JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - This rule raises a rather intriguing question under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. It came up originally before a learned Single Judge who referred it to Division Bench in view presumably of the difficulty of the question involved. 2. The facts are simple and are not disputed. It appears that the opposite party obtained a money decree against the petitioners on 8th May 1934 and in execution of that decree purported to purchase a certain property belonging to the petitioners on 26th April 1937. He was unable, however, to obtain possession of the property inasmuch as it was held by one Goloknath Rout under a usufructuary mortgage. Thereupon, the opposite party brought a title suit in which his case appears to have been that the usufructuary mortgage was a fictitious and collusive transaction, entered into for the purpose of delaying or defeating creditors. In that suit the opposite party impleaded not only the mortgagee Goloknath Rout but also the petitioners. The suit eventually ended in a compromise, under which the opposite party paid to Goloknath Rout a sum of Rs. 509 in lieu of his right, title and interest in the property concerned, whereas the petitioners admitted that the opposite party had a good and valid title to the property which they would not question in any future proceeding. 3. Previously, the petitioners had made an application before a Debt Settlement Board under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. When after the decision in the title suit the proceeding before the Debt Settlement Board was resumed for decision, an objection was taken on behalf of the opposite party that the proceeding was no longer maintainable in view of the admission made by the petitioners in the title suit. Briefly stated, the contention was that the petitioners having admitted the title of the opposite party in the compromise petition filed in the title suit and having further agreed not to question that title in any future proceeding, could not now ask for restoration of possession in the proceedings under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. 4. This contention was repelled by the Board, as also by the appellate officer on appeal. 4. This contention was repelled by the Board, as also by the appellate officer on appeal. The appellate officer held that the petitioners had only admitted that the opposite party had acquired a good title to the property in question, but they had never promised not to pursue their application under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. He observed further that the benefit of S. 37A was available to a debtor notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, and accordingly he took the view that whatever admission the petitioners might have made in the compromise petition filed in the title suit, that admission could not estop them from pursuing their remedy under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. 5. On an application for revision the decision of the appellate officer was reversed by the learned District Judge. He held that the opposite party was now holding the property not as the execution purchaser but by virtue of the purchase he had subsequently made by paying the sum of Rs. 509 to the petitioners. He held farther that the contract contemplated by S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, which would not preclude a debtor from seeking relief under that section was a contract antecedent to an application under the section, and not a contract entered into after a proceeding had been initiated. 6. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that in proceeding upon the basis that the opposite party had made a fresh purchase of the interest of the petitioners by paying them Rs. 509 in the course of the title suit, the learned Judge bas fallen into an obvious error. In our opinion, this contention is correct. If, as the learned Judge assumed, the opposite party had acquired a fresh or further title by paying a further sum of money to the petitioners, the decision arrived at by him might have to be upheld, for, in that event, a part of the title of the opposite party would be referable to the execution purchase and a part to the private purchase made thereafter and since it would not be possible to say which part was attributable to the execution purchase and which part to the private purchase made thereafter, it might be impossible to give any relief under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, as prayed for by the petitioners. But the facts of the learned Judge are wrong inasmuch as the opposite party paid no money to the petitioners. 7. The petitioners, however, fail on another ground which is apparent on the face of the section. Section 37A begins by saying that a debtor may apply under the section "When any immovable property of any person has been sold after the twelfth day of August 1935,...." and it goes on to say that if certain conditions are fulfilled and if the property sold was in the possession of the decree-holder on or after a certain date, the Board may order restoration of possession on certain terms. What was sold in this particular case was merely the equity of redemption of the petitioners. It may be that the term 'immovable property' generally speaking, would include an equity of redemption as respects immovable property, but since S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act contemplates restoration of possession, I am of opinion that in using the term 'immovable property' the section has in view only property of a corporeal character. It follows that since in this particular case what was sold was merely an equity of redemption, there was no sale of any immovable property within the meaning of S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, and accordingly the petitioners are excluded from the benefit of the section by the very introductory clause thereof. 8. It is again to be observed that the petitioners could be given relief under S. 37A only if the opposite party was in possession on or after 20th December 1939, as an execution purchaser. From the facts which I have recited, it is quite clear that the present possession of the opposite party is not possession in the capacity of an execution purchaser but in the capacity of a purchaser of the equity of redemption, who has subsequently redeemed the mortgage. Clearly, S. 37A does not contemplate that the debtor can have the property sold in execution restored from the possession of a person who is in the position of the opposite party in the present case. If the section applies to the case at all, the utmost which the petitioners might be entitled to would be restoration of possession of the property actually sold, that is to say, restoration of possession of the equity of redemption. If the section applies to the case at all, the utmost which the petitioners might be entitled to would be restoration of possession of the property actually sold, that is to say, restoration of possession of the equity of redemption. That, quite clearly, is an impossible notion and it seems to me that inasmuch as what was sold in this particular case was merely the equity of redemption, it is not possible to apply the section to this case at all and the petitioners cannot be given any relief under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. 9. Mr. Mukherjee, who appeared on behalf of the petitioners, contended that the sum paid by the opposite party to the usufructuary mortgagee should be treated as cost of delivery of possession of the property to the decree-holder and that the redemption of the mortgage should be treated as an improvement. I am of opinion that this contention is plainly untenable. The payment made by the opposite party to the mortgagee had no reference whatever to delivery of possession in execution. It was money paid for obtaining possession from a person who was claiming to be entitled to possession as a mortgagee. It could not, therefore, be said that the sum expended by the opposite party in purchasing the right, title and interest of the mortgagee was cost of delivery of possession within the meaning of S. 37A; neither could it be said that the redemption of the property was an improvement. The transaction plainly was what it purported to be, namely, a redemption by the person who had purchased the equity of redemption. The character in which that transaction was gone through by the opposite party was a character entirely different from his character as execution purchaser and it is in my view quite impossible for the petitioners to draw upon the actings of the opposite party in the capacity of the purchaser of the equity of redemption and build any claim thereupon. 10. In my view, for the reasons given above, S. 37A is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the present case and although the reasons given by the learned District Judge for dismissing the application of the petitioners may not have been right, his actual decision must be upheld. 11. This rule is accordingly discharged with costs, the hearing fee we assess at two gold mohurs. Harries, C.J. 12. 11. This rule is accordingly discharged with costs, the hearing fee we assess at two gold mohurs. Harries, C.J. 12. I agree.