JUDGMENT Seth, J. - The question of law raised for consideration in this appeal concerns the right of a proprietor of land on a higher level to drain his surface water on to his neighbour's land on a lower level. It has arisen under the following circumstances. 2. There is a plot of land bearing khasra No. 296 situate in the town of Fatehgarh. A portion of this plot is built over, having a bungalow constructed over it; the remaining portion is open and is being used as a compound of the bungalow. Defendants 3 and 4 have acquired a title to it by means of a gift deed from their husbands defendants 1 and 2. It is adjacent to plot MO. 297 on its north and plot NO. 295 on its east. A nala flows towards the south of the aforesaid plot, No. 296. Plots NOS. 295 and 297 belong to the plaintiff, appellant. The suit giving rise to this appeal was instituted to obtain the removal of a pushta alleged to have been constructed by the defendants on a strip of plot NO. 297 adjoining plot NO. 296 and for an injunction to restrain the defendants from draining the surface water of plot No. 296 on to plot NO. 295 by means of four moris, 3. The plaintiff's case was that the surface water of the entire plot No. 296 used to flow towards the south and drained in the nala aforesaid and that the defendants have altered the course and direction of the surface water and have newly started draining is through the aforesaid four moris on the plaintiff's plot No. 295. The plaintiff prayed for the aforesaid injunction on these allegations. In reply to these allegations the defendants pleaded that the pushta stood on their own land on a portion of plot No. 296, that the surface water of only a portion of plot No. 296 used to flow towards the south and the water that was being drained through the four moris always flowed towards the east on to the plaintiff's plot No. 295 and that thus the defendants had acquired a prescriptive right to drain the water of their plot No. 296 on to the plaintiff's plot No. 295. The land between the building on plot No, 296 and its extreme eastern edge is covered with flower beds fringed with a hedge and mendh on the eastern extremity. 4. The trial Court has found that the defendants' plea with regard to the flow of water is correct and that the surface water of plot No. 296 now flowing on to plot No. 295, always used to How on to it through a number of cuttings made* in its eastern mendh. It has not been possible to ascertain, from the record, the number of cuttings in the mendh and their exact location and, but for an agreement arrived at between the the parties through their counsel, it would have been necessary to remit an issue to find this out. The trial Court held on this finding that the defendants had acquired a prescriptive right to flow the surface water of their plot on to plot No. 295 but that under S. 23, Easements Act the right should be confined to the flow of water through one mori only, namely, the northern most. It also found that the pushta was constructed on defendant's own land in plot No. 296. It, therefore, granted a qualified injunction only with respect to the flow of water confining it through one mori only and dismissed the suit for the removal of the pushta. 5. The plaintiff appealed and the defendants filed cross-objections, each, against the decision in so far as it went against them. The lower appellate Court has held that the pushta was constructed on the plaintiffs land and has ordered its removal. The parties have acquiesced in this decision and the pushta does not, therefore, figure in this appeal. As regards the flow of water, the lower appellate Court has held that the trial Court has misconceived the nature of the defendants' right, that it is not a prescriptive right but that it is a natural right inherent in the ownership of the land and that all that the defendants have done is to construct a wall over the boundary preventing the flow of water except at four places where the maris have been constructed and in this way have instead of extending it, lather restricted the flow of water at some places and are therefore entitled to flow the water through all the four moris. The lower appellate Court has therefore set aside the injunction granted by the trial Court. 6. The plaintiff appealed. The finding of the lower appellate Court about the nature of the defendants' right to flow the water has not been contested by either party. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that the natural right of the proprietor of the land on a higher level to drain its surface water on to his neighbour's land on a lower lever extends only to flowing that water by force of gravitation in the manner in which it would have naturally flown according to the geographical and topographical conditions of the land. It is contended by him that the defendants were not entitled to interfere with the natural flow of water, to collect it on their land and to discharge it through four artificial channels and that they were bound to let it fall slowly in a continuous sheet if they desired to drain it on to the plaintiff's land. This extreme contention of the learned counsel is against the authority of the Privy Council and cannot therefore be accepted. Lord Dunedin, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gibbons v. Lenfestey, AIR 1915 p.a. 165 observed as follows : Where two contiguous fields, one which stands upon higher ground than the other, belong to different proprietors, nature itself may be said to constitute a servitude on an inferior tenement, by which it is obliged to receive the water which falls from the superior. If the water, which would otherwise fall from the higher grounds insensibly, without hurting the inferior tenement, should be collected into one body by the owner of the superior in the natural use of his property for draining or otherwise improving it, the owner of the inferior is, without the positive constitution of any servitude, bound to receive that body of water on his property. 7. Gibbons case, (A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 165), which came before the Privy Council on appeal from the Royal Court. Guernsey, has been followed in this country, on this point, by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Sheikh Hussain Sahib v. Pachipulusu Subbayya, 49 Mad. 441: (A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 449 F.B.) and by the Patna High Court in Rajpati Narain Singh v. Kirat Narain Singh, AIR 1939 pat. Guernsey, has been followed in this country, on this point, by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Sheikh Hussain Sahib v. Pachipulusu Subbayya, 49 Mad. 441: (A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 449 F.B.) and by the Patna High Court in Rajpati Narain Singh v. Kirat Narain Singh, AIR 1939 pat. 71: (173 I.C. 599) where it has been held that the owner of the superior tenement can, in the natural use of his property for draining or otherwise improving it, collect the water into one body and thus discharge it and the owner of the inferior tenement is without the positive constitution of any servitude bound to receive that body of water on his property. Then, again, it has been held by the Madras High Court in Kasia Pillai Vs. Ganesamuthukumarasamia Pillai, AIR 1929 Mad 337 that the owner of upper lands is entitled to discharge into the lands the surplus rain water as well as water brought into his lands by irrigation for ordinary agricultural operations, and he can exercise this right by opening vents in his bund so long as no damage is caused to the owner of the lower lands. It is, thus, clear that the defendants were entitled to make use of the water falling on their land, to collect it and to discharge it by making Moris in the boundary wall. 8. It is, then, contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if the defendants had such right, they had no right to increase the burden on the plaintiff's land by discharging the water with greater force and in a more accumulated form. He contends that the discharge of the collected water through four Moris comes with greater violence and in greater volumes on particular spots of his land and causes there greater damage than used to be caused before. In answer, the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents contends that the defendants have an unrestricted right to flow the collected water through artificial channels in exercise of their natural right to drain their surface water on to the plaintiff's land and that it is immaterial whether it causes greater damage or not. In answer, the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents contends that the defendants have an unrestricted right to flow the collected water through artificial channels in exercise of their natural right to drain their surface water on to the plaintiff's land and that it is immaterial whether it causes greater damage or not. His next contention is that even if it be assumed that the right of the defendants is restricted in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant has failed to prove that any greater damage is being caused to highland. The reply of the learned counsel for the appellant to this last contention, put forward or behalf of the respondents, is that the defendants had not pleaded any case of natural right but toad claimed only a prescriptive right and there, fore there was no occasion to lead any evidence to prove that greater damage was being caused by the alteration made in the natural flow of the water. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the defendants are not entitled to increase the burden upon the appellant's land seems to be sound. After a careful review of numerous cases, English and Indian, and authoritative text books in Sitaram Motiram Vs. Keshav Ramchandra, AIR 1947 Bom 4 Rajadhyaksha J. has in a very able judgment, stated the law upon this point as follows: We are therefore of opinion that the current of authorities both in England and India is to the effect that although the upper proprietor has in the course of the draining operations a right to collect surface water and discharge it in a body on the land on the lower level and although the plaintiff (owner of such land) is bound to receive this water, the upper proprietor cannot by adopting a particular system of drainage affect the land on a lower level in an injurious manner. The owner of the land on a lower level being subject to a disadvantage enjoined by nature has got to submit to all the consequences resulting from the owner of the upper land using that land in a natural way for the purpose of draining it or for the purpose of agricultural operations. The owner of the land on a lower level being subject to a disadvantage enjoined by nature has got to submit to all the consequences resulting from the owner of the upper land using that land in a natural way for the purpose of draining it or for the purpose of agricultural operations. But if the owner of the land on a higher level uses the land in an unnatural way or in the course of draining operations collects the water in one body and discharges it on the plaintiff's land, then although the plaintiff is bound to receive that body of water he has a cause of action if, as a result, the plaintiff's land is subjected to a damage greater than what it would have received as a result of the disadvantage imposed upon it by nature. This conclusion is, in our opinion, nothing more than the application of the principle in 8. 23, Easements Act, to the natural rights which are closely akin to easements, as has been pointed oat by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Sheik Hussain Sahib Vs. Pachipulusu Subbayya and Another, AIR 1926 Mad 449 9. It is needless to refer again to the authorities reviewed in this judgment. It is sufficient to say that I respectfully agree with the above statement of law. To the similar effect is the decision in Kasia Pillai Vs. Ganesamuthukumarasamia Pillai, AIR 1929 Mad 337 wherein the right of the proprietor of the superior land has been hedged round with the limitation "so long as no damage is caused to the owner of the lower lands." No authority to the contrary has been brought to my notice. The authorities that seemingly contradict the view expressed by Rajadhyaksha J. have been noticed and rightly distinguished by that learned Judge on the ground that this precise question did not call for a decision in those cases. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents' contends that, according to the decision of the Privy Council in Gibbon's case, (A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 265) the right of the proprietor of the superior land to collect and dispose of the surface water is unrestricted and is not subjected to any such limitations as have been laid down in Sitaram Motiram Vs. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents' contends that, according to the decision of the Privy Council in Gibbon's case, (A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 265) the right of the proprietor of the superior land to collect and dispose of the surface water is unrestricted and is not subjected to any such limitations as have been laid down in Sitaram Motiram Vs. Keshav Ramchandra, AIR 1947 Bom 4 That there is no force in this contention will appear from the following observations in Gibbon's case, AIR 1915 P.C. 165 ) itself: The right, however, of the superior proprietor is not quite absolute. The limits cannot be defined by definition, but each case must depend on its own circumstances. 11. Their Lordships expressly say that the right is not absolute and further that the limits in each case would depend on its own circumstances. Their Lordships then give two examples of such limits but these two examples do not exhaust their entire scope. In my opinion, another class of limits is the one laid down in Sitaram Motiram Vs. Keshav Ramchandra, AIR 1947 Bom 4 12. As regards the question whether it has been proved that the burden has been increased on the plaintiff's land or not, the position is that the defendants put forward a case of prescriptive right only. This is obvious not only from a perusal of their written statement but also from the issue framed by the trial Court which runs as follows: Have defendants 1 to 4 acquired any right of prescriptive easement for the flow of their water from the drains in dispute ? 13. The plaintiff cannot, therefore, be blamed for not adducing any evidence to prove greater damage. As already stated above, it would have been necessary to remit an issue, and to give opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, to find out whether the damage has been increased or not. The learned counsel appearing for either party have, however, agreed that the damage will not be increased if, instead the water being allowed to flow through four moris, it is to flow through a larger number of moris constructed throughout the length of the wall in such a way that the distance between any two moris is not greater than six feet and the width of each mori is not less than four inches and not greater than six inches. 14. 14. This appeal is accordingly allowed and; the decree of the Court below is modified to this extent that an injunction is granted against defendants 3 and 4 restraining them, by themselves or through their agents, workmen or servants, from allowing the surface water of their plot No. 296 from being drained on to the plaintiff's plot Mo. 295 in any way other than by constructing a sufficient number of moris in their eastern boundary wall in such a way that the distance between any two consecutive moris is not greater than six feet and the width of any one of those moris is not less than four inches and not greater than six inches. There shall be no order as to costs incurred in this Court.