JUDGMENT Agarwalla, J. - This is an application in revision by the Chief Inspector of Stamps and raises questions under the Court-fees Act. 2. The plaintiff-opposite party, Suraj Karan, filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge of Azamgarh alleging that during his minority, the defendant instituted a suit for partition of the family property on a false allegation that the family was still joint; that in that suit he (Suraj Karan) was sued under the guardianship of his mother; that there was a compromise entered into between his mother acting as his guardian and the defendant on 12th December 1913 by means of which he was to get "nine" annas instead of "ten" annas in the rupee which was his real share; that the said compromise was for various reasons mentioned in the plaint null and void and not binding on him; that by reason of the compromise the defendant had obtained possession of various properties and realised various monies, bonds and mortgages, etc. On these allegations he claimed inter alia the following reliefs: (a) Compromise dated 12th December 1932 in Suit No. 14 of 1928 of the Court of the Civil Judge Azamgarh filed by Babu Brij Gopal against Suraj Karan may be cancelled to the extent of 1/16th share of the plaintiff which the defendant received under the compromise and a decree for recovery of possession of 1/16th share of the zamindari property and houses, specified in the Schedule at (a) and (b) and for recovery of flits. 24,802 14-9 as detailed in the Schedule at (c), (d), (e) and (f) which the defendant has realised from the share of the plaintiff after the compromise, may be passed in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendant. 24,802 14-9 as detailed in the Schedule at (c), (d), (e) and (f) which the defendant has realised from the share of the plaintiff after the compromise, may be passed in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendant. (b) The defendant may be ordered to render a correct account of the amount due to the plaintiff under documents, bonds and mortgage deeds and decrees of the revenue and civil Courts and those under Encumbered Estates Act, debts due under the account books, case Sarkat, Pawn of ornaments at Firm Radha Kishan Gopi-Kishan situate at Azamgarh and Firm Sada Sukh Gobardhan Das situated at Bikaner and also profits and the corn in ilaqas, moveable property, other than the amount demanded in relief (a) which have been appropriated about which the plaintiff has no correct knowledge of the realisation and expenses--for the period beginning from the time of management. A decree of whatever amount is found due to the plaintiff by the defendant, may be passed in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendant on payment of court-fee. A correct valuation of it shall be made at the time of preparation of the final decree. At present the court-fee on Rs. 200 has been paid. (e) The pendente lite and future damages to the date of actual possession of the property specified in lists (a) and (b) may be awarded. A correct valuation of it shall be made in the Miscellaneous Department. At the present the court-fee on Rs. 100 has been paid. (d) A declaration may be made by the Court that the defendant has no right to manage the waqf property in list (g) in the name of Shri Thakurji and expenditures of the Shivala, Dharamshala and garden, as against the plaintiff. A declaratory court-fee of Rs. 13-12-0 in respect of this relief has been paid. Relief (a) comprised three reliefs : one (or cancellation of the compromise, another for possession of revenue-paying land and houses, and yet another for recovery of Rs. 24,802-14-9. The relief for cancellation was valued at Rs. 23620-6. The relief for possession was also valued at the same figure; and adding these together with the amount of Rs. 24,802.14-9, the total came to Rs. 29,526 15-9. Reliefs (b) and (o) were valued at Rs. 200 and Rs. 100 respectively. So the total of reliefs (a), (b) and (c) came to Rs. 29,826-15 9. 23620-6. The relief for possession was also valued at the same figure; and adding these together with the amount of Rs. 24,802.14-9, the total came to Rs. 29,526 15-9. Reliefs (b) and (o) were valued at Rs. 200 and Rs. 100 respectively. So the total of reliefs (a), (b) and (c) came to Rs. 29,826-15 9. The plaintiff paid court-fee on this consolidated amount and paid an additional fixed court-fee on relief (d) which could not be valued for purposes of (Court-fee. 3. The defendant pleaded that the court-fee paid by the plaintiff was insufficient. According to him, the relief for recovery of Rs. 24,802-14-9 Also involved a relief for the cancellation of the -compromise and as such, separate court-fee should have been paid on the relief so involved, namely, for cancellation of the compromise. 4. The Chief Inspector of Stamps also raised an objection about the deficiency in court-fee. According to him the plaintiff should have paid court fee on each relief separately and not on the consolidated amount of all the reliefs, and further that the relief for cancellation of the compromise should have been valued at 9/16th of the total value of the property which was two lacs, and not at RS. 2362-0 6 only. 5. The learned Civil Judge repelled the contentions, both of the defendants and the Chief Inspector of Stamps. He held that so far as the relief for recovery of Rs. 24,802-14 9 was concerned, the plaintiff had not asked for the cancellation of the compromise in express terms, and as such, he could not be required to pay a separate court-fee on the relief alleged to be involved in that relief. He further held that the plaintiff was right in paying the court-fee on the consolidated amount of all the reliefs. 6. The defendant submitted to this order; but the Chief Inspector of Stamps has come up in revision to this Court against it. 7. He further held that the plaintiff was right in paying the court-fee on the consolidated amount of all the reliefs. 6. The defendant submitted to this order; but the Chief Inspector of Stamps has come up in revision to this Court against it. 7. In revision it has been argued before us, firstly, that the relief for cancellation of the compromise and for possession of properties were two different reliefs and were rightly valued by the plaintiff separately but that the valuation of the relief for cancellation ought not to have been the same as that for possession; and, secondly, that separate court-fee was payable on the separate reliefs claimed and so court-fee should not have been paid on the consolidated amount of all the reliefs (a), (b) and (c). On behalf of the respondent, it has been urged that in fact the relief for possession of property and for recovery of money mentioned in relief (a) are merely consequential reliefs, flowing from the cancellation of the compromise, and should have been valued together and that there was no necessity of valuing the relief for cancellation separately, the case being in substance one for a declaratory decree or order with a consequential relief falling under S. 7 (iv) (a) of the amended Court-fees Act. 8. We will first take up the question whether the relief for possession of property and recovery of money are consequential reliefs and can be treated along with the relief for cancellation as one relief. It is obvious that the reliefs for possession and recovery of money are reliefs which can be granted only when the relief about the cancellation of the compromise has been granted. It can,- therefore, in one sense, be said that they are consequential reliefs, that is to say, reliefs flowing from another relief. The argument on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party is that they are really one relief and fall under S. 7 (iv) (a), Court-fees Act, as amended for these Provinces which runs as follows : In suits for a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief other than relief specified in sub-s. (ivA) is prayed, court-fee is payable according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. 9. This argument is not sound. 9. This argument is not sound. In the first place, a relief for cancellation of a document or decree is not a relief for a declaration. Declaratory reliefs are those reliefs which fall under S. 42, Specific Relief Act. Reliefs for cancellation of documents or for having a document adjudged void or voidable do not fall under S. 43, Specific Relief Act hut fall under S. 39. This was so held in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kalu Ram Vs. Babu Lal and Others, AIR 1932 All 485 That was a case under the Court-fees Act before its amendment for these Provinces. The matter has been placed beyond doubt by the U.P. Court-fees Amendment Act which has provided a separate sub-section for such reliefs, thus showing that they are not declaratory reliefs. This subsection is 7 (iV-A) which runs as follows: In suits for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for money or other property having a market-value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value : (1) where the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title was a party to the decree or instrument, according to the value of the subject-matter, and (2) where be or his predecessor-in-title was not a party to the decree or instrument, according to one-fifth of the value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be deemed to be, if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the instrument executed, and if only a part of the decree or instrument is involved in the suit the amount or value of the property to which such part relates. A relief for cancellation of a decree or document now has to be valued according to this new provision. 10. In the second place, although the reliefs for possession and for recovery of money can be said to be reliefs which are in their nature consequential upon the grant of relief for cancellation of the compromise, yet they are distinct reliefs and have to be valued separately; the reason is that the only provision in which a consequential relief is taken along with the principal relief is cl. (iv) (a) of S. 7 of the amended Court-fees Act which speaks of a declaratory decree or order with a consequential relief. If the relief for can collation of the compromise is not a relief claiming a declaratory decree or order as held by us already, then no question of lumping together the consequential relief with the principal relief arises. They have got to be separately valued according to the provisions applicable to them under the Court-fees Act. 11. We may add that even if the relief involving cancellation of a document or adjudication of a document as void or voidable is framed in the form of a declaratory relief, it will not be called declaratory relief since the substance of the relief will be seen and not its form. 12. This leads as to a consideration of the question whether court-fee will be separately payable on the different reliefs claimed, or oft the consolidated amount of all the reliefs. Now S. 17 is the only section in the Court-fees Act. which deals with this matter. It runs as follows (as amended for these Provinces): 17. (1) In any suit in which two or more separate* and distinct causes of action are joined and separate and distinct reliefs are sought in respect of each, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees with which the plaints or memoranda of appeal would be chargeable under this Act in separate suits instituted in respect of each such cause of action .... (2) Where more reliefs than one based on the same cause of action are sought in the alternative, the fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable. It will be seen at once that S. 17 provides only for two contingencies, namely, where the suit is for two or more separate and distinct causes of action, i.e., where the suit combines causes of action which could have been separately sued upon under the law, and also where the suit is for alternative reliefs based upon the same cause of action. But the section does not provide for a case like the present where distinct reliefs arising out of the same cause of action are claimed. But the section does not provide for a case like the present where distinct reliefs arising out of the same cause of action are claimed. Since the Court fees Act is a fiscal enactment, its provisions are to be strictly construed, and in case of doubt, they should be construed in favour of the subject. In our opinion, where distinct reliefs arising out of the same cause of action are claimed in the suit, court-fee is payable on the consolidated amount of all the reliefs. 13. The result, therefore, is that we allow this application in revision, set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge and direct that relief for cancellation of the compromise shall be valued at one-sixteenth of the total value of the subject--matter and that court-fee shall be calculated on the consolidated amount of reliefs (a), (b) and (c). The lower Court shall proceed to decide the (sic) accordingly. The parties shall receive and any costs in accordance with their success and failure in this revision.