JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - These two appeals have been heard together, because they involve a common question of law. Second Appeal No. 779 of 1943 arises out of a suit brought by certain persons as Plaintiffs for establishment of their rent-free title to certain lands and for confirmation of their possession therein. There were two Defendants in the suit. Defendant No. 1 was said to be a bhagidar under the Plaintiffs who were denying his title and Defendant No. 2 was a person who had purchased the superior touzi or all the shares of the tousi at a revenue sale and was claiming to have annulled the Plaintiffs' interest. The Plaintiffs accordingly asked for a declaration against both the Defendants, and the principal defence was that inasmuch as Defendant No. 2 had purchased the entire tousi at a revenue sale and had thereafter annulled the interests held by the Plaintiffs, the latter had no subsisting 'interest on the basis of which they could have the reliefs prayed for. 2. Both the Courts below have found that the Plaintiffs had established the rent-free title claimed by them. They have also held that by the purchase at the revenue sale, Defendant No. 2 had not acquired the entire estate as such and had not become entitled to annul the subordinate interests. In that view of the facts and the law, the Courts below have decreed the Plaintiffs' suit. Defendant No. 2 has thereupon appealed. 3. The principal question urged in this appeal naturally had reference to the effect of the revenue sale. It appears that the tousi concerned, namely, Touzi No. 2409 of the Midnapore Collectorate, was distributed into two shares, one being a separate account bearing the number 249/1 and the other being the residuary share. Both these shares came in course of time to be held by a single person, named Jihan Krishna Ghose and from him they devolved upon his two sons. It was in their hands that the two shares were sold, apparently upon the issue of a single notice under sec. 6 of the Revenue Sale Law and at a single sale. The shares were purchased by Appellant before us. It was in their hands that the two shares were sold, apparently upon the issue of a single notice under sec. 6 of the Revenue Sale Law and at a single sale. The shares were purchased by Appellant before us. The sale certificate which is an exhibit in the case shows that what was certified to have been purchased by the Appellant was the separate account as also the residuary share, making up between them the totality of the touzi. 4. What is contended by Mr. Ghose, who appears on behalf of the Appellant, is that having regard to the fact that by the sale of the separate account and the residuary share the entire estate passed into the hands of the purchaser in fact, it must be held that in law too there was, in the facts of this case, a sale of an entire estate as contemplated by sec. 37 of the Revenue Sale Law. I am unable to accept this contention as correct. Much of the task of this Court has been simplified by two previous decisions of this Court, one of which dealt with the identical sale. The other dealt with a sale under somewhat similar circumstances, namely, a sale of two separate shares under a joint notice and a joint order for sale. In the second of these cases, namely, Bibi Sakina Khatoon v. Khirod Chandra Manna (1941) 45 C.W.N. 72 it was held that a joint sale of two separate shares was not warranted by the Revenue Sale Law and that the practice introduced by the revenue authorities for holding such joint sales was unauthorised. In the second case, namely, Satish Chandra Hui v. Sudhir Krishna Ghosh 46 C.W.N. 540 (1942) a Bench of this Court had occasion to pronounce on the effect of this very sale and it was held that the purchaser had not acquired the rights of the purchaser of an entire estate and had not become entitled to annul subordinate interests. 5. Mr. Ghose points out that his client was not a party to the second decision which dealt with this identical sale and as regards the first decision, he contends that although it was there held that a joint sale of two shares was illegal, it was not held that such a sale would be a nullity. 5. Mr. Ghose points out that his client was not a party to the second decision which dealt with this identical sale and as regards the first decision, he contends that although it was there held that a joint sale of two shares was illegal, it was not held that such a sale would be a nullity. He, therefore, contended that so long as the sale was not set aside, it was a good sale and under the sale his client had acquired the entire estate with the rights of a purchaser who purchases an estate as a single entity. 6. Now, it cannot be denied that in the hands of the defaulting proprietor the separate account and the residuary share were separate entities. Mr. Ghose conceded that they could legally co-exist in the hands of the same person and yet maintain their separate character. When, therefore, Mr. Ghose contended that the two separate shares, which were separate entities in the hands of the defaulting proprietor, were merged into one in the hands of the purchaser, he had to point to some provision of law by which such merger had been caused. Mr. Ghose appreciated the need of discharging this onus and attempted to do so by advancing an argument based upon sec. 13 of the Revenue Sale Law. 7. Sec. 13 deals with sales of separate accounts. As is well known, the procedure is that when a particular share or shares are found to be in arrears, they cannot be brought to sale unless the estate, taken as a whole, is also in arrear. If both these conditions are found to exist, namely, that a share as well as the whole estate is in arrear, then the Collector has in the first instance to put up the defaulting share or shares to sale. In all such cases, however, the Collector has to give notice of an intention of excluding the share or shares from which no arrear is due, and the section proceeds to say that the share or shares sold, together with the share or shares excluded from the sale, shall continue to constitute one integral estate, the share or shares sold being charged with the portion or the aggregate of the several separate portions of jama assigned thereto. 8. What is contended by Mr. 8. What is contended by Mr. Ghose is that the sale in the present case was not a sale of a separate account share under sec. 13, because a notice of an intention to exclude a share or shares from which no arrear was due could not possibly be given. It could not be given, because the only other share was also in arrear. I am unable to understand what assistance Mr. Ghose expected to derive from this provision of sec. 13. The section merely lays down that if there are in fact some shares from which no arrear is due, an intention to exclude such share from the sale must be given. So to lay down is, however, not to provide that if there is a case where there are no shares from which no arrear is due, in such a case sec. 13 would not be applicable. The other part of the section relied upon by Mr. Ghose was the concluding part. What is contended is that inasmuch as the purchaser of more than one share, when several shares are sold, becomes liable for the aggregate of the several separate portions of the jama assigned thereto, in a case where the purchaser purchases the only two shares of an estate, he becomes liable for the entire revenue and, therefore, becomes the owner of the whole estate. The fallacy underlying this argument is that the section does not speak of the purchaser at all hut speaks of the share or shares and it is perfectly clear that the word "aggregate" refers back to the word "shares" just as the word "portion " refers back to the word "share." The section simply means that when there is a single share sold, that share, in the hands of the purchaser, will be liable to the separate portion of the revenue assigned to it and where several shares are sold, those shares shall be liable for the sum total of the several separate portions of the revenue assigned thereto. Mr. Ghose, in proposing the construction favoured by him, quite overlooked the fact that where more than one share was sold, they might be purchased by different persons, and surely if different persons become purchasers of different shares, neither of them could claim to have purchased an entire estate. The argument based upon sec. 13 must, therefore, fail. 9. Mr. Ghose, in proposing the construction favoured by him, quite overlooked the fact that where more than one share was sold, they might be purchased by different persons, and surely if different persons become purchasers of different shares, neither of them could claim to have purchased an entire estate. The argument based upon sec. 13 must, therefore, fail. 9. The real difficulty in Mr. Ghose's way is to establish that if in this case see. 13 was not applicable, then there was some other provision in the Act under which the sale could be validly held. There is no provision at all in the Revenue Sale Law which authorises the Collector to bring several defaulting shares to sale all at once, without following the procedure laid down in sec. 13. In a case where there are separate accounts, the Collector must close the separate accounts before putting up to sale the estate as a whole and separate ac-counts, once created can disappear only when they have been so closed up. Mr. Ghose's argument, therefore, fails for two reasons. In the first place, the separate accounts were never in fact closed up. In the second place, if, as he contended, the present sale was not a sale under sec. 13, then there was no other provision at all under which this sale could be held in the manner adopted and consequently his client would he in a worse position, inasmuch as he had not purchased at a valid sale at all. 10. Mr. Ghose next contended that assuming that if the two shares were validly held as separate entities by the defaulting proprietor before the sale, they could not by the sale, have united into a single estate, the question did not really arise in this ease inasmuch as even in the hands of the defaulting proprietor, the two shares were really held as one integral estate. This argument, in my opinion, disregards the clear provisions of the Revenue Sale Law. It cannot for a moment he doubted that there were in fact two separate shares, although they came to be held at the relevant point of time by the same person. This argument, in my opinion, disregards the clear provisions of the Revenue Sale Law. It cannot for a moment he doubted that there were in fact two separate shares, although they came to be held at the relevant point of time by the same person. It may he that if a single person holds a single share he cannot split it up into two shares and have two separate accounts opened in his name but if there is a certain share held by a certain person who opens a separate account and there is similarly another share, also held in a separate account by another co-sharer, and in course of time these two shares come to be held by the same person, then, unless the two shares are amalgamated by an order of the Collector, they continue to remain distinct and separate. Mr. Ghose hardly realised the consequence of the argument which he was advancing'. If, as he stated, two shares were really held as one integral estate by the defaulting proprietor, then the consequence would be that by the sale which took place his client purchased nothing at all. As I have already stated in an earlier part of this judgment what was offered for sale and what was in fact sold was not the whole estate as a single entity but two separate shares. According to Mr. Ghose's present argument, no such separate shares ever existed. It that was so, then the property which the Collector purported to sell bad no legal existence and consequently the sale that was subsequently held passed nothing to the Appellant. 11. It will thus appear that from whatever point of view the matter may be looked at, the same conclusion follows. The conclusion is that by the revenue sale the Appellant did not purchase the whole estate as a single entity and did not become entitled to the rights provided for by sec. 37 of the Act. The conclusion of the Courts below on this question was, therefore, entirely right. 12. The Courts below have also held that the Plaintiffs had established the rent-free title claimed by them. In the circumstances, there is no other point which requires to be considered. 13. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal No. 1205 of 1943. 14. The conclusion of the Courts below on this question was, therefore, entirely right. 12. The Courts below have also held that the Plaintiffs had established the rent-free title claimed by them. In the circumstances, there is no other point which requires to be considered. 13. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal No. 1205 of 1943. 14. The suit out of which this appeal arises Was brought by certain Plaintiffs for a declaration of their raiyati title to certain plots of land and for confirmation of possession in the same, as also for an injunction restraining the Defendant from interfering with their possession. The Defendant was the same revenue purchaser at the revenue sale whose rights I have already discussed in Appeal No. 779 of 1943. For the reasons given in my judgment in that appeal it must be held that the purchaser did not acquire any right to annul the subordinate interests. 15. There is, however, a further question in this appeal. The Plaintiffs, as I have stated, claimed a raiyati title in the plots concerned, Respondent No. 1 contended that the interest of the Plaintiffs was not a raiyati interest but the interest of a tenure-holder and consequently it was liable to be annulled by the purchaser at the revenue sale; but he also contended that the Plaintiffs had no right, title and interest in the suit lands at all and that they had never been in possession, as alleged by them. In spite of this contention, however, the attention of the parties seem to have been chiefly concentrated on the other question, namely, whether the interest held by the Plaintiffs, if they had any interest at all, was a raiyati interest or the interest of a tenure-holder. The relevancy of that question was that if it was a raiyati interest it was protected against annulment, whereas if it was the interest of a tenure-holder, it was liable to be annulled. The parties do not seem to have been fully conscious of the situation that would arise, if it was held that the Respondent had not acquired any right to annul the interests at all; for, in that event, the nature of the Plaintiffs' interest in respect of which they asked for a declaration would have to be determined. Unfortunately, no appropriate issues in relation to that question were ever framed. Unfortunately, no appropriate issues in relation to that question were ever framed. The only relevant issue are Issues Nos. 4 and 6: Issue No. 4 asks whether the status of the Plaintiff's was that of raiyats or that of tenure-holders; and Issue No. 6 asks whether the Plaintiffs had been in possession of the lands as alleged. There is no issue framed as to the real character or extent of the Plaintiffs' interest. 16. The trial Court confined itself to Issue No. 4 and held that the interest of the Plaintiffs was partly that of a tenure-holder and partly that of a raiyat. In coming to that conclusion the trial Court followed the record-of-rights which, it is stated, had not been challenged by the Respondent. The lower Appellate Court went into that matter in greater detail and examined a variety of documents with reference to each one of the numerous plots. What the learned Judge exactly held is not very clear. All that is clear is that he seems to have held that the Plaintiffs had the interest of a tenure-hoder in certain of the plots, but in other plots they had some interest which was not the interest of a raiyat. He pointed out that so far as those plots were concerned the Plaintiffs had purchased the plots at a sale which could not be regarded as a rent sale and therefore they had merely acquired the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors. The learned Judge did not pursue that matter further and did not determine what that interest was. Mr. Ghose who appears for the Respondents in this case pointed out that even that finding of the learned Judge, so far as it went, was not sufficient for the determination of the Plaintiffs' title, inasmuch as all that he had found was that certain of the tenants had not been made parties, but he had not de-finitely found how many tenants had been omitted and who they were. It appears to us that since the character and extent of the Plaintiffs' interest was never made the subject-matter of an appropriate issue, and since that question has now assumed importance by reason of our finding that by the revenue sale the purchaser did not acquire any right to annul the subordinate interests, that question ought to be further considered. It appears to us that since the character and extent of the Plaintiffs' interest was never made the subject-matter of an appropriate issue, and since that question has now assumed importance by reason of our finding that by the revenue sale the purchaser did not acquire any right to annul the subordinate interests, that question ought to be further considered. Both parties made a prayer before us that the case ought to be remanded for further hearing on this question, and in our opinion, that prayer ought to be conceded. 17. It is not possible to say from the state of the record whether any further evidence will be necessary and it seems to us that it will be best to leave that matter to the judgment of the lower Appellate Court. 18. In the result this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court, in so far as they hold that the Respondent had acquired the rights of the revenue purchaser to annul the subordinate interests, are set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court, so far as that question is concerned, are restored. So far as the other question, namely, the nature and extent of the Plaintiffs' interest is concerned, the case is remanded to the lower Appellate Court for a re-hearing of the appeal on that question only. If the learned Judge considers in the course of such re-hearing that he cannot decide the matter properly without further evidence, he will permit the parties to adduce such evidence as he may consider proper. Inasmuch as we have held that the Respondent did not acquire any right to annul the subordinate interests, the learned Judge, if he finds that the Plaintiffs have the interest claimed by them or any other interest, he will make a declaration accordingly; whereas if he finds that they have no interest at all, he will dismiss the Suit. 19. Costs of this appeal will (sic) the result. Harries, C.J. I agree.