Judgement Appeal (No. 31 of 1946) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (November 22, 1943) which affirmed a judgment and decree of the District Judge of Guntur (April 20, 1942) which had reversed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bapatla (July 31, 1939). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The facts giving rise to this appeal were not in dispute, having regard to the findings of the courts in India. The respondent and his father constituted a Hindu joint family. The respondents father died on October 4, 1935, leaving him surviving his widow and the respondent, who was then and was still a minor. Before his death the respondents father had incurred certain debts, including a debt of Rs. 16,000 owing to the appellants and secured by two promissory notes, and a debt of Rs. 1,200 owing to one Ramayya and secured by a mortgage. By an agreement in writing, dated November 29, 1935, the respondent " being " minor by guardian and mother Manikyamma," to quote the words of the agreement, agreed to sell the lands in suit to the appellants for Rs. 17,200. The purchase price was to be applied as to Rs. 16,000 in discharging the promissory notes and as to Rs. 1,200 in discharging the mortgage debt owing to Ramayya. The contract provided that a sale deed was to be executed, registered and delivered to the appellants, at their expense and on their request. The appellants duly paid off the mortgage debt of Rs. 1,200 and in December, 1935 they were let into possession of the lands contracted to be sold, but no sale deed was ever executed or registered. On September, 10, 1938, the respondent commenced the present suit by his mother and next friend Manikyamma, claiming possession of the lands contracted to be sold and mesne profits. 1,200 and in December, 1935 they were let into possession of the lands contracted to be sold, but no sale deed was ever executed or registered. On September, 10, 1938, the respondent commenced the present suit by his mother and next friend Manikyamma, claiming possession of the lands contracted to be sold and mesne profits. The propriety of the contract of sale was challenged before the Subordinate Judge, but, to quote the judgment of the High Court, " The courts below have found, "and the finding has not been challenged before us, that the " plaintiffs father had left a large amount of debts which " could not have been discharged from the income of the family " properties and that it was necessary and beneficial to sell " some of them for the purpose." The Subordinate Judge held, inter alia, that s. 54a of the Transfer of Property Act protected the appellants, and he dismissed the suit. His decision was reversed by the District Judge of Guntur, who made an order for possession in favour of the respondent, subject to his paying to the appellants Rs. 17,200, with interest from the date of suit. An appeal by the present appellants to the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ.) was dismissed Leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council was given by the High Court of Judicature at Madras on the ground that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the true construction of s. 53a of the Transfer of Property Act. That section was in the following terms " 53a. That section was in the following terms " 53a. Part Performance.—Where any person contracts " to transfer for consideration any immovable property by "writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the " terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be "ascertained with reasonable certainty, " and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, " or the transferee, being already in possession, continues " in possession in part performance of the contract and has " done some act in furtherance of the contract, " and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform "his part of the contract, "then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required " to be registered has not been registered, or, where there " is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been " completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for " the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the " transferee and persons claiming under him any right in "respect of the property of which the transferee has taken " or continued in possession, other than a right expressly " provided by the terms of the contract " Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the " rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice " of the contract or of the part performance thereof." 1948. Jan. 27. Rewcastle K.C. and Quass for the appellants. The point, an important one, lies in a very narrow compass, and depends on the construction of s. 53a of the Transfer of Property Act. The question is as to the meaning of " the transferor" in that section, the sole point being whether the infant was not the transferor—whether the word " transferor" means the infant or the infants next friend, or, as stated by the High Court, " where a guardian contracts to transfer immovable "property belonging to his minor ward, can it be said that the " minor is the ‘transferor within the meaning of the section ? " A contract of sale of land entered into by a Hindu mother on behalf of her minor son for the discharge of his fathers binding debts is not void, and the contract of sale in question was necessary and beneficial. " A contract of sale of land entered into by a Hindu mother on behalf of her minor son for the discharge of his fathers binding debts is not void, and the contract of sale in question was necessary and beneficial. It had been part performed, and s. 53a applies to protect the appellants. An infant himself can make no valid contract, but when the guardian makes the contract, he makes it as guardian qua the infant. The respondent was a " transferor " within the meaning of s. 53a. It is the infant making the contract by the only legal agent that he can have. Quass followed. It will be seen from the actual contract that in so many words it purported to be entered into not with the guardian but with the minor. It is signed by the infant through the guardian. Sir Herbert Cunliffe K.C. and Subba Row for the respondent. Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act provides that " every " person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority." There was here no mutuality, as the cases say, between the owner and the purchasers, because a minor is a person who cannot contract, and the person who has contracted has certain powers which the law gives him. One must look at the beginning of s. 53a to see who is " the transferor,” and it is the person who has entered into the contract. The transferor referred to in the section is not the infant, but the person who has entered into the contract. [Reference was made to Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mst. Babooee Munraj Koonweree (( 1856) 6 Moo. I.A. 393.)] It comes back to this the infant has no power to contract, and a " transferor" cannot be the person who has no power to contract. To be able to bind a person for whom a guardian acts it must be that that person shall be capable of acting—and here the infant could not contract. The infant has transferred nothing, first, because he didnt do it, and secondly, because he couldnt. The person who transferred or purported to do so is the guardian, and she did so on behalf of somebody who is incapable of transferring and it cannot therefore be said that he is the transferor. The infant has transferred nothing, first, because he didnt do it, and secondly, because he couldnt. The person who transferred or purported to do so is the guardian, and she did so on behalf of somebody who is incapable of transferring and it cannot therefore be said that he is the transferor. [Reference was made to Jamna Das v. Ram Autar Pande (( 1911) L.R. 39 I.A. 7, 9.) and Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri (( 1911) I.L.R. 39 C. 232 237.).] Section 53a is framed on the hypothesis that the person who is acting is acting for somebody who is competent to act for himself. The transferor in this case was the guardian purporting to act on behalf of the infant. On the facts of this case the appellants are not protected by s. 53a and the respondent is not estopped from recovering possession of the land from the appellants. Rewcastle K.C. replied, and on s. 11 of the Contract Act referred to the Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, by Pollock and Mulla, 6th ed., p. 76. That passage states exactly the situation here ; it is the infants contract all the time, and he can ratify or repudiate when he comes of age ; how could he ratify if it was not his. Feb. 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MORTON OF HENRYTON, who stated the facts set out above and continued Their Lordships entertain no doubt that it was within the powers of the mother as guardian to enter into the contract of sale of November 29, 1935, on behalf of the respondent for the purpose of discharging his fathers debts, and that, if the sale had been completed by the execution and registration of a deed of sale, the respondent would have been bound under Hindu law. As the sale was not so completed, it is conceded by counsel for the appellants that the present appeal must fail unless the appellants are entitled to the protection afforded by s. 53a of the Transfer of Property Act. They are entitled to that protection if, but only if, the respondent comes within the words u the transferor or any v person claiming under him." If he does, the section bars him from obtaining the relief claimed by him in the present suit and the appeal must succeed. They are entitled to that protection if, but only if, the respondent comes within the words u the transferor or any v person claiming under him." If he does, the section bars him from obtaining the relief claimed by him in the present suit and the appeal must succeed. If he does not, the order for possession made in his favour was right and the appeal must be dismissed. Their Lordships think it is clear that the words " the transferor " refer back to the person who " contracts to transfer " for consideration any immovable property by writing signed " by him or on his behalf." Counsel for the respondent rely on s. 11 of the Indian Contract Act, which is as follows " Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of "majority according to the law to which he is subject, and "who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting "by any law to which he is subject." They submit that, having regard to that section and to the decision of their Lordships board in Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (( 1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 114.) a minor cannot be a person who contracts. It is clear that, if the mother and guardian had taken no part at all in the transaction, the respondent could not have entered into a valid contract to sell the land in suit to the appellants, but it is equally clear that such a contract could, and did, come into existence in the present case, and the question for decision is—was the person who contracted within the meaning of s. 53a, the respondent or his mother ? The position of a guardian under the Hindu law was con sidered by their Lordships board in Hunooman persaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (( 1856) 6 Moo. I. A. 393, 412.) where the following passage is to be found " they consider that the acts " of the Ranee cannot be reasonably viewed otherwise than as " acts done on behalf of another, whatever description she " gave to herself, or others gave to her." Thus the act of the mother and guardian in entering into the contract of sale in the present case was an act done on behalf of the minor appellant. The position of the minor under such a contract is discussed in the following passage, with which their Lordships agree, in Pollock and Mullas Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 7th ed., p. 70 "A minors agreement being now " decided to be void, it is clear that there is no agreement to be " specifically enforced ; and it is unnecessary to refer to former " decisions and distinctions, following English authorities " which were applicable only on the view now overruled by the " Judicial Committee." The learned authors are here referring to the decision in Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose already cited (( 1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 114.). They continue "It is, however, different with " regard to contracts entered into on behalf of a minor by his " guardian or by a manager of his estate. In such a case it " has been held by the High Courts of India, in cases which " arose subsequent to the governing decision of the Judicial " Committee, that the contract can be specifically enforced " by or against the minor, if the contract is one which it is " within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his " behalf so as to bind him by it, and, further, if it is for the " benefit of the minor. But if either of these two conditions " is wanting, the contract cannot be specifically enforced " at all." In the present case neither of the two conditions mentioned is wanting, having regard to the findings in the courts in India. It would appear, therefore, that the contract in the present case was binding on the respondent from the time when it was executed. If the sale had been completed by a transfer, the transfer would have been a transfer of property of which the respondent, and not his mother, was the owner. If an action had been brought for specific performance of the contract, it would have been brought by or against the respondent and not fey or against his mother. Having regard to all the circumstances, their Lordships are of opinion that the respondent is the person who most aptly answers the description of "the transferor" in the sense in which these words are used in s. 53a. Having regard to all the circumstances, their Lordships are of opinion that the respondent is the person who most aptly answers the description of "the transferor" in the sense in which these words are used in s. 53a. It follows that he is debarred by the section from obtaining the relief claimed by him in the present action, which was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed and the order of the Subordinate Judge restored. The respondent must pay the appellants costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in India.