Judgment B.P.Sinha, J. 1. This a second appeal on behalf of the defendant-fourth-party from the decision of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga modifying that of the Munsif of Madhubani in a suit in ejectment. 2. The plaintiff-respondents claimed the disputed lands, about 11 kathas and odd in area, by virtue of their several purchases between the years 1913 and 1921 from the family of the original tenants represented by the defendant-third-party. They alleged that the sale held on the 5th of June, 1936, in execution of a decree for rent obtained by the landlord-defendant, did not affect their interest, as they were not represented in the execution proceedings, and that, therefore, the auction sale only affected the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors. The defendant-appellant, who is a settlee from the landlord, who was the auction-purchaser in execution of the decree and sale impugned in this case, alleged that the sale deeds relied upon by the plaintiffs were fraudulent and fictitious which did not convey any title to the plaintiffs; nor they obtained possession thereunder. They also alleged that the decree for rent obtained by the Raj Darbhanga, defendant-second-party, was a good rent decree, and the execution sale passed the holding itself. Hence, on these pleadings, only two questions arose for decision: first, whether the plaintiffs had acquired a good title by virtue of their sale deeds executed between the years 1913 and 1921 in respect of parcels of the holding of 11 kathas and odd held by the family of the defendant-third-party; and, secondly, whether the rent decree and the execution sale following thereupon had the effect of passing the holding itself or only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors. 3. The trial Court held that the sale deeds relied upon by the plaintiffs were genuine and real transactions which conveyed good title and possession as between the parties to those transactions; but it was admitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that there was another son of Sewak Ram named Lalji who did not figure as the vendor in the sale deeds relied upon by the plaintiffs, and his interest, being one fourth share, did not pass by those sales. The trial Court further held that, as a result of the amendment of Sec.26 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, which came into force on the 10th of June, 1935, the plaintiffs purchase must be deemed to have been recognised by the landlord, and, consequently, as they were not parties to the execution proceedings, their interests were not affected by the execution sale held at the instance of the landlord-decree-holder. In that view of the matter, the trial Court decreed the suit in respect of three quarters of the lands in dispute. From its decision, there was an appeal by the defendant-fourth-party, and a cross-objection by the plaintiff-respondents in respect of the one-fourth share of the lands in dispute which was not decreed in their favour by the trial Court. The lower appellate Court has decreed the entire suit, that is to say, it dismissed the appeal, and allowed the cross-objection, holding that, the defendant not having challenged the plaintiffs title to the entire property in dispute by virtue of the sale deeds alleged by them, they were entitled, to recovery of possession in respect of the whole of the disputed lands. It also held, in agreement with the trial Court, that the amendment of the Bihar Tenancy Act, particularly Sec.26N had the effect of making the plaintiffs raiyats in respect of the disputed lands, and, as they were not parties to the execution proceedings, their interests could not have been affected by the execution sale in favour of the landlord, defendant-second-party. Hence this second appeal on behalf of the defendant-fourth-party who is at present interested in the holding as a settlee from the auction-purchaser, the Darbhanga Raj. 4. Mr. Awadh Bihari jha, on behalf of the appellant, has strenuously argued that the decision of the Courts below is erroneous in law in so far as they held that the auction sale held in favour of the landlord-decree-holder did not affect the plaintiffs interest, in view of the provisions of S. 26N which has now been, with some modifications, incorporated in Sec.26 B, proviso. Mr. Jha argued that, as the landlord had not recognised the transfer, the statutory recognition as laid down in the amended Sec.26 N did not have the effect of rendering the execution proceedings null and void as against the transferees, the plaintiffs. Mr. Jha argued that, as the landlord had not recognised the transfer, the statutory recognition as laid down in the amended Sec.26 N did not have the effect of rendering the execution proceedings null and void as against the transferees, the plaintiffs. In this connection, he relied upon the following observations in the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chintaman Mandar V/s. Sia Ram Mandal, 22 Pat 370 at p. 377 "If the landlord had in fact recognised the plaintiffs purchase, he was bound to implead him in his rent suit, and the result of not impleading him would be that the decree obtained in the suit would not be a valid rent decree. But the effect of Sec.26 N is that by fiction, as it were, the landlord shall be deemed to have recognised the plaintiffs purchase in 1913. Such fictional recognition does not necessarily carry all the consequences that would flow from actual recognition. From these observations, Mr. Jha would ask us to hold that the "fictional recognition" of the plaintiffs purchase would not carry with it the legal result that the non-impleading the plaintiffs in the execution proceedings would render those proceedings null and void against them. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention; nor do those observations of Chatterji, J., who delivered the leading judgment in that case, support him to the extent he would ask us to hold. That case dealt with a different set of facts altogether. In the case dealt with by the Full Bench, of which I happened to be a member, the rent decree had been obtained and the execution proceedings concluded with the sale before the amendment referred to above of Sec.26 came into effect, and the Full Bench decision is authority only for this proposition that, if an interest has already been transferred as a result of an auction sale held in execution of a rent decree, that auction sale would not be affected by the coming into effect subsequently of the provisions of Sec.26 N of the Bihar Tenancy Act. In the present case we do not know the exact date of the decree for rent; but we know this much that the auction sale was held on the 5th of June, 1936. In the present case we do not know the exact date of the decree for rent; but we know this much that the auction sale was held on the 5th of June, 1936. Assuming for the purposes of this case that the decree for rent had been passed earlier than the 10th of June, 1935, it would be a good rent decree, and it could be executed as such, if all persons who became interested in the holding at the date of the sale had been impleaded as the judgment-debtors, in this case it is not disputed that the plaintiffs, who became raiyats of the holding as a result of the operation of Sec.26 N of the Bihar Tenancy Act, were not parties to the execution proceedings. Now, the question is--what is the effect of such an execution sale? It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents in this Court, as it was done in the Courts below, that such an execution had the effect only of a money execution, inasmuch as the holding was not represented at all in the execution proceedings. When the auction sale took place on the 5th of June, 1936, the plaintiffs were the raiyats in respect of the, holding by operation of Sec.26N of the Bihar Tenancy Act. It has been conceded that the plaintiffs Had no notice of the execution proceedings. Hence, there is no sufficient reason to uphold the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that it was open to the plaintiffs to satisfy the decree under the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Sec.170 of the Bihar Tenancy Act. Can it be contended that the original tenants who were judgment-debtors in the decree for rent obtained by the defendant-second-party, represented the holding after the coming into effect of Sec.26 N, as it then was, of the Bihar Tenancy Act? In my opinion, such a result would be absolutely against the policy of the legislature in enacting Sec.26N of the Bihar Tenancy Act. That amendment was intended to confer a status on a transferee of a non-transferable occupancy holding which had been in possession of such a transferee for more than ten years before the enactment in question. In my opinion, such a result would be absolutely against the policy of the legislature in enacting Sec.26N of the Bihar Tenancy Act. That amendment was intended to confer a status on a transferee of a non-transferable occupancy holding which had been in possession of such a transferee for more than ten years before the enactment in question. The Privy Council in the case of A. H. Forbes V/s. Bahadur Singh, 41 Ind App 91: 41 Cal 926 have laid it down that, in order to procure a sale of the holding itself, it, is essential that the relationship of landlord and tenant should have continued until the decree was obtained which was the basis of the execution proceedings, and that principle has been extended by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Krishnapada Chatterji V/s. Manadasundari Ghosh, 59 Cal 1202. That case is an authority for the proposition that, if the relationship of landlord and tenant has ceased at any time before the sale was held, such a sale has not the effect of passing the holding itself but only affects the right, title and interest of the persons who were impleaded as judgment-debtors. The position, therefore, is absolutely clear in law that the execution proceedings taken out by the decree-holder in the present case, after the coming into effect of Sec.26 N of the Bihar Tenancy Act, against the original, tenants of the holding had not the effect of passing the holding itself, and could affect only the, right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors. In the case of Girish Chandra V/s. Narendra Nath, 23 Cal WN 654 a Bench of the Calcutta High Court has ruled that a sale held in execution of a decree for rent obtained against the original tenant, after the transferee of the non-transferable occupancy holding had been recognised by the decree-holder landlord, does not pass the holding itself, that is to say, does not affect the interest of the purchaser so recognised. The only difference between that ease and the present case is that, whereas in that case the landlord himself had agreed to recognise the transfer after having obtained the decree against the original tenants, in the present case the provisions of Sec.26N of the Bihar Tenancy Act, now replaced by the Sec.26B proviso of the Act, make it clear that the landlord shall be deemed to have recognised the transfers in question. Reference was made by the learned Advocate for the appellant to the case of Sital Singh V/s. Ramjiprasad, AIR (25) 1938 Pat 591. But the facts of that case are entirely different from those Of the present. In that case the mortgagee of a portion of a non-transferable occupancy holding had deposited the rent under the provisions of Sec.171 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, and had taken possession of the holding as a statutory mortgagee. There was a transfer by way of sale of another portion of the same holding, not recognised by the landlord. That purchaser of the holding did not challenge the position of the mortgagee : it was the judgment-debtor himself, that is to say, the original raiyat, who challenged his position, and James, J. held that he could not challenge the mortgagees deposit, as it was open to him to pay him out, and take possession of the holding. His Lordship expressly reserved his opinion on the position of the purchaser of the portion who had not come up to the Court to challenge the mortgagees possession. Hence, that case has no bearing on the point in controversy in the present case. 5. It was next contended that the lower appellate Court had misdirected itself in granting a decree for the entire disputed land in modification of the judgment and decree of the trial Court which had held that the interest of Laljis branch in the holding had not been transferred to the plaintiffs. But, as rightly pointed out by the lower appellate Court, nobody had even whispered in the pleadings, particularly the contesting defendant, that Lalji had any interest in that holding. There was no oral or documentary evidence to show that Lalji had an interest in the holding which was still outstanding after the purchases relied upon by the plaintiffs. But, as rightly pointed out by the lower appellate Court, nobody had even whispered in the pleadings, particularly the contesting defendant, that Lalji had any interest in that holding. There was no oral or documentary evidence to show that Lalji had an interest in the holding which was still outstanding after the purchases relied upon by the plaintiffs. But, in this Court, the appellant put in a certified copy of the entry in the record-of-rights in respect of the lands in dispute. That entry is of the year 1901. It has been found by both the Courts below that Lalji was a separated member, and, for aught we know, he may have partitioned the properties of the joint family, and taken his share from another block of lands belonging to the family. As this controversy had not been raised in the pleadings nor in the issues before the Courts below, naturally, there is paucity of evidence on that part of the case. This Court, sitting in second appeal, cannot admit the document adduced before us for the first time under the provisions of Rule 27 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, as there is no affidavit bringing the case within the purview of that rule. It is not stated in the affidavit filed in this Court that the appellant was not aware of the entry in the record-of-rights, or, being aware of those entries, had not the opportunity of adducing that document in evidence in the Courts below. It must, therefore, be held that no foundation has been laid for the reception of additional evidence at this late stage. The application, therefore, for reception of additional evidence must be rejected. 6. In these circumstances, it must be held that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are entirely correct. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. Ramaswami, J. 7 I agree.