JUDGMENT 1. Premises No. 4, Diamond Harbour Road, which is within the municipal limits of Calcutta, comprises 69 bighas 19 cottas 8 square feet of land with buildings standing thereon. The respondents, who are the Governors of St. Thomas School were the owners of the land. They were the owners of the buildings which had been constructed before April 1942. The said premises had in the past been assessed to consolidated rates under S. 127(b) , Calcutta Municipal Act (hereinafter called the Act). The assessment at the general six-yearly re-valuation before the challenged assessment was made would have been current up to the third quarter of 1944-45. In April 1942 the said premises were requisitioned under R. 76 (= R. 75A of the amended rules) of the rules made under the Defence of India Act for the purpose of the Government of the Federation and possession was taken by the Central Government on 12th April 1942. A memorandum of agreement between the respondent and the Governor-General in Council was executed on 26th February 1943 by which the Governor-General in Council agreed to pay to the respondents Rs. 4500 per month as compensation with effect from 12th April 1942, and the respondents agreed to bear the municipal taxes. Thereafter the Central Government raised some additional structures at its cost valued at Rs. 3,00,000. This resulted in an intermediate re-valuation under S. 131, cls. (c) and (d), and consolidated rates at an enhanced amount was imposed from 1st quarter of 1944-1945 up to the 3rd quarter thereof. 2. This intermediate assessment is not the subject of the proceedings before us. After this intermediate revaluation the Central Government raised at its costs, additional structures valued at Rs. 50,000. At the general revaluation made under S. 131(1) , the costs of those additional structures made by the Central Government, the total value whereof was Rs. 3,50,000, was taken into account and the annual value computed in terms of S. 127(b) of the Act was determined at Rs. 93,370. The respondents filed objections to this assessment before the Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta Corporation. The first Deputy Executive Officer, who heard the objections, reduced the value of the land from Rs. 900 per cotta to Rs. 750 per cotta with the result that the annual value was reduced to Rs. 77,873, but overruled all the other objections. 93,370. The respondents filed objections to this assessment before the Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta Corporation. The first Deputy Executive Officer, who heard the objections, reduced the value of the land from Rs. 900 per cotta to Rs. 750 per cotta with the result that the annual value was reduced to Rs. 77,873, but overruled all the other objections. Thereupon the respondents filed an appeal in the Court of Small Causes at Sealdah under the provisions of S. 141 of the Act. The learned Judge of that Court framed three issues which were as follows: (1) Is the appeal barred by limitation? (2) Was the assessment in question illegal and ultra vires? (3) Is the said assessment liable to be set aside in whole or in part? He held that the proceeding commenced before him was not barred by limitation. That point has not been further canvassed before us. 3. The contentions of the parties on the merits centred round S. 154, Government of India Act, 1935. The learned Judge held that in view of the provisions of that section the value of the structures raised by the Central Government at its costs cannot be taken into account in fixing the annual value in terms of S. 127(b) of the Act, and so the sum of Rs. 3,50,000 had to be discarded from computation. After excluding that item, he found the annual value on which consolidated rates could be assessed was Rs. 60,374. On issue 3 his finding is that the whole assessment was not liable to be set aside but that the respondents were liable to pay consolidated rates on the basis of Rs. 60,374 as the annual value of the premises. The respondent has not challenged this finding by filing a cross appeal or a memorandum of cross-objections. The Corporation of Calcutta has filed this appeal. The sole contention of the appellant concerns the applicability of S. 154, Government of India Act to the facts of this case. 4. The steps in the argument advanced by the appellant's advocate are as follows: (1) that S. 154, Government of India Act, applies to property of which His Majesty is the full owner; (2) that the word "building", which is an unit of assessment under S. 127(b) of the Calcutta Act, means the land with the superstructure. 4. The steps in the argument advanced by the appellant's advocate are as follows: (1) that S. 154, Government of India Act, applies to property of which His Majesty is the full owner; (2) that the word "building", which is an unit of assessment under S. 127(b) of the Calcutta Act, means the land with the superstructure. The main enactment in S. 154, Government of India Act, would be attracted only when His Majesty is the full owner of the building used in that sense that is to say owner of the superstructure as well of the land underneath; (3) that as on the requisition under the said rule framed under the Defence of India Act the ownership in the land remained where it was before the requisition, namely in the Governors of the School, S. 154, Government of India Act, cannot be invoked to their aid by the assesses. 5. The word requisition has been defined in R. 2(11), Defence of India Rules. It means in relation to any property to take possession of the property or to require the property to be placed at the disposal of the requisitioning authority. The possession or enjoyment of the owner is thus put an end to but his ownership of the property is not affected by an order of requisition. It is only when the property is acquired that the ownership vests in the Government. This is made clear beyond doubt not only by the definition of the word "requisition" but by the terms of para. 2 of R. 75A, Defence of India Rules. Seeing this difficulty, the learned advocate for the assessee urged before us that to all intents and purposes the ownership passes to Government on requisition, as the Government can use the property requisitioned in any manner it pleases even to the extent of destroying it. We cannot accept this last mentioned contention. We hold that after the requisition the ownership of the land remained as before in the respondents, namely the Governors of the School. 6. We cannot accept this last mentioned contention. We hold that after the requisition the ownership of the land remained as before in the respondents, namely the Governors of the School. 6. The learned advocate for the appellant contends that two conditions must be present to attract the first paragraph of section 154, Government of India Act, 1935, namely: (i) that the property in question must be vested in His Majesty and (ii) it must be so vested for the purpose of the Government of the Federation (Government of the Dominion after the Adaptation). The second element is present in the case before us. The question is what is the meaning of the phrase "property vested in His Majesty". The learned advocate for the appellant contends that the word "property" in that phrase means the physical object and the word "vest" used there indicates full ownership. Thus he says a "leasehold interest" belonging to His Majesty which is used for the Government of the Federation would not come within the section. Without deciding the question or passing an opinion on the soundness of the contention, we will proceed upon the assumption that that construction of the phrase is correct for the purpose of this case, as word "vest" is ordinarily used in connection with "title". It cannot in our opinion be controverted that the ownership of the land and the structures existing thereon before the requisition did not in any sense "vest", in His Majesty by the requisition. It is equally evident that the structures raised by the Government at its costs after the requisition belonged absolutely to His Majesty. The position therefore is that the land underneath those additional structures raised at the cost of Rs. 3,50,000/- did not belong to His Majesty, but those additional structures did. The question, therefore, is whether even in these circumstances the value of those additional structures can be taken into account in fixing the annual value, and so the consolidated rates. To be more precise can the value of the said structures be taken into account in arriving at the annual value when the assessment is made under S. 127(b) of the Act? To be more precise can the value of the said structures be taken into account in arriving at the annual value when the assessment is made under S. 127(b) of the Act? As on the annual value depends the amount of the tax the respondents' advocate contends that it cannot be taken into account, for, if it be taken into account the result in substance would be taxation by a local authority of the property e.g. the structures-which belong to His Majesty. 7. The provisions of S. 154, Government of India Act, 1935, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Governor-General in Council v. Corporation of Calcutta, 52 CWN 173 : (AIR 1948 (35) Cal. 116), though not exactly on the same set of facts as before us. But the decision in that case is a binding authority on us on the construction of S. 154, Government of India Act, both of the main enactment and of the proviso. In that case Mukherjee J. noticed the case of a requisition of property under the Defence of India Rules for the purpose of illustrating his decision. He observed at page 177 of the report that in such a case the costs of the structures raised by the Government at its expense after the requisition could not be taken into account in arriving at the annual value under S. 127(b), Calcutta Municipal Act. It is contended before us by the appellant's advocate that this part of his judgment is obiter. 8. The facts of that case were as follows. The Central Government was owner of the land and structures, which were there before 1st April 1937, when part III of the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force, and the premises were being used for the Government of the Federation. The said premises was numbered 7, Gun Foundry Road. After Part III of the said Act had come into force Government raised some additional structures. At the general re-valuation that followed the municipality took into account the costs of those additional structures in arriving at the annual value in terms of S. 127(b) , Calcutta Municipal Act. Mukherjee J. first noticed the main enactment contained in para. After Part III of the said Act had come into force Government raised some additional structures. At the general re-valuation that followed the municipality took into account the costs of those additional structures in arriving at the annual value in terms of S. 127(b) , Calcutta Municipal Act. Mukherjee J. first noticed the main enactment contained in para. 1 of S. 154, Government of India Act, and observed that prima facie the land and building which constituted premises No. 7, Gun Foundry Road would be exempt from municipal rates, and that the Corporation of Calcutta could impose consolidated rates only if the case came within the proviso to that section. It was conceded that the land and the structures which stood thereon before 1st April 1937, could be taxed by the municipality at that general re-assessment, because they were treated as liable to municipal rates before the date when part III of the said Act came into force. The argument of the advocate appearing for the Corporation of Calcutta was that as premises No. 7, Gun Foundry Road had been treated as liable to municipal rates before 1st April 1937, the challenged assessment was quite in order. At p. 176 of the report, Mukherjee J. noticed the argument of the advocate appearing for the municipality, which was that as premises No. 7, Gun Foundry Road was the unit of assessment and that as that unit had been treated as liable to tax before 1st April 1937, that unit could be taxed again. The new buildings erected after that date-could be assessed to rates as part of the unit, namely premises No. 7, Gun Foundry Road. Both the learned Judges repelled this argument. Mukherjee J. held in the first place that the word "property" in para. 1 of S. 154 has been used in a perfectly general sense. It included land, building, chattels, shares, debts and in fact everything which has a market value. 9. Second he held that the mode adopted for assessment by the Corporation of Calcutta was not at all relevant for determining the meaning of the word "property" for the purpose of S. 154 Government of India Act. It included land, building, chattels, shares, debts and in fact everything which has a market value. 9. Second he held that the mode adopted for assessment by the Corporation of Calcutta was not at all relevant for determining the meaning of the word "property" for the purpose of S. 154 Government of India Act. At p. 177 of the report he noticed the provisions of S. 127(b) , Municipal Act, and observed that according to that section the building (meaning thereby the structures apart from the subjacent land) is not to be valued apart from the subjacent land, and that for the purpose of assessment the building is taken as part of the land. But in his opinion those considerations had no bearing on the interpretation of S. 154, Government of India Act. He went on to observe that under the proviso to S. 154, a property liable or treated as liable to pay tax prior to 1st April 1937, would continue to pay the tax. If there is no building on a land and the land was lying vacant on 31st March 1937, the building that is erected on the land subsequent to that date does not in our opinion come within the proviso simply because the building could not be assessed apart from the land and the land was already assessed. The liability that is continued under the proviso to S. 154 is the liability of a particular properly which was subject to a tax on 31st March 1937, and which ex hypothesi was in existence on that date. The mere fact that a property, which comes into existence subsequent to 31st March 1937, is according to the method adopted by a Corporation to be assessed as part of another property existing prior to that date does not bring the new property within the limit of the proviso, which being an exception engrafted upon a general provision has to be construed strictly-In our opinion, the word "property" in S. 154, Government of India Act need not be the entire unit of taxation adopted by a particular taxing statute; it may be a portion of the unit, and the fact that in granting exemption to the particular property the ordinary method of assessment cannot be followed is perfectly immaterial. What we have underlined (here italicised) is a part of the ratio decidendi of the case, and so the aforesaid observations are binding on us, unless we choose to dissent and refer the question to a Full Bench. We, however, see no reason for expressing our dissent. On the other hand, we respectfully agree with these observations. We need not quote in extenso from the judgment of Ormond J. He proceeded on the same lines. These observations cut at the root of the second step in the argument of the learned advocate for the appellant. The structures apart from the land is in every sense the property of His Majesty and so come within the main enactment contained in S. 154, Government of India Act, and being raised after 1st April 1937, do not come within the proviso. The fact that the land underneath those structures does not belong to the Government does not none the less make the structures not the property of His Majesty. The fact that for the purpose of assessment the unit is a building, that is to any land and the structures thereon, does not affect the question. We accordingly do not see our way in accepting the contentions of the appellants. 10. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs. As the case involves the interpretation of S. 154, Government of India Act, 1935, we grant the certificate in terms of S. 205(1) of that Act.