JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The petitioner who is one of several judgment-debtors under a rent decree complains that opposite party No. 1 a co-judgment-debtor was wrongly allowed by the Court below to make a deposit under S. 171, Ben. Ten. Act, and wrongly declared to be entitled to rank as a mortgagee of the tenure. The answer of opposite party No. 1 is that even a judgment-debtor at least a co-sharer judgment-debtor, is entitled to make a deposit under the section. His further case is that, in any event, he is also a subordinate tenant and there could be no question of his right to make a deposit in that capacity. 2. The facts are simple and may be briefly stated. The petitioner and opposite parties Nos. 1 to 38 are the holders of a darpatni under opposite party No. 39 a zemindary estate. It appears that a title suit was brought in 1944 by opposite party No. 1 against opposite party No. 2, and when that suit was pending, the darpatni was advertised for sale on account of arrears of rent. Thereupon, the petitioner deposited the entire amount claimed and he was put in possession of the darpatni under the provisions of O. 39, R. 9, Civil P.C. In the meantime, the landlord had obtained another rent decree for an antecedent period, and the darpatni was again advertised for sale. 12th August 1946 was fixed as the date of sale. On 10th August opposite party No. 1 made an application for leave to deposit the entire decretal amount and for an order that he might, upon making such deposit be given the possession of the darpatni as a statutory mortgagee. By an order passed on the same day the learned Subordinate Judge granted the permission asked for, and by a later order, also made on the same day, he directed that opposite party No. 1 would be treated as a statutory mortgagee under S. 171, Ben. Ten. Act. On 12th August that is to say, on the day fixed for the sale, the petitioner made a similar application for leave to deposit the decretal amount, and it was then that he discovered that opposite party No. 1 had already paid off the entire decretal amount and had secured an order to the effect that he would rank as a statutory mortgagee. The order of 10th August in favour of opposite party No. 1 was an ex parte order, passed without notice to any of the other judgment-debtors. The learned Subordinate Judge, on receiving the application made by the petitioner, made an order that it would come up for hearing along with the application of opposite party No. 1 on a subsequent day. It appears that thereafter three other judgment-debtors made applications objecting to the order made in favour of opposite party No. 1 on 10th August, and ultimately the number of applications and counter applications came to be seven. They were all disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge by an order dated 11th November 1946. 3. It appears to have been contended before the learned Subordinate Judge that the threatened sale could not be a rent sale at all, and therefore s. 171 could have no application. That contention was not repeated before us and accordingly nothing further need be said about it. The learned Subordinate Judge did not hold that opposite party No. 1 was entitled to make a deposit qua judgment-debtor. What he held was that although opposite party No. 1 had made his application in the capacity of a judgment-debtor and had not clearly specified in that application that he had any other interest in the property, the materials subsequently produced before him showed that he had a niskar tenancy under the darputni. The learned Subordinate Judge accordingly held that opposite party No. 1 was entitled to make a deposit and claim the benefits of S. 171 in his capacity as the owner of the subordinate interest, although he might not be; entitled to make a deposit qua a judgment-debtor. The learned Subordinate Judge further held that the order passed on 10th August 1946, not having been questioned by any application to this Court, it had become final and the petitioner had no right to ask the Court to go back upon that order. On the above grounds, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the deposit made by opposite party No. 1 was a valid deposit, and inasmuch as that deposit had already been accepted, there could be no question of the petitioner making a further deposit. In the result he dismissed all the petitions of objection and upheld the deposit made by opposite party No. 1. In the result he dismissed all the petitions of objection and upheld the deposit made by opposite party No. 1. It is against that order that the present Rule was obtained. 4. Two points were urged before us in support of the Rule. Mr. Gupta who appeared on behalf of the petitioner contended that if a person was in fact a judgment-debtor, the fact that he had another interest as well would not entitle him to make a deposit under S. 171, Bengal Tenancy Act. It was contended in the nest place that-the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the order passed on 10th August had become final, could not be upheld inasmuch as that order was passed without any notice to any of the other persons interested, and inasmuch as such other persons had no proper opportunity to question it by appropriate proceedings. It is clear that if Mr. Gupta succeeds on the first point the second need not be considered at all. I may, however, add that the learned Subordinate Judge was not right in holding that the petitioner was in any way estopped from questioning the order passed on 10th August 1946. That order, as already stated, had been passed without any notice to the other persons interested in the property, and in fact the moment the order came to be known to the other judgment debtors, the petitioner as well as three other judgment-debtors immediately made applications, asking the learned Subordinate Judge to vacate that order. The real question to be considered is therefore the first. 5. It appears to me that there can be no possible doubt as to the true meaning of S. 171, Bengal Tenancy Act, if it is read, as it ought to be, along with S. 170. Section 170 provides that when an order for the sale of a tenure or holding in execution of a decree for arrears of rent due thereon has been made, the judgment-debtor or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may pay the decretal amount together with costs into Court. It need hardly be said that the judgment-debtor is also a person whose interests are affected by the sale. It need hardly be said that the judgment-debtor is also a person whose interests are affected by the sale. But since the section mentions him and "any person whose interests are affected by the sale'' separately, the intention seems to me to be clear that by the latter phrase persons other than the judgment-debtor are contemplated. When the Act proceeds to enact the next section, namely, S. 171 it drops the judgment-debtor and confines itself to "any person whose interests are affected by the sale." It seems to me to be perfectly clear that the distinction between a judgment-debtor and persons other than the judgment debtor whose interests are affected by the sale is maintained in S. 171 as well, and it cannot be contended that the latter phrase in that section includes the judgment-debtor. Indeed, it appears to be a mistake to speak of any one making a deposit under S. 171, as if that section makes a second and separate provision for making a deposit in addition to the provision made in S. 170. Section 171 does not create any right of making a deposit at all. It merely lays down the legal effect of a deposit made by one of the two classes of persons to whom a right to make a deposit is given by S. 170. It will appear from a reference to S. 170 that the deposit can be made at any time before the tenure or holding is knocked down to the auction-purchaser. It is thus clear that the deposit can be made at any time before the sale is actually held, and it follows that any deposit made for the purpose of preventing a sale must necessarily be a deposit under S. 170 for the Act does not provide for two different stages, at one of which a deposit can be made under S.170 and at another under S. 171. What S. 171 in fact does is, as I have already endeavoured to explain, that it lays down the consequences of a deposit under S. 170 when it is made not by the judgment-debtor but by any person other than a judgment-debtor whose interests are affected by the sale. It is sub-s. (3) of S. 170 which gives the right to make a deposit. It is sub-s. (3) of S. 170 which gives the right to make a deposit. It is that section which says that a deposit may be made by the judgment-debtor or any person whose interests are affected by the sale. When one passes on to S. 171, one notices that all that is there provided is that certain consequences will follow "when any person whose interests are affected by the sale of a tenure or holding advertised for sale.... pays into Court the amount requisite to prevent the sale." This payment is clearly the payment contemplated and authorised by S. 170 and not any other payment made at any other time. If that be so, there can be no question that the phrase "any person whose interests are affected by the sale" is not used in S. 171 in any wider sense than it bears in S. 170, for S. 171 is really a continuation of S. 170 and not a separate provision I am accordingly of opinion that the phrase "any person whose interests are affected by the sale", as used in S. 171, cannot and does not include a judgment-debtor. 6. The same conclusion would follow from an examination of certain other provisions of the section. Clause (a) of sub-s. (1) of S. 171 provides that when the amount requisite to prevent the sale has been deposited, "the amount so paid by him (i.e. any person whose interests are affected by the sale) shall be deemed to be a debt bearing interest at twelve per centum per annum and secured by a mortgage of the tenure or holding to him" and cl. (c) provides that "he shall be entitled to possession of the tenure or holding as mortgagee of the tenant." If these clauses are to be taken to contemplate the judgment-debtor as well, they must be taken to contemplate that a person can be a creditor in respect of a debt owing by himself and that he can be his own mortgagee. I can see no reason to attribute to the Legislature any absurdity of that kind. The draftsmanship of the Bengal Tenancy Act, notably of some of the recently enacted provisions, may not be of an ideal character, but there is no reason to make impossible assumptions and then to condemn the Legislature for having enacted absurdities. In my opinion, cls. I can see no reason to attribute to the Legislature any absurdity of that kind. The draftsmanship of the Bengal Tenancy Act, notably of some of the recently enacted provisions, may not be of an ideal character, but there is no reason to make impossible assumptions and then to condemn the Legislature for having enacted absurdities. In my opinion, cls. (a) and (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 171 make it abundantly clear that by the phrase "any person whose interests are affected by the sale" judgment-debtors are not contemplated. 7. Dr. Sen Gupta, however, contended that although there might be difficulty in applying S. 171 to the case of a sole judgment-debtor, there was no difficulty at all in applying it to the case of a judgment-debtor who was merely one of many. His contention was that the Legislature must be deemed to have been aware of the other laws of the country and what it did in S. 171 was merely to make a general provision and to leave the actual consequences in particular cases to be worked out by reference to provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. In other words, his contention was that in the case of a deposit by a co-sharer judgment-debtor the share of the rent payable by himself would be deducted from the amount deposited and it would be only in respect of the balance that be would be deemed to be a creditor and similarly he would be deemed to be a mortgagee only in respect of the shares of the tenure or holding held by the judgment-debtors other than himself. The law of merger would operate. The simple answer to that contention is to be found in the language of the section itself. The section does not make any distinction between the amount payable by a sole judgment-debtor and the amount payable by a co-sharer judgment-debtor. It provides that the whole of the amount deposited shall be deemed to be a debt and it provides further that the depositor shall be entitled to the possession of the whole tenure or holding as the mortgagee of the tenant. If the intention of the Legislature was that these provisions should be worked out in particular cases by reading them along with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, provision of a clearer character might have been expected. If the intention of the Legislature was that these provisions should be worked out in particular cases by reading them along with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, provision of a clearer character might have been expected. But the real answer to Dr. Sen Gupta's contention is the one which I have already attempted to give, namely, that in Ss. 170 and 171 the Legislature uses the terms 'judgment-debtor' and 'any person whose interests are affected by the sale', to indicate two quite different classes of persons. The sections provide their own dictionary for the meaning of the terms they use. 8. It was then contended by Dr. Sen Gupta that the petitioner's argument was basically wrong, inasmuch as the principle that a man could not be a creditor in respect of a debt owing by himself and could not be his own mortgagee, had been expressly departed from in the Bengal Tenancy Act. He instanced the case of S. 146B. That section provides that when any parson, who claims that he should have been joined as a co-sharer tenant defendant in a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent, may at any time before the hearing of the suit has commenced, apply to be made a party defendant to the suit, and the Court shall consider his claim, and if it finds that he should have been so joined, shall join him as a party defendant. Then there is a proviso which lays down that if any such person at any time in the course of such suit pays into Court the full amount of the claim together with such costs as the Court may direct, the out shall be dismissed and in any such case the provisions of S. 171 shall apply. Dr. Sen Gupta contended that here was a clear provision to the effect that even a co-sharer tenant and a co-sharer judgment-debtor might make a deposit and on making such deposit he would be entitled to the benefits of S. 171. In my opinion, so to read the section is to misread it altogether. Section 146B contemplates a case where a suit has been brought for recovery of arrears of rent and a person who has not been impleaded as a defendant seeks to intervene on the basis that he also is entitled to be joined as a co-sharer. In my opinion, so to read the section is to misread it altogether. Section 146B contemplates a case where a suit has been brought for recovery of arrears of rent and a person who has not been impleaded as a defendant seeks to intervene on the basis that he also is entitled to be joined as a co-sharer. The right to make a deposit, which is given by the section, is a right to make such a deposit before the final decision in the suit, that is to say, at a stage when the question as to whether he is or is not a co-sharer has not been finally decided. If the suit proceeds to a decision and it is found that the applicant is a co-sharer, there will be no occasion for his making a deposit, because the deposit must be made in the course of the suit and not after the decision. Before the final decision, the status of the applicant will not have been finally determined and it seems to me that what the section really intends to lay down is that when a person who has not been joined as a defendant in a rent suit claims to be a co-sharer and puts forward a case which seems prima facie to require investigation, he may be joined and allowed to deposit the rent claimed; and since such person is yet a stranger to the tenancy and may ultimately fail to establish he is not, and may then be found to have paid an amount for which not he but others were liable, the Legislature, as a measure of justice, provides for him a security. Section 146B does not, in my view, imply that a person who has been found to be a co-sharer and who has suffered judgment in that capacity may still be allowed to make a deposit under S. 170 and then to acquire the benefits provided for in the latter section. In my opinion, the analogy of S. 146B invoked by Dr. Sen Gupta is entirely misleading and it lends no support to his contention. In my opinion, the true view of S. 171, was taken by M.C. Ghosh J., in the case of Kartick Chandra Manna Vs. Nibaran Chandra Ghosh and Others, AIR 1934 Cal 832 . In my opinion, the analogy of S. 146B invoked by Dr. Sen Gupta is entirely misleading and it lends no support to his contention. In my opinion, the true view of S. 171, was taken by M.C. Ghosh J., in the case of Kartick Chandra Manna Vs. Nibaran Chandra Ghosh and Others, AIR 1934 Cal 832 . Reference was made in the course of the argument to the case of Ashutosh Ghose v. Abinash Chandra Choudhuri, 15 C.W.N. 782 : (11 I.C. 501). But I do not attach much importance to that decision as it turned on the language of the section as it stood before the recent amendment. 9. The next question to consider is whether although a person might not be entitled to make a deposit qua judgment-debtor, he would be entitled to do so, if he had also another interest which would be affected by the sale. I have stated the question as it was put during the argument, but, in my view, the statement is not accurate. There can be no question about a judgment-debtor being entitled to make a deposit. He is always entitled to deposit the amount claimed as rent, even if be may have another interest. The real question is whether, where it is the judgment-debtor who makes a deposit and he happens to have another interest as well which is likely to be affected by the sale, the benefits provided for in S. 171, would accrue in his favour. In my opinion, the answer to that question must be in the negative. If a person is in fact a judgment-debtor, he is nonetheless a judgment-debtor although he may have another interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy. If I am right in the view I have already expressed, namely, that S. 170, as well as S. 171, makes a clear distinction between a judgment-debtor and a person whose interests are affected by the sale, then the moment a person is found to be a judgment-debtor, he falls under the first of the two categories, and if he does so fall, he must be excluded from the ambit of S. 171. In my view, if a person is a judgment debtor and he is also the owner of another interests he cannot for the purpose of making a deposit just put by his status of a judgment-debtor, and put on the other status of being the owner of a different interest. Once he is a judgment-debtor, he is consigned by the Act to such rights as he has under S. 170, and he cannot claim any of the rights provided for in S. 171, on the basis of any further interest which he may have in the subject matter of the tenancy. The position of such a judgment-debtor is in no way analogous to the position of an executor or of a trustee as it was sought to contend. Such persons have a different status altogether as executors and trustees which is distinct and separate from their status as private individuals; whereas a judgment-debtor who has a further interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy has not in fact a number of capacities, but what be has is only a number of different interests. In my opinion, it was rightly contended by Mr. Gupta that if a man was in fact a judgment-debtor, he could not lean on any other interest which he might have in the subject-matter of the tenancy to support his claim to make a deposit under S. 170, with the benefits of S. 171. 10. Reference was made in course of the argument to a decision of Mukherjea J., sitting singly, Manindra Chandra Ghose v. Ramnath Samanta, 41 C.W.N. 983, which might prima facie seem to lend some support to the contention that if a person had two capacities, namely, that of a judgment debtor and that of the owner of a further interest, he would not be precluded from claiming the benefits of S. 171 by the reason that be was the judgment-debtor, but might claim such benefits on the basis of the other interest. The decision, if closely read, would indicate that Mukherjea J. did not intend to lay down any general proposition of that character. The facts of the case before him were that a rent decree had been obtained against the recorded tenant. A person other than the recorded tenant had purchased the share of some of the cosharers but had not been recognised by the landlord. The facts of the case before him were that a rent decree had been obtained against the recorded tenant. A person other than the recorded tenant had purchased the share of some of the cosharers but had not been recognised by the landlord. He had also taken a mortgage of the share of another cosharer. He applied to make a deposit as a mortgagee and his claim was resisted on the ground that since he was the purchaser of some shares in the tenancy, although he might be an unrecognised purchaser, his position was in effect that of a judgment-debtor and consequently he could not claim the benefit of S.171. Mukherjea J. expressly refrained from deciding whether the applicant could be treated as a constructive judgment-debtor on the ground that he had acquired some shares in the tenancy, and he proceeded to base his decision on the single ground that the applicant was clearly a mortgagee. In the course of the judgment, however, he happened to observe as follows: I think, therefore, that the Court below was quite right in giving the opposite party No. 1, the relief which he prayed for, and it cannot be said that because he was a transferee of a portion of the holding as well, he was precluded from getting the advantage of S. 171, Bengal Tenancy Act. It will be noticed that Mukherjea J. did not say that the applicant was a judgment-debtor, but only said that he was a transferee of a portion of the holding. It is thus clear that Mukherjea J. did not purport to bold that even if a person was named in the proceeding as a cosharer tenant and was a person against whom a decree had been passed, he would still be entitled to claim the benefit of S. 171 on the basis of some further interest, if he had any. But if it was the intention of Mukherjea J. to bold that even a cosharer judgment-debtor might claim the benefit of S. 171 on the basis of some further interest, I must, with due respect, express my dissent. In my opinion a judgment-debtor, once he is found to be in fact a judgment-debtor, cannot claim the benefits of S. 171 simply on the ground that he has some further interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy. In my opinion a judgment-debtor, once he is found to be in fact a judgment-debtor, cannot claim the benefits of S. 171 simply on the ground that he has some further interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy. It follows from what I have stated above that the orders made by the learned Subordinate Judge on 10th August 1946, and on 11th November following must be set aside. 11. The actual order which should be made by us is, however, a matter of some difficulty. It was held by Akram J. and myself in the case of Durga Das Kuthi v. Ram Dayal Samaddar, 50 C.W.N. 208 : (A.I.R. 1946 Cal. 239) that once an order for sale had been made, it was not extinguished simply by the fact that a person made a deposit under S. 170, but it subsisted till a deposit was finally accepted by the Court. It was added that so long as the order for sale subsisted, all persons competent to make a deposit under S. 170 might make deposits and the Court would ultimately have to decide the question of priority as between them. It was laid down further that in a case of competition between different deposits made by different persons on different dates, the deposit first made ought to have preference on general principles of equity. It follows that, strictly speaking, the deposit made by opposite party No. 1 on 10th August 1946, having been finally accepted by the Court below on the same date, the order for sale was extinguished and thereafter there could be no question of any other party making a further deposit; and it would follow further that opposite party No. 1 must now be told that his money will be applied to the satisfaction of the decree, but he will have none of the benefits under S. 171. In all the facts of the case it appears to me that that will not be a just decision to take. Whatever the legal rights of opposite party No. 1 might have been, there can be no question that he made the deposit in the expectation that he would be able to rank as a mortgagee and that expectation was induced by his experience of previous instances in which similar benefit had been extended to other cosharer judgment-debtors. Whatever the legal rights of opposite party No. 1 might have been, there can be no question that he made the deposit in the expectation that he would be able to rank as a mortgagee and that expectation was induced by his experience of previous instances in which similar benefit had been extended to other cosharer judgment-debtors. It appears from the petition to this Court itself that on a previous occasion opposite party No. 2 had made a deposit in the capacity of a se-putnidar, although he was a judgment-debtor himself, and he was thereupon given the rights of a statutory mortgagee under S. 171. In such circumstances, to declare now that the deposit made by opposite party No. 1 will be detained and applied to the satisfaction of the decree and to send him away with no rights whatsoever, will certainly operate on him with hardship. The proper order to make, in my view, is to set aside all orders passed on and after 10th August 1946, and place the parties where they were when the learned Subordinate Judge directed that the application of opposite party No. 1 and that of the petitioner would come up for decision on a subsequent date. The many applications which were made after that date by other parties, questioning the order made on 10th August 1946, need not be considered by the learned Subordinate-Judge any further, because they stand disposed of by this judgment. We accordingly think that the proper order to make is to relegate the parties to the position in which they were on 12th August 1946, save that the orders passed on and after 10th August will not exist, and leave it to the learned Subordinate Judge to decide which of the two deposits he will accept, provided both of them are still willing to make deposits. If any of them be minded not to insist on his deposit being accepted and to withdraw the same, he should be permitted to do so. If both of them withdraw their deposits, the sale will be held. It both of them insist on their deposits being accepted, the learned Subordinate Judge will decide the question of priority as between the two. If one of them withdraws and the other does not, necessarily an order will be made in favour of the party who does not withdraw. 12. It both of them insist on their deposits being accepted, the learned Subordinate Judge will decide the question of priority as between the two. If one of them withdraws and the other does not, necessarily an order will be made in favour of the party who does not withdraw. 12. In the result, therefore, the orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge on 10th August 1946, and all subsequent orders are set aside and he is directed to consider the applications of opposite party No. 1 and the petitioner regarding the deposits made by them in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Let the records be sent down as early as possible. Let the affidavit in opposition filed in Court today be kept on the record. Harries, C.J. 13. I agree.