JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The petitioners are purchasers at a second sale of about six bighas of land which form a portion of an occupancy holding, which belonged originally to opposite party No. 4. On 17th December 1941 opposite party No. 4 sold the identical six bighas to opposite party No. 1 for a consideration of Rs. 1000. Opposite party No. 1 it may be stated here, is a step-brother of opposite party No. 4. It has been found by both the Courts below that no notice of this sale under S. 26C, Beng. Ten. Act, was ever served upon the two ladies who subsequently made an application for pre-emption out of which the present proceeding arises. It appears that on 14th May 1946, opposite party No. 1 executed a deed of disclaimer in favour of opposite party No. 4 wherein it was stated that the transaction of 17th December 1941, was not a real transaction at all and opposite party No. 1 had acquired no interest in the six bighas of land thereby. Shortly thereafter, on 31st May 1946, opposite party No. 4 sold the same six bighas of land to opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 and the consideration stated in the kobala was Rs. 5000. Thereafter when notice of a certain rent suit was served upon opposite parties, Nos. 1 and 2, they came to know of the sale to opposite party No. 1 on 17th December 1941, and, thereafter they made an application for pre-emption on nth September 1946. Their case was that they had come to know of the sale sometime in June 1946. 2. The allegation of the applicants for preemption was that they had been deliberately kept from the knowledge of both the sales and that the second sale was merely a colourable transaction which had been brought about for the purpose of defeating their rights of preemption. In other words, their case was that the sale to opposite party No. 1 in 1941 was the real sale and it was only to make pre-emption impossible that opposite party No. 4 acting in concert and collusively with opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 brought about the second deed of sale by which in fact no interest passed or was intended to pass. 2 and 3 brought about the second deed of sale by which in fact no interest passed or was intended to pass. Both the Courts below have accepted this story as correct, and have accordingly found that the so-called sale of 1946 was a colourable transaction which was brought into existence simply for the purpose of defeating the rights of opposite parties, Nos. 1 and 2 to preempt the earlier sale. In that view, the Courts below held that although the application was made in 1946 in respect of the sale which took place in 1941, the applicants were well within time, since they had been kept from the knowledge of the sale by the fraud of opposite parties Nos. 2, 3 and 4 till June 1946. In that view the application for pre-emption was allowed. 3. Two points were urged by Mr. Janah in support of the present rule. It was contended in the first instance that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain the application inasmuch as the value of the land sold exceeded the pecuniary limits of his jurisdiction. In our opinion there is no substance whatever in this point. There is really no evidence in the case to indicate that the real value of the six bighas of land was Rs. 5000 or any sum exceeding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsif. As I have already said the kobala of 1946 has been found to be a collusive document and it is quite clear that the amount that was put down there as the price of the lands cannot be taken to represent its real value. But assuming that the value of the lands did exceed in fact the limits of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsif, it is in our opinion quite immaterial that the value of the lands exceeded those limits. The S. 26 series of the Bengal Tenancy Act make it perfectly clear that for the purposes of an application under S. 26F, the value of the subject-matter must be taken to be the amount of consideration stated in the deed of transfer, and it may be a further 10 per cent. thereon as compensation. It is on the payment of that sum that an applicant for pre-emption, provided he can establish his claim is entitled to obtain an order. thereon as compensation. It is on the payment of that sum that an applicant for pre-emption, provided he can establish his claim is entitled to obtain an order. It is not open to any party to plead or prove that the real value of the subject-matter was something more than what was stated in the deed or what was in fact paid by the vendee. That being so, it is in our opinion quite clear that for the purposes of any proceeding under S. 26F, Ben. Ten. Act, the value of the subject-matter must be taken to be the amount of consideration stated in the deed, together with a further 10 per cent. thereon as compensation. It is not disputed that if such be the value of the sis bighas of land sold, in the present case the application was well within the jurisdiction of the learned Munsif. The first point raised by the petitioners must accordingly fail. 4. It is contended in the second place that the Courts below erred in holding that the application for pre-emption was not barred by limitation. It was somewhat surprising to hear the learned advocate for the petitioners contend that no allegation had been made by the applicants for pre-emption of any fraud or collusion against his clients and that no finding of fraud or collusion had been recorded by either Court. In fact, however, the clearest possible allegation was made that the so-called sale of the year 1946 was nothing but a make-belief transaction, brought into existence with the fraudulent object of defeating the rights of pre-emption which the two applicants before the learned Munsif might enforce and that the Courts below have fully accepted the allegation made by the applicants. It is not necessary to refer to the findings of the trial Court. It would be sufficient to mention what the lower appellate Court states. The learned District Judge observed as follows: The applicants have in their application alleged fraud on the part of the opposite parties in keeping the knowledge of the sale from them. A prima facie case of fraud has also been established by them shifting thereby the onus on the opposite parties to prove that the applicants had earlier knowledge of the sale by opposite party No. 4 to opposite party No. 1 then in June 1946. A prima facie case of fraud has also been established by them shifting thereby the onus on the opposite parties to prove that the applicants had earlier knowledge of the sale by opposite party No. 4 to opposite party No. 1 then in June 1946. The opposite parties have failed to discharge that onus by adducing any reliable evidence as has been pointed out by the learned Munsif. 5. There can be no doubt whatsoever as to what the finding of the learned Judge is. He found quite clearly that the applicant for pre-emption had been kept from the knowledge of the sale by the fraud of the petitioners before us and his vendees at the second sale; and that being so, it was for the petitioners to establish, if they could, that the influence of their fraud had ceased to operate at sometime beyond the period of limitation. If they did not discharge that onus, as in the opinion of the learned Judge they had not done, clearly the benefit of the fraud would continue to be available to the applicants for pre-emption as the learned Judge rightly held. 6. In our opinion the finding of the Courts below on both the question of jurisdiction and the question of limitation is correct and the application for pre-emption was rightly allowed. The rule is accordingly discharged with costs, hearing fee two gold mohurs.