Judgments The Chief Justice.-I have read the judgment prepared by Sastri, J., for the Court. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the judgment and have nothing to add. Patanjali Sastri, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree dated 1st August, 1946, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna varying the judgment and decree of the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Palamau which had allowed in part the respondent’s claim on foot of a promissory note. The respondent is a money-lender and trader, and it is not disputed that in the course of such business he was advancing loans and supplying sundry articles from time to time to the appellant. This case is not concerned with transactions that took place before 1929. It is the respondent’s case that in respect of moneys advanced and goods supplied in and after 1929 there was a settlement of account as a result of which a sum of Rs.49,747-12-0 was found due from the appellant and accordingly he passed in favour of the respondent a promissory note for that sum on 8th September, 1932, agreeing to pay simple interest at 9 per cent. per annum. The amount was made up of Rs.23,321-7-0 being advances in cash, Rs.15,294-3-3 being the price of articles supplied and Rs.12,132-1-9 being compound interest due at 12 per cent. per annum on the above two sums for the period prior to the note. This note was renewed on 6th August, 1935, for a sum of Rs.61,662-6-0 which included a sum of Rs.13,805 as interest due under the earlier note. The new note on which the suit was based carried simple interest at 9 per cent. per annum. In the suit brought in 1941 the respondent claimed a sum of Rs.93,707-14-0 as the balance of principal and interest due on the note. The appellant raised various pleas in defence to the suit such as undue influence, misrepresentation, etc., but they were all rejected in both the Courts below, and those findings were not seriously challenged before us. The appellant also claimed relief under the Usurious Loans Act (No.X of 1918) and the Bihar Money-lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Bihar Act) and the only points pressed in this appeal relate to these claims. The appellant also claimed relief under the Usurious Loans Act (No.X of 1918) and the Bihar Money-lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Bihar Act) and the only points pressed in this appeal relate to these claims. In order to be entitled to the benefit of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, the appellant must establish (1) that the interest payable on the loan is excessive and (2) that the transaction was as between the parties thereto, substantially unfair. It was frankly admitted before us that the appellant adduced no evidence as to the circumstances under which he borrowed moneys from the respondent, the availability of credit facilities and possibility of borrowing on easier terms in that part of the country where the transactions took place. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, worked out the average rate of interest on the various transactions on the basis of simple interest and, finding that it was over 13 per cent. per annum, held that the interest charged was “exorbitant and excessive.” He was of opinion that 6 per cent. per annum was a reasonable and just rate having regard to the fact that the appellant was the “premier zamindar” of the place and had no other debts to pay. The High Court, on the other hand, was of opinion that no ground was made out for holding that the rate of interest charged was in excess of “the commercial rate prevailing at the time.” The term “commercial” used in such context by the Privy Council has been explained by Their Lordships in Sunder Mull v. Satya Kinker Sahana1 (to which reference was made in the judgment of the High Court) as meaning, in the case of non-mercantile transactions, “such terms as can be arranged freely between borrower and lender under the circumstances of the particular case,” and it is presumably in this sense, that the High Court has used the expression. If so, their finding is not open to criticism, as the appellant as already stated had adduced no evidence to show that more advantageous terms were available at the time and in the place where the transactions in question took place. The High Court was accordingly of opinion that the rates of interest actually charged, namely, 12 per cent. compound between 1929 and 1932, and 19 per cent. simple under the bonds of 1932 and 1935 were reasonable. The High Court was accordingly of opinion that the rates of interest actually charged, namely, 12 per cent. compound between 1929 and 1932, and 19 per cent. simple under the bonds of 1932 and 1935 were reasonable. On such a subject, the learned Judges had the advantage of better local knowledge and experience and we see no grounds to interfere with their finding. As regards the question whether the transaction was substantially unfair, the trial Court found that the respondent took advantage of “the goodness or weakness” of the appellant in that he did not allow any commission to the latter on a motor car purchased by him through the respondent. The learned Judge also found that a sum of Rs.15 was unjustifiably charged to the appellant as travelling expenses incurred by the respondent in going to the appellant’s place to receive a part-payment. On these grounds the learned Judge held that the transaction was unfair. The High Court held that these two circumstances afforded no ground for holding that the transaction as a whole was substantially unfair as between the parties, and we entirely agree with that view. The allowance of a commission on the purchase of a motor car is a matter of bargain between the dealer and the purchaser, and its non-allowance cannot be regarded as necessarily inconsistent with fair dealing. The charge of a small sum as travelling expenses of the respondent, even if it was not strictly justifiable in the circumstances, was too trivial a fault to vitiate the fair character of a transaction which covered numerous dealings extending over a number of years and involving large sums. The appellant has thus failed to satisfy either of the conditions necessary for granting relief under the Usurious Loans Act, 1918. Turning next to the appellant’s claim to the benefit of the Bihar Act, the learned Subordinate Judge disallowed the claim following certain decisions of the High Court of Patna, which were binding on him, to the effect that the Act had no application to a suit based on a hand note. At the hearing of the appeal, however, it was conceded on behalf of the present respondent that by reason of Ordinance XI of 1945 the Act had become applicable to the case and the learned Judges accordingly considered the appellant’s claim under the provisions of that Act. At the hearing of the appeal, however, it was conceded on behalf of the present respondent that by reason of Ordinance XI of 1945 the Act had become applicable to the case and the learned Judges accordingly considered the appellant’s claim under the provisions of that Act. They held that section 6 which provides that an agreement for the payment of compound interest on loans advanced after the commencement of that Act shall be void, had obviously no application to this case which was concerned only with loans advanced before the commencement of the Act. This was not disputed before us. Similarly section 7 was found to be of no assistance to the appellant. The learned Judges held that the concluding words of that section, namely: “If the loan is based on a document, the amount of loan mentioned in, or evidenced by such document” referred not to any earlier document between the parties but to the document upon which the suit was brought and that, as the interest claimed by the respondentwas less than the amount mentioned in the promissory note of 1935 on which the suit was brought, there was no room here for the application of that section. They relied on certain previous rulings of their own Court including Deo Nandan Prasad v. Ram Prasad1 and the decision of this Court in Jaigobind Singh v. Lachmi Narain Ram2, in support of their view of the construction of section 7. While the decisions in Patna undoubtedly support that view, we are unable to find any clear pronouncement by this Court on the point in Jaigobind Singh v. Lachmi Narain Ram2. In that case the parties settled accounts in respect of a pre-existing liability and agreed that part of the money borrowed from the same lender under a later mortgage should be applied in discharge of the pre-existing liability, though cash did not actually pass between the parties by way of advance and repayment. Varadachariar, J., held that the mortgage should, in such circumstances, be regarded as a loan by itself for the purposes of section 7. Varadachariar, J., held that the mortgage should, in such circumstances, be regarded as a loan by itself for the purposes of section 7. The learned Judge, however, left open the question as to how ordinary cases of renewals should be dealt with under section 7 having regard to the definition of a “loan” in section 2(f) which includes “a transaction on a bond executed in respect of a past liability.” Sulaiman, J., did not express any definite view on the point. We consider it unnecessary to express a concluded opinion on the construction of this section, for, even if the first promissory note of 1932 were to be regarded as the loan to which the provisions of the section have to be applied, it would not assist the appellant as the interest claimed by the respondent would still fall below the amount mentioned in the document. Lastly, the appellant relied on section 8 of the Act and claimed that the entire transaction should be re-opened since 1929 and an account taken between the parties calculating simple interest at 12 per cent. per annum on the principal sums advanced, so as to relieve the appellant of any liability for interest in excess of that statutory rate. The learned Judges rejected the claim holding that the section was not mandatory but discretionary, and that there were no circumstances in the case calling for the exercise of their powers under the section in favour of the appellant. They observed further that, even if an account were taken as claimed by the appellant, the resulting reduction of interest would be so insignificant as to make it inadvisable to reopen the whole transaction. The learned Judge’s view on the construction of section 8 is in accord with the decision of this Court in Jaigobind Singh v. Lachmi Narain Ram1, where it was further held that this Court would not interfere with the exercise of its discretion by the High Court under section 8 unless it appeared that that Court: “did not apply its mind at all to the question before it or acted capriciously or in disregard of some legal principle or was influenced by some extraneous considerations wrong in law.” No such grounds have been suggested in the present case by the appellant’s learned counsel, and accordingly we must decline to interfere. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.