JUDGMENT B.K. Mukherjea, J. - This rule is directed against an appellate order of Mr. Renu Pada Mukherjee, Additional District Judge, 24-Parganas, reversing the order of the 1st Munsiff at Diamond Harbour, made in a proceeding under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C. The material facts are not in controversy and may be stated as follows: The decree-holder opposite party obtained a money-decree against the petitioner and his cosharers in the Court of the Munsiff at Diamond Harbour and in execution of the decree the property in suit measuring about 56 bighas of land was put up to sale on 4th February 1946, and it was knocked down to the opposite party No. 1, a third party purchaser for the sum of Rs. 144 only. The petitioner filed an application on 6th June 1946 for setting aside the sale on grounds of fraud and material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale which resulted in the property being sold at a gross inadequate price. The Munsiff who heard the case accepted the contention of the petitioner and set aside the sale. It was found inter alia that there had been fraudulent suppression of all processes including the notices under O. 21. Rr. 54 and 66, Civil P.C., and that by reason of the fraud and other irregularities, the property which was worth at least 7000 rupees was sold for the shockingly inadequate price of Rs. 144. Against this decision, the auction-purchaser took an appeal to the Court of the District Judge, 24-Parganas, and the appeal was heard by the Additional District Judge who reversed the judgment of the trial Judge and dismissed the application of the petitioner under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C. The Lower Appellate Court did not reverse the findings of the Munsiff regarding the fraudulent suppression of sale processes, or the injury suffered by the judgment-debtor by reason of the fraudulent sale. The application to set aside the sale was dismissed on the sole ground that it was presented more than 30 days after the date of sale, and although the decree-holder was guilty of fraud, the auction-purchaser who was a stranger not being a party or accessory to such fraud the provision of S. 18, Limitation Act could not be invoked against him. It is against this judgment that the present rule has been obtained. 2. It is against this judgment that the present rule has been obtained. 2. It is clear from the language of O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C., that for setting aside a sale under that rule on the ground of fraud in publishing and conducting the sale it is not necessary to prove that the auction purchaser was a party to the fraud. It is also well settled that the fraud contemplated by S. 18, Limitation Act is not confined to fraud committed at the inception of the cause of action but may include fraud committed before that date. Where fraud has been committed by the decree-holder in bringing the property of the judgment-debtor to sale, the fraud though committed during execution proceedings would have a continuing influence and would retain its power of mischief 30 long as that influence is not ended, and the party affected has not clear knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud. As authorities for this proposition, reference may be made to the pronouncement of Judicial Committee in Rahimbhoy v. Charles Agnew, 20 I.A. 1 : (17 Bom. 341 P.C.) and to the decision of Division Bench of the Court in Jotindra Mohun Rai Chowdhury Vs. Brojekdra Kumar Datta Munshi and Others, AIR 1914 Cal 728 The question now arises as to whether the judgment-debtor even though he has established that he was kept out of the knowledge of sale and consequently of his right to have it set aside by reason of the fraud of the decree-holder has got further to show to enable him to take advantage of S. 18, Limitation Act, that the auction-purchaser was also a party to the fraud. The point is not free from doubt and although there is no decision of a Division Bench of this Court directly binding on me different views have been taken on this point by different Judges sitting singly. 3. In Kedar Hura v. Asutosh Roy, 44 C.L.J. 565 B.B. Ghosh J. took the view that in order to avail one-self of the benefit of S. 18, Limitation Act, in a proceeding under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C., it is not necessary to allege or prove that the auction-purchaser was also guilty of fraud. The same view has been taken by Dalai J. of the Allahabad High Court in Jagdeo and Another Vs. The same view has been taken by Dalai J. of the Allahabad High Court in Jagdeo and Another Vs. Ujiyari Kunwar and Another, AIR 1928 All 354 and by Ross J. of the Patna High Court in Mahabir Ram Vs. Rambahadur Dubey and Another, AIR 1923 Patna 435 . On the other hand, the opposite opinion has been expressed by Henderson J. in Jagiswar Das v. Deb Narain, 46 C.W.N. 403 and by Lodge J. in Saila Bala Dasi Vs. Atul Krishna Mondal and Others, AIR 1948 Cal 63 though it may be noted that in both these cases the applications were under S. 174(3), B.T. Act. The Bench decision of this Court in Purna Chandra v. Anukul, 36 Cal. 654 : (2 I.C. 844) is not an authority in point, as that case arose out of a proceeding under S. 214 of the old Code. 4. Now the third paragraph of S. 18, Limitation Act, provides that: The time limited for instituting a suit or making an application (a) against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto or (b) against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for valuable consideration shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby. The relief which the appellant claims in a proceeding under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C. is for setting aside the sale, and to obtain such relief it is enough for him to show that the decree-holder committed fraud or irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale by reason of which he suffered injury. The auction-purchaser if he is a third party does not come in the picture at all at this stage and there could be no talk of alleging or proving against him complicity in the fraud or irregularities committed by the decree-holder. The fraud that can be alleged or proved against him must be a fraud subsequent to the sale, but it has been held by a series of decisions of this Court as well as of the Privy Council that for invoking the benefit of S. 18, Limitation Act it is not necessary to prove fraud subsequent to the sale. If there is any fraud antecedent to the sale, its influence must be deemed to continue, till the party affected has clear knowledge of it. If there is any fraud antecedent to the sale, its influence must be deemed to continue, till the party affected has clear knowledge of it. Suppose for example that by fraud of the decree-holder the judgment-debtor is totally kept out of the knowledge of sale and the property has been sold for a nominal price. The judgment-debtor comes to know of the sale long after the period of limitation has expired. In such circumstances he would have absolutely no remedy under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C. if the auction-purchaser was a third party, who could not normally be a party to the fraud committed by the decree-holder prior to the sale. I do not think that such was the intention of the Legislature. In my opinion, the application for setting aside the sale is directed primarily against the decree-holder, at whose instance and for whose benefit the sale is held, and whose duty it is to see that it is published and conducted regularly. Under S. 311 of the old Civil P.C., the auction-purchaser was not a necessary party to a proceeding to set aside the sale (vide Surendra Mohini v. Loharam, 16 C.W.N. 570 : (39 Cal. 687)). In the present Civil Procedure Code, only a general provision has been made in O. 21, R. 92 giving all persons affected a right to be heard on an application made by the decree-holder or any other person to set aside the sale. The successful bidder is undoubtedly a person having interest in the sale, but his interest is of an "inchoate character awaiting completion by the grant of the sale certificate". He may lose his bargain if the sale is set aside, but that is the indirect result of the allowing of the application under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C., which is directed primarily against the decree-holder. I think therefore that S. 18, Limitation Act, can be availed of to extend the period of limitation of an application under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C., where fraud is proved to have been committed by the decree-holder though not by a stranger auction purchaser. The result is that I make the rule absolute, set aside the judgment of the Additional District Judge and restore that of the Munsiff; there will be no order for costs in this Court, or any of the Courts below.