JUDGMENT Chatterjee, J. - In this case an issue has been raised--Is the notice dated the 11th August, 1945, addressed by Messrs, Charu Chandra Basu to the Secretary, Government of India, Labour Department, in conformity with sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Mr. H.K. Bose, Counsel for the Governor-General of India in Council, has drawn my attention to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Hiralal Murarka v. Mangtulal Bagaria 48 C. W. N. 421 (1944). In that case McNair, J. and Gentle, J. have taken the view that the Court must dismiss a suit under Or. 7, r. 11, when no notice in terms of sec. 80 has been given to a public servant and no averment is made in the plaint that such notice has been delivered or left. The learned Judges have held that any decision on the merits is not res judicata in a subsequent suit. 2. Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. Sen, contends that this case is no authority for the proposition that a suit must be dismissed when a notice had in fact been given and there is an averment in the plaint to that effect. 3. In my view Mr. Sen is right when he contends that a Court cannot reject a plaint under Or. 7, r. 11, when it contains an averment that a notice under sec. 80 has been served. Under Or. 7, r. 11 (d) the plaint shall be rejected where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. 4. Where the notice is not in conformity with the mandatory requirements of the statute, the Court has no jurisdiction to try the case. Notice is condition precedent to the institution of the suit. The language of the section is "No suit shall be instituted against the Crown or against a public officer--until the expiry of two months after notice in writing has been given." In the absence of a valid notice the position is as if no action has ever been brought. There is no properly instituted suit to be tried. The Court cannot adjudicate any issue arising out of the suit. The Court is really debarred from entertaining the suit instituted without compliance with sec. 80. 5. I have decided to try the issue as to the validity of the notice as a preliminary issue. There is no properly instituted suit to be tried. The Court cannot adjudicate any issue arising out of the suit. The Court is really debarred from entertaining the suit instituted without compliance with sec. 80. 5. I have decided to try the issue as to the validity of the notice as a preliminary issue. On the authority of the above decision which is binding on me, I am bound to dismiss the suit, if I hold that the notice is not in conformity with the requirements of sec. 80. Lord Sumner in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council L. R. 54 I. A. 338 : s. c. 32 C. W. N. 61 (1927) held that sec. 80 is express, explicit and mandatory and it admits of no implications or exceptions. He rejected the contention put forward before the Judicial Committee that the section deals with mere procedure. Sec. 80 imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court not to entertain a suit, unless there is a valid notice. 6. The notice in this case has been attacked on two grounds: (a) The name, description and place of residence of the Plaintiff have not been stated and (b) the cause of action pleaded in the plaint is different from the cause of action stated in the notice. 7. The notice in question is in following terms:-- 11th Aug., 1945. The Secretary, Government of India, (Labour Department) Dear Sir, We address you on behalf of our client Mr. Bhupal Chandra Dutt, Proprietor, Art Press of No. 20, British Indian Street, Calcutta under the following circumstances :-- We understand from our client that under instructions from the Manager, Government of India, Central Forms Stores of No. 166, Dharmatolla Street, Calcutta, our client did Government printing works and submitted his bills to him. The particulars of the said bills are as follows :-- (1) Bill No. B/418/43 dated 21st September 1943 for Rs. 1919-11-0 (2) Bill No. B/825/44 dated 7th December 1944, for Rs. 8021-9-0. The bills were duly accepted by the Manager, Central Forms Store, but no payment has as yet been made inspite of repeated requests made by our client. In the circumstances, we have been instructed by our client to inform you that our client intends to file a suit for the recovery of his dues mentioned above against the Governor. 8021-9-0. The bills were duly accepted by the Manager, Central Forms Store, but no payment has as yet been made inspite of repeated requests made by our client. In the circumstances, we have been instructed by our client to inform you that our client intends to file a suit for the recovery of his dues mentioned above against the Governor. General in Council after the expiration of 2 months from the receipt hereof. Please treat this as a notice under Sec. 60 of the Civil Procedure Code. Yours truly, Sd.--Charu Chandra Bosu. 8. The Plaintiff, is described in the notice as "Mr. Bhupal Chandra Dutt, Proprietor, Art Press of No. 26, British Indian Street, Calcutta." Mr. Bose attacks the notice on the ground that the place of residence has not been specified and he points out that the address given is really that of the Art Press of which the Plaintiff is the proprietor. Secondly, he contends that the cause of action stated in the plaint is different. In paragraph 1 of the Plaintiff the Plaintiff states that on the 30th June, 1943, he purchased the business known as the Art Press with all its assets and goodwill. In paragraph 2 it is alleged that the Defendant through its agent the Manager, Central Forms Stores, had placed various orders with the Art Press. In paragraph 3 the Plaintiff states that he notified the Manager of his purchase of the said Press and he was from time to time requested by the Manager to execute the pending orders and that he never intended to do the work gratuitously--In subsequent paragraphs the Plaintiff states that he duly executed the orders and submitted bills. Copies of the bills are annexed to the plaint. The Plaintiff states that he executed all the orders as requested by the Manager as the agent of the Defendant and that the Defendant had the benefit of the work done by him. The bills referred to in the plaint are the bills mentioned in the notice. The Plaintiff makes a claim for the total amount of the bills and states in the plaint that no objection was ever raised as to the correctness of the bills. It is urged that in the notice there is no express mention of the case made under sec. The Plaintiff makes a claim for the total amount of the bills and states in the plaint that no objection was ever raised as to the correctness of the bills. It is urged that in the notice there is no express mention of the case made under sec. 70 of the Contract Act nor of the case that the Manager aforesaid was the agent of the Defendant. 9. In my opinion the notice is substantially in conformity with sec. 80. The notice could have stated the requisite details in cleaner language. The object of serving notice under sec. 80 is to give the Government sufficient warning of the case which is going to be instituted against it so that the Government may, if it so wishes, settle the claim without litigation or afford restitution without recourse to a Court of law. The Government in my opinion was in this case given an opportunity of investigating the alleged cause of complaint. A liberal construction should be put upon the section. The notice is sufficient if it substantially fulfills its object in informing the Government or the public officer of the nature of the suit to be filed. In my opinion the Privy Council judgment in Bhagchand v. Secretary of State L. R. 54 I. A. 338 : s. c. 32 C. W. N. 61 (1927) and Vellyan Chettiar v. Governor of Madras A. I. R. (1947) P. C. 197 do not militate against this view. 10. In Jehangir M. Cursetji v. The Secretary of State for India in Council I. L. R. 27 Bom. 189 (1902) the Government was sued for damages for defamation. The notice was attacked on the ground that it did not allege malice, although in the plaint the Plaintiff charged malice against the officers of the Government. Tyabji, J., held that the notice was sufficient, as the notice informed the authorities generally of the nature of the suit which was intended to be filed against them. Such notices must not be too strictly or too narrowly construed. They must not be construed as if they were pleadings and they need not set out all the details or facts of the case which the Plaintiff intends to prove. The same view has been taken in The Secretary of State for India Vs. Such notices must not be too strictly or too narrowly construed. They must not be construed as if they were pleadings and they need not set out all the details or facts of the case which the Plaintiff intends to prove. The same view has been taken in The Secretary of State for India Vs. Hargovandas Narottamdas Shah, AIR 1935 Bom 229 and in Secretary of State v. Nagorao Tanko Deshmukh A. I. R. (1988) Nag. 415. 11. In Jones v. Nicholls 13 M. & W. 361 : s. c. 153 E. R. 149, Pollock, C. B., observed that the Court should import a little common sense into notices of this kind. The Court should look at the wording of the notice and interpret it in the light of common sense. The same view has been taken in Prasaddas Sen v. K.S. Bonnerjee I. L. R. 57 Cal. 1127 (1129) and Chandulal Vedilal v. Government of the Province of Bombay I. L. R. 1943 Bom. 128 : s. c. A. I. R. 1943 Bom. 131. In the Calcutta case Rankin, C. J., held that if the Defendant has no real difficulty in approaching the Plaintiff for the purpose of making a tender of amend or otherwise negotiating with him, it is open to the Court to take a broad view as to the sufficiency of the notice. In the Bombay case Beaumont, C. J., observed that the object of the notice is to give the Government or the officer concerned notice of the claim which is going to be made against them and to give them reasonable time in which to consider their re-actions. 12. There has not been in this case any violation of the spirit and intention of sec. 80. All that is needed is that the Plaintiff must be described in such a manner that he can be identified without any difficulty so that the Government may deal with him, if it is so advised, The Secretary of State for India Vs. Chimanlal Jamnadas, (1942) 44 BOMLR 295 . It will be pushing technicality to absurd limits if the Court has to dismiss a suit because the Plaintiff has described himself in the aforesaid manner in the notice. He is a business-man and he carries on business at No. 20, British Indian Street. There is nothing to indicate that he does not reside there. It will be pushing technicality to absurd limits if the Court has to dismiss a suit because the Plaintiff has described himself in the aforesaid manner in the notice. He is a business-man and he carries on business at No. 20, British Indian Street. There is nothing to indicate that he does not reside there. Take the case, of a firm or a corporation. It would be sufficient to state in the notice the business address. The words "reside" or "residence" should be construed according to the intention of the legislature. The residence of an incorporated trading company is its principal place of business. The word "reside" in the Insolvent Act, (11 & 12 Vic., c. 21), when applicable to traders, was held to include occupation for the purpose of trading, whether or not accompanied by sleeping or dwelling. In Re: Howard Brothers 11 Ben L. R. 254 (1878) and In re Hurruck Chund Golicha I. L. R. 5 Cal. 605 (1880). In Sheikh Mohammad Zia Vs. United Provinces, AIR 1943 All 345 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Collister and Allsopp, JJ.) observed that defects in a notice which are sheer technicalities should not operate to defeat a suit. The Defendant, in my opinion, cannot be and has not been prejudiced in any way. The suit is substantially one for the amount due for work done by the Plaintiff at the request of the Defendant's Manager and there is no real variation between the notice and the plaint which would justify the dismissal of the suit. I decide the preliminary issue in favour of the Plaintiff. The Defendant must in any event pay to the Plaintiff one day's cost of hearing as of a defended suit on scale No. II, certified for two Counsel. The suit will now be heard on the merits.