This is an appeal by defendant against the judgment and decree of the Special Subordinate Judge, Assam Valley Districts, reversing the judgment and decree of the Munaif of Nowgong, dismissing a suit by a wife for a declaration that she had been divorced from her husband, the defendant. [2l Plaintiff Mt. Maimuna Bibi was married to the defendant, Mirjan Ali on 9th Magh 1847 B. s. At the time of marriage, a kabinnama was executed which contained a clause, which has been translated by the learned advocates, thus : "If Khatun Maimuna, due to any 511-feeling ("Mano-malinya") resides at her father's place for a period of 90 days, and if, I fail to bring her back to my own house by persuasion within the said period of 90 days and to live with me, then on the completion of the said 90 days, my 1, 2, 3 talak bain (words) upon you will be effective and she will be able to take another hus­band after the period of iddat." [3] The plaintiff alleged that after the mar­riage she lived with the defendant as his wife for three or four months, but the defendant ill-treated her physically and mentally, and ill-feeling ("Manomalinya") arose between them. She was unable to endure the life and she went back to her father's house where she had been residing for a period of seven or eight months before the institution of the suit. She further alleged that on 12th January 1942, in the presence of Asad Ali and Ilias Ali, she had accepted talak under the terms of the kabinnama, and she, therefore, prayed for a declaration that her mar­riage had been dissolved. [4] The suit was contested. The defendant denied the story of ill-treatment and asserted that the plaintiff, after living with him contentedly for some time, had gone on a visit to her father's house. The defendant further asserted that plaintiff had fallen under the influence of one Eiasat, who had persuaded her to seek for this declaration that the marriage has been dissolved. [5] The Munsiff in the Court of First Instance held that the allegations of cruelty were not proved, and that it was not proved that plaintiff had gone to her father's house owing to ill-feeling with defendant. [5] The Munsiff in the Court of First Instance held that the allegations of cruelty were not proved, and that it was not proved that plaintiff had gone to her father's house owing to ill-feeling with defendant. The learned Munsif also seems to have disbelieved the plaintiff regarding the actual pronouncement of talak, and he dis­missed the suit with costs. [6] Plaintiff appealed. The learned Special Subordinate Judge found that there was no in­dependent evidence of ill-treatment but that such independent evidence was not to be expected in matrimonial causes. He also held that the defendant failed to adduce any independent evi­dence to prove that he went to his father-in-law's house to bring the plaintiff home. There­fore the learned Judge held that there must have been 'ill-feeling' as contemplated by the kabinnama. The learned Judge then held that a pronouncement of talak by the plaintiff was unnecessary, and that on the happening of the contingency referred to in the kabinnama, the marriage was automatically dissolved. [7] Hence this appeal. In our opinion, the judgment and decree of the Court of Appeal below cannot be sustained. We are unable to agree with the learned Judge that in cases where by agreement between the parties, a Mahomedan husband has conferred on his wife the power of divorcing him on the happening of a certain contingency, then the marriage automatically stands dissolved on the happening of that con­tingency. In such cases, it is always necessary that there shall be a formal pronouncement of talak and it should be made either to the hus­band or in the presence of witnesses. [8] In the present case, there was no evidence worth the came that there had been such a formal pronouncement, and the evidence of plaintiff's witnesses was almost sufficient to prove that there had been no pronouncement. But apart from this defect, it seems to us that the plaintiff's suit ought to have been dismissed on the merits. It is a well-established principle that in matrimonial causes, the uncorroborated testimony of one of the parties to the marriage is not sufficient to prove cruelty; there must be some corroboration of that evidence, though obviously it is not necessary to examine an eye­witness to the alleged acts of cruelty. [9] In the present case, there was the un­corroborated evidence of the wife, denied by the husband, and nothing else, to establish cruelty. [9] In the present case, there was the un­corroborated evidence of the wife, denied by the husband, and nothing else, to establish cruelty. [10] Moreover, when a Mahomed an wife seeks to exercise this delegated power of divorcing herself, she must establish clearly that the condi­tions entitling her to exercise the power have been fulfilled. In the present case, it was in­cumbent on the plaintiff to prove that she left her husband and went to live with her father owing to ill-feeling ('Manomalinya'), She offered no proof of this fact but her own uncorroborated statement. The learned Judge assumed the exis­tence of this ill-feeling from the fact that defen­dant failed to prove by independent evidence that he had attempted to persuade her to return to him. This, in effect, was placing the burden of proving absence of ill feeling on the defendant. [11] In our opinion, the fact that plaintiff continued to reside with her father and refused to return to her husband, is as consistent with the defence explanation as with the plaintiff's version. [12] We are satisfied that the plaintiff failed to prove that she left the defendant owing to ill-feeling, and also that she failed to prove that she had made any formal pronouncement of talak. In this view, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the word ("Manomalinya") in the kabinnama which has been translated 'ill-feeling' is a word implying a defect in defen­dant, and not merely a state of mind for which the plaintiff might be equally responsible. We, therefore, order that this appeal be allowed with costs; the judgment and decree of the Court of Appeal below be set aside, and the suit dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed