Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. The question in issue in this appeal is whether the order of the Commissioner of Muzaffarpur evicting the appellant from occupation of a house is beyond jurisdiction and ultra vires. The plaintiff alleged that he had taken lease of the house from the defendants on a rent of Rs. 18/- per month. In the year 1942-43, a portion of the house was acquired by the Government and demolished for a road widening scheme. The plaintiff advanced a sum of Rs. 1,500.00 to the defendants who agreed to make some additional construction. The plaintiff agreed to pay rent at Rs. 65/- per month. A sum of Rs. 40/-per month was to be deducted monthly so that the loan would be liquidated in December, 1946. A written statement to this effect was signed by both the parties. The plaintiff asserted that as the defendants did not complete the house, he was not liable to pay enhanced rent of Rs. 65/- per month. The plaintiff sent a registered notice to the defendants, who thereupon applied to the Controller for eviction of the plaintiff from the house. The Controller, by his order dated the 26th August 1947, ordered that the plaintiff should be evicted. The plaintiff appealed before the Commissioner who affirmed the order of eviction. 2. Both the Munsiff and the Subordinate Judge have held that the Commissioners order was not ultra vires, and cannot be challenged in this collateral proceeding. 3. The plaintiff has preferred this appeal. On his behalf, learned Advocate presented two arguments. In the first place, learned Advocate pointed out that, in their application the respondents asked for eviction on the grounds (1) that the plaintiff had failed to pay arrears of rent, and (2) that the house was required for their personal use. The Controller held that the respondents failed to establish ground No. 2; but, since the plaintiff had failed to pay the arrears of rent, the Controller ordered that he should be evicted. In appeal, the Commissioner held that there was no proof that the plaintiff failed to pay the arrears of rent. The Commissioner, however, decided that the plaintiff was a tenant for a term, and that he should be evicted because the term of the lease had expired. In appeal, the Commissioner held that there was no proof that the plaintiff failed to pay the arrears of rent. The Commissioner, however, decided that the plaintiff was a tenant for a term, and that he should be evicted because the term of the lease had expired. It was contended for the appellant that the Commissioner was erroneous to hold that the plaintiff was a tenant for a specific period; and that he was liable to eviction on the expiry of the lease under Sec.11 (1) (b) of Act III of 1947. Assuming that this argument is correct and the Commissioner committed a mistake of law, it cannot still be contended that the Commissioner acted without jurisdiction in ordering eviction of the plaintiff. In my opinion, the Commissioner had jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiff was a month to month tenant or if he was a tenant for a term. If he decided the question wrongly against the plaintiff, that was not a matter affecting his jurisdiction. In examining this question, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between an absolute want of jurisdiction and an irregular assumption of jurisdiction. By jurisdiction is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. As pointed out by West, J., in AMRITRAV KRISHNA V/s. BALKRISHNA GANESH, 11 Bom 488: "Jurisdiction consists in taking cognizance of a case involving the determination of some jural relation, in ascertaining the essential points of it, and in pronouncing upon them." Objections affecting jurisdiction must relate either to the person, the place or the character of the suit. If a Court has competence in these respects, it may exercise jurisdiction and does exercise it whether correctly or erroneously in dealing judicially with a cause placed before it. In MALKARIJUN V/s. NARHARI, 27 Ind App 216 (PC), it was held that an execution sale could not be treated as nullity if the Court which sold has jurisdiction to do so, even though it erroneously decided that a person who in fact did not represent the estate of the deceased judgment-debtor was such a representative. Lord Hobhouse observed: "He contended that he was not the right person, but the Court, having received his protest, decided that he was the right person, and so proceeded with the execution. Lord Hobhouse observed: "He contended that he was not the right person, but the Court, having received his protest, decided that he was the right person, and so proceeded with the execution. In so doing the Court was exercising its jurisdiction. It made a sad mistake, it is true; but a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right." In my opinion the Commissioner had jurisdiction in the present case to decide whether the plaintiff was a tenant from month to month or only a tenant for a prescribed term. 4 In the second place, learned Advocate pointed out that, even if the plaintiff was a tenant for a term, the defendants were not entitled to apply for eviction before the expiry of the lease. Sec.11 (3) (a) of Act III of 1947 reads: "A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of a building if he requires it reasonably and in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by him: Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under this Sub-section before the expiry of such period." In the present case the respondents admittedly applied for eviction before the expiry of the period of the lease. But the order of the Commissioner cannot be held ultra vires for this reason. For it is well established that violation of an imperative provision of a statute does not necessarily affect the jurisdiction of a Court. Where an enabling statute prescribes the way in which something is to be done, the enactment may be absolute or directory. If an absolute enactment is neglected or contravened, a Court of law will treat the thing which is being done as altogether void, but if an enactment is merely directory, it is immaterial so far as it relates to the validity of thing which is being done, whether it is complied with or not. If an absolute enactment is neglected or contravened, a Court of law will treat the thing which is being done as altogether void, but if an enactment is merely directory, it is immaterial so far as it relates to the validity of thing which is being done, whether it is complied with or not. For "there is a known distinction" as Lord Mansfield said in REX V/s. LOXDALE, (1758) 1 Burr 445, between circumstances which are of the essence of a thing required to be done by an Act of Parliament, and clauses merely directory." In the present case the proviso to Sec.11 (3) (a), that the landlord "shall not be entitled to apply before the expiry of such period", though expressed as a command, should be considered as a mere direction or instruction involving no invalidating consequence in its disregard. Moreover, there is another important reason. The Act purports to regulate the letting of buildings and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. Now, if the object of a statute is not one of general policy or if the thing which is being done will benefit only a particular class of persons, then the conditions prescribed by the statute are not considered as being indispensable. In WILSON V/s. McINTOSH, (1894) A C 129, an application was made to bring lands under Real Property Act (26 Vict. No. 9), of New South Wales. A caveat was lodged under Sec.23, and more than three months thereafter the applicant lodged his case under Sec.21, and obtained an order that the caveator should file his case. The Judicial Committee said: "Their Lordships are of opinion that the maxim Quilibet protest renunciare juri pro se introducto applies to this case, that it was competent for the applicant to waive the limit of the three months and the lapse of the cavcat by Sec.23." In the present case I consider that the statutory provision (that is the proviso to Sec.11 (3) (a)) was inserted by the legislature simply for the security or benefit of the tenants, that the provision is not indispensable and the party concerned may waive the condition without affecting the jurisdiction of the Court. 5. 5. In the Full Bench decision, RAM RANBI-JAYA PRASAD SINGH V/s. RAM KAWAL UPADHYA, AIR (36) 1949 Pat 139, the Revenue Officer admittedly violated Section 113 of the Bihar Tenancy Act when he granted a second reduction of rent within the prescribed period of fifteen years. Even so, the Full Bench held that that Revenue Officers order cannot be impeached as being ultra vires. 6. The principle has been emphatically stated by Greer, L.J., in R. V/s. MINISTER OF HEALTH, EX PARTE GLAMORGAN COUNTY MENTAL HOSPITAL, (1938) 4 All E R 32 at p. 36: "Where the proceedings are regular upon their face, and the Magistrate had jurisdiction, the superior Court will not grant the writ of certiorari on the ground that the Court below has misconceived a "point of law. When the Court below has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be deemed to exceed or abuse its jurisdiction, merely because it incidentally misconstrues a statute, or admits illegal evidence or rejects legal evidence, or misdirects itself as to the weight of the evidence, or convicts without evidence." 7. In the present case, I hold that the Revenue Commissioner did not act without jurisdiction merely because he failed to comply with the proviso to Sec.11 (3) (a) of the Act. 8. In my opinion, this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Sinha, J. 9 I agree.