Mozelle Morris v. Aarone Shalome Morris — 1948 DIGILAW 107 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Clough, J. - The Plaintiff Mozelle Morris and the Defendant Aarone Shalome Morris are members of the Jewish Community. Both of them profess the Jewish faith, they are domiciled in the Dominion of India, and they reside within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. On 24th February, 1935, the Plaintiff was married to the Defendant in accordance with Jewish rites at the Maghan David Synagogue at 109, Canning Street, Calcutta. Thereafter the parties lived together at various addresses in Calcutta. In November, 1947, the Plaintiff left the Premises No. 2, Hartford Lane, Calcutta, where the parties were residing, and she has not lived with the Defendant since the date. Three children were born of the marriage, they are aged 12, 11 and 8 years respectively. Another child was born to the Plaintiff in 1934, that is to say, before the marriage of the parties--it is alleged in the plaint that the Defendant acknowledged the paternity of this child. On 18th December, 1947, the Plaintiff filed this suit in the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court alleging numerous acts of ill-treatment and insult by the Defendant resulting in the Plaintiff leaving him : the plaint contains also allegations of the Defendant's adultery. Several reliefs are claimed; they include a prayer as follows :-- "Dissolution of the said marriage; alternatively a decree directing the Defendant to give the Plaintiff a Bill of Get (Divorcement)." There are prayers for custody of the children, and for maintenance for the Plaintiff and the children. 2. The plaint also contains allegations that the Plaintiff has lent and advanced considerable sums to the Defendant and has endorsed and delivered to him her Defence Savings Certificates and National Savings Certificates ; the reliefs claimed include a money decree and an order for return of the Savings Certificates. 3. 2. The plaint also contains allegations that the Plaintiff has lent and advanced considerable sums to the Defendant and has endorsed and delivered to him her Defence Savings Certificates and National Savings Certificates ; the reliefs claimed include a money decree and an order for return of the Savings Certificates. 3. On 17th, January, 1948, the Defendant who had not yet filed his written statement, took out a summons for an order in effect to strike out those statements in the plaint which found the alleged cause of action for a decree for dissolution of the marriage, and to strike out the prayers for a decree for dissolution and for custody and maintenance, his contention being that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or to make a decree or order for the dissolution of the marriage of the parties; and no jurisdiction to make orders for maintenance of the Plaintiff or of the children, or for custody of the children. There was a prayer that the suit be set down for trial of an issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Court; and in the result two issues were settled and the suit was ordered to be set down for trial of those issues. They are as follows :-- 1. Has the Court in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction power to administer Jewish Personal Law in Matrimonial Matters ? 2. Has this Court in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction the right to dissolve a Jewish marriage ? 3. Benjamin v. Benjamin I. L. R. 50 Bom. 869 (1926) was a suit brought by a wife against her husband for dissolution of the marriage on the grounds, of adultery and sruelty. The parties were Jews, resident in Bombay. Amongst other defences the Defendant took the plea that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this nature between the parties professing the Jewish faith. Crump, J., held, however, that clause 12 of the Letters Patent empowered the Court to administer the Jewish Law of marriage in a matrimonial suit between Jewish parties filed on the Original Side of the Court and he gave the Plaintiff a decree for dissolution of the marriage. Holding that in granting relief the form of the decree should be that customary in cases between Christians, the decree which he gave was a decree nisi. 4. Holding that in granting relief the form of the decree should be that customary in cases between Christians, the decree which he gave was a decree nisi. 4. In Jacob v. Jacob 48 C. W. N. 513 (1943), Das, J., considered the judgment in Benjamin v. Benjamin I. L. R. 50 Bom. 869 (1926) and came to the conclusion that the decision could not be supported on the broad and general ground oh which it is based ; he held that the Bombay High Court in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction was not empowered generally to administer the personal law of marriage of any community. He expressed the view (at p. 527 report) that so far as the Calcutta High Court is concerned it has inherited the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Calcutta which, under sec. 17 of the Statute 21 Geo. III was authorised to administer the personal laws of the Mahomedans and Gentoos in certain specified matters but not the personal law of any other community; that neither the Letters Patent of 1862 or 1865 brought about a change in this respect ; and that though after the Government of India Act, 1915, the Calcutta High Court in exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction can apply all personal laws, it can do so only in certain matters, namely, those expressly referred to in sec. 112 of the Government of India Act, 1915 ; these are in matters of inheritance and succession to lands, rents and goods and in matters of contract and dealing between party and party. 5. 112 of the Government of India Act, 1915 ; these are in matters of inheritance and succession to lands, rents and goods and in matters of contract and dealing between party and party. 5. At p. 528 of the report Das, J., expressed his conclusions as follows :-- ...I have come to the conclusion that this High Court in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction has to-- (a) receive, try and determine suits of every description as provided in clause 12 of the Letters Patent of 1865, and (b) apply the same law or equity to each case which would have been applied by the Supreme Court of Calcutta namely, rules of English law and rules of Equity of the High Court of Chancery in Great Britain, subject to Indian legislative enactments ; but (c) in suits against an inhabitant of Calcutta in matters of inheritance and succession to lands rents and good and in matter of contract and dealing between party and party, apply when both parties are subject to the same personal law or custom having the force of law, that personal law or custom and when the parties are subject to different personal law or custom, the law or custom to which the defendant is subject. 6. With regard to the decisions in Benjamin v. Benjamin I. L. R. 50 Bom. 369 (1926), Das, J., expressed the view that it could not be supported except on the basis that a Jewish marriage is purely a matter of contract only, and the Jewish marriage laws are laws of contract. His reasons may be summarised as follows:--Under the Statute 37 Geo. III C. 142 S. 13 the laws to be administered by the Supreme Court at Bombay was English Law and equity as modified by Indian Acts, with a reservation in favour of the personal laws of Mahomedans and Gentoos and others in certain matters only. This provision did not authorise the Court to administer generally the personal law of marriage of any community; that under the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court the law and equity to be administered by the High Court in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction was the same at that which used to be administered by the Supreme Court of Bombay under the Statute George III cl. 142 s. 13 and the Charter establishing the Court; and finally, as I have already mentioned that the Government of India Act. 1915, though it authorised the Court to administer the personal law of all communities did so only in regard to the specific matters set out in sec. 112 of the Act, in matters of inheritance and succession to lands, rents and goods, and in matters of contract and dealing between party and party. 7. Jacob v. Jacob 48 C. W. N. 513 (1948) was not a suit for dissolution of marriage; it was filed to enforce the terms of a deed of separation executed by the parties. But in Hillel v. Willel Unreported. Decided by Lodge, J, on the 8th January, 1945 which was a suit filed by a Jewish husband for a decree of dissolution of his marriage with the Defendant Lodge, J., in an unreported judgment delivered on the 8th January, 1945, quoted with approval the conclusions arrived at by Das, J., in Jacob v. Jacob 48 C. W. N. 513 (1948) which are set out at page 528 of the report of that case as to the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction and held that in suits for dissolution of marriage the Court had no power to apply the Jewish law of marriage even where the parties are inhabitants of Calcutta, and, therefore, he had no power in the suit before him to grant a decree for dissolution of the marriage. Lodge, J., declined to follow the decisions in Benjamin v. Benjamin I. L. R. 50 Bom. 369 (1926). 8. With very great respect I agree with the observations of Das, J., in Jacob v. Jacob 48 C. W. N. 513 (1948) at pp. 516 and 527 that this Court is a creature of Statutes and Charters and that the powers and jurisdiction of this Court are defined by Statutes and Charters; and that if neither Charter nor Statute has given the Court on its Original Side authority to administer the personal law of Jews in matters matrimonial, then it is not for this Court to undertake the exercise of jurisdictions; it cannot do so. But with the greatest respect I am not able to agree with the views of Das, J., and of Lodge, J., that this Court has not in fact been vested with such authority. 9. There is substantial agreement between the parties as to what according to the Rabbinical Code is the Jewish personal law as regards divorce: or at least as to what that law is in places where the Jewish personal law is applied. Counsel for both parties have referred to a book on the Jewish law of marriage and divorce published in America by Mr. Mielziner ; and I have been supplied with a translation of passages from Eben-la-Ezir Mielziner, It appears that if the parties to a Jewish marriage agree, a husband may divorce his wife by delivering to her in the presence of two witnesses a document, a Bill of Divorcement or Get written in a certain form ; in this event no specific causes are required. If the wife does not consent the husband must present a petition to and satisfy a specified authority--referred to in Mielziner's book as "the Court" and in Eben-la-Ezir as the Beth Din--that he has certain specific grounds; in which event "the Court" grants the divorce. A wife cannot deliver a Bill of Divorcement to her husband--but if she has good cause, that is to say, certain specific grounds she may petition "the Court," and "the Court" will compel the husband to give her a Bill of Divorcement, Counsel for the parties were not agreed as to the identity of "the Court" to which the parties may resort or whether there was in fact any Court to whom parties domiciled in India may resort, Mr. Surita for the Defendant seemed to be of the opinion that if there was any authority at all which had jurisdiction it was a body in Jerusalem known as the Sanhedrim It appears, however, that the personal law of the Jews recognises that either party to a marriage has in the event of the commission of certain wrongs by the other, the right to have the marriage dissolved ; and according to their personal law either party is in theory entitled to enforce the right and to that end to obtain an order from authority, that is to say from some body which, has power to make such orders, and to enforce them. 10. 10. It seems to me quite clear that there is nothing either in the Regulating Act, 1773 (13 Geo. III Ch. 63) or in the Charter dated 26th March, 1774, which established the Supreme Court at Calcutta which gave that Court jurisdiction to administer generally the personal law of the Jews in matters of divorce. But in my view that jurisdiction was vested in the Court as a result of sec. 17 of the Act of Settlement, 1781 (21 Geo. IV Ch. 70). 11. The jurisdiction given to the Supreme Court by the Charter of 1774 was very circumscribed and limiting. By clause 13 the Court was given jurisdiction to hear and determine the actions and suits therein mentioned, that is to say, those concerning any trespass or injuries or concerning debts, duties and demands ; those concerning rights, titles or claims to real or personal property in Bengal, Behar and Orissa ; pleas real and personal or causes accruing against the Company or against the Mayor or Aldermen, or against persons described as "our subjects" that is to say, British-born subjects who shall be resident in Bengal, Behar and Orissa or who shall have resided there or who shall have any debts or estates there, or against persons in the service of either the Company or of the Mayor and Aldermen or of any other British-born subjects. As regards other persons, inhabitants of India residing in Bengal, Behar and Orissa, it was provided that the Supreme Court shall have like power to hear and determine all such causes of action and suits as aforesaid upon any contract in writing entered into by the inhabitant with any of His Majesty's subjects when the cause of action shall exceed Rs. 500 and where such inhabitant shall have agreed in such contract that in case of dispute the matter shall be determined by the Supreme Court. 12. Clause 14 of the Charter gave the Court powers to give judgment and sentence in the suits before it : they were directed to be given according to justice and right. 13. Clause 15 authorised the Court to execute its judgments and empowered it inter alia to issue writs of execution directed to the Sheriff commanding him to take and imprison the body of the party against whom the writ shall be awarded until he shall render satisfaction. 15. 13. Clause 15 authorised the Court to execute its judgments and empowered it inter alia to issue writs of execution directed to the Sheriff commanding him to take and imprison the body of the party against whom the writ shall be awarded until he shall render satisfaction. 15. Clause 17 ordained that the Court should also be a Court of Equity with power and authority to administer justice in a summary manner as nearly as may be according to the rules and proceedings of the High Court of Chancery. 16. Clause 22 provided that the Court shall be a Court of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but its exercise was confined to British-born subjects residing in Bengal, Behar and Orissa, and the law to be administered was the same as used and exercised in the Diocese of London so far as the circumstances and occasions of the said provinces and people shall admit or require. 17. It is not necessary to refer to the other provisions in the Charter. 18. Thereafter was enacted the Act of Settlement 1781, 21 Geo. III Ch. 70. One of the expressed purposes of this Act was that the inhabitants of Bengal, Behar and Orissa should be maintained and protected in the enjoyment of all their ancient laws usages, rights and privileges. It enacted inter alia that with the exception of actions for wrongs or trespasses and of those civil suits where the parties agree to submit the same to the decisions of the Court, no person shall become subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court simply by reason of his being employed by the company or by the Governor-General and Council or by native of Great Britain. 19. 19. Clause 17 of the Act was in the following terms :-- Provided always, and be it enacted, that the Supreme Court of Judicature, at Fort William in Bengal, shall have full power and authority to hear and determine, in such manner as is provided for that purpose, in the said Charter or Letters Patent, all and all manner of actions and suits against all and singular the inhabitants of the said City of Calcutta ; provided that their inheritance and succession to lands, rents and goods, and all matters of contract and dealing between party and party, shall be determined, in the case of Mahomedans, by the laws and usages of Mahomedans, and in the case of Gentoos by the laws and usages of Gentoos ; and where only one of the parties shall be a Mahomedan or Gentoo by the laws and usages of the Defendant. 20. This section expressly empowered the Supreme Court to hear and determine all and all manner of actions and suits against all and singular the inhabitants of Calcutta, The provisions that the suits are to be heard and determined in such manner as is provided in the Charter or Letters Patent means, I think, that the procedure laid down in clause 13 of the Charter shall be followed : this clause provides for the filing of a plaint, the issue of summons to the Defendant, the appearance of the Defendant and his answer, and the hearing of evidence and arguments. It means also that as in other causes the Court is empowered in respect of all suits contemplated in sec. 17 of the Act of Settlement to give judgment and sentence according to justice and right as is enjoined by clause 14 of the Charter. 21. The proviso in sec. 17 of the Act of Settlement that cases of inheritance and succession to lands, rents and goods of the inhabitants of Calcutta and all matters of contract and dealing between party and party shall be determined in the case of Mahomedans by the laws and usages of Mahomedans, and in the case of Gentoos by the laws and usages of Gentoos, and where only one of the parties shall be a Mahomedan or a Gentoo by the laws and usages of the Defendant, is a positive direction as to the law to be administered in specified matters. This proviso does not exclude the application of the personal law of parties in other matters and it would be wrong to read it so. In certain cases if there is a right of suit at all, the decision of the suit in accordance with justice and right involves the necessity of administering the personal law of the parties ; this will be so where the relief sought, for example, the dissolution of a Jewish marriage, and the grounds for that relief, are all known only to the personal laws of the parties concerned. In the absence of legislation either such a suit will not lie or it must be decided by the application of the parties' personal law. When the Supreme Court was empowered to give judgment according to justice and right, this did not mean that all personal laws were to be excluded except in the specified cases where Gentoos or Mahomedans were parties ; nor, I think, did it mean that in all other civil matters either the English Law and Equity was applicable or there was no right of suit at all. In cases of succession where parties were Gentoos or Mahomedans, or in other cases specified, it was just and right that the personal law should be applied--but it was necessary to make specific mention that it must be applied because in such cases it was possible to apply some other law, namely, the English Law. Where the relief claimed and the cause of action are peculiar to a system of law applicable to a particular community and is well-recognised by the system which the parties regard as binding on them, the authority to entertain all and all manner of actions and suits in the case where the Defendant is an inhabitant of Calcutta, and the duty to decide the suit in accordance with justice and right, resulted, I think, in a jurisdiction in the Court to entertain a suit founded on such a cause of action, and in deciding the suit to apply the personal law of the parties. So far as the Mofussil Courts established in Bengal by the Company are concerned, it was provided by secs. So far as the Mofussil Courts established in Bengal by the Company are concerned, it was provided by secs. 7 and 8 of Bengal Regulation III of 1793 that all persons not British subjects were amenable to the jurisdiction of the Zillah and City Courts and those Courts were empowered to take cognisance of all suits respecting succession or right to property, debts, contracts and other matters including marriage and generally all suits of a civil nature, provided either the land was situated within the jurisdiction of the Court or the cause of action arose or the Defendant resided within that jurisdiction. By Regulation IV of 1793 the City and Zillah Courts were required to give judgment in accordance with justice and right. As regards cases in which Hindus and Mahomedans were concerned, it was expressly provided that the Mahomedan Law and the Hindu Law was to be applied in suits regarding succession, inheritance, marriage, caste and all suits regarding religious usages and institutions. But with regard to the cases of other communities also, even though there was no express provision, their personal laws were applied and this was because of the injunction to give judgment according to justice and right. Mihirwanjee Nuoshirwanjee v. Awan Baee 2 Borr. Bom. Sud Dew. Re. 209 was a case in which the Sudder Adalat at Bombay took cognisance of a matrimonial suit between Parsees and was prepared to afford the parties relief : amongst reliefs prayed for and granted, a declaration of her rights as a wife and in effect an order for restitution of conjugal rights. That case was referred to by the Privy Council in Ardeshir Cursetjee v. Perozeboye [1856] 6 M. I. A. 348 in terms which amount to an approval of the decision. In Moonshee Benzloor Rahim v. Shumsoonissa Begum 11 M. I. A. 551 at p. 608 (1867) it has been observed that "if the law which regulates the relations of the parties gives to one of them a right and that right is denied, the denial is wrong: and unless the contrary be shown by authority or by strong arguments, it must be presumed that for that wrong there must be a remedy in a Court of Justice." Of authority negativing the jurisdiction there is none. The interpretation of the words enjoining the Court to give judgment according to justice and right as giving the Court authority and jurisdiction to apply the personal marriage law of parties in the case of matrimonial disputes is an interpretation which allows these observations to be given full effect. In that particular case it was held that a suit for restitution of conjugal rights by a Mahomedan husband to enforce his marital rights will lie in a Civil Court, the Mahomedan Law recognising that the husband has such rights. 22. If the direction to decide in accordance with justice and right was one which gave jurisdiction to the Mofussil Courts to apply the personal law of the parties, as done even in cases where the parties were neither Hindus nor Mahomedans, it seems to me that the same construction should be put on the similar words in clause 14 of the Charter. The conclusion which I have expressed does not I think run counter to any decisions which are binding on me. 23. Musleah v. Musleah (1844) 1 Fulton's Bop p. 420 was a case where the question in issue was whether succession to land situated in the Mofussil and belonging to a Jew who was an inhabitant of Calcutta at the date of his death, would be regulated by English Law or by the personal law of the Jews, and it was held by a majority of the Court of Appeal that the succession would be regulated by English Law. The decision, it seems to me, turned not on any general principle, but on the nature of the tenure on which the lands were held, and the decision itself does not exclude the possibility of applying Jewish personal law in matters where either that law must be applied or no relief at all can be granted. In Musleah v. Musleah (1844) 1 Fulton's Bop p. 420 itself Seton, J., observed in his judgment that the decision might have been different if the lands in question had been held on some customary tenure subject to the Jewish law of descent. Poel, C.J., in his judgment at p. 441 of the report expressly recognised the duty of the Court to administer law other than English law in what he described as "unexpected cases," though he of course held that the general principle of the Court is English law, with statutory exceptions. Poel, C.J., in his judgment at p. 441 of the report expressly recognised the duty of the Court to administer law other than English law in what he described as "unexpected cases," though he of course held that the general principle of the Court is English law, with statutory exceptions. 24. The case was one to which the English law of descent could be applied and inasmuch as English law was the general law of the Court, it was applied. In Mozelle Joshua v. Sophia Arakie (1911) I. L. R. 88 Cal. 708 both the Court of Appeal [Joshua v. Arakie I. L. R. 40 Cal 266 (1912)] despite objection taken that the Court had no jurisdiction to administer the Jewish personal law, did in fact allow evidence of Jewish Law relating to the marriage contract known as Ketubah to be adduced; and proceeded on the footing of the evidence. It is true, as pointed out by Das, ]., that the conclusion arrived at as to the meaning of the Ketubah was that it did not create the special rights of priority to other creditors claimed by the Plaintiff ; but the Court appeared to consider it necessary to determine what the Jewish personal law on the subject was. Nothing in the decision of Panckridge, J., on a Jewish wife's application for costs in a suit for judicial separation in Samuel v. Samuel 84 C. W. N. 319 (1929) or in the judgment In the Goods of Sarah Ezra I. L. R. 58 Cal. 761 (1930) advances the matter under consideration. 25. In Ardeshir Cursetji v. Perozeboye (1858) 6 M. I. A. 348 the Privy Council clearly indicated its view that the Supreme Court (of Bombay in that case) might on its civil side administer relief in matrimonial matters to Parsees in accordance with the remedies customarily afforded by their own usages, or at least remedies as nearly approaching to them as circumstances would allow. But the observation of the Privy Council in the matter cannot be regarded as a decision that such remedies were in fact available by resort to the civil side of the Supreme Court. 26. But the observation of the Privy Council in the matter cannot be regarded as a decision that such remedies were in fact available by resort to the civil side of the Supreme Court. 26. For the reasons which I have already given I hold, however, that what the Privy Council observed in the case might be available in the Supreme Court at Bombay in the case of matrimonial disputes between Parsees was in fact available in the Calcutta Supreme Court in a case where the parties are jews, and the Defendant is an inhabitant of Calcutta. I hold that a Jewish party is entitled to seek in the Court the relief which is allowed to him by his own customary law. Inasmuch as such jurisdiction was vested in the Supreme Court it has after 1862 been inherited by and is now vested in the High Court. It seems to me that it is on the principle that I have mentioned that the Calcutta High Court on its Original Side will try the validity of a Hindu adoption or the validity of a Hindu marriage. See Ratan Moni Debt v. Nagendra 48 C. W. N. 689 (1944), Edgley, J., pronounced a Hindu marriage a nullity. The question of jurisdiction was not argued in that case. But inasmuch as a Hindu marriage is a sacrament jurisdiction could only have existed by virtue of the words enjoining the Court to act in accordance with justice and right. 27. Mr. Das, appearing for the Plaintiff, advanced a further argument ; that inasmuch as the Company's Courts in matters of marriage administered the parties' personal law as they were bound to do in accordance with the direction to decide according to justice, equity and good conscience and inasmuch as the effect of the High Courts Act, 1861, (24 & 25 Vic. Ch. 104) was to provide for the establishment of a High Court at Calcutta (S. 1) and upon such establishment abolished the Supreme Courts and Sadar Courts (S. 8) and vested the High Court so established with the powers of the Court which were abolished (S. 9), the High Court on its Original Side would have jurisdiction to administer the personal law of the parties in matrimonial matters, where, for example, such parties were Jews. I do not agree with this argument. The relevant provision of sec. I do not agree with this argument. The relevant provision of sec. 9 of the Act is as follows :-- The High Court to be established in each Presidency shall have and exercise all jurisdiction and every power and authority--whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts in the same Presidency abolished under this Act at the time of the abolition of such last-mentioned Courts. 28. Quite apart from the provisions elsewhere in that section which make it clear that reference must be made to the Letters Patent to ascertain the extent of the jurisdiction, it seems to me that nothing in this section can be read as conferring on the High Court on its Appellate Side such jurisdiction as was vested, theretofore, in the Courts which had Appellate Jurisdiction in matters coming from the Mofussil and which were abolished by the Act. 29. One other argument was advanced, namely, that, having regard to the provisions of sec. 112 of the Government of India Act, 1915, the High Court, since the coming into operation of that Act, had jurisdiction, in a suit relating to a Jewish marriage, to administer Jewish personal law, because a Jewish marriage is, in truth, a matter of contract. As regards this, Mr. Hielziner, at p. 25 of his book on "the (sic) law of Marriage and Divorce, in ancient and modern times" has expressed the view that so far as a Jewish marriage is concurred it stands in a position midway between the view of the civil law which regards marriage only as a civil contract and the view of the Roman Catholic Church which holds marriage to be a sacrament. Mr. Hielziner observes as follows :-- Between these two extreme views stands that of the Jewish law. The act of concluding marriage is there certainly also considered as a contract, which requires the consent of both parties and the performance of certain formalities similar to other contracts, and which, under certain circumstances, can be dissolved. But inasmuch as marriage concerns a relation which is based on morality and implies the most sacred duties, it is more than a mere civil contract. But inasmuch as marriage concerns a relation which is based on morality and implies the most sacred duties, it is more than a mere civil contract. In such a contract, the mutual duties and rights emanate from the optional agreement of the contracting parties, while those who enter upon the state of married life must submit to the reciprocal duties which have been imposed by religion and morality. 30. On the materials which I have before me, I cannot come to a positive conclusion that a suit regarding a Jewish marriage can be regarded as a suit relating to a matter of contract or of dealing between party and party before a decision to that effect can be arrived at, it would be necessary to have more materials as to the true nature of a Jewish marriage. In these circumstances, I do not base my decision on this last argument which I have referred to. 31. For the reasons which I have already given, I answer both the issues which have been framed, in the affirmative : and I refuse the application to strike out the paragraphs and the prayers in the plaint mentioned in the Defendants' summons. 32. The written statement must, therefore, be filed by the 23rd June next, cross order for discovery a week thereafter ; inspection immediately thereafter ; and the suit to appear in the prospective list in the first week of August. The Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of the trial of issue as of a hearing.