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1948 DIGILAW 192 (CAL)

Dominion of India v. Jagadish Prosad Pannalal, a Firm

1948-09-09

body1948
JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is a petition for revision of an order of a Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes Calcutta, dismissing an application made to it by the Governor General of India in Council. 2. To appreciate the points in issue in this revision it will be necessary shortly to set out the facts of the case. The proceedings arise out of a suit for compensation brought against the Governor-General in Council as representing the Bengal Nagpur Railway and the East Indian Railway. It appears that a quantity of black pepper was consigned for carriage to the plaintiffs. The consignment was loaded at a town called Alleppy on the South Indian Railway and delivery was to take place at Gaya on the East Indian Railway. The goods had to travel over three railways, the South Indian Railway, the Bengal Nagpur Railway and the East Indian Railway. When the goods were delivered at Gaya it was found that there was a shortage of 9 maunds and a suit was brought against the Governor General in Council representing the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway for compensation amounting to Rs. 495. This suit was filed in the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta and was heard by one of the learned Judges of that Court. On behalf of the present petitioner it was urged that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The suit seems to have been regarded as one against two defendants, namely, the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway. The notices under S. 77, Railways Act and S. 80, Civil P.C., had duly been served and the plaintiffs argued that the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction by reason of the fact that the headquarters of the East Indian Railway were within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction and that as leave had been obtained the Bengal Nagpur Railway could also be properly regarded as defendants. The contention on behalf of the Governor-General was that neither of these railways carried on business within the local limits of the Court and no part of the cause of action arose within those limits. That being so it was stated that the Court had no jurisdiction. It was further contended that the results showed that the Court could not have jurisdiction by reason of S. 18(c) , Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. That being so it was stated that the Court had no jurisdiction. It was further contended that the results showed that the Court could not have jurisdiction by reason of S. 18(c) , Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The relevant portion of S. 18, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act is in these terms: Subject to the exceptions in S. 19, the Small Cause Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature- when the amount of value of the subject-matter does not exceed two thousand rupees; and- (a) the cause of action has arisen, either wholly or in part, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Clause Court, and the leave of the Court has, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, been given before the institution of the suit: or..... (c) any of the defendants at the time of the institution of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain, within such local limits, and either the leave of the Court has been given before the institution of the suit, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution...... According to the argument addressed to the Court on behalf of the Governor-General, neither of these railways carried on business within the local limits of the Court and therefore S. 18(c) could have no application; neither could S. 18(a) , because according to the case for the Governor-General no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction. 3. The learned Small Cause Court Judge held that he had jurisdiction to hear the case and it appears to have been conceded eventually that the loss was caused on the Bengal Nagpur Railway. Eventually the suit was decreed against the Governor-General in Council as representing the Bengal Nagpur Railway for Rs. 360 with costs. 4. An application was then made to a Full Bench of the Small Cause Court and the point as to jurisdiction was again argued. The Full Bench was of opinion that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit by reason of the provisions of S. 18(c), Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 360 with costs. 4. An application was then made to a Full Bench of the Small Cause Court and the point as to jurisdiction was again argued. The Full Bench was of opinion that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit by reason of the provisions of S. 18(c), Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The Court held that the East Indian Railway carried on its business at its headquarters situate within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, and as leave of the Court had been obtained the suit could be maintained not only against the East Indian Railway, but against the co-defendant, the Bengal Nagpur Railway also. The result, therefore, was that the application to the Full Bench failed and was dismissed. 5. On behalf of the Governor-General in Council it has been urged before us that the decision of the Full Bench is clearly erroneous. It is contended that the Governor-General in Council, and at the present time the Dominion of India, owns both the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway. It was urged that the business of both the Railways was at that time carried on by the Governor-General in Council and is now carried on by the Dominion of India and it cannot be said that either the Governor-General in Council carries on his business in Calcutta or does the Dominion of India do so to-day. It was urged that if the suit be regarded, as it must be regarded, as a suit against the Governor-General in Council and now the Dominion of India, then clearly the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction, as neither the Governor-General in India nor the Dominion of India resides nor carries on business within the local limits, and no part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta. The cause of action, it was urged, arose entirely on the property of the Bengal Nagpur Railway. 6. It appears to me that if this suit is to be regarded as a suit against one defendant, namely, the Governor-General in Council, and now the Dominion of India as owner of both these railways, then the Small Cause Court clearly had Jurisdiction by reason of S. 18(a), Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 7. It is true that the goods were lost on the property of the Bengal Nagpur Railway which would be outside the jurisdiction. 7. It is true that the goods were lost on the property of the Bengal Nagpur Railway which would be outside the jurisdiction. But it is clear that part of the cause of action against the Governor-General or the Dominion of India is the service of notice under S. 77, Railways Act and S. 80, Civil P.C. These notices, in so far as they concern the East Indian Railway, at least were served in Calcutta within the local limits of the jurisdiction. If the suit is to be regarded as against one defendant then only one set of notices were required and those notices were served on the Governor General at a place within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court and therefore part of the cause of action against the Governor-General in Council or the Dominion of India arose within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court. Further, leave of the Court was obtained and that being so, the case falls precisely within the terms of S. 18(a) , Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. It is to be observed that learned Advocate for the petitioner concedes that the proper way of viewing this suit is as a suit against the Governor-General in Council and not as a suit against the Governor-General in Council representing two railways. The Governor-General in Council, and now the Dominion of India, does own these two railways. But as owner of the railways, the Governor-General in Council or the Dominion of India is the same entity. It does not own the East Indian Railway in one capacity and the Bengal Nagpur Railway in another capacity. It owns both, and therefore it may well be that upon the true view of the facts in this case, this was a suit against one defendant and one defendant only, namely, the Governor-General in Council, and now the Dominion of India. As I have said, regarded in that way this case clearly falls within S. 18(a) , Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, and the Court had jurisdiction. 8. If the suit is regarded, as it was regarded, as a suit against two entities, namely, the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway, it appears to me clear that the Court had jurisdiction under S. 18(c) . 8. If the suit is regarded, as it was regarded, as a suit against two entities, namely, the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway, it appears to me clear that the Court had jurisdiction under S. 18(c) . If these railways are two distinct entities then each railway must carry on its business at some particular place. A company carries on business at its registered office, and it would appear to me that a railway treated as a separate entity would carry on its business at its head office. Admittedly the head office of the East Indian Railway is within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, though the headquarters of the Bengal Nagpur Railway, being at Kidderpore, is outside such limits. It must be remembered that leave of the Court was obtained for bringing this suit, and that being so the case falls precisely within the terms of S. 18(c) . What that provision requires is that any one of the defendants at the time of the institution of the suit actually and voluntarily resided or carried on business within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court and either that leave of the Court had been given for the institution of the suit, which had been done in this case, or that the defendant who did not reside or carry on business within the limits acquiesced in the institution of the suit. 9. Clearly, the Bengal Nagpur Railway did not acquiesce in the institution of the suit, but the case falls within the provision because the East Indian Railway carried on its business within the limits of the jurisdiction and leave of the Court had been given. That being so, the Court had jurisdiction. 10. It was urged, however, that eventually it was held that the Bengal Nagpur Railway was solely responsible and the suit as against the East Indian Railway was dismissed. If the suit could be regarded as a suit against two entities that would be so. But if it is to be regarded, as I think it might well be regarded, as a suit against one entity, there was no dismissal of the suit in part at all. If the suit could be regarded as a suit against two entities that would be so. But if it is to be regarded, as I think it might well be regarded, as a suit against one entity, there was no dismissal of the suit in part at all. However, the argument was that as the suit was dismissed against the East Indian Railway, which was the defendant that carried on business within the local limits of the Court, then the Court could have no jurisdiction to make any decree against the other railway, namely, the Bengal Nagpur Railway which carried on its business outside the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. 11. The question of jurisdiction must be decided upon the allegations in the pleadings and it must be decided, before the case begins, whether or not there is jurisdiction. If on the face of the pleadings the Court has jurisdiction, it matters not that later the suit as against the person who carried on business or resided within the jurisdiction is dismissed. If the suit is to be regarded as a suit against the two defendants, the Court clearly had jurisdiction upon the allegations alleged in the pleadings. 12. A single Judge decision of this Court, namely Dominion of India Vs. Gopal Chandra Tapadar and Others , has been cited to us. In that case a number of bags of cement were consigned from a station on the East Indian Railway for delivery to the plaintiff at a station on the Bengal Assam Railway. The goods had to be carried not only on the East Indian Railway, but also on the Oudh & Tirhut Railway, then known as the Bengal and North Western Railway, before they reached the Bengal Assam Railway. It seems that when these goods reached Mahadepur Ghat on the Oudh and Tirhut Railway, they were lost and a suit was brought in the Small Cause Court, Calcutta, against the East Indian Railway administration, the Oudh and Tirhut Railway and the Bengal Assam Railway. 13. A point was taken as to whether the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction, to decree the suit against the Oudh and Tirhut Railway. 13. A point was taken as to whether the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction, to decree the suit against the Oudh and Tirhut Railway. It seems to have been conceded by learned advocate on behalf of the railways that the Court had jurisdiction with regard to the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Assam Railway as both those railways, it was said, carried on their business within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court. On the other hand, it was clear that the headquarters of the Oudh and Tirhut Railway were not within the local limits of the jurisdiction. Lodge J. who decided the case held that the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction to make a decree against the Oudh and Tirhut Railway, because the case did not fall within the provisions of S. 18, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The learned Judge appears to have thought that the appropriate paragraph of that section was para. (c), but in his view that paragraph did not give the Court jurisdiction because it was clear that the Oudh and Tirhut Railway had not acquiesced in the institution of the suit, Clearly, they had not acquiesced because they had taken the point of jurisdiction. There is nothing in the judgment of Lodge J. to suggest that leave of the Court had been obtained to bring the suit, and that being so, it might be said that S. 18(c) did not apply. 14. This case before Lodge J. of course proceeds on the assumption that these three railways which are now owned by the Dominion of India were three separate entities. But it may be said that they are now merely three pieces of property owned by one owner, the Dominion of India. The Dominion in that case might have been sued and if the requisite notices were served at the head offices of either the East India Railway or the Bengal Assam Railway, it might be said that the case fell within S. 18(a) and no question of jurisdiction would have arisen. 15. For the reasons which I have given I am satisfied that the decision of the Full Bench of the Presidency Small Cause Court was right, though I uphold the decision for somewhat different reasons from those stated in the judgment of the Full Bench. 16. 15. For the reasons which I have given I am satisfied that the decision of the Full Bench of the Presidency Small Cause Court was right, though I uphold the decision for somewhat different reasons from those stated in the judgment of the Full Bench. 16. The Rule must therefore be discharged with costs, the hearing fee being assessed at three gold mohurs. Chakravartti, J. 17. I agree.