JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The Petitioner who is one of several judgment-debtors under a rent decree complains that Opposite Party No. 1, a co-judgment-debtor, was wrongly allowed by the Court below to make a deposit under sec. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and wrongly declared to be entitled to rank as a mortgagee of the tenure. The answer of Opposite Party No. 1 is that even a judgment-debtor, at least a co-sharer judgment-debtor, is entitled to make a deposit under the section. His further case is that, in any event, he is also a subordinate tenant and there would be no question of his right to make a deposit in that capacity. The facts are simple and may be briefly stated. The Petitioner and Opposite Parties Nos. 1 to 38 are the holders of a darputni under Opposite Party No. 39, a zamindary estate. It appears that a title suit was brought in 1944 by Opposite Party No. 1 against Opposite Party No. 2, and when that suit was pending, the darputni was advertised for sale on account of arrears of rent. Thereupon, the Petitioner deposited the entire amount claimed and he was put in possession of the darputni under the provisions of Or. 39, r. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the meantime, the landlord had obtained another rent decree for an antecedent period and the darputni was again advertised for sale. August 12, 1946, was fixed as the date of sale. On August 10, Opposite Party No. 1 made an application for leave to deposit the entire decretal amount and for an order that he might upon making such deposit be given the possession of the darputni as a statutory mortgagee. By an order passed on the same day the learned Subordinate Judge granted the permission asked for, and by a later order, also made on the same day, he directed that Opposite Party No. 1 would be treated as a statutory mortgagee under sec. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. On August 12, that is to say, on the day fixed for the sale, the Petitioner made a similar application for leave to deposit the decretal amount and it was then that he discovered that Opposite Party No. 1 had already paid off the entire decretal amount and had secured an order to the effect that he would rank as a statutory mortgagee. The order of August 10 in favour of Opposite Party No. 1 was an ex parte order, passed without notice to any of the other judgment-debtors. The learned Subordinate Judge, on receiving the application made by the Petitioner, made an order that it would come up for bearing along with the application of Opposite Party No. 1 on a sub-sequent day. It appears that thereafter three other judgment-debtors made applications objecting to the order made in favour of Opposite Party No. 1 on August 10, and ultimately the number of applications and counter-applications came to be seven. They were all disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge by an order dated November 11, 1946. 2. It appears to have been contended before the learned Subordinate Judge that the threatened sale could not be a rent sale at all, and, therefore, sec. 171 could have no application. That contention was not repeated before us and accordingly nothing further need be said about it. The learned Subordinate Judge did not hold that Opposite Party No. 1 was entitled to make a deposit qua judgment-debtor. What he hold was that although Opposite Party No. 1 had made his application in the capacity of a judgment-debtor and had not clearly specified in that application that he had any other interest in the property, the materials subsequently produced before him showed that he had a niskar tenancy under the darputni. The learned Subordinate Judge accordingly held that Opposite Party No. 1 was entitled to make a deposit and claim the benefits of sec. 171 in his capacity as the owner of the subordinate interest, although he might not be entitled to make a deposit qua judgment-debtor. The learned Subordinate Judge further held that the order passed on August 10, 1946, not having been questioned by any application to this Court, it had become final and the Petitioner had no right to ask the Court to go back upon that order. On the above grounds the learned Subordinate Judge held that the deposit made by Opposite Party No. 1 was a valid deposit, and inasmuch as that deposit had already been accepted, there could be no question of the Petitioner making a further deposit. In the result he dismissed all the petitions of objection and upheld the deposit made by Opposite-Patty No. 1. It is against that order that the present Rule was obtained. 3. In the result he dismissed all the petitions of objection and upheld the deposit made by Opposite-Patty No. 1. It is against that order that the present Rule was obtained. 3. Two points were urged before us in support of the Rule. Mr. Gupta who appeared on behalf of the Petitioner contended that if a person was in fact a judgment-debtor, the fact that he had another interest as well would not entitle him to make a deposit under sec. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It was contended in the next place that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the order passed on August 10 had become final, could not be upheld inasmuch as that order was passed without any notice to any of the other persons interested and inasmuch as such other persons had no proper opportunity to question it by appropriate proceedings. 4. It is clear that if Mr. Gupta succeeds on the first point the second need not be considered at all. I may, however, add that the learned Subordinate Judge was not right in holding that the Petitioner was in any way estopped from questioning the order passed on August 10, 1946. That order, as already stated, had been passed without any notice to the other persons interested in the property, and in fact the moment the order came to be known to the other judgment-debtors, the Petitioner as well as three other judgment-debtors immediately made applications, asking the learned Subordinate Judge to vacate that order. The real question to be considered is, therefore, the first. 5. It appears to me that there can be no possible doubt as to the true meaning of sec. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, if it is read, as it ought to be along with sec. 170. Sec. 170 provides that when an order for the sale of a tenure or holding in execution of a decree for arrears of rent due thereon has been made, the judgment-debtor or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may pay the decretal amount together with costs into Court. It need hardly be said that the judgment-debtor is also a person whose interests are affected by the sale. It need hardly be said that the judgment-debtor is also a person whose interests are affected by the sale. But since the section mentions him and " any person whose interests are affected by the sale" separately, the intention seems to me to be clear that by the latter phrase persons other than the judgment-debtor are contemplated. When the Act proceeds to enact the next section namely, sec. 171 it drops the judgment-debtor and confines itself to "any person whose interests are affected by the sale."' It seems to me to be perfectly clear that the distinction between a judgment-debtor and persons other than the judgment-debtor whose interests are affected (sic) sale is maintained in sec. 171 as (sic) it cannot be contended that (sic) phrase in that section includes the judgment-debtor. 6. Indeed, it appears to be a mistake to speak of any one making a deposit under sec. 171 as if that section makes a second and a separate provision for making a deposit in addition to the provisions made in sec. 170. Sec. 171 does not create any right of making a deposit at all. It merely lays down the legal effect of a deposit made by one of the two classes of persons to whom a right to make a deposit is given by sec. 170. It will appear from a reference to sec. 170 that the deposit can be made at any time before the tenure or holding is knocked down to the auction-purchaser. It is thus clear that the deposit can be made at any time before the sale is actually held, and it follows that any deposit made for the purpose of preventing a sale must necessarily be a deposit under sec. 170, for the Act does not provide for two different stages, at one of which a deposit can be made under sec. 170 and at another under sec. 171. What sec. 171 in fact does is, as I have already endeavoured to explain, that it lays down the consequences of a deposit under sec. 170 when it is made not by the judgment-debtor but by any person other than a judgment-debtor whose interests are affected by the sale. It is sub-sec. (3) of sec. 170 which gives the right to make a deposit. 170 when it is made not by the judgment-debtor but by any person other than a judgment-debtor whose interests are affected by the sale. It is sub-sec. (3) of sec. 170 which gives the right to make a deposit. It is that section which says that a deposit may be made by the judgment-debtor or any person whose interests are affected by the sale. When one passes on to sec. 171 one notices that all that is there provided is that certain consequences will follow " when any person whose interests are affected by the sale of a tenure or holding advertised for sale.... says into Court the amount requisite to (sic) vent the sale." This payment is clearly (sic) payment contemplated and authorized (sic) 170 and not any other payment (sic) any other time. If that be so, (sic) be no question that the phrase any person whose interests are affected by the sale " is not used in sec. 171 in any wider sense than it bears in sec. 170, for sec. 171 is really a continuation of sec. 170 and not a separate provision. I am accordingly of opinion that the phrase " any person whose interests are affected by the sale" as used in sec 171, cannot and does not include a judgment-debtor. 7. The same conclusion would follow from an examination of certain other provisions of the section. cl. (a) of sub-sec. (I) of sec. 171 provides that when the amount requisite to prevent the sale has been deposited, "the amount so paid by him (i.e., any person's interests are affected by the sale) shall be deemed to be a debt bearing interest at twelve per centum per annum and secured by a mortgage of the tenure or holding to him " and cl. (c) provides that " he shall be entitled to possession of the tenure or holding as mortgagee of the tenant." If these clauses are to be taken to contemplate the judgment-debtor as well, they must be taken to contemplate that a person can be a creditor in respect of a debt owing by himself and that he can be his own mortgagee. I can see no reason to attribute to the legislature any absurdity of that kind. I can see no reason to attribute to the legislature any absurdity of that kind. The draftsmanship of the Bengal Tenancy Act, notably of some of the recently enacted provisions, may not be of an ideal character, but there is no reason to make impossible assumptions and then to condemn the Legislature for having enacted absurdities. In my opinion, cls. (a) and (c) of sub-sec. (I) of sec. 171 make it abundantly clear that by the phrase "any person whose interests are affected by the sale " judgment-debtors are not contemplated. 8. Dr. Sen Gupta, however, contended that although there might be difficulty in applying sec. 171 to the case of a sole judgment-debtor, there was no difficulty at all in applying it to the case of a judgment-debtor who was merely one of many. His contention was that the Legislature must be deemed to have been aware of the other laws of the country and what it did in sec. 171 was merely to make a general provision and to leave the actual consequences in particular cases to be worked out by reference to provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. In other words, his contention was that in the case of a deposit by a co-sharer judgment-debtor the share of the rent payable by himself would be deducted from the amount deposited and it would be only in respect of the balance that he would be deemed to be a creditor and similarly he would he deemed to be a mortgagee only in respect of shares of the tenure or holding held by the judgment-debtors other than himself. The law of merger would operate. The simple answer to that contention is to he found in the language of the section itself. The section does not make any distinction between the amount payable by a sole judgment-debtor and the amount payable by a co-sharer judgment-debtor. It provides that the whole of the amount deposited shall be deemed to be a debt and it provides further that the depositor shall be entitled to the possession of the whole tenure or holding as the mortgagee of the tenant. If the intention of the Legislature was that these provisions should be worked out in particular case by reading them along with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, provision of a clearer character might have been expected. If the intention of the Legislature was that these provisions should be worked out in particular case by reading them along with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, provision of a clearer character might have been expected. But the real answer to Dr. Sen Gupta's contention is the one which I have already attempted to give, namely, that in secs. 170 and 171 the Legislature uses the terms " judgment-debtor and " any person whose interests are affected by the sale," to indicate two quite different classes of persons. The sections provide their own dictionary for the meaning of the terms they use. 9. It was then contended by Dr. Gupta that the Petitioner's argument was basically wrong, inasmuch as the principle that a man could not be a creditor in respect of a debt owing by himself and could not be his own mortgagee had been expressly departed from in the Bengal Tenancy Act. He instanced the case of sec. 146B. The section provides that when any person, who claims that he should have been joined as a co-sharer tenant defendant in a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent, may at any time before the hearing of the suit has commenced, apply to be made a party defendant to the suit and the Court Shall consider his claim, and if it finds that he should have been so joined shall join him as a party Defendant. Then there is a proviso which lays down: That if any such person at any time in the course of such suit pays into Court full amount of the c aim together with such costs as the Court may direct, the suit shall be dismissed and in any such case the provisions of section 171 shall apply. 10. Dr. Sen Gupta contended that here was a clear provision to the effect that even a co-sharer tenant and a co-sharer judgment-debtor might make a deposit and on making such deposit he would be entitled to the benefits of sec. 171. In my opinion, so to read the section is to misread it altogether. Sec. 146B contemplates a case where a suit has been brought for recovery of arrears of rent and a person who has not been impleaded as a Defendant seeks to intervene on the basis that he also is entitled to be joined as a co-sharer. 171. In my opinion, so to read the section is to misread it altogether. Sec. 146B contemplates a case where a suit has been brought for recovery of arrears of rent and a person who has not been impleaded as a Defendant seeks to intervene on the basis that he also is entitled to be joined as a co-sharer. The right to make a deposit, which is given by the section, is a right to make such a deposit before the final decision in the suit, that is to say, at a stage when the question as to whether he is or is not a co-sharer has not been finally decided. If the suit proceeds to a decision and it is found that the applicant is a co-sharer, there will be no occasion for his making a deposit because the deposit must be made in the course of the suit and not after the decision. Before the final decision, the status of the applicant will not have been finally determined and it seems to me that what the section really intends to lay down is that when a person who has not been joined as a Defendant in a rent suit claims to be a co-sharer and puts forward a case which seems prima facie to require investigation, he may be joined and allowed to deposit the rent claimed; and since such person is yet a stranger to the tenancy and may ultimately fail to establish he is not, and may then he found to have paid an amount for which not he but others were liable, the Legislature as a measure of justice, provides for him a security. Sec. 146B docs not, In my view imply that a person who has been found to be a co-sharer and who has suffered judgment in that capacity may still be allowed to make a deposit under sec. 170 and then to acquire the benefits provided for in the latter section. In my opinion the analogy of sec. 146B invoked by Dr. Sen Gupta is entirely misleading and it lends no support to his contention. 11. In my opinion, the true view of sec. 171 was taken by M. C. Ghosh. J., in the case of Kartic Chandra Manna v. Nibaran Chandra Ghose 38 C. W. N. 988 (1934). In my opinion the analogy of sec. 146B invoked by Dr. Sen Gupta is entirely misleading and it lends no support to his contention. 11. In my opinion, the true view of sec. 171 was taken by M. C. Ghosh. J., in the case of Kartic Chandra Manna v. Nibaran Chandra Ghose 38 C. W. N. 988 (1934). Reference was made in the course of the argument to the case of Ashutosh Ghose v. Abinash Chandra Chaudhuri 15 C. W. N. 782 (1911). But I do not attach much importance to that decision as it turned on the language of the section as it stood before the recent amendment. 12. The next question to consider is whether although a person might not be entitled to make a deposit qua judgment-debtor, he would be entitled to do so, if he had also another interest which would be affected by the sale. I have stated the question as it was put during the argument, but, in my view, the statement is not accurate: There can be no question about a judgment-debtor being entitled to make a deposit He is always entitled to deposit the amount claimed as rent, even if he may have another interest. The real question is whether where it is the judgment-debtor who makes a deposit and he happens to have another interest as well which is likely to be affected by the sale, the benefits provided for in sec. 171 would accrue in his favour. In my opinion, the answer to that question must be in the negative. If a person is in fact a judgment-debtor he is nonetheless a judgment-debtor although he may have another interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy. If I am right in the view I have already expressed, namely, that sec. 170 as well as sec. 171 makes a clear distinction a judgment-debtor and a person whose interests are affected by the sale, then the moment a person is found to be a judgment-debtor, he falls under the first of the two categories, and if he does so fall he must be excluded from the ambit of sec. 171. 170 as well as sec. 171 makes a clear distinction a judgment-debtor and a person whose interests are affected by the sale, then the moment a person is found to be a judgment-debtor, he falls under the first of the two categories, and if he does so fall he must be excluded from the ambit of sec. 171. In my view, if a person is a judgment-debtor and he is also the owner of another interest, he cannot for the purpose of making a deposit just put by his status of a judgment-debtor and put on the other status of being the owner of a different interest. Once he is a judgment-debtor, he is consigned by the Act to such rights as he has under sec. 170, and he cannot claim any of the rights provided for in sec. 171 on the basis of any further interest which he may have in the subject-matter of the tenancy. The position of such a judgment-debtor is in no way analogous to the position of an executor or of a trustee as it was sought to be contended. Such persons have a different status altogether as executors and trustees which is distinct and separate from their status as private individuals; whereas a judgment-debtor who has a further interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy has not in fact a number of capacities, but what he has is only a number of different interests. In my opinion, it was rightly contended by Mr. Gupta that if a man was in fact a judgment-debtor he could not lean on any other interest which he might have in the subject-matter of the tenancy to support his claim to make a deposit under sec. 170 with the benefits of sec. 171. 13. Reference was made in course of the argument to a decision of Mukherjea, J., sitting singly [Manindra Chandra Ghose v. Ramnath Samanta 41 C. W. N. 983 (1987)] which might prima facie seem to lend some support to the contention that if a person had two capacities, namely, that of a judgment-debtor and that of the owner of a further interest, he would not be precluded from claiming the benefits of sec. 171 by the reason that he was the judgment-debtor, but might claim such benefits on the basis of the other interest. 171 by the reason that he was the judgment-debtor, but might claim such benefits on the basis of the other interest. The decision, if closely read, would indicate that Mukherjea, J., did not intend to lay down any general proposition of that character. The facts of the case before him were that a rent decree had been obtained against the recorded tenants. A person other than the recorded tenants bad purchased the share of some of the co-sharers but had not been recognised by the landlord. He had also taken a mortgage of the share of another co-sharer. He applied to make a deposit as a mortgagee and his claim was resisted on the ground that since he was the purchaser of some shares in the tenancy, although he might be an unrecognised purchaser, his position was in effect that of a judgment-debtor and consequently he could not claim the benefit of sec. 171. Mukherjea, J., expressly refrained from deciding whether the applicant could be treated as a constructive judgment-debtor on the ground that he had acquired some shares in the tenancy, and he proceeded to base his decision on the single ground that the applicant was clearly a mortgagee. In the course of the judgment, however, he happened to observe as follows:-- I think, therefore, that the Court below was quite right in giving the opposite party No, 1 the relief which he prayed for, and it can not be said that because ho was a transferee of a portion of the holding as well, he was precluded from getting the advantage of sec. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 14. It will be noticed that Mukherjea, J., did not say that the applicant was a judgment-debtor, but only said that he was a transferee of a portion of the holding. It is thus clear that Mukherjea, J., did not purport to hold that even if a person was named in the proceeding as a co-sharer tenant and was a person against whom a decree had been passed, he would still be entitled to claim the benefit of sec. 171 on the basis of some further interest if he had any. But if it was the intention of Mukherjea, J., to hold that even a co-sharer judgment-debtor might claim the benefit of sec. 171 on the basis of some further interest I must, with due respect, express my dissent. 171 on the basis of some further interest if he had any. But if it was the intention of Mukherjea, J., to hold that even a co-sharer judgment-debtor might claim the benefit of sec. 171 on the basis of some further interest I must, with due respect, express my dissent. In my opinion, a judgment-debtor, once he is found to be in fact a judgment-debtor, cannot claim the benefits of sec. 171 simply on the ground that he has some further interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy. It follows from what 1 have stated above that the orders made by the learned Subordinate Judge on August 10, 1946, and on November 11 following must be set aside. 15. The actual order which should be made by us. is, however, a matter of some difficulty. It was held by Akram, J., and myself in the case of Durga Das Kuthi v. Ram Dayal Samaddar 50 C. W. N. 208 (1945) that once an order for sale had been made, it was not extinguished simply by the fact that a person made a deposit under sec. 170. but it subsisted till a deposit was finally accepted by the Court. It was added that so long as the order for sale subsisted all persons competent to make a deposit under sec. 170 might make deposits and the Court would ultimately have to decide the question of priority as between them. It was further laid down that in a case of competition between different deposits made by different persons on different dates, the deposit first made ought to have preference on general principles of equity. It follows that strictly speaking, the deposite made by Opposite Party No. 1 on August 10, 1946, having been finally accepted by the Court below on the same date the order for sale was extinguished and thereafter there could be no question of any other party making a further deposit; and it would follow further that Opposite Party No. 1 must now be told that his money will be applied to the satisfaction of the decree, but he will have none of the benefits under sec. 171. In all the facts of the case it appears to me that that will not be a just decision to take. 171. In all the facts of the case it appears to me that that will not be a just decision to take. Whatever the legal rights of Opposite Party No. 1 might have been, there can be no question that he made the deposit in the expectation that he would be able to rank as a mortgagee and that expectation was induced by his experience of previous instances in which similar benefit had been extended to other co-sharer judgment-debtors. It appears from the petition to this Court itself that on a previous occasion Opposite Party No. 2 had made a deposit in the capacity of a se-putnidar, although he was a judgment-debtor himself, and he was thereupon given the rights of a statutory mortgagee under sec. 171. In such circumstances, to declare now that the deposit made by the Opposite Party No. 1 will be detained and applied to the satisfaction of the decree and to send him away with no rights whatsoever, will certainly operate on him with hardship. The proper order to make, in my view, is to set aside all orders passed on and after August 10, 1946, and place the parties where they were when the learned Subordinate Judge directed that the application or Opposite Party No. 1 and that of the Petitioner would come up for decision on a subsequent date. The many applications which were made after that date by other parties, questioning the order made on August 10, 1946, need not be considered by the learned Subordinate Judge any further, because they stand disposed of by this judgment. We accordingly think that the proper order to make is to relegate the parties to the position in which they were on August 12, 1946, save that the orders passed on and after August 10, 1946, will not exist, and leave it to the learned Subordinate Judge to decide which of the two deposits he will accept, provided both of them are still willing to make deposits. If any of them be minded not to insist or his deposit being accepted and to withdraw the same, he should be permitted to do so. If both of them withdraw their deposits, the sale will be held. If both of them insist on their deposits being accepted, the learned Subordinate Judge will, decide the question of priority as between the two. If both of them withdraw their deposits, the sale will be held. If both of them insist on their deposits being accepted, the learned Subordinate Judge will, decide the question of priority as between the two. If one of them withdraws and the other dose not, necessarily an order will be made in favour of the party who dose not withdraw. 16. In the result, therefore, orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge on August 10, 1946, and all subsequent orders are set aside, and he is directed to consider the applications of Opposite Party No. 1 and the Petitioner regarding the deposites made by them in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. 17. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. 18. Let the records be sent down as early as possible. Let the affidavit in opposition filed in Court to-day be kept on the record. Harries, C.J. I agree.