JUDGMENT Seth, J. - This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and the decree of the trial Court has been affirmed by the lower appellate Court. 2. The first ground upon which* the decree of the lower appellate Court is attacked is that the notice of ejectment was not according to law and, therefore, it did not terminate the tenancy. The notice stated that the tenancy of the defendant commenced from the 19th of every English month. The defendant was, therefore, required to vacate the premises "on 18th May 1914 or on such date as your then current month of tenancy will end." 3. It was alleged on behalf of the defendant that the tenancy commenced from the 1st of every English month. This allegation has been found to be correct. The Courts below have held that even though the tenancy commenced from the 1st of every English month, the notice wag a valid notice because it did not make it obligatory upon the defendant to vacate the premises on 18th May 1944, but gave him an option to vacate on another definite date if the tenancy did not terminate on the 18th, viz., the date on which the month of the current tenancy was to end. In support of the view, that such a notice was a valid notice, under S. 106, T.P. Act, both the Courts below have relied upon a decision of the Patna High Court in Sanker Ram and Others Vs. Tulshi Bhagat and Another, AIR 1921 Patna 307 in which a similar view has been taken of a similar notice. It appear from a note by the author of Mulla'a Transfer of Property Act that it is usual, after mentioning the date of the aniversary of the tenancy to add, in the alternative, some such general words as "at the end of the year of the tenancy which will expire next after the end of one-half year from the date of the service of this notice" (vide, Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 1933 Edition, p. 539). The requirements of a notice under the English law are similar to the requirements of a notice under the Transfer of Property Act. The requirements of a notice under the English law are similar to the requirements of a notice under the Transfer of Property Act. It has been held by the English Courts that a notice to quit "at the expiration of the current year of your tenancy, which shall expire after the end of one half year from the service of the notice," is a valid notice. Reference may be made to Doe d.Digby v. Steel, (1811) 3 Camp. 115 at p. 117 : (13 R.R. 768), Doe d. Gorst v. Timothy, (1847) 2 Car. &, K. 351 : (175 E. R 145). 4. The object of a notice under S. 106, T.P. Act is only to allow a tenant sufficient time to vacate the premises. It has been laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, 46 cal. 458: (A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102) that notices should be liberally construed and the only point to be considered in respect of notices is whether the person on whom the notice is served could understand what was really meant by the notice. The Privy Council case was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Tika Ram and Another Vs. Sri Thakur Dooji Maharaj, AIR 1934 All 787 where a notice given on 9th November 1927 required the tenant to vacate the land on 13th May 1927. It was held that the intention of the lessor was that the tenant should vacate on 13th May 1928. It was observed that the defendant could not have understood it to mean that the plaintiff wanted him to vacate the land on a date which had already expired. The learned Judges quoted with approval the following pass, age from Doe on the Several Demises of Willams v. Smith, (1836) 5 Ad. & E. 350 : (5 L.J.Q.B. 216) : This is certainly a lame and inaccurate notice; but such as it is, we must endeavour to give it a rational interpretation. I am satisfied that the appellant well understood what was meant by the notice, namely, that he was called upon to vacate only on the termination of the month of tenancy and that he was not required to vacate on 18th May 1944, if the month of tenancy did not terminate on that day. I am also in agreement with the decision of the Patna High Court. I am also in agreement with the decision of the Patna High Court. There is no force in the contention that the notice was invalid. 5. The second contention put forward is that it has not been proved that the notice was served upon the defendant. It is further contended in this connection that the lower appellate Court acted illegally in receiving additional evidence, at the time of the hearing of the appeal. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to mention that the notice was pleaded in para. 2 of the plaint, which pleaded certain other matters also. The only pleading with regard to the notice in the written statement is that "para. 2 of the plaint is not admitted". It was also stated, inter alia, in para. 2 of the plaint, that the defendant had not vacated the house. It is evident that the defendant never intended to controvert this allegation and to indicate by his "not admitted" that he had vacated the house. I am mentioning this fact for the purpose of showing that; more than one allegation having been made in para. 2 of the plaint, a simple "not admitted" was not proper pleading as required by O. 8, Civil P.C. Order 8, R. 3 enacts that : It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to den; generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. 6. It cannot be said that by a plea, stating that para. 2 of the plaint is not admitted, the defendant had specifically dealt with each allegation of the fact contained in that paragraph. 7. Under these circumstances the plaintiff did not produce any evidence either to prove the posting of the notice or to prove the service of the notice upon the defendant, in the trial Court. When the matter came before the lower appellate Court and emphasis was laid on the point that it had not been proved, that the defendant had been served with a proper notice, that Court allowed an opportunity to the plaintiff to produce further evidence. I am satisfied that in the circumstances mentioned above, the lower appellate Court had ample jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 27, Civil P.C., to receive additional evidence in this case. I am satisfied that in the circumstances mentioned above, the lower appellate Court had ample jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 27, Civil P.C., to receive additional evidence in this case. It is regrettable, however, that that Court did not follow the strict procedure laid down under O. 41, R. 27, Civil P.C., and the succeeding rules of that Order. It was required, to record its reasons for the admission of the additional evidence before allowing it to be produced. It was also required to record the points, on which alone, the additional evidence, was to be directed. It was further required to make it plain to the defendant that he was being given an opportunity to produce such rebutting evidence as he thought proper. The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has not done all this in a proper manner. He has, however, sufficiently complied with the requirements of law though in an irregular manner. The reasons for allowing additional evidence to be produced have been recorded in the judgment by which the appeal was disposed of. The evidence was received on one point only viz., on the question of the proof of service of notice on the defendant. It appears that the parties were fully aware that additional evidence was to be received upon one point only. Although it is not recorded anywhere that the defendant was being allowed an opportunity of producing evidence in rebuttal he was, in fact, allowed such an opportunity. He entered the witness box and his statement was recorded. He never made any complaint that he was not being afforded a proper opportunity to rebut the additional evidence nor did he ask for time to produce any further evidence. Evidently he was satisfied with the opportunity offered to him and it is not now open to him to make any complaint on this score. I have already observed that the procedure adopted by the lower appellate Court was irregular although it was not illegal. I am satisfied that the regularity in procedure has not affected the decision of the case upon merits and that it is cured by S. 99, Civil P. C. 8. The additional evidence produced by the plaintiff, and believed by the lower appellate Court, was sufficient in law to prove service of notice upon the defendant. I am satisfied that the regularity in procedure has not affected the decision of the case upon merits and that it is cured by S. 99, Civil P. C. 8. The additional evidence produced by the plaintiff, and believed by the lower appellate Court, was sufficient in law to prove service of notice upon the defendant. A copy of the notice had already been filed and the postman, who delivered the notice, came into the witness box and deposed on oath that he had delivered the registered cover containing the notice to one Sri Narain. He further deposed that Sri Narain was a servant of the defendant and that Sri Narain used to receive letters on behalf of the defendant as well as on behalf of his partner. It is not possible for me to say that the finding of the lower appellate Court to the effect, that the notice was served upon the agent of the defendant, duly authorised to receive it, is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. It is not within my province to express any opinion on the point whether that evidence is creditable [credible ?] or not. Nor is it within my province to pronounce any opinion on the point whether that evidence would have induced me, if I were sitting as a Court of fact, to arrive at the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court. All that I have to consider, is whether the evidence adduced was or was not legally sufficient to warrant the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court. On that point, I am perfectly satisfied, that it was legally sufficient. I am therefore unable to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant that a proper notice under S. 106, T.P. Act, was not served upon the defendant and that, therefore, the tenancy was not properly terminated. 9. The next point urged on behalf of the appellant, is that the suit was barred by a certain order issued by the District Magistrate of Kanpur under the Defence of India Rules. This plea has not been taken in the grounds of appeal to be found in the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court. The learned counsel is, therefore, not entitled to urge this contention without the leave of the Court. This plea has not been taken in the grounds of appeal to be found in the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court. The learned counsel is, therefore, not entitled to urge this contention without the leave of the Court. The plea was taken halfheartedly in the Court of first instance, as would appear from the fact that no definite issue with regard to this plea was framed. The plea was not repeated before the lower appellate Court. The order of the District Magistrate relied upon has also not been filed. It is, therefore, not possible to ascertain the extent and nature of the prohibition contained in that order. Under these circumstances, I am not disposed to allow this plea to be raised. 10. The last point urged on behalf of the appellant is that no rent had been settled between the parties and the Courts below were, therefore, not justified in decreeing the claim of the plaintiff for rent at Rs. 30 p.m. There seems to be no substance in this contention either. There was definite evidence, before the Court that a rent of Rs. 30 per mensem had been settled. The plaintiff came into the witness box and deposed to that effect. There was one other witness who supported the plaintiff's statement. It was open to the lower appellate Court either to believe or to disbelieve these witnesses. If the Court chose to believe this evidence its finding cannot be said to be vitiated by any error of law. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant at great length and have given my anxious consideration to the case. I have ultimately reached the conclusion that there is no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is asked for. It is refused.