the contemplation of section 150 of the Code, the business of the Court had been transferred. It was held there had been no such transfer. In the present case, the notification did not transfer the business from Bapatla to Tenali,and it was argued for the appellants, that the former Court consequently retained jurisdiction to dispose of the execution petition which had been presented to it before the transfer of the property from the Court’s territory. In this respect the observations previously made regarding the position and the powers of a Court with respect to a pending suit and a pending execution petition are in point and do not require repetition. Ramier’s case2 would be an authority in the appellants’ favour if the principles relating to a suit also applied to an execution petition, which, in my view, they do not. Incidentally it is to be noticed that, in Ramier’s case2a decree for sale was passed by the Court before its territorial jurisdiction was removed, in the present case the order for sale was made after the removal. A decision of a Bench of this Court, directly in point, is found in Kasi Viswanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti3. Incidentally it is to be noticed that, in Ramier’s case2a decree for sale was passed by the Court before its territorial jurisdiction was removed, in the present case the order for sale was made after the removal. A decision of a Bench of this Court, directly in point, is found in Kasi Viswanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti3. There, a decree of a Burma Court was transmitted for execution to the District Court of Ramnad which sent it to the Subordinate Court of Ramnad for that purpose. In the judgment it was presumed that, when the decree was sent to the Subordinate Court, Ramnad, that Court had territorial jurisdiction over the property against which execution by way of sale was sought. The property was transferred to the territory of the Sivaganga Court and thereafter the Ramnad Court ordered sale of it in execution and it was sold. It was held that the sale was invalid because, on the date when it took place, the Ramnad Court had ceased to have territorial jurisdiction over the property. At page 752 of the judgment of the Court it was observed that “if the lower Court was at any time competent to execute the decree in virtue of any transfer to it prior to 15th April, 1943” (when the property was transferred to the territory of the Sivaganga Court), “it forfeited its competence to keep the suit property under attachment or to sell it from that date.” That decision was given some 30 years ago, no authority has been forthcoming in which its correctness has been challenged, it certainly has not been overruled. It was referred to in Veerappa Chetti v. Ramaswami Chetti1, which held that a Court to which a decree is sent for execution has no jurisdiction to order either attachment or sale of immoveable property in execution, if, at the time of the order, the Court had no territorial jurisdiction over the property. Khirod Chandra Ghosh v. Panchu Gopala Sadhu Khan2, followed Veerappa Chetti’s case and held that a sale by an executing Court of a property which is outside its territorial jurisdiction is a nullity. I can find no reason to disagree with the last three authorities cited which, in my opinion, correctly lay down the principle of. law decided by them. Khirod Chandra Ghosh v. Panchu Gopala Sadhu Khan2, followed Veerappa Chetti’s case and held that a sale by an executing Court of a property which is outside its territorial jurisdiction is a nullity. I can find no reason to disagree with the last three authorities cited which, in my opinion, correctly lay down the principle of. law decided by them. The position of a suit is different from that of an execution petition regarding property which is the subject matter of the respective proceedings pending at the time of removal from the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. A suit is not governed by and subject to sections 39 and 42 of the Code which require the Court passing a decree or the Court to which it is transmitted for execution, as the case may be, to have property within its territory so as to confer jurisdiction to order execution against the property. A Court cannot make a valid order for sale in execution unless, at the time the order is made, the property is within its territory. Any sale effected pursuant to an order made without jurisdiction is not in conformity with the requirements of the Code and is invalid. It follows, that the sale by the Bapatla Court to the appellants was one which took place without lawful authority; it is a nullity and does not prevent the respondents executing their decree against the property. Since the sale to the appellants was made by a Court not having jurisdiction in that behalf and the sale was a nullity the second question does not require to be answered for the purpose of disposing of this appeal. But it is convenient, shortly, to express an opinion with regard to it. It was argued that objection to the jurisdiction of the Bapatla Court should have been taken by the judgment debtor in the execution proceedings and, since this was not done, the respondents who seek to execute another decree against the property, cannot now take the objection and, by some doctrine of espoppel or waiver, they are prevented from asserting the Bapatla Court’s want of jurisdiction. By this argument it is sought to apply the principle in section 21 of the Code, upon which I have previously made some observations. By this argument it is sought to apply the principle in section 21 of the Code, upon which I have previously made some observations. Firstly, the respondents were not parties to the execution proceedings and they are not bound by the act or failure of any party thereto. Secondly, the appellants, also, were not parties. The claims by the appellants and the respondents are not adverse to the judgment-debtor, they are adverse to each other, each claiming in right of the judgment-debtor. When a Court has no jurisdiction, no agreement or act of a party can confer jurisdiction which it does not possess. In Ramabhadra Raja Bahadur v. Maharajah of Jeypore3, it was pointed out by the Judicial Committee at page 820 of the report that section 21 does not cover an objection going to the nullity of an order on the ground of want of jurisdiction. In Veerappa Chettiar’s case1after referring to this decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council, Seshagiri Aiyar, J., observed at page 140 of the report, in that case, that section 21 did not bind in terms persons like execution creditors. With regard to property which has been sold in execution pursuant to an order made by a Court after its territorial jurisdiction over the property had been removed Fazl Ali, J., as he then was, observed at page 675 of the report in Khirod Chandra Ghosh’s case1 that, “It may be that the judgment debtor himself may have made it impossible for himself owing to his conduct to assert that such a person has no title to the property but the fact remains that the property continues to be the property of the judgment-debtor.” Elsewhere at page 675 he says, “If a Court which has no jurisdiction to sell a property, sells it, it is clear that the purchaser acquires no title to it.” In Richards v. Johnston2 , Pollock, C.B., said: “A sheriff who comes to seize the goods of a debtor, armed with a writ of execution in favour of a creditor, is not bound by estoppel which might have prevented the debtor himself from claiming the goods,” and Martin, B., observed: “No authority has been cited to show that a judgment creditor is party or privy to the acts of the judgment debtor. The fi fa. directs the sheriff to seize the goods of the debtor. The fi fa. directs the sheriff to seize the goods of the debtor. The sheriff is a stranger to the debtor and the only question for him is-Are these goods the goods of the debtor or not? Therefore on this rule we must say that the sheriff and the executing creditor are not board by the estoppel which would affect the execution debtor.” This decision was cited with approval by Lord Esher M.R., at page 457 in Richards v. Jenkins3 . Reference to those two decisions of the Courts in England was made with approval in Veerappa Chetti’s case4 in which it was held that, although a judgment-debtor who does not object to a confirmation of a sale by a Court making an order for sale when it had no jurisdiction, may be estopped from raising the question that the sale was a nullity, such estoppel does not operate against a subsequent purchaser of the same property in a sale by a Court of competent jurisdiction in execution of another decree against the same judgment-debtor. In the present case, whatever would be the position of the judgment debtor regarding the sale of the property by the Bapatla Court if he sought to have the sale set aside or made any claim to the property, upon which I express no opinion, the sale being a nullity and without jurisdiction, the judgment-debtor, in so far as the respondents are concerned, remained the owner of the property and the appellants did not obtain a title to it in the sale by the Court having no jurisdiction to sell. The respondents are not prevented from asserting the absence of jurisdiction in the Bapatla Court to make an order for sale and to sell the property. For the reasons given, in my view, the appeal should be dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fees Rs. 200. Lakshmana Rao, J.-I agree. Rajamannar, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.