JUDGMENT Majumdar, J. - By consent of learned Counsel for the parties this application is treated as one under the Trustees Act, 1866, and the Charitable and Religious Trust Act of 1920. The application is by four trustees of a trust known as "Gorakhram Ram Pratap Trust" for an order that the two Respondents do endorse the Government Promissory Notes hereinafter mentioned and join with, the Petitioners in taking all steps for giving a valid discharge to Government and to realise the amount due to the trustees on the said Government Promissory Notes and in default of any of the trustees so doing the Registrar of the Court do endorse the said Government Promissory Notes and take necessary steps on their behalf. 2. Of the two Respondents Sir Badridas Goenka has not entered appearance on the ground that he had resigned from the trusteeship. The other Respondent Kesardeo Chamaria contests this application. 3. One Rai Bahadur Ram Protap Chamalia created the aforesaid trust in August, 1917, by dedicating some properties "to be held for religious and charitable purposes" and in particular for the benefit of certain charitable and religious institutions which he had established. In the formal deed of trust executed on the 8th December, 1934, are mentioned the following religious and charitable institutions in particular : (i) The daily Puja and Seva of the Thakur Govindji located in the Mandir (temple) at Fatehpur established by the said Ramprotap Chamaria and also the Jholan, Janamsthami Sarad Purnima, Holi and other festivals and Bhog of the said Thakur and also for the expenses of the Puja and Seva of the said Thakur, up-keep of the said Mandir, salaries of the Pujaries and other employees of the said Mandir and all incidental expenses of the temple. (ii) The promotion and maintenance of Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya and English School and also for the free clothing, boarding and lodging of 30 students of such institutions and to meet the salaries of the Pundits and teachers and other staff. (iii) The expenses of Sadbrai established at Fatehpur for giving alms to the Sadhus and Brahmins, for feeding dogs, etc. (ii) The promotion and maintenance of Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya and English School and also for the free clothing, boarding and lodging of 30 students of such institutions and to meet the salaries of the Pundits and teachers and other staff. (iii) The expenses of Sadbrai established at Fatehpur for giving alms to the Sadhus and Brahmins, for feeding dogs, etc. (iv) The maintenance of a well and garden adjoining the said Mandir and for the maintenance and up-keep of the water works (including the electric plant) for the free supply of drinking water to the Fatehpur town and for the up-keep and maintenance of the Guest House at Fatehpur and reception of distinguished visitors, to give charity in honour of the visits of Rajas, Maharajas and other guests and to meet all expenses for their reception entertainments, etc. (v) The up-keep and maintenance of the charitable dispensary at Fatehpur for the distribution of Ayurvedic and other medicines free of charge to the poor people of Fatehpur. 4. The deed of trust contains various provisions as to (a) the name of the trust, (b) the interpretation clause, (c) the object of the trust, (d) the institutions, (e) powers of the Board of Trustees, (f) the number of trustees, (g) appointment, retirement and removal of the trustees, (h) meeting and procedure of the trustees. In the deed is also mentioned various properties belonging to the trust. 5. The G. P. Notes in question which are of the value of Rs. 1,30,000 (of which Rs. 1,00,000 was 3 per cent, loan of 1941, Rs. 25,000, 3 per cent, loan of 1865 and Rs. 5,000, 5 per cent, loan of 1942-43) were acquired out of the income of the trust properties by the said Ram Protap Chamaria in his own name. 6. On the death of Ram Protap Chamaria which happened in 1937 his grandson Ratanlal Chamaria as the sole surviving heir became a trustee in his place and a suit was instituted in this Court being Suit No. 1077 of 1940 against the said Ratanlal Chamaria and the two Respondents, by the remaining trustees for a declaration, that the said Government Promissory Notes always formed part of the Trust Estate and as such vested in the trustees and for an order that the said Ratanlal Chamaria and if necessary Respondent Kesardeo Chamaria do endorse the said Government Promissory Notes in favour of the trustees. 7. On the 21st August, 1940, on a summons taken out for the purpose Panckridge, J., made an order that the Registrar do endorse in favour of the trustees of the trust the Government Promissory Notes, upon the trustees undertaking not to deal with the same until further orders of this Court. In pursuance of the said order the Registrar endorsed the G. P. Notes in favour of the parties to this application and one Juthalal Baiti who was also a trustee but now dead and in whose place no other trustee has been appointed. By a decree dated 7th May, 1941, McNair, J., declared that the said Government Promissory Notes, always formed part of the trust estate and belonged to and vested in the trustees and the trustees were absolved from the undertaking given by them as above-mentioned. An appeal preferred against that decree was dismissed with a certain variation which is not material for the purposes of this application. 8. The Promissory Notes of the face value of Rs. 1,00,000 matured on the 15th September, 1941, and the promissory notes of the face value of Rs. 30,000 matured on the 16th September, 1946, and since then these promissory notes are bearing no interest. In order to enable the payment of the amount due on these promissory notes the Reserve Bank of India want these notes to be tendered after being receipted on the reverse by the respective holders in the following manner "Received the principal amount of the G. P. Notes together with interest due thereon." 9. The G. P. Notes now stand in the names of the Petitioners and the Respondents. The Respondents having refused to endorse them as required by the Bank, the present application has been made for an order as mentioned above. 10. The only question that has been argued on behalf of the contesting Respondent is that this application is not maintainable under either of the Acts. It is contended that (1) It is not maintainable under the Indian Trustees Act because (a) the trust in this case is not one in which the English Law is applicable, (b) there is no provision in the Act under which the order of the nature asked for can be made. It is contended that (1) It is not maintainable under the Indian Trustees Act because (a) the trust in this case is not one in which the English Law is applicable, (b) there is no provision in the Act under which the order of the nature asked for can be made. (2) It is not maintainable under the Charitable and Religious Trust Act because (a) this is not a trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, (b) there is no provision in the Act under which the order of the nature asked for can be made. 11. Both contentions relate to the jurisdiction of this Court in making the order. There is no question that if either of the Act applies the procedure by which the order asked for can be obtained is by petition and not by suit. 12. As to contention No. 1 (a) it is clear from sec. 3 of the Indian Trustees Act that the powers of the High Court under the Act are limited only to cases to which English Law is applicable. Mr. Gupta relying upon the decision of Pugh, J., in the case of Re: Halima Khatun I. L. R. 37 Cal. 870 (1910) (where the learned Judge is reported to have observed that the cases to which the English Law is applicable are only such must as are in the form of English trust and are constituted by persons of purely English domicile or persons governed by the Indian Trust Act), urges that the present trust does not satisfy the test laid down by Pugh, J., and as such the Indian Trustees. Act is not applicable. This was a case relating to an application by a mutawlli for sanction to sell the wakf property. The question that arose is whether an order could be made upon the petition instituted in the matter of a trust and without a suit. The learned Judge while holding that the Trustees Act did not apply, there being no statute authorising such application for sanction of such a sale it can be obtained only by means of a suit and made the observations as above mentioned. 13. Following the decision of West, J,, in the matter of the petition of Kahandas Narrandas I. L. R. 5 Bom. 13. Following the decision of West, J,, in the matter of the petition of Kahandas Narrandas I. L. R. 5 Bom. 154, Martin, J., In the matter of Indian Trustees Act, 1866, Basil Lang v. Moolji Karsonji and Bhagwan Ravashankar 21 Bom. L. R. 1111 (1919) appointed a new trustee in respect of a Hindu trust on an application by petition made for the purpose under the Indian Trustees Act where the question of the nature arose. This principle was accepted in this Court by Harrington, J., in the case of In re: Nilmony Dey Sarkar I. L. R. 32 Cal. 143 (1904). Harrington, J., held that the Indian Trustees Act would apply to Hindu trusts provided such trusts did not violate any provision of the Hindu Law. I do not consider it necessary to recite the facts of these cases nor the observations of the learned Judges found in their judgment. It appears that the trust in the present case is in English form, and the application of the principles of the English Law in making the order sought for would not violate any provision of the Hindu Law, for it cannot be said that there is any provision in Hindu Law by which the trustee in the circumstances of the present case should be called upon to endorse Government Promissory Notes in order to get payment of the amount due thereof. It must be, therefore, that the recognised principles of the English Equity Courts must apply. It seems to me absurd that for the purpose of obtaining the nature of the relief that has been asked for in this case a party will have to go through the elaborate processes of instituting a suit and carrying it on till the decree is made. I regret I cannot agree with the observations of Pugh, J., that the Indian Trustees Act applies in cases of trust which are constituted by persons of purely English domicile or persons governed by the Indian Succession Act. To my mind the object of mentioning in sec. 3 of the Indian Trustees Act "the case to which English Law is applicable" is to exclude such trusts created and governed wholly under Hindu and Muhammadan Law and to the incidents of which the principle of English Law would be inapplicable. To my mind the object of mentioning in sec. 3 of the Indian Trustees Act "the case to which English Law is applicable" is to exclude such trusts created and governed wholly under Hindu and Muhammadan Law and to the incidents of which the principle of English Law would be inapplicable. I, therefore, agree with the views of the learned Judges of Bombay High Court and of Harrington, J., of this Court and hold that the Indian Trustees Act would apply. 14. Having come to the conclusion that the Indian Trustees Act applies to the trust of the nature as in the present case, I have to see if any relief as has been asked for or any other relief can be granted on this application under the provisions of that Act. 15. Mr. Bose has submitted that the Court can grant relief under one or other of the secs. 23, 34 or 39 of the Act. In going through the various provisions of the Act, I find that those are really the sections which have any relevancy to the question raised in this application and it will, therefore, be necessary to examine how far those sections separately or collectively authorise the Court to grant any relief of the nature claimed by the Petitioner. 16. Sec. 23 provides that where any one of the trustees of any stock, Government securities or thing in action shall neglect or refuse to transfer such stock or Government securities or to receive the dividends, interest or income thereof . . . . . according to the directions of the person absolutely entitled thereto for the space of 28 days next after a request in writing for that purpose shall have been made to him by that person it shall be lawful for the High Court to make an order vesting the right to transfer such stock or Government securities or to receive the dividends, interest or income thereof . . . . in the other trustee or trustees of the said stock, etc., or in any other person or persons whom the said Court may appoint jointly with such other trustee or trustees. . . . in the other trustee or trustees of the said stock, etc., or in any other person or persons whom the said Court may appoint jointly with such other trustee or trustees. Thus under that section no vesting order can be made except under an application by "a person absolutely entitled" and it does not mention is the trustees other than the recusant trustee would be such person within the meaning of the section. 17. Sec. 34 provides that it shall be lawful for the High Court to make declarations and give directions concerning the manner which the right to any stock or Government, securities, etc., vested under the provision's of the Act shall be exercised and thereupon the person or persons in whom such, right shall be vested shall be compelled to obey such directions and declarations, etc. 18. The section clearly contemplates a vesting order being made first to enable the Court to give directions and so no relief can be granted before such vesting order under sec. 23 is made. 19. Sec. 39 provides that an order under any of the hereinbefore provisions concerning any immovable property, stock or Government securities, etc., subject to a trust may be made upon the application of any person beneficially interested in such immovable property, stock or Government securities or upon the application of any person duly appointed as a trustee thereof, etc. 20. This section does not by itself authorise making of any order but only lays down that where under former sections the Court has power to make an order relating to immovable property, stock, or Government securities, such order may be made on the application by a person beneficially interested as well as by the trustee. So no order can be made on the application of a trustee or trustees unless the requirements of the sections authorising the Court to make a particular order has been complied with. Thus the present application by the trustees becomes entertainable only if the requirements of the former sections have been fulfilled. 21. Therefore, one is thrown back upon the former sections and in the present case to sec. 23 alone under which the vesting order can be made. Thus on this application if the petitioning trustees are persons "absolutely entitled" to Government securities under sec. 21. Therefore, one is thrown back upon the former sections and in the present case to sec. 23 alone under which the vesting order can be made. Thus on this application if the petitioning trustees are persons "absolutely entitled" to Government securities under sec. 23, the vesting order under that section can be made and direction given under sec. 34 of the Act. 22. Beyond mere submissions that the Court can grant relief under sec. 23 there has been no argument from the Bar on this point, nor any decisions have been cited to maintain if the trustees would come within the expression "persons absolutely entitled." I could not find any Indian decision on the point but two decision from the Court in England appear to be very helpful. They are Ex parte Russell [1851] 1 Sim. N. S. 404 and In the matter of the Will of David Baxter [1854] 2 Sim. & Giff Appendix V. The said decisions are under the Trusts Act of 1850 of which secs. 24, 31 and 37 which correspond for all practical purposes to secs. 23, 34 and 39 of the Indian Trustees Act of 1866 and the words "persons absolutely entitled" also occur in secs. 23 and 24 of the English Act, the last mentioned section corresponds to sec. 22of the Indian Trustees Act. 23. In Ex parte Russet [1851] 1 Sim. N. S. 404 the surviving trustees of a sum of stock who had refused to receive dividends thereof neglected for 28 days after a request in writing had been made to him by persons who had been duly appointed new trustees to transfer the stock, to them. Upon an application by the new trustees the Court held that they were persons "absolutely entitled" to the stock within the meaning of sec. 23 of the Trustees Act, 1850, and ordered the stock to be transferred to them. Sec. 23 of the Trustees Act of 1850, which I have already indicated corresponds to sec. 22 of the Indian Trustees Act of 1866 relates to the case of a sole trustee of any stock or chose in action, neglecting or refusing to transfer such stock or to receive dividends thereof . . . . Sec. 23 of the Trustees Act of 1850, which I have already indicated corresponds to sec. 22 of the Indian Trustees Act of 1866 relates to the case of a sole trustee of any stock or chose in action, neglecting or refusing to transfer such stock or to receive dividends thereof . . . . according to the direction of the "person absolutely entitled" thereto for the space of 28 days after a request in writing for that purpose shall have been made by "the person absolutely entitled" thereto and empowers the Court to make a vesting order under such circumstances. 24. In the matter of the Will of David Baxter [1854] 2 Sim. & Giff Appendix V two persons Richard Oxtabry and Baxter Barber were appointed trustees under the Will of David Baxter deceased, in respect of 20 shares. Subsequently Baxter Barber being desirous of retiring from the trust executed a deed appointing one Joseph Gordon in place of Baxter Barber. The new trustees Richard Oxtabry and Joseph Gordon then applied to Baxter Barber to transfer to them the 20 shares and he having refused to do so a notice under sec. 24 of the Trustee Act of 1850 was served upon him requesting him to make such a transfer. On his failure to do so, a petition being thereafter presented a vesting order was made in favour of the new trustees, on the authority of "Ex parte Russel" [1857] 1 Sim. N. S. 404 obviously because the new trustees were considered as "persons absolutely entitled" within the meaning of sec. 24 of the Trustee Act of 1850. 25. In the present case the Respondents have refused to receive the interest due or indorse the Government Promissory Note when requested to do so by the petitioning trustees. The request was made in writing on the 6th January, 1948. Since then more than 28 days had expired before the application was made. 26. The point which I have to decide is whether the petitioning trustees are "persons absolutely entitled" to the Government Promissory Notes within the meaning of sec. 23 of the Indian Trustees Act, 1866. 27. Now the Indian Trustees Act, 1866, is a remedial Act and I am disinclined to put any narrow construction on the provisions thereof. 26. The point which I have to decide is whether the petitioning trustees are "persons absolutely entitled" to the Government Promissory Notes within the meaning of sec. 23 of the Indian Trustees Act, 1866. 27. Now the Indian Trustees Act, 1866, is a remedial Act and I am disinclined to put any narrow construction on the provisions thereof. Of the several trustees one having declined to act and Keshardeo Chamaria being recusant and having failed to act in this matter as trustee the remaining trustees who are the Petitioners are in my opinion "absolutely entitled to the Government securities" within the meaning of sec. 23 of the Indian Trust Act and I am fortified in holding this view on the authority of the cases mentioned above. 28. In the circumstances I shall make an order vesting the Government Promissory Notes mentioned in the petition to the Petitioners only with a right to transfer the same and receive interest thereon accrued. I direct them to make necessary endorsement to give discharge to the Government Promissory Notes and to receive the value thereof as well. 29.(sic) to contentions 2 (a) and (b). From the provisions and the purpose of the trust set out above it is to my mind clear that the trust had been created for public purposes of charitable and religious nature. That being the nature of the trust the Charitable and Religious Trust Act would become applicable. The question that arises next is whether this Court under that Act can grant any relief as asked for by the Petitioners. Sec. 7 (1) of the Act provides that any trustee of a trust of the above description may apply to the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any substantial part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate for opinion, advice or direction of the Court on any question affecting the management or administration of the trust property and the Court shall give its opinion, advice, or direction as the case may be provided that the Court shall not be bound to give such opinion, advice or direction, on any question which it considers to be a question not proper for summary disposal. Sec. 7 (2) and (3) of the Act lay down the procedure to be followed before giving any opinion, advice or direction and by sec. Sec. 7 (2) and (3) of the Act lay down the procedure to be followed before giving any opinion, advice or direction and by sec. 7 (4) of the Act it at provided suit trustee who has acted on such advice or direction will be deemed Set far as his own responsibility is concerned to have discharged his duties as a trustee in the matter in respect of which the petition was made Thus under that sec. 7 a trustee is entitled to seek the opinion, advice or direction of the Court in certain matters and if he follows such advice, opinion or direction he is protected but if he chooses not to follow it he cannot be compelled by the Court to do so, although his failure to act according to such opinion, advice or direction would be at 1ms own risk. This is the view that has been expressed by the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Abdul Rab v. Mohammad Hasan 1936 A. L. J. 1112 with which I fully agree. Under the circumstances it is not likely that if the Court had given direction upon the defaulting trustees to endorse the Government Promissory Notes, or to receive interest thereon, that would have been carried, and it was not authorised under the Act to order the Registrar or any person other than those trustees to endorse the Government Promissory Notes as prayed for by the Petitioners. The only curse that would have been left to the Court, had this application been made solely under the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, was to advise the Petitioners to obtain an order under the Indian Trustees Act or to apply under Chapter 13 of the High Court, Original Side Rules by way of originating summons for necessary reliefs, but as this application can be treated as one under the Indian Trustees Act, such advice becomes unnecessary and I am disposed to treat this application as made under the last named Act, alone, the provisions whereof I have already decided are attracted to the present trust. Costs of the parties appearing will be as between attorney and client to come out of the Trust Estate. Costs will be taxed as of a hearing Certified for two Counsel.