JUDGMENT Bind Basni Prasad, J. - This is an appeal arising out of an arbitration proceeding Bithal Das Khanna, the plaintiff, and Shri Nath Das Khanna, defendant 1, are brothers. On 12th June 1945, they executed an arbitration agreement. As the decision of this appeal will depends greatly upon the interpretation of this agreement, it is necessary that its terms may be set forth in detail. It appears that in 1936 there was a partition suit between other members of the family on the one side and these two brothers on the other, and according to a decree passed therein certain houses and zamindary property were allotted to these two brothers jointly. In 1945, these two brothers desired to divide these properties as between themselves. With this object they executed a deed of agreement and appointed Maqsudan Das, defendant 2, as the sole arbitrator. He was empowered to make inquiries publicly or confidentially to decide the dispute with or without taking evidence as he pleased and to divide the houses and the zamindari half and half between the two brothers. If the arbitrator found that there would be a delay in making the partition of the houses he was authorised to divide the zamindari first. It was provided in the agreement that the parties would have no objection if there were two separate awards, one for the division of houses and the other for the zamindari. The zamindari was situated in several villages. A request was made to the arbitrator in the agreement that he should so divide the villages that except in the village of Sarai Lakhan both the brothers should not have their shares in the same village. In other words, the allotment was to be made in such a manner that each was to have the complete zamindari of the family in one or more villages. In village Sarai Lakhan, however, the arbitrator was to divide the land half and half between the parties plot wise. 2. In pursuance of this agreement the arbitrator gave the award on 22nd November 1910, and it was registered the same day. By the award only the zamindari was divided. In village Sarai Lakhan, however, the arbitrator was to divide the land half and half between the parties plot wise. 2. In pursuance of this agreement the arbitrator gave the award on 22nd November 1910, and it was registered the same day. By the award only the zamindari was divided. According to it, lot B mentioned in it was given to the plaintiff and lot A to defendant 1, with the proviso that if defendant 1 so desired he could within a week of the award take lot B by notifying his intention to the arbitrator. It was further provided that after the expiry of one week the award would become final and then no party would have any concern with the village allotted to the other. As regards Sarai Lakhan, the arbitrator by his award allotted to each party equal areas and called upon them to file before him within a week two lots allotting to each party specific plots, otherwise he himself would allot the plots. 3. On 12th December 1945, the plaintiff applied to the Civil Judge at Azamgarh that the arbitrator be required to file the arbitration agreement and the award and a decree be passed in his favour as against defendant 1, in terms of the award. 4. Defendant 1 took a number of pleas. He denied that there was any agreement in fact and alleged collusion between the plaintiff and the arbitrator and misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. He questioned also the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the case. 5. The learned Civil Judge took up the preliminary point of jurisdiction and held that a decree in terms of the award could be passed in the present case only by the revenue Court. In this view of the case, he passed the following order: Let the plaint be returned for presentation to the proper Court. Defendant 1 will get his costs incurred in this Court from the plaintiff. As against this order the plaintiff comes up in appeal. 6. The reasoning adopted by the learned Civil Judge is that the arbitration agreement in the present case really consists of two separate agreements, one in respect of the zamindari and the other in respect of the houses. The award is in respect of the zamindari only. As against this order the plaintiff comes up in appeal. 6. The reasoning adopted by the learned Civil Judge is that the arbitration agreement in the present case really consists of two separate agreements, one in respect of the zamindari and the other in respect of the houses. The award is in respect of the zamindari only. He goes on to say that "If the houses had also been the subject-matter of the award, it would have been different." He was of opinion that as the award is in respect of the zamindari only, so having regard to the provisions of S. 31, Arbitration Act, 1940, the case is not cognizable by the civil Court and it is the revenue Court only which can pass the suitable order on it. There is an inconsistency' in the line of reasoning of the lower Court. At one place it appreciates that the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference to arbitration and not the subject-matter of the award but at another place it holds that its jurisdiction was barred because the award dealt only with the zamindari. It may be said at once that having regard to the definition of the word "Court" as defined in cl. (c) of S. 2 and the terms of S. 31, Arbitration Act, 1940, the jurisdiction of a Court for passing a decree in terms of the award now depends upon the questions which form the subject-matter of reference to the arbitration, and not on the terms of the award. 7. For the determination of the question whether or not the learned Civil Judge had the jurisdiction to deal with this award it is necessary to carefully examine the scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The first significant point to note is that it is an "Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to arbitration." This will be apparent from the preamble and also from the provisions of Ss. 46, 47 and 49 of the Act which provide as follows: 46. The provisions of this Act, except sub-s. (1) of S. 6 and Ss. The first significant point to note is that it is an "Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to arbitration." This will be apparent from the preamble and also from the provisions of Ss. 46, 47 and 49 of the Act which provide as follows: 46. The provisions of this Act, except sub-s. (1) of S. 6 and Ss. 7,12,36 and 37, shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as this Act is inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder. 47. Subject to the provisions of S. 46, and save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder : Provided that an arbitration award otherwise obtained may with the consent of all the parties interested be taken into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit by any Court before which the suit is pending. 49. (1) The enactments specified in the Third Schedule are hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the fourth column thereof. (2) The enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule are hereby amended to the extent and in the manner mentioned in the fourth column thereof. 8. There are a large number of Acts in which there are provisions relating to arbitration, e.g., Ss. 260 to 265, Cantonments Act, 1924, S. 152, Companies Act, 1913, S. 52, Electricity Act, 1910, Ss. 11, 13, 18 and 26, Land Acquisition Act, 1894, S. 52 (h), Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, Ss. 46, 46 A and 46-B and 48, Railways Act, 1890, S. 43 (c), Trusts Act, 1882 and Ss. 113, 180 and 203 to 209, U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. The provisions of these Acts and similar provisions in other Acts were intended to be affected by S. 46, Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 47 is also somewhat to the same effect. Section 49 provides for the repeals and the amendments. 9. 113, 180 and 203 to 209, U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. The provisions of these Acts and similar provisions in other Acts were intended to be affected by S. 46, Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 47 is also somewhat to the same effect. Section 49 provides for the repeals and the amendments. 9. It is clear from the above that with certain saving provisions as regards matters relating to arbitration in other enactments the Arbitration Act, 1940, contains the whole of the law on the question of arbitration and is exhaustive on the subject. 10. The second point to be noted is that the Act deals with three kinds of arbitration: (1) Arbitration without the intervention of a Court (chapter II); (2) Arbitration with the intervention of a Court, where there is no suit pending (chapter III); (3) Arbitration in pending suits (chapter IV). It will be seen that in the present case the arbitration was without the intervention of a Court. 11-14. The third point to be noted is the definition of the word "Court" in cl. (c) of S. 2 of the Act which provides as follows : 'Court' means a civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same bad been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under S. 21, include a Small Cause Court. 15. The learned Civil Judge has held that as the revenue Courts also deal with matters of civil nature they must be held to be civil Courts as contemplated in the above definition. He has relied upon two unpublished decisions of the Board of Revenue. 16. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to examine the provisions relating to arbitration in the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, and the rules made thereunder. Firstly, there is the provision in S. 113 of that Act which provides that when it has been decided to make a partition, the Collector may allow the parties to make the partition themselves, or appoint arbitrators for the purpose. Then there is 8. 130 which provides that in all cases, whether partition has been made by arbitrators or otherwise the revenue of the mahal shall be distributed by the Collector over the several portions into which the mahal has been divided. Then there is 8. 130 which provides that in all cases, whether partition has been made by arbitrators or otherwise the revenue of the mahal shall be distributed by the Collector over the several portions into which the mahal has been divided. Section 203 authorises the revenue Courts of various grades to refer any dispute pending before them to arbitration with the consent of the parties. Section 204 applies the provisions of Ss. 507 to 521 of the old CPC to arbitrations under the Land Revenue Act in so far as they are not inconsistent with anything in that Act. Section 205 provides for the setting aside of the award and S. 206 lays down that if there is no reason to remit the award or to set it aside the dispute shall be decided in accordance with the award. 17. Para. 26 of the Partition Manual provides that the partition officer shall, after deciding objections, if any, inquire from the parties whether they wish to make the partition them selves or to appoint arbitrators for the purpose or whether they wish it to be made by the Court. Sub-para (3) of para. 26 provides that where the matter is referred to arbitration the partition proceeding drawn up by the partition officer will not be binding on the arbitrators. Paragraph 28 (1) provides the principles to be observed by the arbitrators in making the partition. Sub-paragraph (3) of para. 28 applies all the provisions of sch. 2, Civil P.C., (now repealed) to the arbitration proceedings. According to S. 8, General Clauses Act, 1897, the reference to the repealed sch. 2, Civil P.C., shall be construed as reference to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 18. The important point to note is that nowhere in the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, or in the Partition Manual is there any provision for arbitration without the intervention of a Court or arbitration with the intervention of a Court where there is no pending proceeding. The provisions, such as they are in the Land Revenue Act, 1901, as regards arbitration relate only to references in cases pending before the revenue Courts. That being the position, how can the revenue Court entertain in a case like the one before us the plaintiff's application for the passing of a decree in terms of the award. 19. The provisions, such as they are in the Land Revenue Act, 1901, as regards arbitration relate only to references in cases pending before the revenue Courts. That being the position, how can the revenue Court entertain in a case like the one before us the plaintiff's application for the passing of a decree in terms of the award. 19. This brings us to the consideration of the question whether in the expression "civil Court" the revenue Courts are also included or not. I have no hesitation to say that the term "civil Court" does not include revenue Court. The Arbitration Act, 1940, itself does not provide that the revenue Courts are also included in the expression "civil Court". When a term is not defined in an Act, it must be given its plain natural meaning. Every one knows that the term "civil Court" has a definite meaning in contradistinction with the term "revenue Court." The various Courts Acts, e.g., Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Acts, 1887, deal with the civil Courts as they are understood in the ordinary sense, viz., the Munsifs, the Civil Judge and the District Judges. In the CPC 1908, the term "revenue Court" has been defined in sub-s. (2) of S. 5. It means a Court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or other proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes, but does not include a civil Court having original jurisdiction under this Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature." It is true that the revenue Courts also decide suits of a civil nature, but when they have been given a separate name as opposed to civil Courts they cannot be regarded as civil Courts, In S. 111 (1) (b), U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, the words "civil Court" have been used with a definite meaning in contradistinction with revenue Courts. Similarly in Ss. 287 and 288, U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, the expression "civil' Court" has been used as distinct from the revenue Court. Learned counsel for the respondents relies upon the Privy Council ruling in Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Muhherjee, 9 cal. 295 : (9 I.A. 174) in support of his contention that the expression "civil Court" includes the revenue Court also. The facts of that case are distinguishable from the present one. Learned counsel for the respondents relies upon the Privy Council ruling in Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Muhherjee, 9 cal. 295 : (9 I.A. 174) in support of his contention that the expression "civil Court" includes the revenue Court also. The facts of that case are distinguishable from the present one. There the Deputy Commissioner of Manbhum had made decrees in rent suits under the Bengal Bent Act x [10] of 1859 and transferred those decrees for execution into another district. On a consideration of the provisions of the Bengal Rent Act x [10] of 1859 and the CPC then in force and also the provisions of the earlier Code, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee arrived at the conclusion that a rent Court is also a civil Court. The views expressed in regard to the provisions of other Acts in relation to a case of quite distinct nature cannot be applied to the present case. I have no hesitation to say that the expression "civil Court" as used in S. 2 (c), Arbitration Act, 1940, does not include the revenue Court. The position thus is that the revenue Courts cannot deal with awards made without the intervention of the Court or arbitrations with the intervention of a Court as regards matters not before them in any pending case. By virtue of the saving provisions contained in as. 46 and 47, Arbitration Act, 1940, they can, however, deal with awards made through their intervention in cases pending before them. There are provisions in the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, which indicate that where an award has been made without the intervention of the Court, revenue Courts will act upon it although they may not go through the procedure of passing a decree in terms of it. 20. Thus, sub-s. (1) of S. 34 provides that every person obtaining possession by succession or transfer, of any proprietary or other right in a mahal, or part of a mahal, or the profits thereof, or in any specific area therein, which is required to be recorded in the registers prescribed by cls. (a) to (d) of S. 32, shall report such succession or transfer to the Tahsildar of the tahsil in which the mahal or any part thereof is situated. (a) to (d) of S. 32, shall report such succession or transfer to the Tahsildar of the tahsil in which the mahal or any part thereof is situated. The Explanation to this section provides that the word 'transfer' includes a family settlement by which the proprietary share or part of the proprietary share recorded in the register of proprietors in the name of one or more members of that family is declared to belong to another or other members. An award like the one before us is nothing but a family settlement. A family settlement in strict legal phraseology is a settlement between the several members of a family of their dispute, each one relinquishing all claims in respect of property in dispute other than that falling to his share and recognizing the rights of the others to the portions allotted to them respectively. Section 40, Land Revenue Act, provides that all disputes regarding entries in the annual registers shall be decided on the basis of possession. Any person aggrieved from the order passed by the revenue Court under S. 40 has his remedies open to him in the civil Court. 21. This brings us to the question whether or not the learned Civil Judge had jurisdiction to pass a decree in terms of the award. The decision of this question rests upon the provisions of S. 31, Arbitration Act, 1940, which provides as follows: 31. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act an award may be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or parsons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court. (3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may be, filed, and to no other Court. (3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may be, filed, and to no other Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. 22. The definition of the word "Court" has already been given above and it has been held that it does not include the revenue Court. It will be seen that the jurisdiction is to be determined with reference to "the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of the suit." It is wrong to determine the jurisdiction with reference to the terms of the award. Jurisdiction is of three kinds (1) territorial, (2) pecuniary and (3) the nature of the subject-matter. It is not disputed that the learned Civil Judge of Azamgarh had the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction in the ease. The only question is whether having regard to the subject-matter of the questions which were referred to the arbitration, he was competent to deal with the case or not. The reference was for the division of houses and zamindari. Clearly the Civil Judge had the jurisdiction to divide the houses. It is urged, however, that in view of S. 233 (k), U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, he had no jurisdiction for the partition of the zamindari. The expression or the phrase "partition or union of mahals" in S. 233 (k) has been the subject of interpretation by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1938 210 (Privy Council) It was held in that case that the expression refers to processes regulated by chap, VII of the Act and the result thereof which is given statutory effect. In the present case there was no partition between these two brothers under chap. VII, U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, and so there was no question of the arbitration reference seeking to modify any distribution which by partition had been effected under the Act. In the present case there was no partition between these two brothers under chap. VII, U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, and so there was no question of the arbitration reference seeking to modify any distribution which by partition had been effected under the Act. I am unable to agree with the lower Court that the arbitration agreement in the present case should be taken as two distinct agreements, one relating to the houses and the other to the zamindary property. The whole immovable property of the joint family was brought into the hotchpot and the arbitrator was appointed to divide it. Even if it be assumed that the learned Civil Judge had no jurisdiction as regards the partition of the zamindari property by virtue of S. 233 (k), U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, it cannot be denied that he had jurisdiction as regards the houses. In Sukhdeo and Another Vs. Basdeo and Others, AIR 1935 All 594 it was held that a suit that is based on a cause of action with respect to which adequate relief can only be granted by the civil Court is cognizable by that Court notwithstanding the fact that one of the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff is for the declaration of his right to a tenancy holding. In the present case the learned Civil Judge had the jurisdiction to divide the houses by metes and bounds. As regards the zamindari property, he had certainly the jurisdiction to declare the title of the parties. Excepting the case of Sarai Lakhan, there was no question of the partition of any mahal. In the present case by the award in terms of which the decree is prayed for Sarai Lakhan has not been divided between the parties plotwise. My conclusions, therefore, are as follows: 23. The Arbitration Act, 1940, is an exhaustive Act on the subject except as provided there in by Ss. 46 and 47, inasmuch as the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, makes no provisions for the filing of the award made without the intervention of the Court or with its intervention but not in a pending suit, the award before us cannot be filed in the revenue Court and the order of the lower Court directing the plaint to be returned for proper presentation was erroneous. The term "civil Court" occurring in S. 2 (c), Arbitration Act, 1940, does not include revenue Courts and the revenue Courts can deal only with the references for arbitrations made through their intervention in pending cases. By sub-ss. (2) and (3) of S. 31, Arbitration Act, 1940, learned Civil Judge had the exclusive jurisdiction in the case. The award like the one before us is a family settlement and when a decree has been passed in its terms, it can be given effect to by the revenue Court under Ss. 34 and 40, U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. As part of the subject matter of the reference, viz., the division of houses, was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court and as regards the reference about the division of zamindari, the arbitrator was only required to make the partition, except Sarai Lakhan, villagewise between the parties, the learned Civil Judge was competent to entertain the case. Section 233 (k), Land Revenue Act, is no bar to the proceedings which have given rise to this appeal. 24. For the reasons given above the appeal-should, in my opinion, be allowed with costs, the order of the lower Court should be set aside and the case should be remanded to the learned Civil Judge to proceed with it according to the law. Malik J. 25. I agree and have nothing to add. 26. Order of the Court. -- The appeal is allowed with costs. The order of the lower Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower Court to proceed according to law.