JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - This is a Rule directed against a decree dated the 17th of December, 1947, passed by the learned Small Cause Court Judge at Bishnupur on a claim for damages for loss of goods during transit over a railway. There are two Petitioners before me, one is the Governor-General in Council, now the Dominion of India, representing the Bengal Nagpur Railway and the other is the Bankura Damodar River Railway Co., Ltd. 2. The material facts are the following: The Plaintiff is a person named Basanta Kumar Goldar to whom five bags of cocoons were dispatched from Chakradharpur Railway Station on the Bengal Nagpur Railway to the Sonamukhi Station, situated on the Bankura Damodar River Railway. The goods were booked on the 23rd of March, 1946 and reached Sonamukhi Station on the 7th of April following. At the destination, when delivery was sought to be taken it was found that one of the five bags was missing. The consignee thereafter brought a suit for recovering a sum of Rs. 130-13 as compensation for the loss sustained. In his plaint the Plaintiff averred that the bag contained "cocoons and in paragraph 6 of the plaint he stated that cocoons did not come under the category of excepted articles enumerated in Schedule 2 to the Indian Railways Act. 3. The only defence which is material for the purposes of this Rule was that the contents of the missing bag were excepted articles within the meaning of item "1" of Schedule 2 to the Indian Railways Act and the consignor not having made the declaration required under section 75 was not entitled to recover any compensation in any circumstances. 4. The Court below overruled this defence in the view that the missing bag contained Tasar Cocoons which were different from silk cocoons and that it was only silk cocoons which were contemplated by item "1" of Schedule 2. In the result the learned Judge decreed the Plaintiff's claim in full. 5. On behalf of the Petitioners it was contended that the finding of the learned Judge that the missing bag contained Tasar cocoons as distinguished from silk cocoons was based on no evidence. In the result the learned Judge decreed the Plaintiff's claim in full. 5. On behalf of the Petitioners it was contended that the finding of the learned Judge that the missing bag contained Tasar cocoons as distinguished from silk cocoons was based on no evidence. A larger ground was also formulated which was to the effect that Tasar cocoons could not be said to be outside item "1" of Schedule No. 2 in the absence of better evidence and that if the question fell to be decided by the dictionary meaning of the word "cocoon," that meaning would not exclude Tasar cocoons. 6. In my opinion it is not necessary for me to enter upon an examination of the second contention although it appears to me to be one of great importance. The Plaintiff referred to an earlier judgment passed in another case by Mr. Justice Edgley, in which he refused to interfere in revision with a decision of the trial Court whereby it had been held that Tasar cocoons were different from silk cocoons and were consequently outside item "1." That decision, however, can not be one of general application in as much as the ground upon which the learned Judge really proceeded was that the finding of the Court below was a finding of fact, based upon evidence and consequently it was not open to revision. The general question as to whether Tasar is silk and consequently whether Tasar cocoons are not also silk cocoons seems to me to require fuller investigation which, however, is not necessary here in view of the special facts of the case. 7. It has already been seen that all that the Plaintiff stated in his plaint was that the missing bag contained "cocoons." He did not differentiate between Tasar Cocoons and silk cocoons. All that was added in paragraph 6 of the plaint was that the cocoons which were missing were outside the list of excepted articles. It was only at the stage of evidence that attention seems to have been properly directed to the importance of the distinction and the only evidence led was that of the consignee himself who stated, not in his original deposition but on being re-called, that the missing bag contained Tasar cocoons and that such cocoons were different from silk cocoons. It was only at the stage of evidence that attention seems to have been properly directed to the importance of the distinction and the only evidence led was that of the consignee himself who stated, not in his original deposition but on being re-called, that the missing bag contained Tasar cocoons and that such cocoons were different from silk cocoons. I am unable to see how this evidence can prove the one fact required to entitled the Plaintiff to succeed. 8. The witness was the Plaintiff himself and he, as has already been stated, was the consignee. He could not possibly have known what was contained in the missing bag unless he was able to say that he was present at the time when the bag was filled. The bag was dispatched to him to be delivered at Sonamukhi and in the ordinary course of things he could have no knowledge of what was being put into it at the other end of the line at Chakradharpur. Mr. Roy contended that the Plaintiff was a person who dealt in cocoons and since the remaining four bags which he opened and saw contained Tasar cocoons, the missing one also must be deemed to have contained the same articles. This argument has only to be stated in order to be seen how untenable it is. There can be no presumption that when goods are ordered in a lot, all the receptacles which are sent under the same order contain the same kind or quantity of the goods. There is thus no legal evidence at all that the missing bag contained Tasar cocoons rather than silk cocoons. 9. It is well-established now that in case of the present description, the onus lies on the Plaintiff to show that the goods for the loss of which he claims compensation did not belong to the class of excepted articles, as enumerated in Schedule 2 to the Act. See the case of The Secretary of State for India v. Messrs Gopalmal Purusothan Das 45 C.W.N. 452 (1941). The onus in the present case being on the Plaintiff, he, in my opinion, has completely failed to discharge that onus. Even assuming that the case decided by Mr. See the case of The Secretary of State for India v. Messrs Gopalmal Purusothan Das 45 C.W.N. 452 (1941). The onus in the present case being on the Plaintiff, he, in my opinion, has completely failed to discharge that onus. Even assuming that the case decided by Mr. Justice Edgley lays down a general proposition and that it decides that Tasar cocoons are in fact different from silk cocoons, which I do not think that it does, the Plaintiff cannot succeed on the strength of that decision inasmuch as he has not proved that his goods were Tasar cocoons. 10. Mr. Lahiri invited me to take the present opportunity of laying down the procedure to be followed by the parties to prove the true character of the goods consigned in cases of the present kind. I do not think that this case is a fit one for undertaking that task. It can be disposed of on the short and simple point which I have already indicated. 11. It was contended in the last resort by Mr. Roy that, in any event, his client's claim ought to succeed up to the amount of Rs. 100. He referred to a decision of Mr. Justice Lodge reported in [Governor-General in Council v. Tarak Nath Das AIR 1947 Cal. 182 ]. It was contended that that decision is authority for the proposition that on loss being established, the Plaintiff can succeed in any event up to the amount of Rs. 100. I am unable to accede to that proposition and the case cited does not lay down any such thing. The section itself says that the bar contained therein would not apply unless the value of the goods exceeded Rs. 100 and, therefore, no judicial pronouncement is necessary to exclude the operation of the section where the claim is below the figure stated. But surely it cannot be contended that even if the claim is for an amount exceeding Rs. 100 the claim will succeed in any event up to that amount, although it may fail for the balance. So to hold would be to reduce the section to absurdity and to go against its plain terms. 12. For the reasons given above this Rule is made absolute. The judgment and decree of the learned Small Cause Court Judge are set aside and the Plaintiff's suit is dismissed. So to hold would be to reduce the section to absurdity and to go against its plain terms. 12. For the reasons given above this Rule is made absolute. The judgment and decree of the learned Small Cause Court Judge are set aside and the Plaintiff's suit is dismissed. Hearing-fee in this Rule is assessed at one gold mohur.