JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit for contribution. The suit was decreed in part by the learned Subordinate Judge of Birbhum. An appeal was taken to the District Judge and he has passed a decree modifying the (sic) of the trial Court. From this decision (sic) appeals to this Court. There is also (sic) cross-objection by defendants 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) who are the heirs of the original defendant 3, deceased. 2. The facts which need be state (sic) the purposes of this appeal are briefly (sic) plaintiff and defendants 1 to 18 are (sic) patnidars holding their patni under Akshay Kumar Ghose. On the death of Akshay Kumar Ghose, his executors brought a suit for the recovery of patni rent against the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 18, the suit being sent Suit No. 13 of 1937 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Birbhum. The suit was decreed on 18th May 1938, for the sum of Rs. 3771-10-3 including coats with interest at 6 per cent per annum on the decretal amount till realisation. The decree was put into execution in Rent Execution Case No. 36 of 1938 of the Subordinate Judge's Court and the property of the plaintiff was attached. On 1st April 1939, the plaintiff paid Rs. 500 towards the decretal amount and on 12th April 1939 he paid the sum of Rs. 3508-12-9 and thereby satisfied the entire decretal dues. Thereafter the plaintiff filed the present suit on 11th April 1942 claiming contribution against all the defendants according to their shares in the patni. A decree was passed against defendants 3 to 13 but the suit was dismissed in toto as against defendants 1 and 2 on a certain ground with which I shall deal presently. This portion of the decree was upheld by the lower appellate Court. This appeal is directed against that portion of the decree by which the suit has been dismissed against defendants 1 and 2. 3. The cross-objection by the defendants 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) relates to a wrong calculation regarding the amount payable as contribution by the defendants against whom the suit has been decreed. 4. I shall first take up the appeal for consideration. The decisions of the Courts below ace based on the following facts. 3. The cross-objection by the defendants 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) relates to a wrong calculation regarding the amount payable as contribution by the defendants against whom the suit has been decreed. 4. I shall first take up the appeal for consideration. The decisions of the Courts below ace based on the following facts. At the time when execution was levied, the estate of defendants 1 and 2 was vested in the Court of Wards. The Courts held that having regard to the provisions of S. 10C, Court of Wards Act, the decree was not executable against defendants 1 and 2 and therefore they were not liable to contribute. The main question for decision is whether this view of the Court's below is in accordance with law. 5. The learned advocate for the appellant, Mr. Lala Hemanta Kumar, contends that the relief claimed by the plaintiff against defendants 1 and 2 cannot be refused on this ground and he relies on certain equitable principles and on certain sections of the Contract Act. He has also referred to the case of S.P. Abraham Servai v. Raphial Muthirian; AIR 1915 Mad. 675 : (39 Mad. 288) and to the case of Bejoy Kumar Sen and Another Vs. Kusum Kumari Debi and Others, AIR 1929 Cal 315 . His argument put shortly is this: Even if defendants 1 and 2 were not liable by reason of S.10C, Court of Wards Act, to pay the landlords in execution of the decree passed against them, that does not absolve them from their liability to pay their co-sharer, the plaintiff, contribution to the extent of their share in respect of the amount which the plaintiff has paid in excess of his share of the dues. He contends that the liability to pay the landlord and the liability to contribute among cosharer tenants are two distinct liabilities and a co-sharer tenant cannot claim exemption from contribution because his liability to pay the landlord has ceased. 6. On behalf of defendants 1 and 2, it was argued that as these defendants were not liable to pay the decretal amount by reason of the operation of S. 10C, Court of Wards Act, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has paid anything on their behalf and therefore they should not be held liable to contribute. 7. I have no hesitation in holding that the contentions urged by Mr. 7. I have no hesitation in holding that the contentions urged by Mr. Lala Hemanta Kumar on behalf of the appellant are the correct' ones. I would first point out that the Courts below were wrong in saying that the decree was not executable against defendants 1 and 2. All that S. 10C, Court of Wards Act, says is that the Civil Court shall not execute any decree on order passed against a ward of Court within four years from the date of the commencement of the Bengal Court of Wards Amendment Act 1935, or from the date of the assumption of charge of, the property by the Court of Wards, whichever is later, and for seven years thereafter if the interest due, under such decree or order be paid in full every year during the said seven years. It is therefore wrong to say that the decree is not executable against the defendants 1 and 2 All that S. 10C Court of Wards Act, does is to postpone the execution of the decree for four years from the date of assumption of the property of a ward by the Court of Wards and for a further period of seven years if interest on the decree is paid in full every year, I merely wish to point out that the Courts below have wrongly construed S. 10C, Court of Wards Act. The error however does not affect the question involved because I am of opinion that even if the decree be not executable at all against defendants 1 and 2, that would not necessarily absolve them from the liability to contribution. 8. The position of joint promisors as regards contribution, inter se, has been very lucidly explained by Tyabji J., in the case of S.P. Abraham Servai Vs. Raphial Muthirian, AIR 1915 Mad 675 . He refers to the provisions of Ss. 42, 43 and 44, Contract Act, and demonstrates how these sections would operate. I endeavour to reproduce his views below: As between joint promisors and the promisee all the joint promisors are liable to fulfil the promise. This is laid down in S. 42, Contract Act. The promisee may compel any one or more of the joint promisors to perform the whole promise. This is provided for by the first portion of S. 43, Contract Act. This is laid down in S. 42, Contract Act. The promisee may compel any one or more of the joint promisors to perform the whole promise. This is provided for by the first portion of S. 43, Contract Act. The second paragraph of the section says that if one of the promisors is made to perform the entire promise he may compel every other joint promisor to contribute equally with himself to the performance of that promise unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. Section 44, Contract Act, says that where two or more persons have made a joint promise, a release of one of such joint promisors by the promisee does not discharge the other joint promisor or joint promisors; neither does it free the joint promisor so released from liability to contribution to the other joint promisor, or joint promisors. Therefore, even if a joint promisor is no longer liable to pay any amount to the promisee which all the joint promisors had agreed to pay by reason of a release by the promisee, it does not discharge him from contribution; he will still be liable to pay his share of the amount to the other joint promisor or promisors who have paid on his behalf. It is clear from these sections, that where there are joint promisors there is an implied contract amongst them, inter se, to contribute equally towards the performance of the joint promise. That implied contract of contribution is independent of the contract as between the joint promisors and the promisee. The promisee cannot in any way absolve a joint promisor from his liability to contribution so far as his other joint promisors are concerned who may have performed the promise. This was the view expressed by Tyabji J., and I would say with great respect that this is the correct view of the law. To hold otherwise would be illogical and lead to the most inequitable results. The promisee is no party to the implied contract regarding contribution which is a contract, inter se, between the joint promisors and it would be illogical to allow anything which he may do to affect the respective liabilities of the joint promisors inter se. Again, the promisee in collusion with a joint promisor may allow the latter's liability to him to become barred by limitation or otherwise. Again, the promisee in collusion with a joint promisor may allow the latter's liability to him to become barred by limitation or otherwise. If this fact is allowed to disturb the contract, inter se, among the joint promisors it would result in increasing the burden on the other joint promisors. This would be against all principles of equity. 9. Learned advocate for the appellant nest referred to the case of Bejoy Kumar Sen and Another Vs. Kusum Kumari Debi and Others, AIR 1929 Cal 315 where Suhrawardy and Garlick JJ. took a similar view which they have based on principles of equity. At page 223 their Lordships say: Now the claim for contribution is based on principles of equity and the Court must take an equitable view in the circumstances of each case and decide according to principles of equity and adjust the rights of the parties in accordance with rules consistent with justice, equity and good conscience. The right to contribution though an equitable right arises out of an implied contract of indemnity between the parties liable for the same debt.....But this tight is not confined to Rs. 69 and 70, Contract Act, but may be based upon other equitable considerations and these considerations are available as much to the plaintiff as to the defendants. 10. I would point out that in the case of S.P. Abraham Servai Vs. Raphial Muthirian, AIR 1915 Mad 675 there were two joint promisors. The claim against one joint promisor was barred by limitation, and the other joint promisor was made to pay the entire decretal amount. He sued for contribution and as I have stated before it was held, in spite of the fact that the defendant in the contribution suit was not liable to pay the promisee anything by reason of the claim against him having become barred by limitation, that he was liable to pay contribution to his joint promisor. 11. In the present case, the other joint promisors, defendants 1 and 2, were not absolved from payment of their dues to the landlord. The execution of the decree against them was merely postponed. The plaintiff in this suit however cannot wait till the time when the decree becomes executable against defendants 1 and 2 because if he does so, his suit for contribution will become hopelessly barred by limitation. The execution of the decree against them was merely postponed. The plaintiff in this suit however cannot wait till the time when the decree becomes executable against defendants 1 and 2 because if he does so, his suit for contribution will become hopelessly barred by limitation. Having regard to the principles laid down in the Contract Act and in the two cases mentioned above I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to get contribution from defendants 1 and 2. I bold that the suit against them has been wrongly dismissed. 12. Now the amount for which the plaintiff was liable is admittedly Rs. 1661-7-0 The plaintiff is therefore entitled to be reimbursed for the amount which he has paid in excess of this sum, that is to say, for the amount of Rs. 2347-5-9 (Rs. 4008-12-9 minus Rs. 1661-7-0). All the defendants are liable to contribute towards this sum in proportion to the shares which they held in the tenancy. 13. I now turn to the cross-objection. It is said that the calculation in the decree is wrong and not in accordance with the judgment. It appears that this is so. It is unnecessary to point out in which particular detail the calculation is wrong because the whole amount will now have to be re-calculated on the fresh basis indicated above, Defendants 1 and 2 have paid Rs. 187-8-0 before suit and defendants 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) have paid Rs. 360-14-0. The liability of the defendants inter se will be calculated after taking these payments into account, but I wish to make it quite clear that all the defendants will have to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 2347-5-9 and there will be no deduction from this amount payable to the plaintiff. This case shall be sent down to the District Judge for making the calculation of the amounts payable by each contribution to the plaintiff. 14. The appeal is allowed with costs against defendants 1 and 2. The cross-objection is allowed but there will be no order as to costs in the cross-objection. 15. Leave to appeal under Cl. 15, Letters Patent, is prayed for by the learned advocate for respondents 1 and 2 and is refused.