JUDGMENT Mukherjea, J. - To appreciate the points in controversy in this appeal it would be necessary to narrate certain earlier facts. The shine of deity Sree Sree Tarakeswar Jew is one of the most famous places of Hindu Pilgrimage in Bengal, which attracts innumerable devotees from far and near, all round the year. Besides the offerings that are given by the pilgrims, there are considerable landed properties attached to the endowment which yield a splendid income every year. On 15th September, 1922, seven persons as Plaintiffs, instituted a suit, in the Court of the District Judge, Hooghly, with the permission of the Collector, under sec. 92, Civil Procedure Code, for removal of the then Mohant of the endowment known as Satish Chandra Giri, on various grounds of misconduct, misappropriation and waste, and for framing a scheme for the management of the Tarakeswar Math and its endowed properties. The suit which was registered as Trial Suit No. 28/22 was vigorously contested by the Defendant Mohant, and it appears that some time in 1924 certain negotiations were set on foot for compromise of the suit between the Mohant and some of the Plaintiffs. This action on the part of the Mohant which was construed to be an attempt to stifle the suit alarmed a section of the Hindu community and the Bangiya Brahman Sava which is a corporate body functioning in the interest of the orthodox Hindu public decided at a meeting of its executive committee, that at least three members of the Sabha should join the suit as added Plaintiffs, and see to the suit being prosecuted properly. In accordance with this resolution the present Appellant Pandit Sarat Chandra Sankhya Vedantatirtha and two other persons named Bejoy Krishna Mukherjee and Monomohan Bhattacharjee all of whom were members of the said Brahman Sabha applied for being added as Plaintiffs to the suit: their application was granted on 23rd August, 1924, and they were described as added Plaintiffs Nos. 8-10 in the plaint. On September 2, 1924, a petition of compromise was actually filed in Court by the Defendant Mohant along with six out of the seven original Plaintiffs. The added Plaintiffs vehemently opposed the recording of this compromise and eventually on 28th March, 1925, the petition of compromise was rejected. 8-10 in the plaint. On September 2, 1924, a petition of compromise was actually filed in Court by the Defendant Mohant along with six out of the seven original Plaintiffs. The added Plaintiffs vehemently opposed the recording of this compromise and eventually on 28th March, 1925, the petition of compromise was rejected. Thereafter the suit was carried on primarily by the added Plaintiffs and the expenses of litigation were met partly by public subscription but mainly by advances made by the Brahman Sabha, who appointed a committee of its own known as Tarakeswar Suit Committee which was placed in charge of this suit. Mono Mohan Bhattacharjya was the first Secretary to this suit committee, and on his death, the present Appellant Sarat Chandra became the Secretary. It is said by the Appellant that a sum of Rs. 67,000 in all was advanced by the Brahman Sabha and spent for purposes of this litigation. The suit was decreed by the District Judge of Hooghly by his judgment dated 6th November, 1929. The Defendant Satish Chandra Giri was removed from his office as Mohant and all the properties in suit were declared to be the properties of the endowment. The decree further directed the framing of a scheme for management of the debuttar. Against this decree an appeal was preferred by the Defendant to this Court, and that appeal was dismissed on 6th July, 1934. A further appeal to the Privy Council was also dismissed on 17th November, 1939. On 18th November, 1942, the Appellant Sarat Chandra, who as said above was one of the added Plaintiffs in the suit, presented an application before the District Judge of Hooghly for a direction on the Respondent, who is the present Mohant of the Tarakeswar endowment that the sum of Rs. 67,000 which was advanced by the Bangiya Brahman Sabha to carry on the litigation, might be paid out of the fund of the endowment to the Brahman Sabha, either directly or through the applicant himself This application was rejected by the District Judge by his order dated 4th February, 1944, and against this order the present appeal has been filed. The District Judge did not take any evidence in the case and did not come to any finding as to what sum, if any, was advanced by the Brahman Sabha for the purpose of carrying on the litigation. The District Judge did not take any evidence in the case and did not come to any finding as to what sum, if any, was advanced by the Brahman Sabha for the purpose of carrying on the litigation. He held, firstly, that the applicant Sarat Chandra had no locus standi to maintain the application, and that even if he was competent to make the application, it was not entertainable at this stage. 2. Mr. Bankim Chandra Mukherji appearing on behalf of the Appellant has assailed the propriety of the decision of the District Judge on both these points. 3. So far as the first point is concerned, it seems to us that the decision of the learned District Judge is correct at least to this extent that the Appellant even though he was a Plaintiff in the suit could not make this application for recovery of costs incurred in the suit, in his own personal capacity. As has been said already he came into the suit as an added Plaintiff in his capacity as a representative of the Bangiya Brahman Sabha. It was the Brahman Sabha who appointed a committee consisting of some of its members to look after the Tarakeswar suit and the Appellant became the Secretary of this Suit Committee after the death of Monmohan. Whatever money was spent by the Appellant out of the funds of the Brahman Sabha in connection with the litigation, was spent by him in his capacity as a representative of the Sabha and the appointed Secretary of its Suit Committee. It is not correct to say, therefore, as seems to have been done in some of the paragraphs of the Appellant's petition that the Brahman Sabha advanced the money by way of loan to the Appellant, and as the Sabha demanded back the money, the Appellant was obliged to make this application. The money was the money of the Brahman Sabha, and it was spent through its own representative or officer as the Appellant undoubtedly was; and it is the Brahman Sabha alone who can pray for recovery of the money, if it is entitled to do so under the law. It seems to us, however, that the application though it was made in the name of the Appellant was in substance an application on behalf of the Sabha. It seems to us, however, that the application though it was made in the name of the Appellant was in substance an application on behalf of the Sabha. The story of loan as stated in the petition is obviously an error based on a misconception of the true position but the prayer in the petition definitely is that the money be paid to the Brahman Sabha, either directly or through the Appellant. 4. Before us, a formal petition was put in on behalf of the Brahman Sabha praying to be added a party to this proceeding. In our opinion the form of the petition though defective is capable of being rectified, and we can make an order in favour of the Brahman Sabha, if on the merits of the case we are of opinion that this application would be maintainable in law if it was made by the Sabha or the Appellant on their behalf. 5. This takes us to the second point raised in the case. So far as this point is concerned, it is not and cannot be disputed that the Tarakeswar endowment is a public trust of a religious nature and that the Brahman Sabha came in as added Plaintiffs in the suit under sec. 92, C.P. Code, for the purpose of protecting the endowment and removing the then Mohant against whom, there were gross allegations of misconduct and waste. The Sabha did it entirely in the interests of the Hindu community and as the result of the litigation showed, their efforts were of immense benefit to this religious institution. It is a settled rule of English law that the relators in a charity information, when there is nothing to impeach the propriety of the suit, is upon obtaining a decree for the charity entitled to have all his costs as between attorney and client paid out of the charity estate (Vide Tudor on Charities, pp. 378-79, 5th Edition). The Plaintiffs in the present case, when they obtained the decree, were not only entitled to have the usual fixed costs between party and party but they could claim all the litigation expenses incurred by them in the litigation, as between solicitor and client out of the Trust Estate. Mr. 378-79, 5th Edition). The Plaintiffs in the present case, when they obtained the decree, were not only entitled to have the usual fixed costs between party and party but they could claim all the litigation expenses incurred by them in the litigation, as between solicitor and client out of the Trust Estate. Mr. Mukherjee has drawn our attention to prayer (12) of the plaint, filed in the suit and his case is that in fact there was claim for such costs in the suit itself. Prayer (12) as it occurs in the plaint is in these words:-- That the Trust estate be responsible for the costs for maintenance and conduct of this suit and that the necessary amount be directed to be paid from time to time from the Trust Estate by the Defendant. 6. On the face of it this prayer seems to have been moulded on the terms of sec. 10 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act (Act XIV of 1920) which provides as follows :-- (1) In any suit instituted under sec. 14 of the Religious Endowment Act, XX of 1863, or under sec. 92 of the CPC 1908, the Court trying such suit, may, if, on application of the Plaintiff, and after hearing the Defendant and making such enquiry as it thinks fit, it is satisfied that such an order is necessary in the public interest, direct the Defendant either to furnish security for any expenditure incurred, or likely to be incurred by the Plaintiff in instituting and maintaining such suit, or to deposit from any money in his hands as trustee of the trust to which the suit relates such sum as such cost considers sufficient to meet such expenditure in whole or in part. (2) When any money has been deposited in accordance with an order under sub-sec. (1) the Court may make over to the Plaintiff the whole or any part of such sum for the conduct of the suit. Before making over any sum to the Plaintiff, the Court shall take security from the Plaintiff fox the refund of the same in the event of such refund being subsequently ordered by the Court. 7. This is a provision which the Plaintiff in a suit relating to public trust may avail of during the pendency of the suit. Before making over any sum to the Plaintiff, the Court shall take security from the Plaintiff fox the refund of the same in the event of such refund being subsequently ordered by the Court. 7. This is a provision which the Plaintiff in a suit relating to public trust may avail of during the pendency of the suit. The Court if it is prima facie satisfied as to the bond fides of the Plaintiff's suit may help him with money from the Trust Estate for the purpose of carrying on the litigation, which was started entirely for the benefit of the public. Sec. 10 of Act XIV of 1920, has, however, no application after the suit has ended. If the suit was carried on by the Plaintiff somehow or other, and is brought to an end, the proper order to be made at that time is not under sec. 10 of Act XIV of 1920, but an order for costs to be embodied in the final decree, by which the successful Plaintiff may be allowed, not merely the costs as between party and party but as between solicitor and client. It appears from the records of the case, that the Plaintiffs did make applications for time under sec. 10 of Act XIV of 1920 for giving them money out of the Trust Estate for maintaining the suit, but it does not appear that they ever claimed costs as between attorney and client at the final stage of the suit or the appeal. Shortly after the suit was filed we find the original Plaintiffs making an application for an order upon the Defendant to deposit Rs. 2,000 in Court. The order sheet shows that the Court refused to make any order at that stage. We have another order in the order sheet dated 13th January, 1932 by which the District Judge directed the Receiver in possession of the debuttar Estate to pay out of the debuttar funds, the expenses that were being incurred by the Plaintiffs for carrying on proceedings before the Account Commissioner in pursuance of the decree for accounts. 8. These were quite proper orders, and it depended entirely upon the Court to decide what orders it would make in the interest of justice under sec. 10 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act. 9. But now that the suit has ended, sec. 8. These were quite proper orders, and it depended entirely upon the Court to decide what orders it would make in the interest of justice under sec. 10 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act. 9. But now that the suit has ended, sec. 10 of the Religious Trust Act has no further application and we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that we can treat the present application to he one under sec. 10 of the Religious Trust Act, or at any rate based on analogous grounds. No analogy can be invoked to extend the express provisions of an Act to cases not covered by it, and in our opinion no ground for analogical extension exists in the present case. 10. The object of sec. 10 of the Religious Trust Act is to help the Plaintiff who has no personal interest in the litigation to carry it on in the interest of the public. But for such help the interest of the public might suffer, as the relators might not have funds enough to prosecute the suit till the end. 11. But once the suit has ended, this question does not at all arise, and the Court has ample jurisdiction to allow costs to the Plaintiff on such scale as it thinks proper. 12. Mr. Mukherjee argues in the alternative that the decree made by the District Judge did allow to his client all costs as between attorney and client and the present application may be treated as one to determine the amount of such costs. We are not at all impressed by the contention, The relevant portion of the trial Court's decree reads as follows:-- That it is further ordered that the Plaintiffs do get full costs of the suit with interest at 6 per cent per annum and that the costs of the suit wall be realised from the rent and profits of the trust estate. 13. Mr. Mukherjee contends that the expression "full costs" means not merely costs as between party and party which are fixed according to a scale but all other costs legitimately incurred. The contention is negatived by the paragraph which follows, end which assesses the total costs of the suit as Rs. 2,986-15-9. 13. Mr. Mukherjee contends that the expression "full costs" means not merely costs as between party and party which are fixed according to a scale but all other costs legitimately incurred. The contention is negatived by the paragraph which follows, end which assesses the total costs of the suit as Rs. 2,986-15-9. The calculations by which this figure is arrived at are shown immediately after this paragraph and they are the ordinary costs which are allowed according to High Court rules to a successful party. 14. Mr. Mukherjee further suggests that only the usual costs which are allowed between party and party were assessed by the Court and scheduled in the decree, but with regard to other costs the Court merely gave the Plaintiffs a declaration by saying that they were entitled to full costs and the exact amount might have to be ascertained on proper enquiry later on. This is an extreme contention, which we find ourselves totally unable to accept. If Mr. Mukherjee's argument is correct, we have held that there was a preliminary decree for costs, the amount of which would have to be determined in a subsequent proceeding and then made final. The suggestion is novel but as we have said already, neither the prayer in the plaint, nor the language of the decree gives the least countenance to such a suggestion. As matters stand we cannot treat this as an application under sec. 10 of the Religious Trust Act, nor one for determination of costs already declared by a decree which is non-existent. The application, therefore, has been rightly dismissed by the District Judge. Mr. Chakravarty appearing for the Respondent has taken a further point that the appeal itself is incompetent. Obviously it would be incompetent if the application be taken to be one under sec. 10 of the Religious Trust Act. The order also does not operate as a decree, so as to be appealable under sec. 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. As we have dismissed the appeal on its merits it is hardly necessary to pursue this matter any further. If our decision was in favour of the Appellant we might have invoked our powers of revision under sec. 115, C.P.C. 15. The result is that the appeal is dismissed. We direct that each party would bear his own cost. As we have dismissed the appeal on its merits it is hardly necessary to pursue this matter any further. If our decision was in favour of the Appellant we might have invoked our powers of revision under sec. 115, C.P.C. 15. The result is that the appeal is dismissed. We direct that each party would bear his own cost. The Respondent No. 1 will have his costs out of the debuttar Estate. No order is necessary on the applications. Ahmad, J. I agree.