JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - This Rule is directed against an order of a judge of the Presidency Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, whereby he allowed an application of the Opposite Party under sec. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The Petitioner, against whom the order was made, complains that it was passed without jurisdiction. The material facts are as follows. The Petitioner holds a tenancy under the Opposite Party of Premises No. 23, Aga Mehdi Street, which consists of nineteen corrugated iron sheds. The lease was first taken on July 15, 1937. On July 23, 1942, a further lease was granted which was a lease for five years, commencing on July 1, 1942, and ending on June 30, 1947. On December 23, 1946, the Opposite Party served a notice upon the Petitioner to quit the premises by June 30, 1947, when the term of five years would expire. As he failed to comply with the notice, the Opposite Party made an application to the Presidency Court of Small Causes under sec. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for an order for possession against the Petitioner. The Petitioner appeared and showed cause, but the learned Judge overruled his contentions and made the order prayed for. 2. No argument was addressed to us on the merits and all that was contended was that the order passed by the learned Judge was one without jurisdiction. That contention was founded on sec. 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act which reads as follows: If the occupant does not appear at the time appointed and show cause to the contrary, the applicant shall, if the Small Cause Court is satisfied that he is entitled to apply under sec. 41, be entitled to an order addressed to a bailiff of the Court directing him to give possession of the property to the applicant on such day as the Court thinks fit to name in such order. 3. What is contended is that sec. 43 only empowers the Small Cause Court judge to deal with an application under sec. 41 in a case where the occupant does not appear. There being no other section in the Act which deals with the case where the occupant appears, the conclusion, it is said, must follow that where there is appearance by the Defendant, the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court is immediately ousted. 4. 41 in a case where the occupant does not appear. There being no other section in the Act which deals with the case where the occupant appears, the conclusion, it is said, must follow that where there is appearance by the Defendant, the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court is immediately ousted. 4. In my opinion, this contention is not sustainable. At first sight the section does appear to bear the meaning attributed to it by the Petitioner, but a close examination of its terms will show that the intention of the section is entirely different. The section contemplates two contingencies in which an order for possession should be made. One is, if the occupant does not appear and the other is, if he does not show cause to the contrary. It is perfectly clear that if the occupant does not appear, there can be no question of his showing cause to the contrary or any cause, and it seems to me to follow that the second part of the section, namely, that which deals with showing cause to the contrary, deals with a case different from that in which the occupant does not appear. It is true that the two phrases are connected by the conjunction "and," but what the section really means is that the Small Cause Court judge shall make an order for possession if the occupant does not appear or it, alter appearing, he does not show cause to the contrary. It was, however, further contended that the word "cause" in the section meant any cause and that even if the section covered a case where the Defendant appeared, the jurisdiction the Small Cause Court Judge would still be, ousted if he showed some cause, good, bad or indifferent. This contention, again, in my view, is plainly untenable. The section does not use the word "cause" simpliciter, but uses the phrase "cause to the contrary," which must clearly mean cause why the order for possession should not be made, in other words, good and sufficient cause for not making the order. It is, therefore, not possible to contend that as soon as the Defendant appears to answer an application under sec. 41 and puts forward some kind of defence, the Small Cause Court Judge is rendered incompetent to proceed further and must throw out the application or return it to the applicant. 5. It is, therefore, not possible to contend that as soon as the Defendant appears to answer an application under sec. 41 and puts forward some kind of defence, the Small Cause Court Judge is rendered incompetent to proceed further and must throw out the application or return it to the applicant. 5. This, it appears to me, is pre-eminently a case where the word "and" should be read as "or." The section, in my view, does nothing more than what any other procedural statute does, namely, provide for the case where there is a default of appearance on behalf of the Defendant and also provide for the case where the Defendant appears but fails to prove his defence. It is certainly unfortunate that the language in which the section is expressed should be so unhappy and clumsy, but the intention of the action has still not been wholly eclipsed. It combines the two provisions, to which I have already referred, into one, and although it says somewhat ungrammatically "if the occupant does not appear and show cause," what it means is "if the occupant does not appear or does not show cause," thus contemplating not one contingency only, but two. The section does not mean, as the Petitioner would read it, "if the occupant does not appear to show cause." 6. In reality, the contention of the Petitioner is set completely at rest by the Explanation appended to sec. 43 itself. That Explanation provides as follows:-- If the occupant proves that the tenancy was created or permission granted by virtue of a time which determined previous to the date of the application, he shad be deemed to have shown cause within the meaning of this section. 7. Clearly, the Explanation contemplates a case where the occupant has appeared and shown some cause. Of the various causes which it is possible for an occupant to show against his eviction, the Explanation mentions one and declares that to be a sufficient cause for the purposes of the section. The implication plainly is that if the Defendant appears and shows the particular cause mentioned, the Court shall accept it as sufficient and not make the order prayed for, which involves that the Court shall adjudicate on the cause shown by a Defendant who has appeared and see whether it is the cause recognised by the statute as sufficient or some other good cause. The provision implies power and a duty to decide the case on the cause shown and not termination of jurisdiction, for when it says "shall be deemed to have shown cause," it must mean "deemed by the Court" for the purpose of making an order on the application. The section thus makes it perfectly clear that even after the occupant has entered appearance and has shown some cause, the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court Judge is not ousted, but he is required to consider and pronounce upon the defence put forward before him. If the section intended to provide that the jurisdiction of the Court would end as soon as the Defendant appeared, there was no reason why it should have gone on to say what cause would be good cause. 8. Indeed, if it was the intention of the section to enact that as soon as a Defendant appeared or appeared and showed some cause, the Small Cause Court Judge would be rendered incompetent to proceed further, one would have expected some provision in the Act as regards how the Small Cause Court Judge would have to deal with the application in such a case. The Act does not provide anywhere that on the Defendant appearing and showing some cause, the Small Cause Court Judge shall either return the application to the applicant or dismiss it or deal with it in any other manner. This, in my view, is another indication that the case of non-appearance and the case of failure to show satisfactory cause, that is to say, to make out a sufficient defence though the Defendant appears, are combined in one section, namely, sec. 43, and because they are so combined, no separate provision is made anywhere else for the second case, nor is it provided that if the Defendant appears and shows cause, the Court shall return the application or dismiss it. In my view, the construction suggested by the Petitioner is not the true construction of sec. 43 and his contention, based on a mis-reading of the section, cannot be accepted. 9. In the course of the argument, reference was made to a decision of Lodge, J., sitting singly, in the case of Purusottam Lal Sarogi Vs. Mt. Hawi Bai, AIR 1947 Cal 401 . 43 and his contention, based on a mis-reading of the section, cannot be accepted. 9. In the course of the argument, reference was made to a decision of Lodge, J., sitting singly, in the case of Purusottam Lal Sarogi Vs. Mt. Hawi Bai, AIR 1947 Cal 401 . The identical point was raised before the learned Judge and he disposed of it with the following observations: With regard to the first of these contentions, if the matter were res integra, I should have some difficulty in holding that the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction to go further into the matter after the occupant had once appeared and objected to the order on any legal ground sec. 41, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act provides for an application to be made and for a summons on the occupant calling upon him to how cause why he should not be compelled to sliver up the property. Sec. 43 provides that an order directing the occupant to deliver up possession may be made if the occupant does not appear at the time appointed and show cause to the contrary. The Act is silent as to what may be done if the occupant does appear and show cause. There is however an Explanation appended to he section indicating one case at least in which the occupants shall be deemed to have shown clause. 10. The learned Judge then proceeds to decide the case on what he describes as the long standing practice of the Small Causes Court which had received the approval of this Court. 11. In my opinion, this was not a proper or satisfactory way of dealing with a question of construction and the doubt felt by the learned Judge as to the true meaning of sec. 43 is not warranted. He did take notice of the Explanation appended to sec. 43, but appears to have regarded it as merely defining a certain kind of cause as sufficient cause. With respect, he does not seem to have realised that the Explanation had a bearing upon the cardinal question as to whether the Small Cause Court Judge would have jurisdiction to proceed further, in case the Defendant appeared and showed cause. 43, but appears to have regarded it as merely defining a certain kind of cause as sufficient cause. With respect, he does not seem to have realised that the Explanation had a bearing upon the cardinal question as to whether the Small Cause Court Judge would have jurisdiction to proceed further, in case the Defendant appeared and showed cause. For the reasons I have already given, the Explanation completely disposes of the Contention of the Petitioner and establishes jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court even in cases where the occupant appears and shows cause. In my view, the section cannot be read as constituting the Small Causes Court a Court for only undefended applications under sec. 41 of the Act. The first contention of the Petitioner must accordingly be overruled. 12. It was next contended that the order made by the learned Judge was bad for a second reason. It was said that there were several subtenants on the premises, but the only notice served was a notice on the Petitioner. No notice had been served on the sub-tenants and it was contended that by reason of that omission and the provisions of sec. 41 of the Act, the Opposite Party could not maintain his application or at least succeed on it. Sec. 41, to quote only the material portion, deals with cases where a person is in occupation of property of a certain annual value, either as a tenant or by permission of another person or of some person through whom such other person claims. The section goes on to say that if such tenancy or permission has been determined or withdrawn and such tenant or occupier or any person holding under or by assignment from him (hereinafter called the occupant) refuses to deliver up such property in compliance with a request made to him in this behalf by such other person, such other person (hereinafter called the applicant) may apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons against the occupant, calling upon him to show cause, on a day therein appointed, why he should not be compelled to deliver up the property. 13. 13. What was contended before us was that the actual occupants of the premises in the present case were a number of sub-tenants and in order to obtain an order for possession, the Opposite Party was bound to serve a notice upon them and to bring them before the Court This argument overlooks altogether the definition of "occupant" given in the section itself and it will be found that the term covers all persons belonging to the several classes mentioned in the earlier part of the section who may be on, or have an occupancy interest in, a certain premises. It covers the tenant, covers sub-tenants under the tenant and covers perhaps even licensees under either the tenant or the sub-tenant. If the owner of the premises demands possession from one of such various classes of persons who may be in occupation of the premises, he is perfectly entitled under the terms of the section to proceed against him under the Act. The application may and indeed must be made against the particular occupant who had been asked to, deliver possession and failed to do so. In the facts of the present case, the Opposite Party, having demanded possession of the Petitioner, who is a tenant, was well-entitled under sec. 41 to proceed against him alone and obtain an order for possession against him, although he may have sub-let the premises to others. Whether that order would be effective against any subtenants who may be on the premises is a further question with which we are not concerned. All that we are concerned with is the proper constitution of the application that was actually made and I am of opinion that inasmuch as the present proceeding is limited to the Opposite Party and the Petitioner, the former was not required to implead any other party in order to get an effective order, so far as his immediate tenant was concerned. In my opinion, the second contention of the Petitioner must also be overruled. In the result, both the contentions urged on behalf of the Petitioners fail. The Rule is accordingly discharged with costs--hearing-fee, two gold mohurs. Harries, C.J. I agree.