JUDGMENT Das Gupta, J. - The plaintiff bases his claim to the lands in suit on two registered and one unregistered kobala, while the defendant's claim is based on purchase in execution of a decree he obtained on a hatchita. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant did not acquire any right to these lands in suit by his purchase, first because these properties were not covered by the attachment before judgment and secondly because the attachment must be held to have ceased to be operative after the dismissal for default of the first execution case brought by the defendant. Defendant's purchase was admittedly made in the second execution case after the first had been dismissed for default. 2. The trial Court held that item 1 of the schedule was covered by the attachment while items 2, 3 and 4 were not so covered. Accordingly, it decreed the plaintiff's suit as regards items 2, 3 and 4 of the plaint. 3. On appeal, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that items 2, 3 and 4 were also covered by attachment before judgment and accordingly held that the plaintiff acquired no title thereto by his purchase after attachment. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the entire suit dismissed with costs. 4. Two points have been taken on behalf of the plaintiff appellant here. First, it is argued that the alleged attachment before judgment was not effected in accordance with law. Secondly, it was urged that in any case the attachment ceased to be operative on the dismissal of the first execution case. 5. As regards the first point, the main criticism of the learned advocate to the attachment as effected is that the attachment order was affixed only to item 1 of the properties and not to all the different properties. According to him it is necessary that the writ of attachment should be affixed on every separate item of property. Order 21, Rule 54, Civil P.C., which lays down the procedure to be followed in attachment of immovable property provides that the order shall be proclaimed at some place on or adjacent to such property by beat of drum or other customary mode, a copy of the order shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and then upon a conspicuous part of the court-house. It is useful to compare the language in this with the language of O. 21, R. 67 which after providing that every proclamation of sale shall be made and published as nearly as may be, in the manner prescribed by R. 54, sub-r. (2), proceeds to provide that where property is divided into lots for the purpose of being sold separately, it shall not be necessary to make a separate proclamation for each lot unless proper notice of the sale cannot, in the opinion of the Court, otherwise be given. The Legislature was clearly conscious of the fact that a property to be attached may be in different lots and in R. 67 of O. 21 provides for separate proclamation for each lot in certain cases, but omits to make any such provision for different lots in O. 21, R. 54. The intention of the Legislature seems clear to me that the immovable property to be attached is considered to be one and it is sufficient if the order is affixed on a conspicuous part of the property. In my opinion, the law does not require that where this property is in several plots, contiguous or otherwise, the order should be affixed on each separate plot. I am not prepared to follow the contrary decision, relied on by the learned advocate, in Murugappa Chettiar Vs. Thirumalai Nadar and Others, AIR 1948 Mad 191 . 6. As regards the next question whether the attachment ceased to be operative with the dismissal of the execution case, divergent views have been taken by different High Courts. Order 21, Rule 57, Civil P.C., provides that where any property has been attached in execution of a decree but by reason of the decree-holder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date. Upon the dismissal of such application, the attachment shall cease unless the Court shall make an order to the contrary. The question, therefore, is whether though this rule speaks of attachment in execution of a decree it should apply also to attachment before judgment. On principle, I should see no reason for such extension. The learned advocate for the appellant relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Meyyappa Chettiar Vs. The question, therefore, is whether though this rule speaks of attachment in execution of a decree it should apply also to attachment before judgment. On principle, I should see no reason for such extension. The learned advocate for the appellant relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Meyyappa Chettiar Vs. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1924 Mad 494 wherein it was decided that attachment before judgment will also cease on the dismissal of an application for execution for default on the part of the decree-holder. The question came before this Court in at least two cases. In the case of Ganesh Chandra Adak v. Banwari Lal Roy, 16 C.W.N. 1097 : (14 I.C. 345), it was held by Brett and Sharf-ud-din JJ. that an order for attachment before judgment subsists after the decree for the purpose not merely of the original application for execution * has teen dismissed and subsists for the purpose of the subsequent application for execution as well. The point again came up for consideration in the case of Shibnath Singh Ray Vs. Saberuddin Ahmed, AIR 1929 Cal 465 and the Madras decision was expressly dissented from and the previous decision of this Court in Ganesh Chandra Adah's case, ( 16 CWN 1097 : 14 I.C. 345) was followed. I am content to follow the authority of the decision of this Court mentioned above and hold that the argument that the attachment before judgment ceased to be operative with the dismissal of the first execution case is erroneous. 7. The learned advocate for the appellant also wanted to attack the judgment of the Court below on the ground that it has not considered the bainapatra which, according to the plaintiff, was executed by Amullya for the sale of 14 bighas of land including the disputed land on 26th chaitra 1346 B.S. The trial Court came to a definite conclusion that the bainapatra was not in existence prior to 24th July 1941 and was a fabricated document. It is apparent from the judgment of the Court below that this finding wag not challenged before it. In my opinion, the judgment cannot be attacked on the ground of non-consideration of the matter after the appellant refused to challenge it. 8. The appeal accordingly is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for and is refused. In my opinion, the judgment cannot be attacked on the ground of non-consideration of the matter after the appellant refused to challenge it. 8. The appeal accordingly is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for and is refused. _____________________________________________________________________________ * In the certified copy supplied to us, the sentence occurs as it is printed here. But from the context it seems that the words "but even alter such application" or words to that effect have been omitted by the typist between the word "execution" and the words "has been dismissed."-Ed.