JUDGMENT Chatterjee, J. - This is a suit by the Plaintiffs as reversioners for setting aside a deed of settlement executed by a Hindu lady who, according to the Plaintiffs, was merely a life-tenant or had a Hindu widow's estate in the property in question. A genealogical table of the Kanodia family will elucidate the relationship of the Plaintiffs with the said lady. The family was governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. 2. It appears that Ramjidas, Harnandroy, Chotelal and Ramlal carried on business in partnership under the name and style of Kanhialal Ramjidas in piece-goods at Cotton Street in Calcutta. Ramlal died towards the end of the last century leaving him surviving his adopted son Sagoremull. Sagoremull married Rampeary in 1906. The boy was then 17 years of age and the girl was only 16. In 1907 Sagoremull died. 3. In 1918 Musstt. Rampeary instituted a suit in this Court being Suit No. 768 of 1918, against Harnaudrai, Chotelal and Bisseswarlal son of Ramjidas, for the dissolution of the said partnership and for a declaration that she was entitled to four annas share therein and for accounts. There was also a prayer for the administration of the estate of Sagoremull, if necessary. One Musuddilal was also made a party to that suit. He claimed to be an adopted son of Sagoremull, but Musstt. Rampeary denied the same. Pending the suit Chotelal died and his son Rameswarlal who was then an infant, was substituted in his place as a Defendant. In the plaint-it was alleged by Rampeary that Sagoremull was a partner of the firm and he had four annas share in the same. She also alleged that she was herself a partner, obviously after the demise of Sagoremull and had been carrying on the business in copartnership with the Defendants. 4. On November 25, 1920, a preliminary decree was passed by consent of the parties in the above suit. The terms of settlement are Annexure "A" to the decree. Clauses 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9 are relevant. They are set out below. (1) Rampeary will be declared entitled to three annas share and Musuddilal will be declared entitled to one anna share of the subject-matter of the suit. (2) The defendants other than Musuddilal will be entitled to the remaining twelve annas share thereof. Clauses 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9 are relevant. They are set out below. (1) Rampeary will be declared entitled to three annas share and Musuddilal will be declared entitled to one anna share of the subject-matter of the suit. (2) The defendants other than Musuddilal will be entitled to the remaining twelve annas share thereof. (5) The accounts will be taken of the businesses In the plaint from 1963 Sambat to 1977 Assar Sudi 1st by such office as the Court may direct and interest of nine annas per cent per mensem will be charged on such amount. In the taking of accounts the amounts paid by the defendants to the plaintiff or her mother-in-law are to be taken into consideration. (6) That the income of year commencing from Assar Sudi 1st 1976 to Assar Sudi 1977 should be separately assessed and whatever sum out of the share of the defendants other than Mussuddi Lal will be settled by them for Sadabrata at Kanud the plaintiff will also settle for same purpose a proportionate sum out of her share of the profit for that period and the Trustees will be the same. If there be any surplus of the plaintiff's share of the income of the last mentioned period after such settlement as aforesaid the same will be invested in Government Securities and the plaintiff will settle same for such trust also at Kanud as she may think proper. (7) That whatever sum may be found due to the plaintiff on such account loss the payment mentioned in clause 4 will be invested by the plaintiff within six months in the purchase of some immoveable properties to be selected by her and if not invested the whole of the amount and if invested the balance will be paid to the plaintiff and the income of the immoveable properties will be enjoyed by her for her life and after her death It will go to her adopted son hereinafter mentioned. (9) That the plaintiff will be entitled to adopt a son unto her husband who will be entitled to all the properties that the plaintiff may get or leave at the time of her death. 5. On July 19, 1921, an order was passed by consent of the parties in the said suit. (9) That the plaintiff will be entitled to adopt a son unto her husband who will be entitled to all the properties that the plaintiff may get or leave at the time of her death. 5. On July 19, 1921, an order was passed by consent of the parties in the said suit. Clause 1 of the Terms of Settlement is as follows:-- (1) It be declared that an account being taken of all partnership business mentioned in the plaint up to Assar Sudi 1st 1976 Sambat a sum of Rs. 1,74,050/14/3 is due by the defendants other than Musuddi Lal of which Rs. 1,43,332,9/- be declared to be due to the plaintiff Rampeary and Rs. 30,718/5/3 to the defendant Musaddi Lal and that out of the said sum of Rs. 1,43,332/9/- the plaintiff has received an advance of Rs. 16,000/- leaving a sum of Rs. 1,27,332/9/- as due In respect of share of the plaintiff for the said period and the said sums of Rs. 1,27/332/9/- and Rs. 30,718/5/3 should bear Interest at the rate of nine annas per cent per annum from Assar Sudi 2nd 1976 Sambat and will be dealt with according to the terms of the consent decree made in the above suit on the 25th day of November, 1920 6. On August 14, 1922, the final decree was passed in the said suit again by consent of the parties. Clauses 1 and 2 of the Terms of Settlement are important. (1) That the defendants Harnandrai and Bissessarlal do out of Rs. 20,500/- payable to the plaintiff Mussamat Rampoary in full settlement of her claim and costs and other charges in this suit retain Rs. 3,000/- in satisfaction of any sum paid to Munni Bibee, Ramlal's daughter, at the time of death of her husband and Rs. 1,500/- for the plaintiff's share in the costs incurred upto date for the repairs of the Havily at Kanud and pay to the plaintiff the balance of Rs. 16,000/- in fall settlement, discharge and satisfaction of her claim and costs in this suit except to the properties at Kanud mentioned in Clause (3) of the terms of settlement filed in this suit on the 8th day of March, 1921 on payment of the said sum of Rs. 16,000/- and on the plaintiff's obtaining payment of Rs. 16,000/- in fall settlement, discharge and satisfaction of her claim and costs in this suit except to the properties at Kanud mentioned in Clause (3) of the terms of settlement filed in this suit on the 8th day of March, 1921 on payment of the said sum of Rs. 16,000/- and on the plaintiff's obtaining payment of Rs. 1,27,333/9/6 less any deduction the plaintiff will have to pay to the sheriff the plaintiff undertakes to cause satisfaction to be entered up in this suit. All further proceedings in this suit including the reference are dropped in default of payment of the said sum of Rs. 16,000/- by the 16th August, 1922 the same will carry interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum. (2) The plaintiff will be entitled to the sum of Rs. 1,27,333/9/6 lying with the Sheriff to the credit of this suit. The Sheriff do pay the said amount to the plaintiff's attorney Babu Charu Chandra Bose after deduction of his poundage and charges subject to the production of the certificate that there is no attachment affecting the same and there is no execution pending against the abovenamed defendants, it being distinctly understood that there is in fact no attachment or application for execution pending against the defendant, 7. On September 26, 1922, by a registered conveyance Musstt Rampeary purchased the premises at Nawab Badruddin Street as described therein for Rs. 1,46,001. I hold that the amounts mentioned in the order and the decree were duly paid to Musstt Rampeary and the lady purchased the property mostly with the moneys which she obtained as a result of the settlement of the suit as aforesaid. The details will be given later. 8. Rampeary died in October, 1944, without having adopted any son. The Plaintiffs as reversioners now claim the said property. Before her death, she executed a deed of settlement dated May 9, 1935, whereby she purported to transfer the said premises to a number of trustees upon certain trusts for the benefit of idols installed in the temple erected by her. In that deed Musstt. Rampeary stated that the various properties were acquired by her with funds which were her stridhan property. This is not true and I have no hesitation in finding that the deed of settlement contains an issue of untrue statements. In that deed Musstt. Rampeary stated that the various properties were acquired by her with funds which were her stridhan property. This is not true and I have no hesitation in finding that the deed of settlement contains an issue of untrue statements. It is stated that for four generations Sagoremull's family used to take sons in adoption and that Sagoremull left a Will and disclosed his intention on his death-bed to this lady. These are all based on imagination and the lady invented these stories in this deed. The lady, according to the recitals therein, had received from her father various properties consisting of jewellery, cash, etc., and she also inherited in her own rights properties lying at Hatras. The deed further states that she started business with her own stridhan and purchased with her moneys properties in Calcutta and Kama-has and that she was fully entitled thereto and was competent to deal with the same, I am satisfied that these are also untrue recitals. Tejpal gave evidence on behalf of the Plaintiff in a satisfactory manner. He said that these are absurd and false statements and that the lady's father was a man of no substance. T accept his evidence that the consideration money for the purchase of the Calcutta property excepting Rs. 7,500 came from the moneys which she received as a result of the compromise of the said suit (Q. 398). I accept the evidence of Tejpal Kanodia as well as that of Babu Sashi Bhusan Das Gupta, an assistant of the firm of Messrs. Charu Chunder Bose. I have no evidence as to how this sum of Rs. 7,500 was repaid with interest. Tejpal said that the arrangement between the lady and Messrs. Matadin Bhagwandas who advanced the money on 3 hundies was that the same would be repaid from the usufruct of the property. Even if this money was repaid out of the income of this property, it would be paid out of her stridhan. I hold that no portion of the consideration money required for stamps and other expenses in connection with the purchase of the property came from any stridhan of Musstt. Rampeary except Rs. 7,500. 9. The following Issues were raised:-- 1. Did the amount paid to Musstt. I hold that no portion of the consideration money required for stamps and other expenses in connection with the purchase of the property came from any stridhan of Musstt. Rampeary except Rs. 7,500. 9. The following Issues were raised:-- 1. Did the amount paid to Musstt. Rampeary under decree in Suit No. 768 of 1918 represent the share due and payable to her husband's estate as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint? 2. Did Musstt. Rampeary purchase premises No. 1, Nawab Badruddm Street out of moneys belonging to her husband's estate ? 3. Was the interest of Musstt. Rampeary in the said premises limited to her life only as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint? 4. Are the Plaintiffs the reversioners to the estate of Sagoremull Kanodia as alleged in paragraph 10 of the plaint? 5. To what relief, if any, are the Plaintiffs entitled? 10. I answer Issues Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative except that Rs. 7,500 was the stridhan of the lady. 11. Issue No. 3 involves the question what is the nature of the interest which Rampeary got in this property. In my opinion on the construction of the terms of settlement of the 25th November, 1920, she had a life interest or at best a Hindu widow's estate in the funds in question. The moneys which were obtained by Rampeary as the result of the said litigation were received by her as a Hindu widow on the division of the assets to which her husband was entitled along with others. In the case of Debi Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo prosad Singh L.R. 39 IndAp 121: S.C. 1 L.B. 34 All 234 (1911) the Judicial Committee held that according to the Mitakshara there is no substantial difference in principle between the woman's property acquired by inheritance and that acquired by partition. Reversing the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, the Judicial Committee held that the share which a Hindu widow obtains on partition of the joint family property is not her stridhan in the sense that on her death it passes to her stridhan heirs. It is really given to her for her maintenance and on her death it devolves upon the heirs of her husband in the absence of an express agreement amongst the co-sharers to the contrary and not upon her own heirs. 12. It is really given to her for her maintenance and on her death it devolves upon the heirs of her husband in the absence of an express agreement amongst the co-sharers to the contrary and not upon her own heirs. 12. This judgment of the Judicial Committee has been subjected to a good deal of criticism by competent jurists. But it is academic to discuss what is the real meaning of the injunction of Vijnanesvara on the subject and whether the great Hindu jurist did really intend to make an addition to the categories of stridhan as enumerated in the ancient Smriti texts. In the latest edition of Mayne on Hindu Law (10th Edn., page 737) the learned author observes as follows :-- The criticism made by the Judicial Committee in the above case that the reference by Vijnanesvara to Manu is not borne out by that authority as given in para, 4, is due to Mr. Colebrooke's erroneous translation which Dr. Jolly hag corrected and explained 13. We have got to accept as correct the view expressed by Lord Robson so long as the judgment of the Judicial Committee is binding on the Indian Courts. In effect the whole of Vijnanesvara's expansion as given in the Mitakshara is to be discarded. Partition, it may be pointed out, is by pre-existent right according to Vijnanesvara (Mitakshara I, 1, 17 and 23). Vijnanesvara expressly states that the mother does not take her share in lieu of maintenance. (Mitakshara II, 1, 32-3). But it is no use indulging in academic discussions as to the soundness of Lord Robson's observations. 14. I have been referred to the pleadings in the suit of Rampeary as well as to the affidavit of her agent Ramnarain Sharma dated July 8, 1918, Ex. B2. It is clearly stated in the affidavit that Rampeary was claiming the estate of her husband Sagoremull and partition of the joint properties. On behalf of the Defendants learned Counsel Mr. Shankar Banerjee has argued that the case of Debt Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh L.R. 39 IndAp 121 : S.C. ILR 34 All 234 (1911) is a case of partition and the law laid down therein should not be applied in the case of assets obtained by a Hindu widow on the dissolution of partnership. Shankar Banerjee has argued that the case of Debt Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh L.R. 39 IndAp 121 : S.C. ILR 34 All 234 (1911) is a case of partition and the law laid down therein should not be applied in the case of assets obtained by a Hindu widow on the dissolution of partnership. On principle I do not think that there should be any difference in the two cases. It is now settled law both under the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga that property inherited by a woman from a male is not her absolute property and passes on her death to the heirs of the male from whom she inherited it. Reading all the relevant documents together, in my opinion, the lady got a life estate. She was not being given the moneys payable under the consent decree absolutely and safeguards were provided. In accordance with clause 7 of the terms of settlement of November, 1920, the money was to be invested by Rampeary within six months in purchase of property which was to be selected by her. She was only to enjoy the income of the property for her life. If she had adopted any son, the property would have gone to him. Inasmuch as she bad not adopted any son, the same should go to the Plaintiffs as the next heirs of her deceased husband. 15. I have been referred to the case of Naihu Lal v. Babu Rant L.R. 63 IndAp 155 : S.C. 40 C.W.N. 481 (1935). In that case the Judicial Committee held on the construction of an award of certain arbitrators that the widow received an absolute interest in the property allotted to her. The important clauses of the award are set out at page 481 of the report in the Calcutta Weekly Notes. It was really a question of construction of that document. On its true construction Sir George Rankin held that the purport and intention of the award was to confer on the widow an absolute estate and she was, therefore, competent to make a gift of the same to her daughter. 16. It was really a question of construction of that document. On its true construction Sir George Rankin held that the purport and intention of the award was to confer on the widow an absolute estate and she was, therefore, competent to make a gift of the same to her daughter. 16. The effect of that Privy Council judgment is that property obtained by a woman under a compromise or settlement of any claim which she makes is her stridhan if on the construction of the document and having regard to the surrounding circumstances the intention was to give her an absolute estate. The fact that she claimed as a widow does not necessarily cut down her estate to a mere life-estate. What estate or what interest she would take, would depend on the terms of the deed and other relevant circumstances. On the construction of the relevant document in this case and the other circumstances proved before me the intention was not to confer an absolute estate on Musstt. Rampeary. It is proved that Tejpal was taking an interest as to how the money was actually utilised by the lady. It is established that his branch of the family was interested to see that the funds were not dissipated. They were taking a very active and intelligent interest in what this lady was doing. Even if the lady purported to acquire a larger interest the compromise would not be binding on the actual reversioners, who were not parties to the same. In the terms of settlement words were carefully introduced in order to narrow down her interest. I hold that Musstt. Rampeary did not get an absolute estate and she never acquired an alienable interest in the property and she was not competent to deal with the same as she purported to do by the deed of settlement 17. I answer Issue No. 4 in the affirmative. 18. The Plaintiffs will be entitled to recover possession of the property in question on payment of the sum of Rs. 7,500 with interest at 6 per cent, per annum from the date of the conveyance dated September 26, 1922, till the dale the whole amount is paid by the Plaintiffs to the Trustees of the deed of settlement. 18. The Plaintiffs will be entitled to recover possession of the property in question on payment of the sum of Rs. 7,500 with interest at 6 per cent, per annum from the date of the conveyance dated September 26, 1922, till the dale the whole amount is paid by the Plaintiffs to the Trustees of the deed of settlement. Possession will be made over by the Trustees to the Plaintiffs on receipt of the said sum with interest and the Trustees will hold the moneys that will be paid to them by the Plaintiffs as trust funds or moneys impressed with the trust. Costs of both parties of this suit on Scale No. 2 will come out of the property. Certified for two Counsel.