JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J 1. This Rule was issued at the instance of a person, who may be described accurately enough as a second transferee of an occupancy holding. It appears that a lady named Menaka Bala Dasi had a one-third share in a certain occupancy holding and on August 13, 1946, she sold her share to one Nirapada Dolui for a consideration of Rs. 500. It is said that prior to the sale or at the time of the sale there was an agreement that if the lady paid back the amount of the consideration together with interest at 8 per cent. per annum within a certain period of time, the purchaser would be bound to recovery the property to her. This agreement which was oral at the beginning is said to have been reduced to writing on September 23, 1946. It appears that the lady did pay back the money and Nirapada executed a reconveyance on October 17. Menaka Bala Dasi entered into an agreement for sale with the Petitioner with respect to the very property--the agreement being that she would sell her share to the Petitioner for Rs. 900. The actual sale took place on October 23 following. 2. The present application for pre-emption was made on November 8, 1946, and the applicant for pre-emption sought to preempt not the second sale to the Petitioner, nor the reconveyance to Menaka Bala Dasi, but the original sale by Menaka Bala Dasi to Nirapada Dolui. The application was resisted on two grounds. It was urged in the first instance that the transaction between Menaka Bala Dasi and Nirapada Dolui was not a sale at all, but a mere mortgage by conditional sale. It was urged in the second place that in any event, there was no absolute sale in favour of Nirapada Dolui, but a sale burdened with an agreement to reconvey, and that in view of that limitation on the sale sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act could not be applicable. 3. Both the Courts below have overruled these contentions and Mr. Lahiri who appears on behalf of the Petitioner did not press the first objection further. What he argued was that a sale contemplated by sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act could not be applicable. 3. Both the Courts below have overruled these contentions and Mr. Lahiri who appears on behalf of the Petitioner did not press the first objection further. What he argued was that a sale contemplated by sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act was an absolute sale and that a sale like the one in the present case, where the vendor retained a right to obtain a reconveyance of the property was not an absolute sale as contemplated by sec. 26F. 4. I am unable to accept this contention as correct, but it appears to me that there is a further difficulty in Mr. Lahiri's way. As I have said already, a document was brought into existence on September 23, 1946, and it recites that prior to the sale or at the time of the sale to Nirapada Dolui, there was an oral agreement for a reconveyance. The document, however, goes on to incorporate a promise then made by Nirapada Dolui, to reconvey the property within a certain period of time. It appears to me that assuming there was an oral agreement before the sale, the parties were no longer relying on the same, because they were not merely making a note of that agreement in the shape of a memorandum. What they were doing was that they were entering into a fresh agreement by the document executed on September 23, 1946. If that was the character of the document, it seems to me that inasmuch as the rights created by a registered instrument, namely, the deed of sale in favour of Nirapada Dolui and were sought to be affected by the agreement executed on September, 23, the said agreement was compulsorily registrable. Mr. Lahiri said that he could still rely upon the oral agreement. He perhaps could have, if the agreement of September 23 was not in existence. As I have said, that document seems to supersede any oral agreement that may previously have been entered into, but in any event the written agreement cannot be used in evidence of the alleged prior oral agreement. 5. I may, however, proceed on the basis that the sale effected on August 13, 1946, was accompanied by a condition that the purchaser would be bound to reconvey the property, if the consideration was offered back to him within a certain period of time. 5. I may, however, proceed on the basis that the sale effected on August 13, 1946, was accompanied by a condition that the purchaser would be bound to reconvey the property, if the consideration was offered back to him within a certain period of time. I cannot say that such a condition can operate to exclude the application of sec. 26F. If it could, then the position would be that a party could at his will suspend the operation of a statute. I cannot agree with Mr. Lahiri that after the sale effected on August 13 any rights to the property remained in Menaka Bala Dasi. What remained in her was merely a right to obtain a reconveyance, or in other words, the rights under a contract for sale. Those rights were very different from rights in the property. The rights in the property passed absolutely to Nirapada Dolui, and as would appear from the agreement itself they required to be reconveyed. The agreement was an agreement for sale, that is to say, Nirapada Dolui would have to resell the property and that quite plainly implies that the title had passed to Nirapada Dolui and no part of it was remaining in Menaka Bala Dasi. 6. In view of the above position in law, which I conceive is the true position, the Courts below were right in holding that Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to apply under sec. 26F for preemption in respect of the sale by Menaka Bala Dasi to Nirapada Dolui on August 13, 1946. The Rule is accordingly discharged with costs--the hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.