JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by the Plaintiff u/s 6-A of the Court Fees Act read with Section 104, Code of Civil Procedure. It arises under the following circumstances. 2. The Plaintiff instituted a suit for pre-emption of house property sold under a sale deed dated the 9th April, 1940. The suit was originally instituted in the Court of the Munsif on a valuation of Rs. 2,087-15. The Defendants raised the plea that the claim had been under valued and that the court-fee paid was insufficient. The learned munsif held an inquiry into the question of valuation and the sufficiency of court-fee paid. He came to the conclusion that the house in suit could not be worth less than Rs. 10,000 in value. He returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. Subsequently the plaint was presented to the Court of the Civil Judge and a court-fee on a valuation of Rs. 10,000 was paid. The Defendants then raised an objection to the effect that the property was on that date worth Rs. 50,000. The learned Judge framed an issue in these terms:- Whether the suit is undervalued and the court-fee paid is sufficient. 3. Before determining this issue, the learned Civil Judge called for a report from the amin on the value of the property in dispute. Thereafter, he took the evidence of the parties. On a consideration of the whole matter, he came to the conclusion that the market value of the house on the date of the presentation of the plaint in his Court was 20,497-8. In view of this finding, he directed the Plaintiff to pay the deficiency in court-fee. Against this order the Plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court. 4. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff Appellant has strongly contended that the view of the law taken by the Court below was erroneous. In order to appreciate the point raised by the learned Counsel, it is necessary to refer to the relevant previsions of the Court Fees Act. Section 7(vi) runs thus:- In suits to enforce a right of preemption. according to the value (computed in accordance with paragraph (v) of this section) of the land, building or garden in respect of which the right is claimed. 5. Paragraph (v) of Section 7, so far as it is material runs thus. (v) In suits for possession of land buildings or gardens. according to the value (computed in accordance with paragraph (v) of this section) of the land, building or garden in respect of which the right is claimed. 5. Paragraph (v) of Section 7, so far as it is material runs thus. (v) In suits for possession of land buildings or gardens. according to the value of the subject matter and such value shall be deemed to be... (II) where the subject matter is a building or garden-according to the market value of the building or garden as the case may be. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that the value of the property must be determined with reference to the point of time When the sale took place and not with reference to the point of time when the plaint was presented in the proper Court. It will be noticed that Sub-section (vi) of Section 7 specifically refers to paragraph (v) for determining the manner of computing the "value" of the property in suit. Sub-section (v)(II) Provides that the value of the subject matter of the suit where it is a building or garden, is to be determined according to the "market value" of such property. It is, therefore the market value of the house in suit which has to be considered. The crucial question, however, is the point of time, with reference to which the market value has to be determined. Neither of the two Sub-sections of Section 7 indicates the point of time with reference to which the market value is to be determined. The contention of learned Counsel for the Appellant is that in a suit for pre-emption the Plaintiff if successful can only be substituted in place of the original vendee. It is further urged that the Plaintiff in such circumstances is liable to pay only the price which was actually paid by the verdee to the vendor. In view of these circumstances, it is contended by learned Counsel, that it would be very unfair to ask the Plaintiff to pay court-fee on an amount which is in excess of the price which was paid by the vendee at the time of the execution of the sale-deed and which he is liable to pay in case of the success of the sait. Learned Counsel has relied on a single decision of the Lahore High Court AIR 1924 Lahore 380 . Learned Counsel has relied on a single decision of the Lahore High Court AIR 1924 Lahore 380 . where following the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah (1885) 7 All 775, it was held that the right of pre-emption being (Sic) a right of substitution and not a right of repurchase, it is reasonable to suppose that the legislature intended by the provisions of Section 7(vi) of the Court Fees Act that the Plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption should pay a court-fee on the value which the property had at the date of the sale deed. 7. Learned Counsel for the Respondents. on the other hand, has invited our attention to a decision of two learned judges in Mohammad Sharif v. Sheihh Fazallul Rahman 1946 A.L.W. 174. In this case, he specific question which arises in (Sic) present case was decided and it was held that court-fee had to be paid on the market value which was to be determined with reference to the date of the suit and not with reference to the date of sale. The bench decision of this Court had to consider the decision of the single Judge of the Lahore High Court in AIR 1924 Lahore 380 and the learned Judges eventually dissented from that ruling. They have pointed out that the decision given by the Lahore High Court rested entirely upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Govind Dayal v. Inayat ullch 1946 A.L.W. 174 and that the latter case was not at all concened with the question of court-fees but merely explained the incidents of the right of pre-emption. We have considered the decision of this Court in Mohammad Shariff v. Sheikh Fazalul Rahman (1885) 7 All 775 and we have also considered carefully the provisions of Sub-sections (V) and (VI) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. It seems to us that the market value of the property in suit must be determined with reference to the provisions of the Court Fees Act alone. We are really not concerned with the question of the incidents of the right of pre-emption. It seems to us that the market value of the property in suit must be determined with reference to the provisions of the Court Fees Act alone. We are really not concerned with the question of the incidents of the right of pre-emption. As mentioned already the provisions of Sub-sections (V) and (VI) of Section 7 in themselves do not deal with the question of the point of time with reference to which the value-i.e. the market value-is to be determined; but obviously the question of the court fee would arise only when the suit is instituted. Keeping this fact in mind, it seems to us that when the legislature provided in Section (vi) read with Sub-section (v) that the court-fee must be paid according to the market value of the building or land, it must be deemed to lay down that the value should be determined with reference to the point of time when the suit is instituted. It follows therefore, that the price paid or the or the variation in the value of the properly at a date earlier than the date when the suit is instituted should not be taken into account. 8. Another argument put forward by learn ed counsel for the Appellant in support of his contention was that in any event, his client should not be asked to pay court-fee with reference to the valuation of the property at a date later than the date when that suit was first instituted in the Court of the Munsif His contention is that the learned Munsif held an inquiry into this question and recorded a finding that the value of the house in suit was not less than Rs. 80,000. The contention of learned Counsel is that at the worst his client might be asked to pay court fee on sum and that the court-fee on that amount was actually paid when the plaint was presented a second time in the Court of the learned Civil Judge. We have considered this point also with reference to the provisions of the Court Fees Act. It seems to us that the presentation of the plaint to the Court of the learned Munif was in the (Sic) of law no presentation at all. We have considered this point also with reference to the provisions of the Court Fees Act. It seems to us that the presentation of the plaint to the Court of the learned Munif was in the (Sic) of law no presentation at all. it is only the presentation of the plaint to the proper Court that amounts to the institution of the suit and it is the date of the institution of the suit which is material. In this connection, learned Counsel has strongly pressed upon us that this view of the law may in certain cases, inflict unmerited hardship upon a Plaintiff in a pre-emption suit. We express no opinion with regard to this question of hardship, as we feel that it is our plain duty to interpret the provisions of the Court Fees Act and to enforce the law as it stands. In our judgment to put any other interpretation upon the language used in Section 7(vi) read with Sub-section (v) would be to put an interpretation not warranted by law. 9. The result, therefore, is that we dismiss this appeal with costs. Learned Counsel for the Appellant prays for three months time for making good the deficiency in court-fee. The time prayed for is allowed.