JUDGMENT Mitter, J. - One Shyamadas Dutt, to whom the property in suit originally belonged, was the Manager of the Defendant Respondent, Haridas Addya. The latter filed a suit for accounts against the former (being Title Suit No. 2 of 1928) in the Second Court of the Subordinate Judge at Hooghly on the 10th January, 1928. He had the property in suit attached before judgment on the 21st February, 1928. That attachment continued after claims tiled by the son and mother of Shyamadas had been rejected. Shyamadas appeared in the suit and filed his defence. The suit was, however, decreed. The preliminary decree was passed on the 26th November, 1929, and the final decree for the sum of Rs. 2,500 was passed on the 27th March, 1930. At the Court sale held in execution of the said final decree Haridas Addya himself purchased the property in suit on the 8th April, 1931. The sale was duly confirmed and he took possession through Court and was in possession at the date of the suit in which this appeal arises. While the said account suit was pending Shyamadas applied on the 12th March, 1929, before the District Judge of Burdwan for adjudication as insolvent. In the schedule of creditors attached to this application the name of Haridas Addya was not shown. He was adjudicated an insolvent in the same year and the Nazir of the Court was appointed Receiver in insolvency. As such Receiver the Nazir put up the property in suit to sale on the 23rd December, 1929, when Jibananda Banerjee, the original Plaintiff offered the highest bid. His bid was accepted and he paid the purchase money in full to the Nasir on the 2nd January, 1930. The Nazir, however, executed the conveyance in favour of Jibananda on the 25th November, 1931. 2. Shyamadas obtained his discharge on the 8th February, 1930 3. Jibananda brought this suit for possession in the year 1941. The question in the suit and in the appeal is whose purchase shall prevail. The finding of the Courts below is that Haridas Addya had bond fide made his purchase at the Court sale in execution of the final decree for accounts and had at no time knowledge of the insolvency proceedings. His purchase, however, was after the adjudication and also after Shyamadas had obtained his discharge. 4. The finding of the Courts below is that Haridas Addya had bond fide made his purchase at the Court sale in execution of the final decree for accounts and had at no time knowledge of the insolvency proceedings. His purchase, however, was after the adjudication and also after Shyamadas had obtained his discharge. 4. Both the Courts below have held that the Respondents' purchase prevailed over Jibananda's in view of the provisions of sec. 51 (3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (V of 1920, hereafter called the Act). Both the Courts below have held that the title to the property had vested in Jibananda not on the date when the Nazir held the sale, nor when Jibananda paid the price is full, but on the date when the Nazir executed the conveyance in his favour. This conclusion appears to me to be correct, but this point is not of importance, if the Respondent is able to invoke to his aid the provisions 0f sec. 51 (3) of the Act. 5. The Respondent had his decree transferred to the Nadia Court where he started execution proceedings after Shyamadas had been adjudicated an insolvent. The finding is that he did not know of the insolvency proceedings, with the result that the Receiver in insolvency was not made a party to the execution proceedings and a fortiori no notice was issued on him in terms of Or. 21, r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At that time when that execution was started and when the sale was held by the Nadia Court, sub-r. (3) had not been added by the Rule Committee to Or. 21. r. 22. The addition was made on the 3rd February, 1933. 6. If sec. 51 (3) of the Act had not been there the Respondent would not have acquired title at all, because (1) the Court sale at which he had purchased would not have been binding on the Receiver in Insolvency and persons claiming title through him, as the said Receiver had not been made a party to the execution proceedings; (2) the sale would have been void for the reason that notice under Or. 21, r. 22 of the Code had not been given to him, and (3) the sale to the Respondent would not have passed title to him as his judgment-debtor, Shyama Dutt, had at the date of the execution sale no title to the property as that property had already vested in the year 1929 in the Receiver in Insolvency at the time when the order of adjudication was made. All these reasons given by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Raghunath Dass v. Sunder Das Khetry L. R. 41 I. A. 241 : s. c. 18 C. W. N. 1058(1914) would have been applicable. The adjudication of the judgment-debtor as insolvent in Raghunath Dass's case (1), however, was made under the provisions of the Indian Insolvency Act of 1848 (11 and 12 Vict., C, 21), which statute did not contain a provision similar to sec. 51 (3) of the Act. 7. Whether the decision in Raghunath Das's case (1) still holds the field, notwithstanding this section, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Dineshchandra Ray Chaudhuri v. Jahanali Biswas I. L. R. 62 Cal. 457 (1984), where the facts were exactly of the type which I have before me. The Division Bench held (1) that Or. 21, r. 22 of the Code did not control sec. 51 (3) of the Act, and (2) that sec. 28 (2) of the Act was controlled by sec. 51 (3), with the result that the purchaser who had bond fide purchased the property at the Court sale held in execution of a money decree and without knowledge of the insolvency proceedings acquired a good title, although the judgment-debtor had been adjudicated an insolvent before the said sale, and the Receiver in insolvency was neither made a party to the execution proceedings nor had been served with a notice under Or. 21, r. 22 of the Code. Raghunath Dass's case (1) was noticed in the judgment and was distinguished. Sitting singly, I am bound to follow this decision of the Division Bench. This decision has, however, been dissented from by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Bachu Mallikar Jana Rao v. The Official Receiver, Kistna (3). That Bench held that inspite of sec. Raghunath Dass's case (1) was noticed in the judgment and was distinguished. Sitting singly, I am bound to follow this decision of the Division Bench. This decision has, however, been dissented from by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Bachu Mallikar Jana Rao v. The Official Receiver, Kistna (3). That Bench held that inspite of sec. 51 (3) of the Act one of the reasons given by the Judicial Committee in Raghunath Dass's case L. R. 41 I. A. 241 : s. c. 18 C. W. N. 1058 (1914) was still applicable where the execution sale was held after the order of adjudication of the judgment-debtor, that reason being that at the date of the execution sale the judgment-debtor had no right title or interest in the property, and so nothing was taken by that purchaser, the title to the property having already vested by operation of law in the Receiver in Insolvency the moment the judgment-debtor was adjudicated an insolvent. In their view sec. 51 I. L. R. 1938 Mad. 1068 had application only to cases where the execution sale had taken place after the application for adjudication had been presented or admitted but before the order of adjudication had been passed. 8. As I have already said that sitting singly I am bound to follow the Bench decision in Dineshchandra Roy Chaudhury's case I. L. R. 62 Cal. 457 (1934), which is indistinguishable from the case before me. In the course of the argument, however, I intimated to the Advocates that if a reasonable doubt about the correctness of that decision is raised in my, mind I would grant leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, as sitting singly I cannot refer the case to a Full Bench. It is with this object in view that 1 propose to examine the soundness of the reasons given by the Madras High Court in that case in some detail. Both the learned Judges, Burn and Mockett, JJ., arrived at the same conclusion, which I have stated above, but not on the same grounds. In commenting upon Dineshchandra Roy Chaudhury's case I. L. R. 62 Cal. 457 (1934), Bum, J., said that in that case the only question dealt with was the effect of non-service of a notice under Or. Both the learned Judges, Burn and Mockett, JJ., arrived at the same conclusion, which I have stated above, but not on the same grounds. In commenting upon Dineshchandra Roy Chaudhury's case I. L. R. 62 Cal. 457 (1934), Bum, J., said that in that case the only question dealt with was the effect of non-service of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22 of the Code on the Receiver in Insolvency and Observed that this Court dealt with the judgment of the Privy Council in Raghunath Dass's case (1) only in connection with the said question. That may be so, but this Court having that decision in mind went further and dealt with the question of the effect of sec. 51 (3) on sec. 28 (2) of the Act. Burn, J., thought that the Judicial Committee had said two things, namely, that the execution sale was L. R. 41 I. A. 241 : s. c. 18 C. W. N. 1058 (1914) irregular and (2) inoperative; that the said sale was irregular because (a) the executing Court ought not to have allowed the sale to go on and (b) the sale ought rot to have been allowed to go on in any event without serving a notice on the Receiver in Insolvency under Or. 21, r. 22 of the Code. He seems to hold that where the judgment-creditor had no notice of the insolvency proceedings neither of these two considerations would apply and the Court sale, if otherwise valid, cannot be attacked on these two grounds--the grounds for irregularity,--and that sec. 51 (3) of the Act has affected this part of the decision of the Judicial Committee. He further observed that the Judicial Committee used the word "inoperative," because at the date of the Court sale the judgment-debtor had no right, title or interest in the property which, by reason of the adjudication made before the sale had already vested in the Receiver in Insolvency, and that this part of the judgment of the Judicial Committee was still good law, not being affected by sec. 51 (3) of the Act. For the last mentioned conclusion he observed that as sec. 51 (3) in a chapter beaded "Effect of insolvency on antecedent transactions," it applied to execution sales held before the adjudication, and was put in only to counteract the effect of the provisions of sec. 51 (3) of the Act. For the last mentioned conclusion he observed that as sec. 51 (3) in a chapter beaded "Effect of insolvency on antecedent transactions," it applied to execution sales held before the adjudication, and was put in only to counteract the effect of the provisions of sec. 28 (7) of the Act, which gave the adjudication retrospective effect from the date of the presentation of the application for adjudication. Mockett, J. arrived at the same conclusion, namely, that sec. 51 (3) of the Act was confined to execution sales held after the admission of the application for adjudication but before the adjudication by holding that the word "debtor" occurring in sec. 51 (3) was not equivalent to the word "insolvent," that is to say, a person already adjudicated. He noticed the fact that so far as phraseology was concerned no clear-cut distinction has been made or maintained in the different provisions of the Act between the word "debtor," which strictly meant a person who has applied for adjudication or against whom an application for adjudication had been made but who had not yet been adjudicated, and the word "insolvent" which strictly meant a person who had already been adjudicated, but held that the word "debtor" used in that sub-section is to be taken in its strict sense, because the section occurs in a group of sections under the heading "Effect of insolvency on antecedent transaction" and the heading can be legitimately used for construing the subsection. He took the word "insolvency' occurring in the heading to mean "adjudication." I respectfully disagree from the line of reasoning adopted by both the learned Judges for the following reasons. 9. I. There are three successive stages in an insolvency proceedings under the Provincial Insolvency Act, namely, (1) Presentation of the application, either by the debtor or by the creditor; (2) Admission of that application, and (3) Adjudication of the debtor. 10. An appreciable interval of time, long or short, would intervene between the first and the second stage and between the second and the third. 11. 10. An appreciable interval of time, long or short, would intervene between the first and the second stage and between the second and the third. 11. A sale of the debtor's property in execution of a decree for a debt which by its nature is provable under the Act may occur (1) before the presentation of the application for adjudication, (2) between the presentation of the application for adjudication and its admission, (3) between its admission and the adjudication and (4) after the adjudication. The first case is out of the insolvency proceedings. There can thus be three cases of sales, which would come within the insolvency proceedings and can be effective thereby. The second and third fall within the same type in relation to sec. 28 (7) of the Act. There would, therefore, be no point in the legislature using the phrase in all cases in sec. 51 (3) of the Act, if it meant to include only one type of case; namely, the second and the third. II. It is not right to take the word "Insolvency" occurring in the heading to be synonymous with the word "adjudication." The word "Insolvency" is used in sec. 55 which is one of the sections grouped under the same heading. The proviso to that section shows unmistakably that the word is not used in the limited sense of adjudication but in a wider and general sense. I may observe incidentally that the inexactitude of language is also apparent in that section, for the word "insolvent" used in that section cannot in reference to all the cases dealt with in that section refer to a person who has already been adjudicated. III. That sec. 52 is out of place if the word insolvency used in the heading be taken to mean "adjudication," for that section also covers the case where the execution has issued before the adjudication and the stage of adjudication had not yet arrived. 12. III. That sec. 52 is out of place if the word insolvency used in the heading be taken to mean "adjudication," for that section also covers the case where the execution has issued before the adjudication and the stage of adjudication had not yet arrived. 12. To me it seems that the combined effect of sub-secs, (1) and (3) of sec 51 is as follows:-- (1) that where the execution sale has taken place after the presentation of the application for adjudication but before its admission, the judgment-creditor retains the fruits of the execution, that is to say, the money fetched at the sale, and the auction purchaser's title would be good, although on an eventual adjudication the vesting of the property in the Receiver in insolvency would be dated back to the date of the presentation of the application for adjudication, provided that the purchaser had taken in good faith; (2) that if the execution sale takes place after the admission of the application tor adjudication, but either before or after the adjudication the judgment-creditor cannot retain the price fetched at the sale but must pay the same on demand to the Receiver in Insolvency for distribution among all the creditors but auction-purchaser's title would be good as in the last mentioned case, if he had acquired the property in good faith. 13. These conclusions are supported by the observation of another Division Bench of the Madras High Court [Muthan Chettiar v. Venkituswami Naicken I. L. R. 59 Mad, 928 (1938)]. I follow the observations made therein in preference to the Bench decision of the same Court in Bachu Mallikarjana Rao's case I. L. R. 1988 Mad. 1063. 14. The next point urged by the Appellant's Advocate is that the judgment-debt for the enforcement of which the execution sale was held by the Nadia Court had in law no existence at the date of the execution sale, i have already stated that that sale was held about two months after Shyamadas Dutt had obtained his discharge. For supporting this contention he relies upon sec. 44 of the Act. The relevant question is, whether the claim of the Respondent as put forward in the account suit was provable under the Act. In my opinion it was not. For supporting this contention he relies upon sec. 44 of the Act. The relevant question is, whether the claim of the Respondent as put forward in the account suit was provable under the Act. In my opinion it was not. No doubt the preliminary decree in the account suit was passed before the date of the discharge, but the final decree was passed after that date. On the taking of accounts by the Hooghly Court there was just a possibility of nothing being found due from Shyamadas to the Respondent. In these circumstances the latter could not appear in the insolvency proceedings and prove, before the discharge. There was at that time no debt in existence. A liquidated sum only is a debt, though it may be payable in future: Before the date of the discharge the Respondent's claim as preferred in the account suit was incapable of being fairly valued in the Insolvency proceedings by the Respondent. For these reasons I overrule this contention urged by Appellant's Advocate. The Respondent's Advocate also attempted to meet this point by saying that by reason of the attachment made before the adjudication his client be-came a secured creditor and so was outside the insolvency proceedings. In Peacock v. Madangopa l I. L. R 29 Cal. 428 (1902) and Kristnasami Mudaliar v. Official Assignee of Madras I. L. R. 26 Mad. 673 (1903) the contention that an attachment of a property of the debtor by the judgment-creditor of a simple money decree before the vesting in the Receiver in Insolvency gives him a charge on the property attached and so gives him priority over the claims of the Receiver in Insolvency was negatived. In Raghunath Das's case L. R. 41 I. A. 241 : s. c. 18 C. W. N. 1058 (1914) this position was accepted by the Judicial Committee, though it cannot be said that the Judicial Committee gave the decision, as the point was conceded in the course of arguments. In Gummidelti v. Official Receiver of Secunderabad L. R. 60 I. A. 167 at 174 175 : s. c. 87 C. W. N. BBS (1983), Lord Thankerton noticed those two cases and no doubt observed that Suraj Bansi Koer's case (8) had not been noticed in them, but he did not say that these two cases were wrongly decided. In Gummidelti v. Official Receiver of Secunderabad L. R. 60 I. A. 167 at 174 175 : s. c. 87 C. W. N. BBS (1983), Lord Thankerton noticed those two cases and no doubt observed that Suraj Bansi Koer's case (8) had not been noticed in them, but he did not say that these two cases were wrongly decided. All he meant to say was that if the question were to arise in future before the Board the matter may have to be considered in the light of some of the observations made in Suraj Bansi Koer's case L. R. 6 I. A. 88 : s. c. I. L. R. 5 Cal. 148 (1879), which, however, was not a case of insolvency but a case dealing with the effect of an attachment of ancestral property belonging to a joint Mitakshara family, where after the attachment and before the sale the judgment-debtor had died and his interest had passed by survivorship on his sons. As Peacock's case I. L. R. 29 Cal. 428 (1902) which is a decision of a Full Bench of this Court has not been overruled by the Judicial Committee, I must follow it, and so cannot accept this contention of the Respondent's Advocate. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs.