JUDGMENT Chatterjee, J. - An application was made in this suit for leave to defend under Or. 37 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. On July 20, 1948, I granted leave to the Defendant to defend the suit on condition that security is furnished to the full extent of the amount of the claim within a fortnight to the satisfaction of the Registrar and I further ordered that in default the application would stand dismissed with costs. The time to furnish security expired on August 4, 1948. On August 11, this application was made for an extension of time for furnishing security. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. A. K. Sen has contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant time. He has referred to me a number of cases. I have been referred to the case of Khetra Mohan Ghose v. Gour Mohan Kapali 37 C. W. N. 878 (sic) where a Division Bench of this Court held that where a certain time is fixed by a decree of the Court for taking some steps and it directs that on failure of doing so within the time limited the suit should stand dismissed, the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time limited by the decree. It is pointed out by the Counsel for the Defendant that a decree and an order do not carry the same legal consequences and where the suit is still pending the Court can enlarge time under sec. 148 of the Code. Mr. Sen then contends that (sic) effect of my order was that in the (sic) non-compliance the same came into(sic) tion automatically and without a (sic) ther intervention of the Cour (sic) application stood dismissed on (sic) and, therefore, there is no (sic) which is pending or no previo (sic) rent on which another (sic) time can possibly operate. (sic)- graphy Co. v. Gregg (2) and Gulraj v. Kaniram (3)]. He also referred to me the case of Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad (4) where a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that in such a case the Court ceases to be seized of the matter and becomes functus officio and cannot extend the period for payment under sec. 148 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. In my opinion Mr. Sen's contention is sound and I have got no power to extend time. 148 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. In my opinion Mr. Sen's contention is sound and I have got no power to extend time. In my view if a suit is pending and there is no statutory bar to a fresh application then the Court can make an appropriate order on that application and give relief to the party in default who wants time to do something which the Courts required him to do. But that is not possible where the action is dead by virtue of the previous order or where there is some legal bar under a statute. 2. Reference has been made to the case of Manley Estates, Ltd. v. Benedek (5) by Mr. Susil Dutt, the learned Counsel for the applicant. In that case a judgment in default of appearance was obtained against the Defendant. The Defendant later stated that he had a defence to the action, and leave was then given to defend, provided certain conditions were complied with within seven days. After that time had elapsed, the Defendant applied for an extension of time and it was held that the Court or a Judge had power under R. S. C. Or. 67, r. 7 to enlarge the time since the action was still in existence. McKinnon, (sic) held that the action had not disappear-(sic) was in existence and, therefore, the (sic) had jurisdiction to enlarge time. (sic) of the Code is practically a copy (sic) Or. 67 of the rules of the (sic) court. It may be that in some of the cases an extreme view has been taken, for example, in the case of Mohammad Asraf Ali v. Nabijan Bibi I. L. R. (1939) 1 Cal 468, where Edgley, J., took the view that having regard to Or. 20, r. 3 of the Code, the Court has no jurisdiction to extend time for deposit of decretal amount specified in a conditional order for setting aside a sale in execution of a rent decree, and sec. 148 of the Code has no application to such a case. It is to be noted that Or. 20, r. 3 does not apply to the Original Side of the High Court. The difficulty I feel is that in a suit under Or. 148 of the Code has no application to such a case. It is to be noted that Or. 20, r. 3 does not apply to the Original Side of the High Court. The difficulty I feel is that in a suit under Or. 37 an application for leave to defend must be made within 10 days of the service of the writ of summons and the Court has no power to extend this period. [Quazie Mohmudar Rahman v. Sarat Chandra Dutt 5 C. W. N. 259 (1900)]. With respect I agree with the observations of MacKinnon, L. T. But if they are to be made applicable to this case, the granting of this application would mean in effect an extension of time for making an application for leave to defend beyond the statutory limit of 10 days and I have no power to do so. When the decree will be passed, the Court will have power to set aside the same under Or. 37, r. 4, and the Court in an appropriate case can then give leave to the Defendant to defend the suit on such terms as it may think fit. I have no jurisdiction at this stage to grant any further time or to grant leave to defend. The application is dismissed with costs. The written statement which is now on the record, must be taken off the file. Certified for Counsel.